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MODERN ATHEISM 


UNDER ITS FORMS OF 


PANTHEISM, MATERIALISM, SECULARISM, 
DEVELOPMENT, AND NATURAL LAWS. 


BY 


JAMES BUCHANAN, D.D., LL.D., 


DIVINITY PROFESSOR IN ‘“‘THE NEW COLLEGE,’’ EDINBURGH, AND AUTHOR 
OF “THE OFFICE AND WORK OF THE HOLY SPIRIT,” ETC. 


BOSTON: 
Core Lap 2 hop rE eNO OL N, 


59 WASHINGTON STREET. 
NEW YORK: SHELDON, BLAKEMAN & CO., 
CINCINNATI: GEORGE S. BLANCHARD. 


1857. 


Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1856, by 
GOULD AND LINCOLN, 


In the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts. 


Electro-Stereotyped by 
G.J.STILES & COMPANY, 
23 Congress Street, Boston. 


PREFATORY NOTE. 


Tax contents of this volume originally constituted about one half 
of a work, entitled “ Faith in God and Modern Atheism compared, 
in their Essential Nature, Theoretic Grounds, and Practical Influ- 
ence.” Simultaneously with the first issue of that work in Scotland, 
the five principal chapters in this volume were published separately, 
accompanied with the announcement that each was complete in itself. 
The hint thus given by the author, has been acted upon by the 
present publishers. On examining the whole work, it was found to 
be divided into four Sections. Of these, the third was devoted 
exclusively to “Modern Atheism.” It embraced the five chapters 
already alluded to, together with a general introduction and four 
shorter chapters. It appeared, in fact, to be a complete treatise by 
itself; and it is now presented to the American public in the convic- 
tion that such a work is peculiarly demanded by the present state of 
religious opinion in this country. 

The author is one of the most distinguished divines of the Free 
Church of Scotland. In 1845, he was appointed Professor of 
Apologetic Theology in the New College, Edinburgli; and, on the 
death of Dr. Chalmers, in 1847, he was translated to the Chair of 
Systematic Theology thus made vacant. In the former position, it 
became his duty to prepare a complete course of Lectures on Natural 
Religion. His work on “ Faith in God,” &c., contains, in an altered 
form, adapted to general readers, the substance of those Lectures. 

Respecting this work, the British press generally has spoken in 
the highest terms. The distinguished geologist, Hugh Miller, says, 
in the Edinburgh Witness: “It is one of, at once, the most readable 


IV PREFATORY NOTE. 


and solid which we have ever perused;” and the News of the 
Churches, the organ of the Free Church, describes it as “a work of 
which nothing less can be said than that, both in spirit and sub- 
stance, style and argument, it fixes irreversibly the name of its 
author as a leading classic in the Christian literature of Britain.” 
An American critic says: “ His succinct analyses of the doctrines 
held by the various schools of modern atheism are admirable, and 
his criticisms on their doctrines original and profound; while his 
arguments in defence of the Christian faith against philosophical 
objectors are unsurpassed by those of any modern writer. Clear, 
vigorous, logical, learned, and strong as a Titan, he fairly vanquishes 
all antagonists by pure mental superiority; never understating their 
views or evading their arguments, but meeting them in all their 
force and crushing them.” Another critic says: “It is a great argu- 
ment for Theism and against Atheism, magnificent in its strength, 
order, and beauty. .... The style is lucid, grave, harmonious, and 
every way commensurate with the dignity and importance of the 
subject. . . . . The chapter on Pantheism is admirable. Regarding 
it as ‘the most formidable rival of Christian Theism at the present 
day,’ Dr. Buchanan seems to have specially addressed himself to the 
_ task of exposing and refuting this error. His statement of Spinoza’s 
system is beautifully clear.” 

The reader will find that there is no exaggeration in these enco- 
miums. Hugh Miller, always felicitous in his choice of words, has 
exactly described the two leading characteristics of “Modern 
Atheism,” by the phrase “readable and solid.” Every one who 
begins the book will find himself drawn strongly onward to the 
end; and no one can rise from its perusal without a conviction that 
it contains a weight of argument against all the forms of Atheism 
such as never before has been combined in one book. 

Should the reception of this volume by the public furnish suffi- 
cient encouragement, it is the intention of the publishers to issue the 
remainder of the work (“Faith in God,” &c.), in uniform style. 


Boston, December, 1856. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

ESERODUCTIONS) ge) cm sath eevee Beinn anne 
CHAPTER’ L. 

MODERN -ATHBIOM 1% Fl VER cua ye ee eee 
CHAPTER II. 

THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT, ..... . . .465 


SECTION I. 


THEORY OF COSMICAL DEVELOPMENT,—‘“THE VESTIGES,” . 47 


VI : CONTENTS. 


SECTION II. 


— PHYSIO-PHILOSOPHY, 


_ 


SECTION III. 


THEORY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT,— AUGUSTE COMTE, 


SECTION IV. 


PAGE 
THEORY OF PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT, —“ TELLIAMED,” 
3 On 


THEORY OF ECCLESIASTICAL DEVELOPMENT,— J. H. NEWMAN, 116 


CHAPTER. IIT. 


THEORIES OF PANTHEISM,. . . 


SECTION I. 


THE SYSTEM OF SPINOZA, 


pECLlON. TT 


MATERIAL PANTHEISM, 


SECTION III. 


IDEAL PANTHEISM, . 


129 


- 142 


. 161 


+ 467 


CONTENTS. Vil 


CHAT rice EV. 


PAGE 


THEORIES OF MATERIALISM,. . - + + «+ «+ 189 
SECTION I. 
DISTINCT FORMS OF MATERIALISM, . - - + - + + 1% 


SECTION Il. 


PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM, -. - + © © 8 «+ 207 


SECTION III. 


RELATIONS OF MATERIALISM TO THEOLOGY,. - - «+ : 236 


CHAPTER V. 


THEORY OF GOVERNMENT BY NATURAL LAWS, — 
VOLNEY,—COMBE, . . .. . pie a Saha ok atone ees 
SECTION I. 


THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES, . 252 


SECTION II. 


THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN IN ITS RELATION TO THE GOV- 
ERNMENT OF GOD, . ie than’ : : : : wae . 264 


1* 


VIII . CONTENTS. 


SECTION III. 


THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER, 


CHAPTER ‘VI. . 


THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE, . 


CHAPTER VII. 


THEORIES OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM, 


CHAPTER VIII. 


THEORIES OF CERTITUDE AND SKEPTICISM, . 


CHAPTER IX. 


Piao OF SECULARISM,. §. 4° « 48 


PAGE 
. 283 


303 


323 


333 


361 


INTRODUCTION. 


A TREATISE on the Being and Perfections of God, as the 
Creator and Governor of the world, can scarcely be adapted to 
the exigencies of modern society, unless it be framed with 
express reference to the existing forms of unbelief, and the 
prevailing tendencies both of philosophical thought and of 
popular opinion. It is quite possible, indeed, to construct a 
scheme of evidence on this subject out of the ample materials 
which the storehouse of nature affords, without entering into 
any discussion of the questions, whether Physical or Meta- 
physical, which have been raised respecting it. But this 
method, although it might be sufficient for many, perhaps for 
most, of our readers — for all, indeed, who come to the study of 
the subject with reflective but unsophisticated minds — could 
scarcely be expected to meet the case or to satisfy the wants of 
those who stand most in need of instruction; the men, and 
especially the young men, in all educated communities, who, 
imbued with the spirit of philosophical speculation, and 
instructed, more or less fully, in the principles of modern 
science, have been led, under the influence of certain celebrated 
names, to adopt opinions which prevent them from seriously 
considering any theological question, and to regard the whole 
subject of religion with indifference or contempt, as one that 
lies beyond the possible range of science, — the only legitimate 


10 INTRODUCTION. 


domain of human thought. In such cases (and they are neither 
few nor unimportant), it may be useful and even necessary to 
neutralize those adverse presumptions or “prejudicate opin- 
ions,” which prevent them from considering the evidence to 
which Theism appeals, and to review the various theories from 
which they spring, so as to show that they afford no valid 
reason for discarding the subject, and no ground for alleging . 
that it is not fit to goto proof. It is true that we must ulti- 
mately rely, for the establishment of our main positions, on that 
body of natural and historical evidence, which depends little, if 
at all, on any of the Theories of Philosophical Speculation, 
or even on any of the discoveries of Physical Science ; but it 
is equally true that the evidence, however conclusive in itself, 
cannot be expected to produce conviction unless it be candidly 
examined and weighed ; and if there be anything in the exist- 
ing state of public opinion which leads men to regard the whole 
subject with indifference or suspicion, to conceive of it as a 
problem insoluble by the human faculties, and to treat Theology 
as a fond fancy or a waking dream, it were surely well to ex- 
amine the grounds of such opinions, to expose their fallacy so 
as to counteract their influence, and to refute those theories 
which prevent men from judging of the evidence as they would 
on any other topic of Inductive Inquiry. In adopting this 
course, we are only following the footsteps of the profound 
author of the “Analogy,” who finding it, he knew not how, 
“to be taken for granted, by many persons, that Christianity is 
not so much as a subject of inquiry,” set himself, in the first 
instance, to prove “that it is not, however, so clear a case that 
there is nothing in it;” —this preliminary proof being designed 
to neutralize objections, and to disburden the subject of all 
adverse presumptions, so as to be judged on its own proper and 
independent merits. We are imitating, too, the example of 
another sagacious writer on a kindred theme, who thought that 
“ Apologists had paid too little attention to the prejudices of 
/ 


INTRODUCTION. jl 


their opponents, and had been too confident of accomplishing 
their object at once, by an overpowering statement of the direct 
evidence, forgetting that the influence of prejudice renders the 
human mind very nearly inaccessible to both evidence and 
argument.” + 

If this method was ever necessary or expedient, it is pecu- 
liarly so in the present age. Opinions are afloat in society, and 
are even avowed by men of high philosophical repute, which 
formally exclude Theology from the domain of human thought, 
and represent it as utterly inaccessible to the human faculties. 
They amount to a denial, not merely of its truth, but of its very 
possibility. ‘They place it among the dreams of the past — 
with the fables of the Genii, or the follies of Alchemy, or the 
phantoms of Astrology. They intimate, in no ambiguous terms, 
not only that Catholicism is effete, and Christianity itself dead 
or dying, but that Theology of every kind, even the simplest 
and purest form of Theism, must speedily vanish from the 
earth. * Admitting that the religious element was necessarily 
developed in the infancy of the species, and that its influence 
was alike inevitable and salutary during the world’s minority, 
when it was placed provisionally “under tutors and governors,” 
they proclaim that mankind have outgrown the vestments which 
suited them in earlier times, and that now they must “put 
away childish things.” That such sentiments have been pub- 
licly avowed, that they have been proclaimed as the scientific 
results of speculative thought, and that they have been widely 
circulated in the vehicles both of philosophic discussion and of 
popular literature, will be proved by evidence, equally sad and 
_ conclusive, in the succeeding chapters; in the meantime we 
refer to them merely for the purpose of showing that, in so far 
as their influence prevails, they must necessarily tend, unless 


1 BisHor ButiER, “ Analogy,” Preface, p. 11. 
Dr. Ine xis, “ Vindication of the Christian Faith,” p. vr. 


12 INTRODUCTION. 


they be counteracted by some effective antidote, to generate 
such a prejudice against the whole scheme of Theology, whether 
Natural or Revealed, as may be expected, especially in the case 
of young, inexperienced, and ardent minds, to prevent them 
from entertaining the subject at all, or examining, with serious 
_ and candid interest, any kind or amount of evidence that might 
be adduced in regard to it. For this reason, we propose to 
review the various Theories or Systems which may be said _ to 
embody and exhibit these prevailing tendencies, to meet our 
opponents on their own chosen ground, and to subject their 
favorite speculations to a rigorous and sifting scrutiny; and 
this, not for the purpose of proving our fundamental position, 
for that must rest on its proper and independent evidence, but 
simply with the view of neutralizing the adverse presumptions 
which prevent many from considering its claims, and proving 
that it is a subject that demands and deserves their serious and 
sustained attention. 

Taking a comprehensive view of European Science and 
Literature during the last half century, we may discern the 
great currents, or chief tendencies, of speculative thought, in 
so far as it bears on the evidences and doctrines of Religion, in 
several distinct but closely related systems of opinion, which, 
whether considered severally or collectively, must exert, in 
proportion to their prevalence, a powerful influence on the 
side of Atheism. These systems may be divided generally 
into two great classes, according as they relate to the sub- 
stance or to the evidence of Theism, to the truths which it 
involves, or the proofs to which it appeals. The interval 
between the first and second French Revolutions may be 
regarded as the season during which the theories to which we 
refer were progressively developed, and ultimately consoli- 
dated in their existing forms. The germ of each of them may 
have existed before, and traces of them may be detected in the 
literature of the ancient world, and even in the writings of 


INTRODUCTION. 13 


medieval times; nay, it might not be too much to affirm that 
in the systems of Oriental Superstition, and in the Schools of 
Grecian Skepticism, several of them were more fully taught in 
early times than they have yet been in Modern Europe, and 
that the recent attempts to reconstruct and reproduce them in a 
shape adapted to the present stage of civilization, have been 
poor and meagre in comparison with those more ancient efforts 
of unenlightened reason. What modern system of Skepticism 
can rival that of Sextus Empiricus? What code of Pantheism, 
French or German, can be said to equal the mystic dreams of 
the Vedanta School? What godless theory of Natural Law 
can compete with the Epicurean philosophy, as illustrated in 
the poetry of Lucretius? The errors of these ancient systems 
have been revived even amidst the light of the nineteenth cen- 
tury, and prevail to an extent that may seem to justify the 
apprehension, frequently expressed on the Continent of late 
years, of the restoration of a sort of Semi-Paganism in Modern 
Europe ; and it is still necessary, therefore, for the defence of a 
pure Theism, to reéxamine those ancient forms of error which 
have reippeared on the scene after it might have been sup- 
posed that they had vanished for ever. For the very tenacity 
with which they cleave to the humar mind, and their perpetual 
recurrence at intervals along the whole course of the world’s 
history, show that there must be something in the wants, or at 
least in the weaknesses of our nature, which induces men to 
tolerate and even to embrace them. But the chief danger, as 
we conceive, lies in those new, or at least newly organized, 
theories that have only recently received their full development 
in the Inductive and Scientific pursuits which constitute the 
peculiar glory of modern times; and which, commencing with 
the era of Bacon and Descartes, and gradually matured by 
Newton, Leibnitz, and their successors, have at length issued in 
the construction of a solid fabric of Science. To Theism there 


is no danger in Science, in so far as it is true, for all truth is 
2 


: ¢ 
14 INTRODUCTION. =. 


self-consistent and harmonious; but. there may be much danger 
jin the use that is made of it, or in the spirit in which it is 
applied. In the hands of Bacon, and Newton, and Boyle, the 
doctrine of Natural Laws was treated as an ally, not as an 
antagonist, to Theology; in the hands of Comte it becomes a 
plea for Atheism; and even in the hands of Combe an argu- 
ment against a special Providence and the efficacy of prayer. 
Here the danger is the greater just by reason of the acknowl- 
edged truth and practical value of the Inductive Philosophy ; 
for its certainty is so well ascertained, and its manifold uses so 
generally appreciated, that if it shall come to be regarded as 
incompatible with the recognition of God and Religion, Society 
will soon find itself on the verge of universal Atheism. And 
this is the fearful issue to which the more recent schools of 
speculation are manifestly tending. The first French Revo- 
lution was brought about by the labors of men who fought 
against Christianity, at least ostensibly, under the banner of 
Deism or Natural Religion; the second Revolution was con- 
summated under the auspices, not of a Deistic, but of an Athe- 
istic philosophy. The school of Voltaire and Rousseau has 
given place to the school of Comte and Leroux. The differ- 
ence between the two indicates a rapid and alarming advance. 
It may not be apparent at first sight, or on a superficial survey ; 
but it will become evident to any one who compares the two | 
French Encyclopedias, which may be regarded as the 
exponents of the reigning philosophy of the two great revolu- 
tionary eras. The first, the Encyclopedie of D’Alembert, 
Voltaire, and Diderot, sought to malign and extirpate Chris- 
tianity, while it did frequent homage to Natural Theology; the 
second, the “Nouvelle Encyclopedie” of Pierre Leroux and 
his coadjutors, proclaims the deification of Humanity, and the 
dethronement of God! 


Beis ro be 
e 
MODERN ATHEISM. 


‘? 


OHA P.DER: 1, 
GENERAL VIEW OF.ATHEISM. 


Berore entering on a detailed discussion of the theories to 
- which it appeals, it may be useful to offer some general reflec- 
tions on ATHEISM itself, its generic nature and specific varie- 
ties, its causes and springs, whether permanent or occasional, 
and its moral and social influence, as illustrated alike by 
individual experience and by public history. 

By Atheism we mean any system of opinion which leads 
men either to doubt or to deny the Existence, Providence, and 
Government of a living, personal, and holy God, as the Creator 
and Lord of the world. In its practical aspect, it is that state 
of mind which leads them to forget, disown, or disobey Him. 

We are met, however, at the outset, by a previous question, 
Whether Atheism be a real or even a possible thing ? a question 
which was wont to be discussed by divines under the head, an 
dentur Athet ?* and which has recently been revived by the 
strong protestations of some philosophic writers, who deny not 
only the existence, but the very possibility of Atheism. On 
this point the policy which infidels have pursued has been 
widely different at different times. On some occasions, they 
have sought to exaggerate the number of Atheists, claiming as 
their own adherents or allies a large majority of the intellectual 
classes, as well as whole tribes or nations of barbarians, in 


1 Bupp 21, “ Theses Theologice de Atheismo et Superstitione,” cap. r. 


16 -" MODERN ATHEISM. 


order to impress the public mind with the conviction that 
belief in God is neither natural nor universal; at other times, 
they have sought to allay the prejudice which avowed Atheism 
seldom fails to awaken, by disclaiming much that had been 
imputed to them, by professing a sort of mystic reverence for 
the Spirit of Nature, and by denying that their speculations 
involve a disbelief in God. In following these opposite courses 
at different times, they have been actuated by a politic regard 
to the exigencies of their wretched cause, and have alternately 
adopted the one or the other, just as it might seem, in existing 
circumstances, to be more expedient either to brave or to con- 
ciliate public opinion. It is incumbent, therefore, on every 
enlightened advocate of Christian Theism to exercise a prudent 
discretion in the treatment of this topic, and to guard equally 
against the danger either of being led to exaggerate the extent, 
or of being blinded to the existence of the evil. Nor is it dif- 
ficult to discover a safe middle path between the opposite 
extremes: it is only necessary to define, in the first instance, 
what we mean when we speak of Theism or Atheism respec- 
tively, and then to ascertain, in the second place, whether any, 
and what, parties have avowed principles which should fairly 
serve to connect them with the one system or with the other. 
A clear conception of the radical principle or essential nature 
of Atheism is indispensable ; for without this, we shall be liable, 
on the one hand, to the risk of imputing Atheism to many 
who are not justly chargeable with it —a fault which should be 
most carefully avoided ; and equally liable, on the other hand, 
to the danger of overlooking the wide gulf which separates 
Religion from Irreligion, and Theism from Atheism. There is 
much room for the exercise both of Christian candor and of 
critical discrimination, in forming our estimate of the characters 
of men from the opinions which they hold, when these opinions 


1J.C. Woxrius, “De Atheismi falso Suspectis.” 


MODERN ATHEISM. 17 


relate not to the vital truths of religion, but to collateral topics, 
more or less directly connected with them. It is eminently 
necessary, in treating this subject, to discriminate aright between 
systems which are essentially and avowedly atheistic, and those 
particular opinions on cognate topics which have sometimes 
been applied in support of Atheism, but which may, neverthe- 
less, be held by some salvé fide, and without conscious, still less 
avowed, Infidelity. And hence Buddeus and other divines 
have carefully distinguished between the radical principles or 
grounds of Atheism, and those opinions which are often, but not 
invariably, associated with it. 

But it is equally or still more dangerous, on the other hand, 
to admit a mere nominal recognition of God as a sufficient dis- 
proof of Atheism, without inquiring what conception is enter- 
tained of His nature and perfections ; whether He be conceived 
of as different from, or identical with, Nature; as a living, per- 
sonal, and intelligent Being, distinct from the universe, or as 
the mere sum of existing things; as a free Creator and Moral 
Governor, or as a blind Destiny and inexorable Fate. These 
are vital questions, and they cannot be evaded without serious 
detriment to the cause of religion. A: few examples will suffice 
to prove our assertion. M. Cousin contends that Atheism is 
impossible, and assigns no other reason for his conviction than 
this, — that the existence of God is necessarily implied in every 
affirmation, and. may be logically deduced from the premises 
on which that affirmation depends. His reasoning may pos- 


1 BuppazxI, “ Theses Theologice,” cap. 111., “ De dogmatibus que cum 
Atheismo conjuncta sunt, aut ad eum ducunt,”’ p. 240. 

2 Cousin, “Introduction Generale a l’Histoire de la Philosophie,” 1. 
169 : — “ Que toute pensée implique une foi spontanée & Dieu, et qu’il n’y 
a pas d’Atheisme naturel. Croit-il qu’il existe, par exemple? S’il croit 
cela, cela me suffit,’” — ‘il adone foi au principe de la pensée ;— or ldest 
Dieu,” —“ Selon moi, toute parole prononcée avec confiance, n’est pas 
moins qu’une profession de la foi a la pensée, —a la raison en soi, —c’est 
a dire a Dieu.” 

y* 


aot 


18 MODERN ATHEISM. 


sibly be quite conclusive én point of logic, in so far as it is an 
attempt to show that the existence of God ought to be deduced 
from the consciousness of thought; but it cannot be held con- 
clusive as to the matter of fact, that there is no Atheism in the 
world, unless it can be further shown that all men know and 
acknowledge His existence as a truth involved in, and deducible 
from, their conscious experience. Yet he does not hesitate to - 
affirm that “every thought implies a spontaneous faith in God;” 
nay, he advances further, and adds that even when the sage 
“denies the existence of God, still his words imply the idea of 
God, and that belief in God remains unconsciously at the bot- 
tom of his heart.” Surely the denial or the doubt of God’s 
existence amounts to Atheism, however inconsistent that Athe- 
ism may be with the natural laws of thought, or the legitimate 
exercise of speech. 

Yet the bold paradox of Cousin was neither an original dis- 
covery nor an unprecedenied delusion. It was taught, in a 
different form, but with equal confidence, by several writers 
belonging to the era of the first French Revolution. Thus Hrn- 
VETIUS, in his work on Man, says expressly: “There is no 
man of understanding who does not acknowledge an active 
power in Nature ; there ts, therefore, no Atheist. He is not an 
Atheist who says that motion is God ; because, in fact, motion 
is incomprehensible, as we have no clear idea of it, since it does 
not manifest itself but by its effects, and because by it all things 
are performed in the universe. He is not an Atheist who says, 
on the contrary, that motion 1s not God, because motion is not 
a being, but a mode of being. They are not Atheists who 
maintain that motion is essential to matter, and regard it as the 
invisible and moving force that spreads itself through all its 
parts,” “as the universal soul of matter, and the divinity that 
alone penetrates its substance. Are the philosophers of this 
last opinion Atheists? No; they equally acknowledge an 
unknown force in the universe. Are even those who have no 


-MODERN ATHEISM. 19 


ideas of God Atheists? No; because then all men would be 
so, because no one has a clear idea of the Divinity.” 1 

A more recent writer, the ABBE LAMENNAIS, is equally 
explicit, and very much for the same reasons: “The Atheist 
himself has his own notion of God, only he transfers it from 
the Creator to the creation; he ascribes to finite, relative, 
and contingent being the properties of the necessary Being; 
he confounds the work with the workman. Matter being, 
according to him, eternal, is endowed with certain primitive, 
unchangeable properties, which, having their own reason in 
themselves, are themselves the reasons of all successive phe- 
nomena;” and “it matters little whether he rejects the name 
of God or not,” or “whether he has, or has not, an explicit 
knowledge of Him;” he cannot but acknowledge an eternal 
First Cause2 And so a whole host of Pantheistic Spiritualists 
will indignantly disclaim the imputation of Atheism, and even 
attempt to vindicate Spinoza himself from the odious charge.’ 
Nay, some of the grossest Materialists, such as Atkinson and 
Martineau, while they explicitly deny the existence of a living 
personal God, will affirm that Pantheism is not Atheism.* Now, 
unquestionably, if by Theism we mean nothing more than the 
recognition of an active power in nature,—such a power as 
may or may not be identified with motion, and as may be 
designated indifferently as the Divinity, or as the Soul of the 
world, —the possibility of Atheism may be effectually excluded ; 
but this only serves to show the indispensable necessity of a 
correct definition of the terms which are employed in this 


> 


1M. HeEtvetivs, “Treatise on Man, his Intellectual Faculties and 
Education :” translated by W. Hooper, M.D.,”’ 1. 247. 

2M. LAMENNAIS, “‘ Esquisse d’une Philosophie,” 1. 95. 

8 “ Spinoza is a God-intoxicated man.’”’— NovatLis, quoted in T. Car- 
lyle’s Essays, 11. 43. + 

4“Tetters on the Laws of Man’s Nature and Development, by H. G. 
ATKINSON and HARRIET MARTINEAU,” p. 241. 


20 MODERN ATHEISM. 
-— : 


discussion, since it is perfectly manifest that they are not used in 
the same sense by the contending parties, and that consequently 
the disputants are not arguing about the same thing. For 
Pantheism, whatever form it may assume, and ‘whatever lan- 
guage it may adopt, can be regarded in no other light than as a 
system of Atheism, by all who have any definite conception of 
what is meant when we either affirm or deny the existence 
and government of a living, intelligent, personal God. 

As Atheism has appeared in several distinct forms, it is 
necessary to consider both its generie nature and its specific 
varieties. It may be defined, generally, as that state of mind 
which involves either the dental or the doubt of the existence 
and government of God as an all-perfect Being, distinct from 
the created universe ; or which leads to the habitual forgetful- 
ness and wilful neglect of His claims as our Creator, Preserver, 
and Lord. This state of mind, whether evinced by words or 
by actions, contains in it the essence of Atheism, and it is 
recognized in Scripture, in each of its two aspects, as an evil 
alike natural and prevalent. The words of the Psalmist, 
“The fool hath said in his heart, No God,”! whether they be 
interpreted as the expression of an opinion or of a wish, indi- 
cate in either case the existence of that state of mind which 
has just been described, and which may issue either in prac- 
tical or speculative Atheism, according to the temperament of 
individual minds, and the influences which are brought to bear 
upon them. ‘The same inspired writer has said,’ that “The 
wicked through the pride of his countenance will not seek after 
God; God is not in all his thoughts ;” — “He hath said in his 
heart, God hath forgotten; He hideth his face; He will never 
see it.”—“ Wherefore doth the wicked contemn God? he 
hath said in his heart, Thou wilt not require it;” And these 
words exhibit a graphic delineation of that state of mind in 


1 Psalm 14: 1; 53: 1. 2 Psalm 10: 4, 11, 13. 


MODERN ATHEISM. 21 


which occasional thoughts of God are neutralized by habitual 
unbelief, and the warnings of conscience silenced by the denial 
of a supreme moral government. In like manner, when the 
apostle tells the Ephesian converts that at one time “they 
were without God in the world,’! and the Galatians, that 
“when they knew not God, they did service unto them which 
by nature are no gods;” when he further speaks of some as 
“lovers of pleasures more than lovers of God,” as “having a 
form of godlinesss, but denying the power thereof,” as “ profess- 
ing that they know God, but in works denying Him ;” ?—in all 
these statements we see the generic nature of that ungodliness 
which cleaves as an inveterate disease to our fallen nature, and 
which, whether it appears only in the form of practical unbelief 
and habitual forgetfulness, or assumes the more daring aspect 
of avowed infidelity, contains in it the essence of Atheism. 
While such is its generic nature, we must further discrim- 
inate between its specific varieties; for it does not always wear 
the same aspect, or rest on the same grounds. It may be 
divided, first of all, into speculative and practical Atheism: the 
former implying a denial, or a doubt of the existence and gov- 
ernment of God, either openly avowed or secretly cherished ; 
while the latter is perfectly compatible with a nominal religious 
profession, and consists in the habitual forgetfulness of God and 
of the duties which arise out of His relation to us as His crea- 
tures and subjects. Speculative Atheism is comparatively 
rare; Practical Atheism is widely prevalent, and may be 
justly regarded as the grand parent sin, the universal charac- 
teristic of fallen humanity.’ It is not Atheism in profession, it 
is Atheism in practice. Those who are chargeable with it may 
“profess that they know God, but in works they deny Him.” 


1 Eph. 2 : 12, 4deo ev tazoouwe, 

“Gal. 4.8 2 Tim. 3: 4° Titus ft : 16. 

3 EsTLIn, “ Discourse on Atheism,” pp. 8, 19, 28. 
Dr. CHaLMERS, “ Institutes,” 1. 375. 


22 MODERN ATHEISM. 


As distinguished from theoretical or speculative Atheism, it is 
fitly termed ungodliness. It does not necessarily imply either 
the denial or the doubt of the existence or government of God, 
but consists mainly in the forgetfulness of His character and 
claims. Speculative Atheism always implies habitual ungodli- 
ness ; but the latter may exist where the former has never been 
embraced, and has even been openly and sincerely disclaimed. 
Yet such is the connection between the two, that Speculative 
Atheism invariably presupposes and perpetuates practical 
ungodliness ; and that the latter has also a tendency to produce 
the former, since the habitual disregard of God in the practical 
conduct of life indicates a state of mind in which men are 
peculiarly exposed to the seductions of infidelity and prone to 
yield to them, especially in seasons of revolutionary excitement 
or of prevailing epidemic unbelief. It would be wrong to rank 
every ungodly man among professed or even conscious Atheists, 
for he may never have denied or even doubted the existence 
and government of God; yet it were equally wrong to repre- 
sent or treat him as a true believer, since he shows that, prac- 
tically, “ God is not in all his thoughts ;” and hence the neces- 
sity of our first distinction beetween theoretical or speculative, 
and practical or habitual Atheism. 

Speculative Atheism, again, is either dogmatic or skeptical. 
It is dogmatic, when it amounts to an affirmation, either that 
there is no God, or that the question of his existence is neces- 
sarily insoluble by the human faculties. Atheism has been 
distinguished from Anti-theism ; and the former has been sup- 
posed to imply merely the non-recognition of God, while the 
latter asserts His non-existence. This distinction is founded 
on the difference between unbelief and disbelief ;1 and its valid- 
ity is admitted in so far as it discriminates merely between 
dogmatic and skeptical Atheism. But Anti-theism is main- 


1 Dr. CHALMERS, Works, “ Natural Theology,” 1. 58. 
“The Reasoner,” edited by Hotyoaxs, x1. 15, 232. 


MODERN ATHEISM. 23 


tained, in the strictest sense of the term, where it is affirmed 
either that there is no God, or that the existence of the 
Supreme Being cannot in any circumstances become an object. 
of human knowledge. In each of these forms, Atheism is dog+ 
matic; it denies the existence of God, or it denies the pos- 
sibility of His being known. But there is also a skeptical 
Atheism, which does not affirm absolutely either that there is” 
no God, or that the knowledge of God is necessarily excluded 
by the limitations of human reason, but contents itself with 
saying, “non-liquet,’ —1?. e., with denying the sufficiency of the 
evidence. It answers every appeal to that evidence by saying 
that, however satisfactory it may be to the minds of some, it 
does not carry conviction to the minds of all, and that for this 
reason it may be justly regarded as doubtful or inconclusive. 
These two forms of Atheism — the Dogmatic and the Skeptical 
'—are widely different from each other; they rest on distinct 
grounds, and they require, therefore, to be discussed separately, 
each on its own peculiar and independent merits. The Dog- 
matic Atheist feels no force in the arguments which are directed 
merely against his skeptical ally ; for, strong in his own position 
and confident in his ability to: maintain it, he is conscious of no 
speculative doubt, and affirms boldly what he unhesitatingly 
believes. The Skeptical Atheist, again, feels no force in the 
arguments which are directed against a Dogmatic System such 
as he utterly disclaims; he is equally unwilling to affirm either 
that there is, or that there is not, a God: he takes refuge in 
doubt, and refuses alike to affirm or to deny; his only plea is, 
the want or the weakness of evidence on either side. From 
this radical difference between the two forms of Speculative 
Atheism, there arises a necessity for discussing each of them 
on its own merits; and yet, although theoretically they may 
be easily distinguished, it will be found that practically they 

are often conjoined, since the same mind will often fluctuate 

between the two, and shift its ground by betaking itself 


24 MODERN ATHEISM. 


alternately to the one or the other, according to the exigencies 
of the argument. Assail the Dogmatic Atheist with the 
unanswerable statement of John Foster, that it would require 
nothing less than Omniscience to warrant the denial of a God, 
and he will probably defer to it so far as to admit that he 
-€annot prove his negative conclusion, but will add that he is 
not bound to do so, and that all that can be reasonably required 
of him is to show that the evidence adduced on the opposite 
side is insufficient to establish the. Divine existence, or that the 
phenomena which supply that evidence may be as well, or 
more satisfactorily, explained in some other way. Assail, in 
like manner, the Skeptical Atheist with the self-evident truth 
that, even on his own principles, he is not entitled to assume 
or to act upon the assumption, that there 7s no God, since the 
result of his reasonings is déwbt merely, and such doubt as 
implies that there may be a Creator, Governor, and Judge, he 
will probably defer to it so far as to admit that this is the only 
logical result of his system, but will add that, where there is no 
conclusive evidence on either side, there can be no moral 
obligation to a religious life, and no guilt in living “ without 
God in the world.” It will be found, too, that, distinct as these 
two forms of Speculative Atheism may appear to be, yet they 
have often been made to rest on a common ground, and the 
self-same arguments have been adduced in support of both. 
Thus the doctrine of Materialism, the theory of Development, 
and the system of Natural Laws, have all been applied by the 
Dogmatic Atheist to justify his denial of the existence and 
government of God, on the ground that all the phenomena of 
Nature may be accounted for without the supposition of a 
‘Supreme Mind; while the very same doctrines or theories 
have been also applied by the Skeptical Atheist to justify, not 
his denial, but his doubt, and to vindicate his verdict of “non- 
iquet” on the evidence adduced. And as the same arguments 
are often employed by both parties in.support of their respective 


MODERN ATHEISM. 25 


views, so they make use, for the most part, of the same 
objections in assailing the cause of Theism; insomuch that it 
would be impossible, and even were it possible it would be 
superfluous, to attempt a formal refutation of either, without 
discussing those more general principles which are applicable 
to both. For this reason, we propose to examine in the sequel 
the various theories which. have been applied in support alike 
of Dogmatic and of Skeptical Atheism, so as to illustrate the 
grounds that are common to both, while we consider also the 
distinctive peculiarities of the two systems, and more particu- 
larly the grounds of Religious Skepticism. 

Besides the radical distinction between Dogmatic and Skep- 
tical Atheism, we must consider the difference between the four 
great leading systems which have been applied to account for 
the existing order of Nature, without the recognition of a liv- 
ing, intelligent, personal God. There are many specific 
varieties of Atheism; but, ultimately, they may be reduced to 
four classes. The first system assumes and asserts the eternal 
existence of THE Cosmos; that is, of the present order of 
Nature, with all its laws and processes, its tribes and races, 
whether of vegetable or animal life ; and affirms that the world, 
as now constituted, never had a beginning, and that it will 
never have an end. This has been called the Aristotelian 
Hypothesis, because Aristotle, while he spoke of a Supreme 
Mind or Reason, maintained not only the eternity of matter, 
but also the eternity of “substantial forms and qualities.” 

The second system affirms, not the eternal existence of THE 
Cosmos,—for the commencement of the existing order of 
Nature is admitted to be comparatively recent,—but the 
eternal existence of Matter and Motion; and attempts to 
account for the origin of the world and of the races by which it 
is peopled, either by ascribing it, with Epicurus, to a fortuitous 
concourse of atoms, or, with more modern Speculatists, to a 
law of progressive development. This has been called the 


8 


26 MODERN ATHEISM. 


Epicurean Hypothesis, because Epicurus, while nominally admit- 
ting the existence of God, denied the creation of the world, and 
ascribed its origin to atoms supposed to have been endued with 
motion or certain inherent properties and powers, and to have 
been seif-existent and eternal. 

The third system affirms the coéxistence and coéternity of 
God and the World; and, while it admits a distinction between 
the two, represents them as so closely and necessarily conjoined, 
that God can be regarded only as the Soul of the World,— 
superior to matter, as soul is to body, but neither anterior to 
it, nor independent of it, and subject, as matter itself is, to the 
laws of necessity and fate. This has been called the Stoical 
System; since the Stoics, notwithstanding all their sublime 
moral speculations and their frequent recognition of God, 
taught that God sustains the same relation to the World as the 
soul of man does to his body. 

The fourth system denies the distinction between God and 
the World, and affirms that all is God, and God is all; that 
there exists only one substance in the Universe, of which all 
existing beings are only so many modes or manifestations ; that 
these beings proceed from that one substance, not by creation, 
but by emanation; that when they disappear, they are not 
destroyed, but reibsorbed; and that thus, through endless 
cycles of change, of reproduction and decay, it is one and the 
same eternal being that is continually modified and manifested. 
This has been called the Pantheistic Hypothesis, and it is 
exemplified, on a large scale, in the speculations of the Brah- 
mins in India, and, in Europe, in those of Spinoza and his 
numerous followers. 

If this be a correct analysis of Speculative Atheism, in so far 
as it assumes a positive or dogmatic shape, we have only to 
conjoin with it the peculiar characteristics of that which is 
merely Skeptical, and we shall obtain a comprehensive view 
of the whole subject, which may serve as a useful guide in the 


MODERN ATHEISM. O77 


selection and treatment of the topics which demand our chief 
attention in the prosecution of this inquiry. 

‘It is necessary, however, in discussing this subject, to bear 
in mind that there is a wide difference between Systems of 
Atheismf such as we have briefly described, and certain doc- 
trines which have sometimes been associated with it, or even 
applied in its support or vindication. These doctrines may 
have been connected, historically, with the promulgation and 
defence of atheistic views; they may even seem to have a ten- 
dency adverse to the evidence or truths of Christian Theism ; 
but they must not on that account be summarily characterized 
as atheistic, nor must those who have at any time maintained 
them be forthwith classed among avowed infidels.t| The doc- 
trine of Philosophical Necessity, which in the hands of Jona- 
than Edwards was applied, whether consistently or otherwise, 
in illustration and defence of Christian truth, became in the 
hands of Collins and Godwin an. associate and ally of anti- 
Christian error; the doctrine of the natural Mortality of the 
Soul, which in the hands of Dodwell was applied, whether con- 
sistently or otherwise, to vindicate the peculiar privileges of the 
Christian Covenant, has often been applied by infidels as a 
weapon of assault against the fundamental articles of Natural 
Religion itself; the doctrine of Materialism, which in the hands 
of Priestly was maintained, whether consistently or otherwise, 
in connection with an avowed belief in God as the Creator and 
Governor of the world, became in the hands of Baron D’Hol- 
bach and his associates the corner-stone of the atheistic “ Sys- 
tem of Nature;” the doctrine of “ Natural Laws,” which in 
the hands of Bishop Butler is so powerfully applied in proof 
of a system of Divine Government, has become in the hands 
of Mr. Combe a plausible pretext for denying a special Provi- 
dence and the efficacy of prayer; and the mere fact that these 


1 RoBerT Hatw’s Works, I, 58, 


28 MODERN ATHEISM. 


doctrines have been applied to such different and even opposite 
uses, is a sufficient proof of itself that they are not in their own 
nature essentially atheistic, and that they should be carefully 
discriminated from the systems with which they have been 
occasionally associated. We are not entitled to identify them 
with Atheism, in the case of those by whom Atheism is explic- 
itly disclaimed ; and yet there may be such an apparent con- 
nection between the two, and such a tendency in the human 
mind to pass from the one to the other, as may afford a suffi- 
cient reason for examining these cognate doctrines, each on its 
proper merits, for defining the sense in which they should be 
severally understood, for estimating the evidence which may 
be adduced for or against them individually, and for showing in 
what way, and to what extent, they may have a legitimate 
bearing on the grounds of our Theistic belief. For this reason, 
we shall bring under review, not only several systems of 
avowed Atheism, but also various theories, not necessarily 
atheistic, which have been applied to the support and-defence of 
Atheism, and which have a tendency, as thus applied, to induce 
an irreligious frame of mind. 

The causes and springs of Atheism may easily be distin- 
guished from the reasons on which it is founded. In the 
present state of human nature, there is a permanent cause which 
is abundantly sufficient to account for this species of unbelief, 
notwithstanding all the evidence which Nature affords of the 
being, perfections, and providence of God. Our Lord explained . 
in a single sentence the whole Philosophy of Unbelief, when 
he said that “men loved the darkness rather than the light, 
because their deeds are evil; for whoso doeth evil hateth the 
light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be 
reproved.” No thoughtful man can seriously reflect on his own 
conscious experience, without discovering, in the disordered 
state of his moral nature, a reason which sufficiently explains 
his natural aversion from God; he finds there an evidence, 


MODERN ATHEISM. 29 


which he can neither overlook nor deny, of his own personal 
turpitude and guilt; he is self-convinced and self-condemned at 
the bar of his own conscience; he remembers with remorse 
and shame many cases of actual transgression in which he 
resisted the dictates of reason, and resigned himself to the 
dominion of evil passions; and when, with these convictions 
and feelings, he is asked to conceive of God as a living, per- 
sonal Being, everywhere present, beholding the evil and the 
good, whose “eyes are as a flame of fire,” and can discern 
“the very thoughts and intents of the heart ;” when he con- 
ceives of such a Being as his Lawgiver, Governor, and Judge, 
as one who demands the homage of the heart and the obedience 
of the life, and who has power to enforce His rightful claims 
by the sanctions of reward and punishment, he will be sensible, 
in the first instance, of an instinctive disposition to recoil from 
the contemplation of his character, and a strong desire to deny, 
or at least to forget, His claims ; and just in proportion as the 
idea of God becomes more vivid, or is more frequently pre- 
sented to his mind, it will become the more intolerable, 
insomuch that he will be tempted either to banish the subject 
altogether from his thoughts, or, if he cannot succeed in this, 
to alter and modify his view of the Divine character so as to 
bring it into accordance with his own wishes, and to obtain 
some relief from the fears and! forebodings which it would 
otherwise awaken in his mind. If he should succeed in this 
attempt, he will fall into one or other of two opposite states 
of mind, which, however apparently different, do nevertheless 
spring from the same latent source,—a state of security, or a 
state of servitude. In the former, he either forgets God 


> 


altogether, —“ God is not in all his thoughts;” or he con- 
ceives of Him as “one like unto himself,” indulgent to sin, and 
neither strict to mark nor just to punish it: in the latter, he 
either “remembers God and is troubled,” or, if he would allay 
the remorse and forebodings of an uneasy conscience, he has 


38* 


30 MODERN ATHEISM. 


recourse to penance and mortification, to painful sacrifices and 
ritual observances, in the hope that by these he may propitiate 
an offended Deity. In the one case, the conflict ends in prac- 
tical Atheism, in the other, in abject Superstition. And these 
two, Atheism and Superstition, however different and even 
opposite they may seem to be, are really offshoots from the 
same corrupt root,—“the evil heart of unbelief which 
departeth from the living God.” In the case of the great 
majority of mankind, who are little addicted to speculative 
inquiry, or to serious thought of any kind, it may be safely 
affirmed that, in the absence of Revelation, they will 
inevitably fall into one or other of these two extremes, or 
rather, that they will oscillate alternately between the two,— 
in seasons of ease and prosperity living “without God in the 
world,” and in seasons of distress or danger betaking them- 
selves for relief to the rites of a superstitious worship. The 
apostle describes at once the secret cause and the successive 
steps of this sad degeneracy, when, speaking of the Gentiles, 
he says that “when they knew God, they glorified him not as 
God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imagi- 
nations, and their foolish heart was darkened; professing them- 
selves wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the 
incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible 
man.” —“ And even’as they did not like to retain God in their 
knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind.”* The 
secret cause of all these evils was a latent “enmity against 
God,”—“ they did not “ke to retain God in their knowledge.” 
From this proceeded, in the first instance, a practical habit of 
Atheism,—‘“ they glorified him not as God, neither were 
thankful;” and from hence proceeded, in the second instance, 
the gross superstition of Polytheistic belief and worship,— 
“they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an 


1 Romans 1 : 21, 28. 


MODERN ATHEISM. 31 


image made like to corruptible man,’—“they changed the 
truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature 
more than the Creator, who is blessed forever.” 

But, while practical Atheism and blind Superstition are the 
two extremes which divide among them the great majority of 
mankind, there have always been some more thoughtful and 
inquiring spirits, who have sought to penetrate the mysteries 
of their being, and to account. for the present order of things. 
They have asked, and have attempted to answer, such ques- 
tions as these: What are we? what was our origin? what is 
our destination? Whence came this stupendous fabric of 
Nature? Is it self-existent and eternal? or did it come -into 
being at some definite time? If not eternal, how was it pro- 
duced? by chance or by design? by inevitable fate or by 
spontaneous will? Whence the order which pervades it, and 
the beauty by which it is adorned? Whence, above all, the 
evil, moral and physical, by which it is disfigured and cursed ? 
And, in reply to these thoughtful questionings, various theories 
have been invented to account for the existing order of things, 
while not a few of the most daring thinkers have abandoned 
the subject in despair, and, holding it to be an insoluble prob- 
lem, have resigned themselves to the cheerless gloom of Skep- 
ticism. In reviewing all these speculations and theories, we 
must bear in mind that their authors and advocates, although 
more thoughtful and inquisitive than the great majority of 
mankind, were equally subject to the same corrupting 
influence, —“ the evil heart of unbelief,’—and that the same 
cause which produced practical Atheism in some, and abject 
Superstition in others, may also have operated, but more 
insidiously, in producing Speculative Infidelity in the minds 
of those who are more addicted to abstruse philosophical 
inquiries. We must seek to get down to the root of the evil, 
if we would suggest or apply an effectual remedy; we must 
not deal with the symptoms merely, but search for and probe 


$2 MODERN ATHEISM. 


the seat of the disease ; and if that be the disordered state of 

our moral nature, which gives rise to fears and forebodings as 
often as we think of God, no remedy will be effectual which 
does not remove our distrust, suspicion, and jealousy; and no 
argument, however conclusive, will have any practical power 
which does not present such views of God as to make him an 
object of confidence, and trust, and love. It is of vast impor- 
tance that this fundamental truth should be kept steadily in 
view ; for, as the disordered state of our moral nature is the 
rudimental source both of practical Atheism and of popular 
Superstition, so it is also the prolific parent of Speculative 
Infidelity in every variety of form: and as long as the remedy 
is not applied to the root of the disease, the Atheist, if forced 
to relinquish one theory, will only betake himself to another, 
and after having gone the round of them all, will rather throw’ 
himself into the vortex of utter and hopeless skepticism, than 

acknowledge a God whom he cannot love, a Judge whom he 
cannot but dread. Christianity alone can supply an effectual 
remedy, and it is such a remedy as is fitted to cure alike the 
habitual ungodliness, the abject superstition, and the spec- 
ulative infidelity, which have all sprung from the same prolific 
source. It exhibits such a view of the character and will of 

God as may relieve us from the fears and forebodings of guilt, 

and, by revealing a divine method of reconciliation, may place 

us in a position the most favorable for a calm and dispassion- 

ate consideration of the natural evidence in favor of His Being, 

Perfections, and Moral Government. 

But, while the grand parent cause of all Atheism— whether 
practical or speculative, dogmatic or skeptical— is to be found 
in the disordered state of our own moral nature, there are 
other subordinate causes in operation, which may be regarded 
either as ¢nctdental occasions, or as plausible pretexts, for this 
form of unbelief. The internal causes are the primary and 
most powerful; but there are external influences which co- 


MODERN ATHEISM. 3S 


operate with these, and serve to stimulate and strengthen 
them. Among the incidental occasions of Atheism, we might 
mention a defective, because irreligious, education in early life, 
the influence of ungodly example and profane converse, and 
the authority of a few great names in literature or science 
which have become associated with the cause of Infidelity ; 
and among the plausible pretexts for Atheism we might 
mention the inconsistencies of professed believers and espec- 
ially of the clergy, the divided state of the religious world, as 
indicated by the multiplicity of sects, the bitterness of religious 
controversy, the supposed opposition of the Church to the 
progress of science and the extension of civil and religious 
liberty, and the gross superstitions which have been incorpo- 
rated with Christianity itself in some of the oldest and most 
powerful states of Europe. These and similar topics may be 
justly said to be the “ loci communes of Atheism,” and they 
are often employed in eloquent declamation or indignant invec- 
tive, so as to make a much deeper impression, especially on 
young and ardent minds, than their intrinsic weight or real 
argumentative value can either justify or explain. Infidel 
writers have not been slow to avail themselves of these pre- 
texts for unbelief, in regard alike to Natural and Revealed 
Religion; and have artfully identified Religion with Super- 
stition, and Christianity with Popery, as if there were no con- 
sistent or tenable medium between the two. And, perhaps, 
of all the incidental occasions or external inducements to 
Atheism, none has exerted so much influence over reflecting 
minds as the wide-spread prevalence of Superstition; for 
never was Atheism more general among the cultivated classes 
in ancient times than in the States of Greece, whose hospitable 
Pantheon enclosed the gods of all nations, and whose inhabit- 


ants were “exceedingly given to idolatry ;” and nowhere, in 
modern times, has Atheism been more explicitly avowed or 


more zealously propagated than in those countries of Europe 


34 MODERN ATHEISM. 


which are most thoroughly subjugated to the superstitions 
of the Papacy. In the graphic words of Robert Hall, 
“Infidelity was bred in the stagnant marshes of corrupted 
Christianity.” ! 

Having described the nature, evinced the reality, and 
referred to the permanent and occasional causes of Atheism, 
we may briefly advert to cts moral and social influence. On 
this point three distinct questions have been raised: First, 
whether Atheism be conducive to personal happiness ? 
Secondly, whether it be compatible with pure morality and 
_ Virtue? and, thirdly, whether it be consistent with social well- 
being, with the authority of the laws, and the safety or comfort 
of the community? In considering these questions, it is neces- 
sary to remember that in no age, and in no region of the 
world, has Speculative Atheism been universal, or even so 
prevalent as to exhibit on a large scale a full development of 
its legitimate results. It has always been in a minority, and 
has been continually checked, modified and controlled, by the 
prevailing beliefs of society; and, whether these beliefs were 
purely religious or grossly superstitious, they have exerted a 
powerful influence in counteracting the native tendencies of 
atheistic speculation. “The effects of Atheism,” as Mr. Estlin 
justly observes, “we have not yet in any great degree experi- 
enced, as the mental habits of those who hold it in speculation 
were in general formed, before they had adopted their present 
principles, by the imperceptible influence of that religion which 
they now traduce.”? Perhaps the nearest approach to a state 
of prevailing Atheism which has ever been exhibited in the 
history of the world, is to be found in France at the era of the 
first Revolution, when Christianity was publicly abjured, and 
the goddess of Reason substituted for the God of the Bible. 
But that even this fearful outburst of impiety did not proceed 


1 Ha’s “ Works,” 3. 128. 2Estuin’s “ Discourse,” p. 57. 


MODERN ATHEISM. 85 


from the universal prevalence of Speculative Atheism among 
the great body of the people; that there still existed in the 
heart of society some germs of religious feeling, and certain 
instinctive or traditionary beliefs which operated as a restraint 
and check even during that season of revolutionary frenzy, is 
sufficiently evinced by the reiiction which speedily occurred in 
the public mind, and which restored Catholicism itself, as if by 
magic, to its wonted supremacy ; while the anti-social tendency 
of Atheism, in so far as it did prevail, was strikingly attested 
by the fact, that the leading actors in that fearful drama found 
themselves compelled to provide for the public safety by 
restoring at least the forms of religious worship, and to 
acknowledge that “if there were no God, it would be necessary 
to invent one.” — “The true light,” says the eloquent Robert 
Hall, “in which the French Revolution ought to be con- 
templated is that of a grand experiment on human nature.” 
“God permitted the trial to be made. In one country, and 
that the centre of Christendom, Revelation underwent a total 
eclipse, while Atheism, performing on a darkened theatre its 
strange and fearful tragedy, confounded the first elements of 
society, blended every age, rank, and sex, in indiscriminate 
proscription and massacre, and convulsed all Europe to its 
centre, that the imperishable memorial of these events might 
teach the last generations of mankind to consider Religion as 
the pillar of society, the safeguard of nations, the parent of 
social order, which alone has power to curb the fury of the 
passions, and secure to every one his rights; to the laborious 
the reward of their industry, to the rich the enjoyment of their 
wealth, to nobles the preservation of their honors, and to 
princes the stability of their thrones.” ? 

In the case of individuals holding atheistic opinions, but - 
living in the midst of Christian society, the full influence of 


1 Ropert Hatt, “ Modern Infidelity Considered,” 1. 38, 67. 


56 MODERN ATHEISM. 


these opinions cannot be felt, nor their effects fully developed, 
in the presence of those restraints and checks which are 
imposed by the religious beliefs and observances of others. 
We cannot estimate their influence either on the personal hap- 
piness, or the moral character, or the social welfare of men, 
without taking this circumstance into account. To arrive at 
even a tolerable approximation to a correct judgment, we must 
endeavor to conceive of Atheism as prevailing universally in 
the community, as emancipated from all restraint, and free to 
develop itself without let or hindrance of any kind, as tolerated 
by law, and sanctioned by public opinion, and unopposed by 
any remaining forms either of domestic piety or of public 
worship, as reigning supreme in every heart, and as forming 
the creed of every household; and thus conceiving of it as an 
inveterate, universal epidemic, we are then to inquire whether, 
and on what conditions, society would in such a case be pos- 
sible, and how far the prevalence of Atheism might be 
expected to affect the morals and welfare of mankind. 

The question has been raised whether Atheism might not 
be more conducive than religion to the personal happiness of 
mmdividuals ; and some, who have confounded Religion with 
Superstition, have not hesitated to answer that question in the 
affirmative. ‘The conviction that there is no God, and no 
moral government, and no state of future retribution, could it 
only be steadfastly and invariably maintained, might serve, it 
has been thought, to relieve the mind of many forebodings and 
fears which disturb its peace, and, if it could not ensure per- 
fect happiness, might act at least as an opiate or sedative to a 
restless and uneasy conscience. In the opinion of Epicurus 
and Lucretius, tranquillity of mind was the grand practical 
benefit of that unbelief which they sought to inculcate respect- 
ing the doctrine of Providence and Immortality. They 
frequently affirmed that fear generated superstition, and that 
superstition, in its turn, deepened and perpetuated the fear 


MODERN ATHEISM. 34 


from which it sprung; that the minds of men must necessarily 
be overcast with anxiety and gloom as long as they continued 
to believe in a moral government and a future state; and that 
the only sovereign and effectual antidote to superstitious terror 
is the spirit of philosophical unbelief. Similar views are per- 
petually repeated in the eloquent but declamatory pages of 
“The System of Nature.” But the remedy proposed seems to 
be subject to grave suspicion, as one that may be utterly 
powerless, or at the best, exceedingly precarious ; for, first of 
all, the fears which are supposed to have generated Religion 
must have been anterior to it, and must have arisen from some 
natural cause, which will continue to operate even after 
Religion has been disowned. They spring, in fact, necessarily 
out of our present condition as dependent, responsible, and 
dying creatures; and they can neither be prevented nor cured 
by the mere negations of Atheism; we can only be raised. 
above their depressing influence by a rational belief and well- 
grounded trust in the being and character of God. Again, if 
the denial of a Providence and of a future state might serve, 
were it associated with a full assurance of certainty, to relieve 
us from the fear of retribution hereafter, it must equally destroy 
all hope of immortality, and reduce us to the dreary prospect 
of annihilation at death,—a prospect from which the soul of 
man instinetively recoils, and by which his whole life would be 
embittered just in proportion as he became more thoughtful 
and reflective. Unbelief can operate as a sedative to fear only 
in so far as it is habitual, uniform, undisturbed by any inward 
misgivings or apparent uncertainty; but, in the case of men 
not utterly thoughtless or insensible, it is rarely, if ever, found 
to possess this character. It is often shaken, and always hable 
to be disquieted, by occasional convictions, which no amount 
of vigilance can ward off, and no strength of resolution repress. 
It is maintained only by a painful and sustained conflict, which 
is but ill-concealed by the vehemence of its protestations, and 
4 


38 MODERN ATHEISM. 


often significantly indicated by the very extravagance of its 
zeal. Add to this, that Atheism itself affords no guarantee 
against future suffering. It may deny a Providence here and 
a judgment hereafter, it may even deny a future state of con- 
scious existence, and take refuge in the hope of annihilation 
that it may escape from the dread prospect of retribution; but 
it cannot affirm the impossibility, it can only doubt the certainty 
of these things; and in their bare possibility there is enough 
_ at once to impose an obligation to serious inquiry, and to 
occasion the deepest anxiety, especially in seasons of affliction 
or danger, which awaken reflective thought. “ Athedsm,” said 
the acute but skeptical Bayle, “does not shelter us Jrom the 
Sear of eternal suffering.” But, even if it did, what influence 
would it exert on our present happiness? Would it not limit 
our enjoyments, by confining our views within the narrow 
range of things seen and temporal? Would it not deprive us 
of the loftiest hopes? Would it not repress our highest 
aspirations, by interdicting the contemplation of the noblest 
Object of thought, the Ideal Standard of truth and excellence, 
the Moral Glory of the Universe? Would it not diminish the 
pleasure which we derive even from earthly objects, and 
aggravate the bitterness of every trial? How wretched must 
be the condition of those who are “ proud of being the offspring 
of chance, in love with universal disorder, whose happiness is 
involved in the belief of there being no witness to their designs, 
and who are at ease only because they suppose themselves 
inhabitants of a forsaken and fatherless world!” “No one 
in creation,” said Jean Paul, “is so alone as the denier of God: 
he mourns, with an orphaned heart that has lost its great 
Father, by the corpse of Nature which no World-Spirit moves 
and holds together, and which grows in its grave; and he 
mourns by that corpse till he himself crumble off frora it. The 


1 RoBERT HA. on Modern Infidelity, 1. ‘70. 


MODERN ATHEISM. 39 


whole world lies before him, like the Egyptian Sphynx of 
stone, half-buried in the sand; and the All is the cold iron 
mask of a formless Eternity.”? 

But the malign influence of Atheism on personal happiness 
will become more apparent, if we consider its tendency to 
affect the moral springs of action, on which happiness mainly 
depends. The question whether Atheism be compatible with 
moral virtue, or whether an Atheist may be a virtuous man, 
is one of those that can only be answered by discriminating 
aright between the different senses of the same term. In the 
Christian sense of virtue, which comprehends the duties of 
both tables of the Law, and includes the love of God as well 
as of man, it is clear that the Atheist cannot be reputed virtu- 
ous, since he wants that which is declared to be the radical 
principle of obedience, the very spirit and substance of true 
morality. But, in the worldly sense of the term, as denoting 
the decent observance of relative duty, it is possible that he 
may be so far influenced by considerations of prudence or 
policy, or even by certain natural instincts and affections, as to 
be just in his dealings, faithful to his word, courteous in his 
manners, and obedient to the laws. But this secular, pru- 
dential morality, is as precarious in its practical influence as it 
is defective in its radical principle. Atheism saps and under- 
mines the very foundation of Ethics. The only law which it 
can recognize (if that can be called a law in any sense which 
is not conceived of as the expression of a Supreme Will) is, 
either the greatest happiness of the individual, or the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number ; but, whether it assumes the 
form of Felicitarian or of Utilitarian calculation, it degenerates 
into a process of arithmetic, and is no longer a code of morals. 
The fundamental idea of Duty is awanting, and can only be 
supplied from a source which the Atheist ignores. By denying 


1T. CARLYLE, “ Essays,” 11. 142. 


40 MODERN ATHEISM. 


the existence of God, he robs the universe of its highest 
clory, obliterates the idea of perfect wisdom and goodness, and 
leaves nothing better and holier as an object of thought than 
the qualities and relations of earthly things. He degrades 
human nature, by doing what he can to sever the tie which 
binds man to his Maker, and which connects the earth with 
Heaven. He circumscribes his prospects within the narrow 
range of “things seen and temporal,” and thus removes every 
stimulus to dignity of sentiment, and every incentive to eleva- 
tion of character. His wretched creed (if a series of cold 
negations may be called a creed) must be fatal to every dis- 
interested and heroic virtue; let it prevail, and the spirit of 
self-sacrifice will give place to Epicurean indulgence, and the 
age of martyrdom will return no more. Substitute Nature, or 
even Humanity, for God, and the eternal standard of truth 
and holiness and goodness being superseded, every moral sen- 
timent will be blighted and obscured. Conscience has a rela- 
tion to God similar to that which a chronometer bears to the 
sun. Blot the sun from the sky, and the chronometer is useless ; 
deny God, and conscience is powerless. And the vices which, 
if not subdued, were yet curbed and restrained by the over- 
awing sense of an unseen omnipresent Power, will burst forth 
with devastating fury, snapping asunder the feebler fetters of 
human law, and overleaping the barriers of selfish prudence 
itself; vanity and pride, ambition and covetousness, sensual 
indulgence and ferocious cruelty, will rise into the ascendancy, 
and establish their dark throne on the ruins of Religion. 

Tf such be the natural and legitimate effect of Atheism on 
the personal happiness and moral character of individuals, we 
can be at no loss to discover what must be its influence on 
society at large. For society is composed of individuals, and 
its character and welfare depend on the aggregate sentiments 
of its constituent members. The question whether Atheism 
might not be consistent with social well-being, with the 


| 


MODERN ATHEISM. 4i 


continued authority of the laws, and the general comfort of the 
community, is answered historically by the fact, that in modern 
France the Reign of Atheism was the Reign of Terror, and 
that in ancient Rome its prevalence was followed by such 
scenes of proscription, confiscation, and blood, as were then 
unparalleled in the history of the world. The truth is that, 
wherever Atheism prevails, GOVERNMENT BY LAW must 
give place to GOVERNMENT BY FORCE; for law needs some 
auxiliary sanction; and if it be deprived of the sanction of 
Religion, it must have recourse, for its own preservation, and 
the prevention of utter anarchy, to the brute power of the 
temporal sword. It is worse than useless to discuss, in this 
connection, the question, revived by Bayle,’ whether Atheism 
or Superstition should be regarded as the worst enemy to the 
Commonwealth, for it has no relevancy to our present inquiry; 
we are not contending for either, we are objecting to both; 
and we are under no necessity of choosing the least of two evils, 
when we have the option of “pure and undefiled Religion.” 
But we may observe, in passing, that, historically, it has been 
found possible to keep society together, and to maintain the 
authority of law with a greater or less measure of civil liberty, 
where Superstition has been generally prevalent; whereas 
there is no instance on record of anything approaching to 
national Atheism, in which government by law was not 
speedily superseded by anarchy and despotism. And the 
reason of this difference may be that in every system of Super- 
stition, whether it be a corruption of Natural or of Revealed 
Religion, “ some faint embers of sacred truth remain unextin- 
guished,” some convictions which still connect man with the 
spiritual and the eternal, and which are sufficient, if not to 
enlighten and pacify the conscience, yet to keep alive a sense 


x 


1P, Bayye, “Pensées diverses Ecrites & un Docteur de Sorbonne a 
VOccasion de la Cométe,” 4 vols. Also his “ Reponse aux Questions d’un 
Provincial,” 11. 688, 1v. 101, 112. 

4* 


42 MODERN ATHEISM. 


of responsibility and a fear of retribution ; “certain sparks,” as 
Hooker calls them, “of the light of truth intermingled with 
the darkness of error,” which may have served a good purpose 
in maintaining civil virtue and social order, although these 
would have been far better secured by the prevalence of a 
purer faith. 

There are some circumstances, of a novel and unprecedented 
nature, which impart a solemn interest to our present inquiry. 
At the beginning of the present century, Robert Hall, refer- 
ring to the unbelief which preceded and accompanied the first 
outburst of the Revolution in France, mentioned three circum- 
stances which appeared to him to be “equally new and alarm- 
ing.” He regarded it as the first attempt which had ever been 
witnessed on an extensive scale to establish the principles of 
Atheism, as the first attempt to popularize these principles by 
means of a literature addressed and adapted to the common 
people, and as the first systematic attempt to undermine the 
foundations, and to innovate on the very substance of Morals. 
But if we compare the first with the new Encyclopedie, —the 
former concocted by Voltaire, D’Alembert and Diderot, the 
latter by Pierre Leroux and his associates, —we shall find that 
Infidelity has assumed greater hardihood, and has appeared 
under less restraint in recent than in former times; while the 
speculations of Comte and Crousse are as thoroughly atheistic 
as those of D’Holbach himself. For, however irreligious and 
profane Voltaire and his associates might be, and however 
devoted to their avowed object of crushing Christ and his cause, 
so significantly indicated by their motto and watchword, 
“Ecrasez ’Infame;”? yet they continued, as a party, to advo- 
cate Deism, and seemed at least to oppose the bolder specula- 
tions of the author of the “Systeme de la Nature.” Both 


1 Havz on Modern Infidelity, 1. 59, 64. 
2 ABBE BARRUEL, “‘ Memoires pour servir a |’Histoire du Jacobinisme,” 
t. 31, 181, 135, 184, 357. 


MODERN ATHEISM. 43 


Voltaire and Frederick the Great wrote in reply to its atheistic 
tenets But now, in France, these tenets are openly avowed 
and zealously propagated. Nor is this fatal moral epidemic 
confined to our continental neighbors: there is too much reason 
to fear that it has infected, to some extent, the artisans of our 
own manufacturing towns, and even, in some quarters, the 
inhabitants of our rural districts. The Communists of France 
have their analogues in the Socialists of Britain; and the peri- 
odical press, although for the most part sound, or at least 
innocuous, has lent its aid to the dissemination of the grossest 
infidelity which the Continent has produced. The “ Leader” 
gives forth Lewes’s version of Comte’s Philosophy; and the 
“ Glasgow Mechanics’ Journal,” a digest of his Law of Human 
Progress, which is essentially atheistic. Nor is indigenous 
Atheism wanting. Mr. Mackay in his “ Progress of the Intel- 
lect,” Atkinson and Martineau in their “ Letters on the Laws 
of Man’s Nature and Development,” and Mr. G. Holyoake in_ 
“The Reasoner,” have sufficiently proved that if Atheism be 
an exotic, it is capable of taking root and growing up in the 
land of Bacon, Newton, and Boyle. 


1 Appi BARRUEL, “ Memoires pour servir a l’Histoire du Jacobinisme,” 
1. 22, 11. 190, 193. 

2“ The Leader ;” a series of articles on Comte’s Philosophy, by G. H. 
Lewes, April 7, 10, 17, etc., etc., 1852.—“ The Glasgow Mechanics’ 
Journal.” 


CHAPTER II. 


THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT. 


TuEeRE have been various applications of the general prin- 
ciple of Development, by means of which an attempt has been 
made to explain the origin of all things by Natural Laws, so.as 
to exclude the necessity of any Divine interposition, either for 
the creation of the world, or for the introduction and establish- 
ment of Christianity itself. It has been applied, first, to explain 
the origin of worlds and planetary systems, by showing that, 
certain specified conditions being presupposed, there are fixed 
mechanical laws which might sufficiently account for the pro- 
duction of the earth and of the other planets and satellites of 
our Solar System, without any special interposition of Divine 
power at the commencement of the existing erder of things. 
It has been applied, secondly, to explain the origin of the vari- 
ous tribes or races of vegetable and animal life, and especially 
the production of the human race, by showing that the existing 
types may have sprung, by a process of gradual development, 
from inferior races previously existing, and that these again 
may have been produced by the action of chemical agents in 
certain favorable conditions. It has been applied, thirdly, to 
explain all the most-important phenomena of Human History, 
and to illustrate the law which is supposed to determine and 
regulate the progressive course of civilization, so as to account, 
on natural principles, for the origin and prevalence of the 


46 MODERN ATHEISM. 


various forms of Religion, and even for the introduction, in its 
appointed season, of Christianity itself, without having recourse 
to anything so utterly unphilosophical as the idea of a Divine 
Revelation, or the supposition of supernatural agency. And it 
has been applied, fourthly, to explain the order, and to vindi- 
cate the use, of those additions both to the doctrines and rites 
of primitive Christianity, which Protestants have denounced as 
corruptions, but which Popish and Tractarian writers defend as 
developments, of the system that was originally deposited, like a 
prolific germ or seed, in the bosom of the Catholic Church. 

It is the more necessary to examine the various forms of this 
theory, because unquestionably it can appeal to not a few nat- 
ural analogies, which may serve, on a superficial view, to give 
it the aspect of verisimilitude. For many of the most signal 
works of God have been manifestly framed on the principle of 
gradual growth, and matured by a process of progressive 
development. We see in the natural world a small seed 
deposited in the earth, which, under the agency of certain 
suitable influences, germinates and springs up, producing first 
a tender shoot, then a stem, and branches, and leaves, and blos- 
soms, and fruit; and every herb or tree, “having seed in 
itself,” makes provision for the repetition of the same process, 
and the perpetuation and indefinite increase of its kind. The 
same law is observed in the animal kingdom, where a continu- 
ous race is produced from a single pair. And even in the super- 
natural scheme of Revelation itself, the truth was gradually 
unfolded in a series of successive dispensations ; the First 
Promise being the germ, which expanded as the Church 
advanced, until it reached its full development in the Scrip- 
tures of the New Testament. These and similar instances may 
suffice to show that, both in the natural and supernatural Prov- 
idence of God, He has been pleased to act on the principle of 
gradual and progressive, as contradistinguished from that of 
instant and perfect production; and they may seem, at first 


COSMICAL DEVELOPMENT. 47 


sight, to afford some natural analogies in favor of the radical 
idea on which the various modern Theories of Development 
are based. In such circumstances it would be an unwise and 
dangerous course either to overlook the palpable facts which 
Nature and Revelation equally attest, or to deny that they may 
afford signal manifestations of the manifold wisdom of God. 
Nor is it necessary for any enlightened advocate of Theism to 
betake himself to these, expedients ; he may freely admit the 
existence of such cases of gradual development, he may even 
appeal to them as illustrative of the order of Nature, and the 
design which that order displays; and the only question which 
he is at all concerned to discuss amounts in substance to this » 
Whether the method of production which is pursued in the 
ordinary course of Nature can account for the ortginal com- 
mencement of the present system of things ? » 

But the state of the question, and the right application of the 
argument, may be best illustrated by considering each of the 
four forms of the theory separately and in succession. 


SBOCTION 1A, 


THEORY OF COSMICAL DEVELOPMENT, OR OF THE PRODUCTION 
OF WORLDS AND PLANETARY SYSTEMS BY NATURAL LAW.— 
“THE VESTIGES.” } 


Tue doctrine of a Nebular Cosmogony was first suggested 
by some observations of the elder Herschell on those cloud-like 
appearances which may be discerned in various parts of the 


_ heavens by the aid of the telescope, of even, in some cases, by 


the naked eye. It assumed a more definite form in the hands 
of La Place, although even by him it was offered, not as an 
ascertained discovery of science, but simply as a hypothetical 
explanation of the way in which the production of the planets 


Ats MODERN ATHEISM. 


and their satellites might possibly be accounted for by the 
operation of the known laws of Nature. 

The explanation of the whole theory may be best understood 
by dividing it into two parts: the first being that which 
attempts to account for the formation of planets and satellites, 
on the assumption of the existence of a central sun, and of cer- 
tain other specified conditions ; the second being that which 
undertakes to account for the formation of the sun itself, on 
the assumption of the existence of a diffused nebulous matier in 
space, or, as it has been aptly called, “a universal Fire-Mist.”? 

When the theory is limited to the explanation of the origin 
of the planets and their satellites, the original condition of our 
solar system is assumed to have been widely different from 
what it now is; the sun is supposed to have existed for a time 
alone, to have revolved upon his axis, and to have been sur- 
rounded with an atmosphere expanded by intense heat, and 
extending far beyond the limits of our system as it now exists. 
This solar atmosphere revolved, like the sun itself, around its. 
axis; but its heat, constantly radiated into sidereal space, 
gradually diminished, and the atmosphere being contracted in 
proportion as it cooled, the rapidity of its rotation was acceler- 
ated, until it reached the point at which the central attraction 
was overcome by the centrifugal force, and then a zone of 
vapor would be detached or thrown off, which might either 
retain its form as a nebulous ring, like the ring of Saturn, or 
first breaking into fragments, from some want of continuity in 
its structure, and afterwards coalescing into one mass, might be 
condensed into a planet as the vapor continued to cool. These 
rings or planets, thus detached from the central atmospheric 
mass, would continue to revolve, in virtue of the force originally 
impressed upon them, and their motion would be nearly 
circular, in the same plane and in the same direction with that 


1 “ Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation,” p. 17. 


COSMICAL DEVELOPMENT. 49 


~ 


of the sun. The first planet, so formed, must have been that 
at the extreme limit of our solar system; the second the next 
in point of remoteness from the centre, and so on; each result- 
ing from the operation of the same natural laws, and emerg- 
ing into distinct existence at that precise point in the gradual 
cooling and contraction of the atmosphere at which the centrif- 
ugal became stronger than the centripetal force. But each 
planet might also be subjected to the same process of cooling 
and contracting, and might therefore throw off, under the oper- 
ation of the same mechanical laws, zones of vapor more or less 
dense, which might consolidate into moons or satellites, and 
which should also revolve, like the planets, round their primary. 
Thus, Uranus has six satellites, and Saturn seven; while the 
latter has also thrown off two zones so perfectly uniform in 
their internal structure that they remain unbroken, and con- 
stitute a double ring around the planet. 

In this first form of the theory, which assumes the existence 
of the sun and its atmosphere, and the rotation of both round 
an axis, La Place sought to give a scientific form to the specu- 
lations of Sir William Herschell on the condensation of Nebule, 
by proving simply the dynamical possibility of the formation 
of a planetary system by such means, according to the known 
laws of matter and motion; but he did not affirm the scientific 
certainty of his conjecture, and far less the actual production 
of the solar system in this way. He has been followed by M. 
Comte, who has attempted to furnish, if not a complete demon- 
stration, at least a plausible mathematical verification, of the 
hypothesis." Utterly excluding all supernatural agency in the 
work of creation, he equally excludes from the problem which 


1 AuGusTE ComtTE, “Cours de Philosophie Positive,” 11. 363,, 376. 
The merits of this attempt are very differently estimated by two comype- 
tent authorities ; by PRorrssor SEpe@wiIckx in the “ Edinburgh Review,” 
No. 82, p. 22; and by Str Davip BrewsTeER in the “ North British 
Review,” No. 3, p. 476. 

5 


50 MODERN ATHEISM. 


he attempts to solve, the origin of the sun and its atmosphere ; 
and confining himself to the task of accounting, in the way not 
of demonstrative certainty, but merely of plausible hypothesis, 
for the formation of the planets and satellites of our solar sys- 
tem, he conceives the theory of La Place to be susceptible of 
such a numerical. verification as is sufficient to give it a high 
degree of verisimilitude. Assuming that the periodic: time of 
each planet must be equal to that of the portion of the solar 
atmosphere of which it was formed at the era when: it was 
thrown off, and combining the theorems of Huygens on the 
measure of centrifugal forces with Newton’s law of gravitation, 
he establishes a simple equation between the time of the rota- 
tion of each zone or section of the solar atmosphere, and the 
distance of the corresponding planets. On applying this equa- 
tion to the various bodies of our system, he found that the 
periodic time of the moon agrees, at least within the tenth of a 
day, with the duration of the earth's revolution, when her 
atmosphere is supposed to have extended to the moon; and 
that the periodic times of the planets maintain a similar cor- 
respondence with what must have been the duration of the solar 
revolution when they were severally thrown off from its atmos- 
phere. It it the less necessary, however, to enter on a detailed 
exposition of his argument, because he admits that it can afford 
at the utmost only a probable proof of an hypothesis; and 
further, because it is expressly limited to the production of the 
planets and their satellites, while not only is the existence of 
the solar atmosphere presupposed, but also its existence in a 
certain stat2, and with several determinate conditions ; while no 
account whatever is given of the origin cither of the sun or 
its atmosphere, and none of the laws or conditions on which 
the whole process of development is confessedly dependent. 
But the author of “The Vestiges” takes a much wider 
range, and attempts a more arduous task. He seeks to account 
for the origin both of suns and of solar systems by the agency 


COSMICAL DEVELOPMENT. ; St 


of natural laws. Not content with the more limited form of 
the theory, which M, Comte holds to be the only legitimate or 
practical object of scientific treatment, he holds that the origin 
of the sun itself, and the forms, the positions, the relations, and 
the motions, of all the heavenly bodies, may be accounted for 
by supposing a previous state of matter, fluid or gasiform, sub- 
ject only to the law of gravitation. The Nebular Cosmogony, 
which is well characterized by himself as his “ version of the 
romance of Nature,’ is based on the assumption that “the 
nebulous matter of space, previously to the formation of stellar 
and planetary bodies, must have been a universal Fire-Mist,”? 
in other words, a diffused luminous vapor, intensely hot, which 
might be gradually condensed into a, fluid, and then into a solid 
state, by losing less or more of its heat. The existence of such 
a luminous matter being assumed, and it being further supposed 
that it-was not entirely uniform or homogeneous, but that it 
existed im various states of condensation, and that it had “ cer- 
tain nuclei established in it which might become centres of 
aggregation for the neighboring diffused matter,’ — the author 
attempts to show that “on such centres a rotatory motion would 
be established wherever, as was the most likely case, there was 
any obliquity in the lines of direction in which the opposing - 
currents met each other; that this motion would increase as 
the agglomeration proceeded; that at certain intervals the cen- 
trifugal force, acting on the remoter part of the rotating mass, 

would overcome the agglomerating force; and that a series of 
rings would thus be left apart, each possessing the motion 
proper to itself at the crisis of separation. These, again, would 
only continue in their annular form, if they were entirely uni- 
form in their internal structure. There being many chances 
against this, they would probably break up in the first instance, 
and be thereafter. “agglomerated into one or several masses, 


1 “ Vestiges,” p. 11, 23. 


a2 MODERN ATHEISM. 


which would become representatives of the primary mass, and 
perhaps give rise to a progeny of inferior masses.” In support 
of this theory, reference is made to the existence, at the present 
moment, of certain cloud-like nebule, or masses of diffused 
luminous matter, exhibiting a variety of appearances, as if they 
were in various degrees of condensation, and which are 
described as “solar systems in the process of being formed” 
out of a previous condition of matter. And the observations 
of M. Plateau, of Ghent, are adduced as affording an experi- 
mental verification of some parts of the theory, and, especially, 
as serving to explain the spherical form of the planets, the 
flattening at the poles, and the swelling out at the equator. 

- It does not belong to our proper province, nor is it necessary 
for our present purpose, to discuss the merits of this theory, 
considered as a question of science. This has been already 
done, with various degrees of ability, but with unwonted 
unanimity, by some of the ablest men of the age, by Whe- 
well, Sedgwick and Mason, in England, by Sir David Brewster 
and Mr. Miller, in Scotland, and by Professor Dod and Presi- 
dent Hitchcock, in America.t But, viewing it simply in its 
relation to the Theistic argument, we conceive that the adverse 
presumption which it may possibly generate in some minds 
against the evidence of Natural Theology, will be effectually 
neutralized by establishing the following positions : 

That it is @ mere hypothesis, and one which, from the very 
nature of the case, is incapable of being proved by such 
evidence as is necessary to establish a matter of fact. 

That the progress of scientific discovery, so far from tending 


1 WHEWELL, “ Indications of a Creator.” SEpDGwicK’s “ Discourse,” 
5th edition. ‘ Edinburgh Review,” No. 82. Sir D. Brewster, “ North 
British Review,” No. 3. Prorressor Dop, “Princeton Theological 
Essays,” second series. H. MiLurr, “Footprints of the Creator.” T. 
Monck Mason, “Creation by the Immediate Agency of God.” 


COSMICAL DEVELOPMENT. 58 


to verify and confirm, has served rather to disprove and 
invalidate the fundamental assumption on which it rests. 

That even were it admitted, either as a possible, or probable, 
or certain explanation of the origin of the present planetary 
systems, it would not necessarily destroy the evidence of 
Theology, nor establish on its ruins the cause of Atheism. 

Each of these positions may be conclusively established, and 
the three combined constitute a complete answer to the theory 
of Development, in so far as it has been applied in the support 
or defence of Atheism. 

1. That it is a mere hypothesis or conjecture, designed, not 
to establish the historical fact, but to explain merely the 
dynamical possibility of the production of the planetary bodies 
by the operation of known natural laws, must be admitted, I 
think, even by its most enthusiastic admirers. It might have 
seemed, indeed, to have something like a basis of fact to rest 
upon, had the conception of the elder Herschell been verified, 
when he announced the existence of a nebulous fluid, capable 
of being distinguished, by certain well-defined marks, from 
unresolved clusters of stars; but even then it presupposed so 
many postulates, which could in no way be established by 
experimental or historical evidence, that it. could scarcely be 
regarded in any other light than as an ingenious speculation or 
a splendid conjecture. For, let it be considered, first of all, 
that the theory proceeds on the assumption of the existence 
and wide diffusion of a nebulous fluid of whose reality there is 
no actual proof; secondly, that it necessarily requires, also, the 
supposed existence of certain favorable conditions ; and, thirdly, 
the operation of certain invariable laws; and it will be mani- 
fest at once that it is purely hypothetical throughout, and that 
it includes a variety of topics which never have been, and never 
can be made the subjects of experimental verification. For it 
postulates, in the words of an acute writer, “the establishment 
of nuclei in the body of the elemental mass, as well as the ’ 

5 


54 MODERN ATHEISM. 


action of heat on its substance, and then seeks to explain the 
concentration of the nebulous particles into these nuclei by the 
force of gravitation, the rotation of the bodies so produced by 
the confluence of the nebulous fluid, the separation of a portion 
of the outer surface of these revolving masses in the form of 
rings, the disruption of these rings, and the subsequent recom- 
position of their fragments into separate spheres, answering to 
the planets and satellites of our system.”’ But even were the 
existence of a nebulous fluid admitted, we have no. access to 
know what was its internal structure; we cannot determine 
whether it was uniform and homogeneous throughout, or 
whether it contained nuclei which might become centres of 
aggregation; we have no means of estimating the intensity of 
the heat which belonged to it, or of calculating the process by 
which ‘it was dispersed, so as to occasion the condensation of 
successive portions of the mass. No eye ever saw the separa- 
tion of any part of it in the form of a ring, or the disruption 
of that ring, or the subsequent recomposition of its fragments 
into a solid sphere. And even had all this been matter, not of 
mere conjecture, but of actual observation, it would still have 
left much to be explained which can only be accounted for by 
ascribing it to a designing Intelligent Cause. 

2. The progress of scientific discovery, so far from tending 
to verify, has served rather to invalidate the fundamental 
assumption on which the whole theory depends. That assump- 
tion was the existence of a Nebulous Fluid or Fire-Mist, 
capable of being distinguished, by certain characteristic marks, 
from unresolved nebule or clusters of stars. ‘The existence 
of any such fluid has become more and more doubtful, in pro- 
portion as astronomers have been enabled, with the aid of 
larger and better constructed telescopes, to resolve several 


1 Tuomas Moncx Mason, “ Creation by the Immediate Agency of God, 
as opposed to Creation by Natural Law; being a Refutation of ‘The Ves- _ 
tiges,’”’ &c., p. 34. 


COSMICAL DEVELOPMENT. Bys) 


nebulz which had previously defied the power of less perfect 
instruments. We do not affirm that every cluster has been 
already resolved, nor is it necessary for the purposes of our 
argument to suppose that, at any future time, this stupendous 
achievement is likely to be effected; for it is a very obvious 
consideration, that just in proportion as our telescopic powers 
are enlarged so as to enable us to resolve many of the nearer 
nebulz, they must also bring within the range of our extended 
vision others more remote and hitherto unperceived, which may 
continue to exhibit the same cloud-like appearance as the 
former, until, by a new improvement of the telescope, we may 
succeed in separating them into distinct stars; and even then 
the march of discovery is not ended,—we may reasonably 
expect that with every fresh increase of telescopic vision, new 


clusters will be brought into view, and new clouds appear in 


the utmost verge of the horizon. But, unquestionably, the 
progress which has already been made in this direction affords 
a strong presumption in favor of the idea, that the apparent 
nebulosity of those masses which still appear, even to our best 
telescopes, as cloud-like vapors, is to be ascribed rather to the 
imperfection of our instruments than to any difference between 
them and such as have been already resolved. Sir John Her- 
schell, a high authority in such a case, tells us that “we have 
every reason to believe, at least in the generality of cases, that 
a nebula is nothing more than a cluster of stars.”4 Sir David 
Brewster is equally explicit: “It was certainly a rash general- 
ization to maintain that nebule differed essentially from clusters 
of stars, because existing telescopes could not resolve them. 
The very first application of Lord Rosse’s telescopes to the 
heavens overturned the hypothesis ; and with such unequivocal 
facts as that instrument has brought to light, we regard it as a 


1§1r Joun HERSCHELL, “ Memoir on Nebule and Clusters of Stars,” 
London Philosophical Transactions, 1833. ‘‘ Edinburgh Review,” No. 82, 
p. 19. 


56 ; MODERN ATHEISM. 


most unwarrantable assumption to suppose that there are in 
the heavenly spaces any masses of matter different from solid 
bodies, composing planetary systems.”+ And Professor Nichol, 
while he gracefully acknowledges that he has “somewhat 
altered the views which he formerly gave to the public, as the 
highest then known and generally entertained, regarding the 
structure of the heavens,” states, as the result of more mature 
reflection, that “the supposed distribution of a self-luminous 
fluid, in separate patches, through the heavens, has, beyond all 
doubt, been proved fallacious by that most remarkable of tele- 
scopic achievements,—the resolution of the great nebula in 
Orion into a superb cluster of stars; and that this discovery 
necessitates important changes in previous speculations on 
Cosmogony.” ? 

In short, Lord Rosse’s observations at Parsonstown have 
conclusively proved that what appeared to be a nebula was in 
reality a cluster of stars; and while they still leave many 
nebulz unresolved, they afford a strong warrant for believing 
that discoveries in the same direction might be indefinitely 
extended in proportion to the increase of telescopic power. 

3. But even were the Nebular Hypothesis admitted, and 
were the Theory of Development by Natural Laws conceived 
to afford a satisfactory explanation of the origin of the plane- 
tary systems, it would not follow, as a necessary consequence, 
that the peculiar evidence of 'Theism — that on which it mainly 
depends, and to which it makes its most confident appeal — 
would be thereby destroyed, or even diminished. The only 
legitimate result of such a doctrine would seem to be, that we 
must distinguish aright between a work of JJ/ediate, and a work 
of Immediate Creation. In the Bible each of these is distinctly 
recognized, We have a specimen of the one in the creation 


1“ North British Review,” No. 3, p. 477. 
2 PROFESSOR NICHOL, “The System of the World,” Preface, v1., and 


{08. 


COSMICAL DEVELOPMENT. 57 


of the first man by the direct agency of Divine power; we 
have a specimen of the other in the creation, less direct but 
equally real, of all his natural posterity, through the medium 
of ordinary generation. Men do not cease to be the creatures: 
of God because they are born of their parents,.in virtue of 
that creative word, “ Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish 
the earth;” and hence children are admonished “to remember 
their Creator in the days of their youth.”* The work of 
creation is equally real and equally Divine, whether it be 
effected mediately or immediately, with or without the interven- 
tion of means, by the direct and instantaneous exertion of 
Almighty power, or by the gradual and successive operation of 
second causes acting according to established laws. In the 
ordinary course of Providence, the method of mediate pro- 
duction, gradual growth, and progressive development, may be 
observed in innumerable instances ; but it can never be justly 
held to exclude, or even to obscure, the evidence of a presiding 
Intelligence and a supernatural Power. On the contrary, it 
may serve rather to enhance that evidence; since the very 
arrangements and provisions which have been made with a 
view to the reproduction of every thing after its kind, may bear 
on them the legible impress of a designing Mind and an ordain- 
ing Will. Thus, year by year continually, the whole inhab- 
itants of the world are supported by the fruits of harvest, which 
are produced and matured under the action of natural laws ; 
yet every intelligent Theist ascribes the result ultimately to the 
goodness, wisdom, and power of God, and sees in the very 
processes by which it is brought to pass some of the most 
signal proofs of these Divine perfections. 

Now, as this method is followed in the work of Providence, 
which may be, and often has been, described as a continuous 
creation, and yet has no tendency to destroy, or even to 


1 Ecclesiastes 12: 1. 


58 MODERN ATHEISM. 


diminish, the evidence of a presiding Intelligence in Nature, so 
no good reason can be assigned why it mzght not also have been 
adopted in the production of planets and astral systems, if so it 
had seemed good to Supreme Wisdom. If this method was 
adopted for the propagation of plants and animals, no reason 
can be given why it might not also have been adopted for the 
production of planets and moons; nor would it in the latter case, 
any more than in the former, impair the evidence of God’s 
creative wisdom and power. Jor, suppose it be possible that, 
by a marvellous process of self-evolution, the material elements 
of Nature might assume new forms, so as to originate a suc- 
cession of new worlds and new planetary systems, without the 
immediate or direct interposition of a Supernatural Will; 
suppose that the earth and the other bodies now belonging to 
our own system, were generated out of a prior condition of 
matter, existing in a gasiform state and diffused through space 
as a Fire-Mist, subject to the ordinary action of heat and 
gravitation ; suppose, in short, that there were LAWS FOR THE 
GENERATION OF WORLDS in the larger cycles of time, just as 
there ARE LAWS FOR THE GENERATION OF ANIMALS in the 
short ages of terrestrial life;— would a provision for such a 
succession of marvellous developments necessarily destroy, or 
even impair, the evidence for the being and perfections of God? 
Does the generation of the animated tribes diminish the 
evidence of design in the actual constitution of the world? 
And why should a similar provision, if any such were found to 
exist, for the generation of stars and systems, be regarded in 
any other light than as an exhibition, on a still larger scale, of 
“the manifold wisdom of God?” 

Let it ever be remembered that the Theistic argument 
depends, not on the mode of production, but on the character of 
the resulting product. ‘The world may have been produced 
mediately or immediately, with or without the operation of 
natural laws; but if it exhibit such an arrangement of parts, 


COSMICAL DEVELOPMENT. 59 


such an adaptation of means to ends, or such a combination of 
collocations and adjustments, as enables us at once to discern 
the distinctive marks of intelligent design, the evidence cannot 
be diminished, it may even be possibly enhanced, by the 
method of production. Provision is made, doubtless, for the 
growth and development of the eye, the ear, and the hand, in 
the human foetus, and the process by which they are gradually 
formed is regulated by natural laws. But the resulting pro- 
ducts are so exquisitely constructed, so admirably adapted to 
the elements of nature, and so evidently designed for the uses 
of life, that they irresistibly suggest the idea of wise and benev- 
olent contrivances; and this idea is as strong and clear as it 
could have been had they been produced instantaneously by 
the direct act of creative power. And so of the planets and 
astral systems: they may have been generated, that is, pro- 
duced, in a way of natural development; yet the resulting 
products are such as to evince the supreme wisdom and 
beneficence which presided over their formation. But even 
this is not all. Let us suppose, further, that Philosophy may 
yet reach its extreme, and, as we humbly conceive, unattainable 
limit; let us suppose that it may succeed in decomposing all 
the chemical elements now known, by resolving them into ONE 
primary basis; let us even suppose that it may succeed in 
reducing all the subordinate laws of Nature into oNE supreme 
and universal law; still the development of such a system as 
we see around us out of such materials, and by such means, 


would not be necessarily exclusive of the idea of God, but 


might afford evidence of a Supreme Mind, creating, combining, 
and controlling all things for the manifestation of His adorable 
perfections. 

We have thus seen that the Theory of Cosmical Develop- 
ment is a mere hypothesis, incapable of experimental or his- 
torical proof; that the recent progress of scientific discovery 
has tended to disprove the fundamental assumption on which it 


60 MODERN ATHEISM. 


rests; and that, even were it admitted as a possible, or, still more, 
as a plausible explanation of the origin of planets and astral 
systems, it would not serve to destroy, and scarcely, if at all, 
to diminish the evidence of Theism. 

The last of these positions, if well established, might seem to 
supersede the necessity of discussing the hypothesis at all in 
connection with our present theme. But such a discussion of 
it as has been offered may be useful to those — and they are 
not a few — who, superficially acquainted with Science in its 
more popular form, are exposed to the danger of being seduced 
by the authority of a few distinguished names which have 
unfortunately become identified with the cause of Atheism. 
For, while the author of “The Vestiges” repudiates the 
atheistic conclusions which some have deduced from his hy- 
pothesis, M. Comre boldly avows his, creed in the following 
revolting terms: “To minds unacquainted with the study of 
the heavenly bodies, Astronomy has still the reputation of 
being a science eminently religious, as if the famous verse, 
‘Ceeli enarrant gloriam Dei’ (‘The heavens declare the glory 
or Gop’), had preserved all its force.” And, he adds, in a 
note, “ At present, to minds that have been early familiarized 
with the true astronomical philosophy, the heavens declare no 
other glory than that of Hipparchus, Kepler, Newton, and all 
those who have contributed to the establishment of their laws!” 
The reader of these laws may become illustrious, but the Maker 
of them must be utterly ignored ! 


“Sn 


PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT. 61 


SECTION. II. 


THEORY OF PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT; OR THE PRODUC- 
TION OF VEGETABLE AND ANIMAL RACES BY NATURAL LAW. 
—“TELLIAMED.” —“ PHYSIO-PHILOSOPHY. 


Tue Theory of Development has been applied not only to 
explain the origin of worlds and of astral systems in the sky, 
but also to account for the origin of the various tribes of vege- 
table and animal life which exist on the earth itself. There is 
nothing, indeed, in any of the kingdoms of Nature that may 
not be included in it, since the formation of all material bodies, 
organic or inorganic, is supposed to be sufficiently accounted 
for by the sole action of Chemical or Mechanical laws. The 
wide range of this theory is strikingly illustrated by the words 
of one whose powers of observation have added some interest- 
ing discoveries to Natural History, but whose speculations on 
the origin of Nature resemble the distempered ravings of 
lunacy, rather than the mature results of philosophic thought. 
“ Physio-philosophy has to show,” says Dr. Oken, “how, and 
in accordance indeed with what laws, the Material took its 
origin, and, therefore, how something took its existence from 
nothing. It has to portray the first periods of the world’s 
development from nothing ; how the elements and heavenly 
bodies originated ; in what method, by self-evolution into higher 
and manifold forms, they separated into minerals, became 
finally organic, and, in man, attained self-consciousness. .... 
Physio-philosophy. is, therefore, the generative history of the 
world ; or, in general terms, the history of Creation, a name 
under which it was taught by the most ancient philosophers, 
namely, as Cosmogony. From its embracing the Universe, it 
is plainly the Genesis of Moses!” 4 


1 LorENZ OKEN, M. D., “ Elements of Physio-philosophy,” — reprinted 
(unfortunately) under the auspices of the Ray Society, London, 1847. 
6 


62 MODERN ATHEISM. 


It will be observed that this strange speculation goes far 
beyond the comparatively modest conjecture of La Place. It 
postulates nothing, and undertakes to account for everything. 
In flagrant opposition to the old atheistic maxim, “ Ex nihilo, 
nihil,” it boldly affirms, “Ex nihilo, omnia.” It speaks, 
indeed, of “laws in accordance with which the world took its 
origin ;” but these laws must be as abstract as those of Mathe- 
matics, since they existed -before matter ,itself; nay, more 
abstract, or, rather, more inconceivable still, since they existed, 
it would seem, even before Mind! Dr. Oken attempts to 
explain the production of the world from nothing by comparing 
it to the evolution of Arithmetical and Mathematical Science, 
out of the fundamental conception of zero! But, waiving this, 
we shall direct our attention to the only points in this theory 
which, in the existing state of speculative thought, can be held 
to have any practical interest in connection with our great 
theme. 

That theory attempts to account for the production both of 
the Fiora and the Fauna of the natural world by the process 
of Development rather than by the miracle of Creation. It pro- 
ceeds on the assumption, akin to that of Epicurus, that atoms 
or monads alone existed in the first instance 5 and that from 
these were derived, under the action of natural law and by a 
process of gradual development, all existing substances and 
beings, whether organic or inorganic, mineral, vegetable, or 
animal. “No organism has been created,” says Dr. Oken, “ of 
larger size than an infusorial point. No organism is, nor ever 
has one been created, which is not microscopic. Whatever is 
larger has not been created, but developed. Man has not been 
created, but developed.” On this fundamental assumption the 
whole theory is based. But we must carefully distinguish 
between the Atomic Theory and the application which is here 
made of it. The recent discoveries of Chemistry, by which all 
material compounds have been decomposed into their constit- 


PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT. 63 


uent elements, amounting to little more than fifty substances, 


which are either the primary or the proximate bases of all 
existing bodies, and the marvellous transformations which these 
elementary principles undergo, in respect alike of form, of 
density, of solidity, and of magnitude, under the action of 
natural laws, — may serve to make it credible that there is no 
a priort impossibility in the assumption on which the Atomic 
Theory depends. Had it been the will of God to call into 
being the various vegetable and animal races in the way of 
gradual evolution out of these primary monads, no enlightened 
Theist will presume to say that it was either impossible, or 
inconsistent with His wisdom to do so. It must be observed, 
however, that the natural analogies which have sometimes 
been appealed to in support of this hypothesis, labor under a 
grievous defect when they are applied to account for the origin 
of the existing races, and that they are extended far beyond 
their legitimate limits when they are supposed to prove that 
these races might begin to be without any direct interposition 
of creative power. For, while the oak may spring from an 
acorn, and the largest animal from a microscopic monad, yet 
within the whole range of our experience both in the vegetable 
and animal kingdoms, the seed is produced by the organism, and 
necessarily presupposes it; whence it follows, either that there 
must have been an eternal succession of organisms producing 
seed, and thereby perpetuating the race, or if this be inconceiv- 
able, still more if it can be disproved by geological or historical 
evidence, then that the analogy of our present experience leads 
us up, not to “an infusorial point” or “microscopic monad,” 
but to a primary living organism as the commencement of each 


existing tribe. In the words of Dr. Barclay, “It will not be 


easy, on any principles exclusive of the vital, to answer these 
questions, What was the origin of the first egg, or what was 
the origin of the first bird? For where is the egg that comes 
not from a bird, and where is the bird that comes not from an 


64 MODERN ATHEISM, 


ego? To the mere materialists, who exclude every species 
of vitality but that from organism, this problem is nearly as 
embarrassing as the origin of the Universe itself.” * 

If these views be correct, all the natural analogies would 
lead us to acquiesce, as Dr. Barclay did, in the Mosaic nar- 
rative as the most philosophical account of the commencement 
of the present order of things. It traces up every race to a 
primary organism, endowed with reproductive powers ; for it 
tells us, in regard to the Fiora, that God said, “ Let the earth 
bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit-tree yield- 
ing fruit after his kind, whose seed is in ttself, upon the earth; 
and it was so.” And it tells us, with regard to the Fauna, 
that God said, “Let the waters bring forth abundantly the 
moving creature that hath life, and fowl that may fly above 
the earth in the open firmament of heaven. And God created 
great whales, and every living creature that moveth, which 
the waters brought forth abundantly, after their kind, and every 
winged fowl after his kind. And God blessed them, saying, 
Be fruitful, and. multiply, and fill the waters in the seas, and 
let fowl multiply in the earth.” 

Here the distinction between different genera and species, 


and the provision that was made for the perpetuation of differ-’ 


ent races, are prominently presented; while the production, in 
the first instance, not of an “infusorial point” or “microscopic 
monad,” but of a living organism capable of multiplying its 
kind, is expressly declared; and every race is traced up to 
that primary organism, in perfect consistency with the only 


law, whether of vegetable or animal reproduction, which is ~ 


known to be in operation at the present day. And this law of 
reproduction, so far from being exclusive of a primary act of 
Creation, seems to presuppose and require it; for there must 
be a living organism before there can be vital transmission. 


1Dr. Jonn Barcray, “Inquiry concerning Life and Organization,” 
pp. 33, 36. See also pp. 177, 235, 413, 526. 


PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT. 65 


But the theory of Physiological Development proceeds on a 
totally different supposition, —a supposition for the truth of 
which we have not only no historical evidence, but not even 
the slightest analogical presumption, since we have no instance 
of development anywhere except from a germ or seed, pro- 
duced by an organism preéxisting in a state of maturity. 

But the exigencies of that theory demand a wide departure 
from all the familiar lessons of experience ; and hence recourse 
has been had to a series of the wildest and most extravagant 
conjectures, such as may well justify the opinion of those who 
have held that the creed of certain philosophers makes a much 
larger demand on human credulity than that.of almost any 
section of the Christian Church. For, according to that the- 
ory, the origin of the FLora is first accounted for by the 
action of some element — probably electricity —on a certain 
mucus, which is supposed to be generated at those points where 
the ocean comes into contact with the earth and air; that is, 
on the shore of the sea at low water mark. Mariier had 
broached the idea of the marine origin of all our present 
“herbs, plants, roots, and grains,”' at a period when the Uni- 
versal Ocean, of which Leibnitz said so much, was still the 
creed of some speculative minds; but it has been more recently 
revived, and exhibited in greater detail, though not with 
stronger evidence, by some writers of our own age. Thus 
Dr. Oken tells us that “all life is from the sea;” that “ when 
the sea organism, by self-elevation, succeeds in attaining into 
form, there issues forth from it a higher organism ;” and that 
“the first organic forms, whether plants or animals, emerged 
from the shallow parts of the sea.” And so the author of 
“The Vestiges” attempts to show that new races, both of 
plants and animals, marine and terrestrial, may be accounted 


1“ Telliamed; ou, Entretiens d’un Philosophe Indien avec un Mission-» 
aire Francois, sur la Diminution de la Mer, la Formation de la Terre. 
VOrigine de ’ Homme,” 2 vols., 1748. ° 

G* 


66 MODERN ATHEISM. 


for, without any act of immediate creation, by a change or 
transmutation of species resulting from the agency of natural 
causes. “'There is,” as he tells us, “another set of phenomena 
presented in the course of our history ; the coming into exist- 
ence, namely, of a long suite of living things, vegetable and 
animal, terminating in the families which we still see occupy- 
ing the surface. The question arises, — In what manner has 
this set of phenomena originated? Can we touch at, and rest 
for a moment on, the possibility of plants and animals having 
likewise been produced in the way of Natural Law, thus 
assigning but one class of causes for everything revealed to 
our sensual observation? Or are we at once to reject this idea, 
and remain content either to suppose that creative power here 
acted in a different way, or to believe, unexaminingly, that the 
inquiry is one beyond our powers?” In reply to these ques- 
tions, he proceeds to show that “there is a balance of proba- 
bility from actual evidence in favor of an organic creation by 
law,” and that “in tracing the actual history of organic beings 
upon the earth,” as revealed by Geology, we find that “these 
came not at once, as they might have been expected to do if 
produced by some special act, or even some special interpo- 
sition of will, on the part of the Deity; they came in a long- 
continued succession, in the order, as we shall afterwards see 
more convincingly, of progressive organization, grade follow- 
ing grade, till, from an kumble starting-point in both kingdoms, 
the highest forms were realized.” Such is his general princi- 
ple; and, without entering into the details, we may sum up his 
general argument by saying, in the words-of another,” that, 
according to his theory, “dulse and hen-ware became, through 
a very wonderful metamorphosis, cabbage and spinach; that 
kelp-weed and tangle bourgeoned into oaks and willows; and 
that slack, rope-weed, and green-raw, shot up into mangel-wur- 


1“ Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation,” 6th edition, p. 90. 
2Mr. Hueu MILER, “ Footprints of the Creator,” p. 226. 


PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 67 


zel, rye-grass, and clover.” So much for the FLora; and now 
for the Fauna, and the transition from the one to the other. 
His views are thus exhibited by Sir David Brewster: “'The 
electric spark, escaping from the wild elements around it, struck 
life into an elementary and reproductive germ, and sea-plants, 
the food of animals, first decked the rude pavement of the 
ocean. ‘The lichen and the moss reared their tiny fronds on 
the first rocks that emerged from the deep; land-plants, evolv- 
ing the various forms of fruit and flower, next arose, — the 
Upas and the bread-fruit tree, the gnarled oak and the lofty 
cedar. Animal life appeared when the granary of nature was 
ready with its supplies. A globule, having a new globule form- 
ing within itself, which is the fundamental form of organic 
being, may be produced in albumen by electricity ; and as such 
globules may be identical with living and reproductive cells, we 
have the earliest germ of organic life, the first cause of all the 
species of animated nature which people the earth, the ocean, 
and the air. Born of electricity and albumen, the simple 
monad is the first living atom; the microscopic animalcules, 
the snail, the worm, the reptile, the fish, the bird, and the 
quadruped, all spring from its invisible loins. The human 
similitude at last appears in the character of the monkey; the 
monkey rises into the baboon, the baboon is exalted to the 
ourang-outang, and the chimpanzee, with a more human toe 
and shorter arms, gives birth to man.” 

The remarks which were offered, in the previous section, on 
Cosmical Development, are equally applicable, metatis mutan- 
dis, to this other form of the doctrine of Creation by Natural 
Law. ‘It might be shown, with reference to the supposed gen- 
eration of plants and animals, just as it was then shown with 
reference to the generation of planets and astral systems, first, 
that the theory rests upon a mere hypothesis, which is utterly 


1 “ North British Review,” 1845, p. 483. 


68 MODERN ATHEISM, 


unsupported by experimental evidence; secondly, that the 
progress of science has hitherto afforded no ground to believe 
that the transmutation of species is provided for under the 
established constitution of nature; and, thirdly, that even were 
the theory admitted, it would not destroy the evidence of The- 
ism, any more than the propagation of plants and animals under 
the existing system, which, so far from excluding or impairing, 
serves rather to enhance and illustrate the proof of creative 
wisdom and power. In support of this last position, we might 
adduce the testimony of the author of “The Vestiges” him- 
self; for, referring to the idea that “to presume a creation of 
living beings by the intervention of law”, is equivalent. to 
“superseding the whole doctrine of the Divine authorship of 
organic nature,” he takes occasion to say, “Were this true, it 
would form a most important objection to the Law theory; but 
I think it is not only not true, but the reverse of the truth. As 
formerly stated, the whole idea of law relates only to the mode 
in which the Deity is pleased to manifest His power in the 
natural world. It leaves the absolute fact of His authorship 
of and supremacy over Nature precisely where it was.” He 
adds, in the words of Dr. Buckland, “Such an aboriginal con- 
stitution, so far from superseding an Intelligent Agent, would 
only exalt our conceptions of the consummate skill and power 
that could comprehend such an infinity of future uses under 
future systems, in the original groundwork of His Creation.?? 

But, without enlarging on those general considerations which 
were formerly stated, and which admit of an easy and obvious 
application to this second form of the theory, we shall offer a 
few remarks bearing directly on its distinctive peculiarities, 
and directed to the exposure of its radical defects. 

The theory rests on two very precarious foundations: the 
assumption of spontaneous generation, on the one hand, and the 


*  1“YVestiges of the Natural History of Creation,” p. 92. 


PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT. 69 


assumption of a transmutation of species on the other. Each 
of these assumptions is necessarily involved in any attempt to 
account for the origin of the vegetable and animal races by 
natural law, without direct Divine interposition. For if, after 
the first organism was brought into being, the production of 
every subsequent type may be accounted for simply by a 
transmutation of species, yet the production of the original 
organism itself, or the first commencement of life in any form, 
must necessarily be ascribed either to a creative act or to spon- 
taneous generation. A new product is supposed to have come 
into being, differing from any that ever existed before it, in the 
possession of vital and reproductive powers; and this product 
ean only be ascribed, if Creation be denied, to the spontaneous 
action of some element, such as Electricity, on mucus or albu- 
men. In this sense the doctrine of spontaneous generation 
seems to be necessarily involved in the first step of the process 
of Development, and is, indeed, indispensable, if any account is 
to be given of the origin of vegetable and animal life; but in 
the subsequent steps of the same process it is superseded by a 
supposed transmutation of species, whereby a lower form of 
life is said to rise into a higher, and an inferior passes into a 
more perfect organism. : 

But we have no experience either of spontaneous genera- 
tion on the one hand, or of a transmutation of species on the 
other. Observation has not discovered, nor has history re- 
corded, an authentic example of either. In regard to the jist, 
the author of “The Vestiges” anticipates this objection, and 
attempts to answer it. The objection is, that “a transition 
from the inorganic to the organic, such as we must suppose to 
have taken place in the early geological ages, is no ordinary 
cognizable fact of the present time upon earth; structure, 
form, life, are never seen to be imparted to the insensate ele- 
ments; the production of the humblest plant or animalcule, 
otherwise than as a repetition of some parental form, is not 


70 MODERN ATHEISM. - 


one of the possibilities of science.”! Such is the objection ; 
and how does he attempt to answer it? He endeavors to 
show, first, that the work of creation having been for the most 
part accomplished thousands of years ago, we have no reason 
to expect “that the origination of life and species should be 
conspicuously exemplified in the present day; secondly, that. the 
comparative infrequency, or even the entire absence, of such 
phenomena now would be no valid reason for believing that 
they have never been exhibited heretofore, if, on other grounds, 
the doctrine of Mera creation’ or ‘life-creating laws’ can 
be rendered probable ; and, thirdly, that even in our own times 
there are facts which seem to indicate the reality, or at least 
the possibility, of “the primitive imparting of life and form to 
inorganic elements.” ? 

Now, to this elaborate argument in favor of spontaneous 
generation, or the production of life by natural law, we answer, 
in the first place, that the mere fact of its being adduced in 
connection with the Theory of Development affords a conclu- 
sive proof that it is indispensable to the maintenance of that 
theory, that the hypothesis would be incomplete without it, 
and that no account can be given of creation by the mere doc- 
trine of a transmutation of species. It is the more necessary 
to make this remark, because nota few who embrace the lat- 
ter doctrine affect to disown the former, and seek to keep it 
out of view. But the one is as necessary as the other to a 
complete theory of Natural Development. The author of 
“The Vestiges” felt this, and virtually acknowledges it when 
he undertakes the task of vindicating the credibility of spon- 
taneous generation. But we answer, in the second place, that 
the method in which he performs his self-imposed task is sin- 
gularly curious, and not a little-instructive. He had, it must 
be owned, a difficult game to play. The general theory of 


/ 


1“ The Vestiges,” p. 104, 2 Ibid. 


PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 71 


«The Vestiges” is founded on the fact that, in the ordinary 
course of Nature, the races of.plants and animals are perpetu- 
ated by propagation, aceording to established Natural Laws, — 
a fact which might seem to afford a strong analogical argu- 


| 4 


ment in favor of the supposition that the same order of Nature 
, 


is maintained also in’the few apparently exceptional cases in 
which, from our defective knowledge, we are unable to trace 


i] 
| 
H 


the connection between the parent and the product. And yet 
the author evinces no little anxiety to make out a case in favor 
of “a non-generative origin of life even mm. present day ;” 
and he appeals to a class of facts, confessedly obscure, which 
have not been, as he thinks, satisfactorily accounted for by the 
law which usually regulates the production of organic beings. 
- He refers us to the speculations of Dr. Allen Thomson on the 

primitive production of Infusoria,! to the facts which modern 

science, aided by the microscope, has discovered respecting 


the Entozoa, or the creatures which live within the bodies of 


others, and, above all, to the experiments of Mr. Crosse and 
Mr. Weekes, which seemed to result in the production of a 
small species of insect (Acarus Orossit) from the action of a 
voltaic battery on a saturated solution of the silicate of potash, 
or the nitrate of copper, or the ferrocyanate of potassium. 
The reason of his anxiety to avail- himself of these cases is 
evident. The exigencies of his theory demanded a method 
of accounting for the primary origin of life different from any 
that can be found in the common process of propagation. He 
saw clearly enough that his main argument, founded, as it was, 
on the law of hereditary transmission, could not account for 
the production of the first organism; and that, if he would 
avoid either the doctrine of Jmmediate Creation, which is so 
offensive to him, or the idea of Hternal Generation, which is 
utterly excluded by the clearest lessons of Fossil Geology, he 


1 Topp, “Cyclopedia of Anatomy and Physiology,” article, Generation. 


72 MODERN ATHEISM. 


must have recourse to the hypothesis of Spontaneous Gener- 
ation. Hence he attempts to account for the commencement 
of new species both of plants and animals, in the course of the 
world’s history, by a transmutation of species; while, for the 
origin of the first species, he has reéourse to the same law of 
Development, but acting in widely different circumstances, and 
giving rise to what he calls “aboriginal generation,’ whereby 
the inorganic passes into the organic, and life, form, and struc- 
ture, are imparted to hitherto inert materials by the action of 
Electricity on mucus or albumen. ‘To accomplish this twofold 
purpose, he felt it necessary to insist, in the first instance, on 
the ordinary law of generation as the established order of 
mediate creation ; while he found it equally necessary, in the 
second place, to insist on those apparently exceptional cases in. 
which the connection between the germ and the product has 
hitherto eluded philosophical research,— and this for the pur- 
pose of showing that the original production of plants and 
animals was not similar to the ordinary method of their propa- 
gation in any other respect than this, that in both cases the 
result is brought about by Natural Laws, without mis direct 
interposition of any supernatural cause. 

Now, in so far as his argument is founded on the prin- 
ciple of analogy,—and it is on this principle that it proceeds 
throughout,—we submit that it is radically vicious, and utterly 
inconclusive. For the vast majority of cases in which the 
commencement of life and organization falls under our notice 
being confessedly those, not of primary production, but of 
mediate reproduction, it is reasonable to believe that the same 
law governs all cases alike, whether we have been able or not 
to trace the origin of life to the principle of propagation, the 
few apparent exceptions being sufficiently accounted for by our 
imperfect knowledge of the causes and conditions on which 
‘they depend. Besides, the argument’ from analogy in favor of 
a primary production of life by natural causes, in so far as it is 


PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT. io 


founded on the present law of hereditary transmission, is radi- 
cally defective, since the two cases are widely different ; the 
one presupposing @ primary organism of the same kind, from 
which others are evolved by a law of natural succession, the 
other exhibiting life as a new product, resulting not from any 
prior organism, but from the action of causes of a totally dif- 
ferent kind, which are not known to be capable of giving birth 
either to vegetable or animal organisms under the actual con- 
stitution of Nature. 

But suppose, even, that the Acarus Crossit were admitted to 
be a real product of Galvanic action on the silicate of potash, 
and an undeniable instance of “a non-generative origin of life,” 
how would the illustrative example accord with the author’s 
general theory? It might afford a specimen of aboriginal 
production ; but how would it fit in with his favorite doctrine 
of a gradual and progressive advancement from the lower to 
the higher forms of organization? The Acarus, at first sup- 
posed to be a new and hitherto unknown creature, is now 
acknowledged to be one of a very familiar species, —a species 
which may have deposited its ova, and propagated its kind, 
since the commencement of the present order of things, and 
whose eggs might very well resist the action even of nitrate of _ 
copper, since the creature itself could live in that poisonous 
mixture. Moreover, it belongs, in point of organization, to 
one of the highest orders of organisms ; not to the radiata, not 
to the mollusca, but to the highest type of the artéewlata, the 
nearest to the vertebrata. Had it been a monad,—a mere 
living cell,— which Galvanism evolved from the solution, and 
had this primary product developed itself afterwards in various 
forms, according to the ascending scale of a progressively im- 
proving organization, it might have accorded admirably with 
the twofold doctrine of spontaneous generation and transmu- 
tation of species; but, unfortunately, the first process is so 


perfect, in the present instance, as to leave little room for the 
t 


74 MODERN ATHEISM. 


second, and we are almost tempted to hope that perhaps the 
clumsy and troublesome expedient of a transmutation of 
species may yet be superseded by the discovery of some 
method,— we know not what,— whereby not only the aricu- 
lata, but the vertebrata, and even Man himself, may be imme- 
diately produced by some new combination of Nature’s ele- 
mental laws !? 

We have given prominence, in the first instance, to the doc- 
trine of “spontaneous” or “aboriginal” production, because it 
constitutes an indispensable part of the Theory of Develop- 
ment, and because we believe that, were this clearly understood, 
that theory would soon sink into general discredit or total 
oblivion, like the kindred speculations of Anaximander and 
Anaxagoras, of the old Ionic School. The experiments of 
Ehrenberg, instituted with the view of testing the doctrine of 
spontaneous generation, may be said to have decided the whole 
question. They did not succeed, indeed, in explaining every 
apparently exceptional case, for some of the facts are still 
obscure, and will probably continue to be so, notwithstanding 
every extensicn of microscopic power, just as, in the analogous 
case of the Nebula, the increase of telescopic power has 
enabled us to resolve not a few of them into clusters of stars, 
while it has served to bring others yet unresolved within the 
range of our vision. But they were sufficient, at least, to show 
that, as far as our clear knowledge extends, the one uniform 
law, “Omne vivum ex ovo,” universally prevails, and that the 
whole analogy of Nature, in so far as its constitution has been 
ascertained, is adverse to the doctrine of spontaneous gener- 
ation. Ehrenberg detected the minute germs of vegetable 
mould, and the ova of some of the smallest animalcules ; and 
when it is considered that these germs and ova are so tenacious 


1 Mr. Hues MILrer, “Footprints of the Creator,” p. 233. T. Monck 
Mason, “Creation by the Immediate Agency of God.” ‘“ Princeton 
Theological Essays,” Second Series, p. 422. 


PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT. rie 


of vitality that certain prolific seeds have come down to us 
from the age of the Pharaohs in the wrappings of the Egyp- 
tian mummies,— that they are widely diffused in the air and 
the waters, insomuch that no sooner does a coral reef appear 
above the level of the sea than it is forthwith covered with 
herbage by means of seeds wafted by the winds or deposited 
by the waves, 


and that it is almost impossible to exclude 
them by any artificial expedient, since they are capable of 
resisting the action of boiling water and even of alcohol itself, 
— it cannot, we think, be denied that the few cases which still 
remain obscure or unexplained may be, at least, probably 
accounted for in accordance with the same natural law which 
is found to be invariably established in every department to 
which our clear knowledge extends. 

In regard, again, to the supposed “ transmutation of species,” 
we are equally warranted in affirming that it is destitute of all 
experimental evidence, and unsupported even by any natural 
analogy. As the doctrine of spontaneous generation stands 
opposed to the maxim that organic life can be produced only 
by organic life, so the doctrine of a transmutation of species 
stands opposed to the equally certain maxim that lke produces 
like, both in the vegetable and animal kingdoms. Cuvier has 
demonstrated, with reference to the birds and reptiles pre- 
served in Egypt, an entire fixity and uniformity of species, in 
every, even the least, particular, for at least three thousand 
years.’ In the actual course of Nature we see no tendency to 
change; nay, a barrier seems to have been erected in the con- 
stitution of Nature itself to prevent the possible confusion of 
races by promiscuous intercourse, through that provision 
which renders the mule incapable of reproduction. No plant 
has ever been found in a state of transition from a lower to a 
higher form; no instance has ever been produced of one of 


1 Cuvier, “‘ Ossemens Fossiles,” p. 61, 


76 MODERN ATHEISM. 


the alge being transmuted into the lowest form of terrestrial 
vegetation; nor of a small gelatinous body developing itself 
into a fish, a bird, or a beast; nor of an ourang-outang rising 
intoaman.! It is true, indeed, that “there is a capacity in 
all species to accommodate themselves, to a certain extent, to 
a change of external circumstances, this extent varying greatly 
according to the species. There may thus arise changes of 
appearance or structure, and some of these changes are trans- 
missible to the offspring; but the mutations thus superinduced 
are governed by constant laws and confined within certain 
limits. Indefinite divergence from the original type is not 
possible, and the extreme limit of possible variation may 
usually be reached in a short period of time ; in short, species 
have a real existence in Nature, and a transformation from 
one to another does not exist.”? 

The whole science of Natural History is based on the exist- 
ence of distinct species, capable of being discriminated from 
each other by certain characteristic marks; and the whole 
art of the agriculturist and the stockbreeder proceeds on the 
assumption of a law, invariable in its operation, whereby “like 
produces like in the vegetable and animal worlds.” The 
instances to which the author of “The Vestiges” refers in 
support of his theory are utterly frivolous when opposed to 
the copious inductions to which they are opposed; and they 
may all be explained consistently with the law of variation 
within definite limits, as stated by Dr. Whewell, or by our 
ignorance of all the conditions involved in each particular 
case. Nor is his argument founded on the limited range of 
our observation, even with its singular illustration derived 
from Mr. Babbage’s calculating engine, fitted to diminish, in 
the slightest degree, our confidence in the general results of 


1 Mr. Huenu MILER, “ Footprints,” p. 254. 
2Dr. WHEWELL’s “ Indications,” p. 54. 


i 
i] 


PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT. , ai 


these inductions ; for, not to mention that it amounts to nothing 
more than an appeal from what we do know to what we do not | 
know, from knowledge to ignorance, from the certainties of 

science to the mere possibilities of conjecture, it has been well 

shown by Mr. Miller, that our range of observation is not so 

limited as the author of “The Vestiges” would have us to 

believe, since “extent of space is, in a matter of this kind, 

equivalent to duration of time. For, although no man has 

lived five hundred years, so as to observe the gradual develop- 

ment of the oak from the acorn in its various stages of progress, 

yet every man who can survey five hundred yards of an 

English forest, can see the oak in every stage of its growth, and 

need have no doubt as to the law of its progressive develop- 

ment. And go, had there really been such a transmutation of 

species as is contended for, we might expect to find, somewhere 

on the vastly extended sea coasts of our islands and continents, 

some specimens of plants or animals in a state of transition 

from the lower to the higher forms.” 

We are told, indeed, in answer to this argument, that Mr. 
Babbage’s engine produces numbers according to a certain law 
up to a particular point, and then, most unexpectedly, perhaps 
even unaccountably, the law of the series is changed, and the 
next term exhibits a striking departure from the order previ- 
ously followed; and so, it is argued, it may be in nature. 
Each organism may propagate after its kind for immense 
periods, so as to give the impression of this being an invariable 
law; but at a certain stage the order may change, and the 
next term in the series may differ from all that went before it. 
The argument — if it can be called an argument — amounts to 
this: Mr. Babbage’s machine produces a series of numbers, and 
of numbers only, but according to different laws of succession ; 
ergo, Nature may produce in the same way, and with similar 
variations, different races of plants and animals. ‘The argu- 
ment: would have been perfect if the engine had produced 

7* 


78 MODERN ATHEISM. 


something else than numbers; if, as Professor Dod supposes, 
“while watching Mr. Babbage’s machine, presenting to us 
successive numbers by the revolution of its plates, we should 
suddenly see one of those plates resolving itself into types, and 
these types arranging themselves in the order of a page of 
‘Paradise Lost,’ or even of ‘The Vestiges of Creation ;’—in 
such a case, there might have been something in the argument; 
but even then, the withering question remains, Is there any 
man in his senses who would not immediately conclude that 
some new cause was now at work 2” 

In short, in so far as the facts of the case are concerned, 
there is not only no known instance either of ‘spontaneous 
generation ” or of “transmutation of species,” but there is not 
even any natural analogy that can give the theory the slightest 
aspect of verisimilitude. The author of “The Vestiges” 
thinks that a presumption in its favor may be derived from 
“the analogy of the inorganic world,’ —in other words, from 
the supposed conversion of nebule into planets and astral 
systems by the operation of natural causes; but this analogy 
‘has been conclusively set aside by disproving the hypothesis 
on which it depends. He further thinks that a favorable 
presumption may be derived from “ the analogy of the organic 
world,” — in other words, from the process of propagation by 
which the races of plants and animals are perpetuated ; but the 
presumption thence derived, so far from being favorable, is 
directly opposed to his theory, since all the facts which come 
under our cognizance in every department of Nature serve 
only to establish the two great maxims of Natural History, — 
that organic life can spring only from organic life, and that 
like produces like, both in the vegetable and animal werld. 

If we have succeeded in disposing of the facts of the case, we 
shall have little difficulty in exposing the fallacy of the prin- 
ciples which are involved in the author’s speculations on this 


subject. It is of fundamental importance, in this inquiry, to 


PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT. 79 


form a clear and correct conception of the precise point at 
issue, and of the two alternatives between w hich we are called 
to make our choice. It has been well said that “the great 
antagonist points in the array of the opposite lines are simply 
the Law of Development versus the Miracie of Creation.” * 
And the author of “The Vestiges” virtually acknowledges 
this to be the real state of the question, when he says that “ if 
we can see no natural origin for species, a miraculous one 


992 


must be admitted. Now, the grand alternative being Crea- 
tion by Miracle or Creation by Law, that is, Creation by a 
Natural or by a Supernatural cause, we affirm that it is utterly 
presumptuous and unphilosophical to represent the ene as less 
worthy of God, or more derogatory to His infinite perfections, 
than the other. Yet the author does not hesitate to say that 
the natural ought to be preferred to the miraculous method of 
accounting for the origin both of planets and of their inhab- 
itants, for this among other reasons, that the latter would be 
derogatory to the wisdom and power of the Most High. His 
words are remarkable: “The Eternal Sovereign arranges a 
solar or an astral system by dispositions imparted primordially 
to matter; He causes, by the same majestic means, vast oceans 
to form and continents to rise, and all the grand meteoric 
agencies to proceed in ceaseless alternation, so as to fit the 
earth for a residence of organic beings. But when, in the 
course of these operations, fuci and corals are to be for the first 
time placed in those oceans, a particular interference of the 
Divine power is required; and this special attention is needed 
whenever a new family of organisms is to be introduced, — a 
new fiat for fishes, another for reptiles, a third for birds; nay, 
taking up the present views of Geologists as to species, such an 
event as the commencement of a certain cephalopod, one with a 
few new nodulosites and corrugations upon its shell, would, on 


1 “ Footprints of the Creator,” p. 19. 2“ The Vestiges,” p. 105. 


80 MODERN ATHEISM. 


this theory, require the particular care of that same Almighty 
who willed at once the whole means by which infinity was 
replenished with its worlds?” .,.. “Is it conceivable, as a 
fitting mode of exercise for Creative Intelligence, that it should 
be constantly paying a special attention to the creation of 
species, as they may be required in each’ situation throughout 
those worlds at particular times? Is such an idea accordant 
with our general conception of the dignity, not to speak of the 
power, of the Great Author?” ... . “It would be distressing 
to be compelled to picture the power of God as put forth in 
any other manner than in those slow, mysterious, universal laws 
which have so plainly an eternity to work in.”} 

Such is the author’s presumptuous decision on a matter which 
is far “too high for him.” We offer the following remarks 
upon it: 

First of all, let it be observed that, unless on the principle 
of absolute Atheism, which he professes to repudiate, he cannot 
but acknowledge that once, at least, the power of God must have 
been put forth 7m another manner than “in those slow, mysteri- 
ous, universal laws” of which he speaks; and that, even if he 
could succeed in disproving “repeated interferences of creative 
power,” he. could in nowise dispense with a primitive act of 
direct, immediate, supernatural creation, since he does not pro- 
fess to believe in the eternal existence of matter and its laws. 
We find, indeed, that even in the subsequent acts of a con- 
tinuous, but mediate creation, he is compelled to acknowledge 
a supernatural power as acting, in each individual case, accord- 
ing to established natural laws; for he says expressly, “ There 
cannot be an inherent intelligence in these laws ; the intelligence 
appears external to the laws, something of which the laws 
are but as the expression of the will and power.’ If this 
be admitted, the laws cannot be regarded as primary or 


1 “The Vestiges,” pp. 91, 96. 


PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT. 81 


independent causes of the phenomena of the physical world. 
We come, in short, to a being beyond Nature, — its Author, its 
God.” ....‘ When we speak of Natural Law, we only speak 
of the mode in which the Divine power is exercised ; it is but 
another phrase for the action of the ever-present and sustaining 
God.” It is admitted, then, first, that there must have been 
a primary act of creation, in the highest and strictest sense, by 
a direct and immediate interposition of Divine power, at the 
commencement of created existence; and, secondly, that, even 
in the continuous work of creation, which is supposed to have 
been subsequently carried on after the method of development 
by established natural laws, Divine agency is still equally real, 
although it is differently manifested, and is indispensably neces- 
sary to account for the resulting products. Now, can it be 
reasonably asserted that the direct and immediate creation of 
such a being’as Man would be more derogatory to the wisdom 
and power of God than the primordial production of “a uni- 
versal Fire-Mist,” or even of “electricity and albumen?” or, 
will it be pretended that immediate creation of molluscs as 
molluses, of fishes as fishes, of reptiles as reptiles, would be less 
worthy of the great Author of Nature than the establishment 
of a system which must in due time give them birth, and that, 
too, not without the concurrence and codperation of the Divine 
will; for “natural law is but another phrase for the action of the 
ever-present and sustaining God ?.” 

But, while we hold that ‘there is no good. ground for an 
affirmative answer to these questions, we would carefully guard 
against rushing to the opposite extreme, and affirming, either 
that the production of new races by the method of natural law 
was, on @ priort grounds, impossible, or that God might not 
have adopted that method, had He so pleased, in perfect con- 
sistency with the manifestation of His wisdom and power. We 


1 “The Vestiges,”’ p. 9. 


82 MODERN ATHEISM. 


see that He has done so, under the actual constitution of Nature, 
so far as the production of ctndividuals is concerned; we see 
not why a similar provision might not have been made for the 
production of genera and species. In either way His power 
and His wisdom might have been displayed, But, when we . 
are told that the one is derogatory to the Divine Majesty, and 
the other alone consistent with the loftiest views of His per- 
fections, we denounce the whole speculation as one that is 
alike presumptuous and unphilosophical, on the simple but con- 
clusive ground that we are in no degree competent judges of 
the best method either of creating or of governing the world. 
Had we been asked to say whether it was likely that, under 
the rule of infinite wisdom and almighty power, certain insects, 
reptiles, and fishes, that are unattractive to the eye, and loath- 
some to the fastidious taste of many, could find a place at all 
among the works of God, we might have thought it improbable 
that they should be created; but they exist notwithstanding, 
and the fact of their existence is enough to silence all our pre- 
sumptive reasonings. And surely it is not less —it is much- 
more — presumptuous to affirm that, existing as they do, they 
could not have been brought into being, without disparagement 
to Divine wisdom, otherwise than by the action of established 
laws, or by a process of natural development; as if it were 
unworthy of God to produce that for whose production He 
confessedly did make provision. 

But, further, we see here very strikingly exemplified the 
tendency of such speculations to exclude God from all real, 
active, and. direct connection with His works. The dominion 
of Natural Law, which, as we shall afterwards see, is held by 
M. Comte and Mr. Combe to exclude the doctrine of a special 
Providence and the efficacy of prayer, is here extended, by the 
author of “The Vestiges,” so as to be exclusive also of any 
direct Divine interposition in the work of Creation itself, other 
than what may have been implied in the aboriginal production 


PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT. 83 


of matter and its laws, or in the subsequent concurrence of His 
will with the action of these laws in the established order of 
Nature. 

We have said that the Theory of Development, as ex- 
pounded in “ The Vestiges,” is not necessarily atheistic, partly 
because the author professedly disclaims Atheism, and partly 
also because, in strict logic, it might still be possible, even on 
the basis of that theory, considered simply in itself and apart 
from the speculations with which it has been associated, to 
construct, from the actual phenomena of Nature, a valid proof 
for the being and attributes of God. And yet we have thought 
it necessary to.advert to it as one of the recent speculations of 
science, because, whatever may be its professed aim, its prac- 
tical tendency is unquestionably hostile to the influence of 
religious truth. It will be found, in the great majority of 
cases, and especially in the case of ardent youthful minds, that 
this theory, when it is embraced as an article of their philo- 
sophie creed, is, to all practical purposes, .tantamount to 
Atheism. For not to insist on the consideration, so forcibly 
stated by others,! that the natural argument for the Immortality 
of Man, or for the doctrine of a Future Life, as implying 
distinct individuality and continued self-consciousness, must be 
materially weakened, if not entirely neutralized, by a theory 
of development which traces the human lineage up through 
the monkeys and fishes to albumen impregnated by electricity, 
or, further still, to a diffused Nebula or universal Fire-Mist,— 
we think that the Sensational and Materialistic speculations 
with which the work abounds have a tendency to weaken the 
evidence for a living, personal, spiritual God, as the Creator 
and Moral Governor of the world, and to diminish that rever- 
ence, confidence, and love, which these aspects of His character 


1 HucH Mier, “Footprints,” pp.13,15, PROFESSOR Dop, “‘ Prince- 
ton Theological Essays,” 11. 432. « 


7 


84 MODERN ATHEISM. 


alone can inspire. The system of Epicurus, although it con- 
tained a formal recognition of a First Cause, has always been 
held to be practically atheistic, simply because it removed God 
from the active superintendence of the affairs of the world, and 
excluded the doctrine of a special providence and of a moral 
government. It was held, in the words of Cicero, “ Epicurum 
verbis reliquisse Deos,—re sustulisse.”* And so, in “ The 
Vestiges,’ Natural Law is substituted for Supernatural Inter- 
position, not only in the common course of Providence, but in 
the stupendous work of Creation itself. 


SECTION III. 


THEORY OF SOCIAL OR HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. — 
AUGUSTE COMTE. 


It might have been thought that the principle of Develop- 
ment had exhausted its powers, and achieved its highest 
triumphs, when it had been applied successively to account, 
first, for the creation of planets and astral systems, and, secondly, 
for the production of vegetable and animal life ; and that little 
could remain for it to do after it had succeeded in tracing the 
genealogy of Maw back, in a direct line through many gener- 
ations, to the nebulous matter or luminous Fire-Mist which 
was diffused at the beginning of time throughout the Universe. 
But, on a more careful study of its last and highest product,— 
Man, with his intellectual and moral nature, his religious 
beliefs, his social history, and his immortal hopes,— it seemed 
as if there were still some phenomena which remained to be 
accounted for, some facts of palpable reality and great mag- 
nitude which had not yet been adequately explained. The 


1 Cicero, “‘ De Natura Deorum,” L. 11. 


HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. 85 


mental faculties and their operations, the moral laws that are 
universally recognized and appealed to, the social institutions 
which have been established, the religious beliefs and feel- 
ings which have generally prevailed, and the rites of worship 
which have been observed in all ages and climes, were so 
widely different from the phenomena of mere vegetable or 
animal life, that they seemed to demand a distinct account of 
their origin; and it might not be apparent, at first sight, how 
they could be reduced under the same all-pervading law by 
which the planets were formed, so as to exclude all idea of 
Divine supernatural interposition. This Herculean task was 
fearlessly undertaken, however, by M. AveustEe Comte, and 
it has been elaborated with singular ability in his ponderous 
work, the “ Cours de Philosophie Positive.” 

M. Comte’s Course of Positive Philosophy began to be 
delivered at Paris in the winter of 1829-30, and was com- 
pleted in its published form in 1842-43. It comprehends a 
general outline of all the branches of Inductive Science, and of 
the relations which they bear to each other; and they are 
expounded in a style singularly copious, clear, and forcible. 
He has acquired, in consequence, a high reputation as a philo- 
sophical thinker, and has already found, in our own country, 
some able allies, and not a few enthusiastic admirers. The 
“ System of Logie,” by John Stuart Mill, and “ The Biographi- 
cal History of Philosophy,” by G. H. Lewes, are avowedly 
indebted to his speculations for some of their most character- 
istic contents; while the outline of his theory has been pre- 
sented to the more popular class of readers in England through 
the columns of “The Leader,” and in Scotland through those 
of “The Glasgow Mechanics’ Journal.” 

It is not my intention, nor is it necessary for my present 
purpose, to offer any remarks on the strictly scientific portion 
of his voluminous work. I shall confine myself exclusive!y to 
those speculations which bear, more or less directly, on the 

8 


86 MODERN ATHEISM. 


great cause of Natural and Revealed Religion, selecting them 
from all the various parts of his work, and exhibiting them, in 
one comprehensive view, as a compact theory of absolute and 
avowed Atheism. 

The fundamental idea of his system is a supposed “law of 
the development of human thought,” which regulates and 
determines the whole progress of the species in the acquisition 
of knowledge. This law is announced with the air of a man 
who has made a great discovery, and who is entitled, in conse- 
quence, to be regarded both as an original thinker, and as a 
benefactor to the world. “TI believe,” he says, “that I have 
discovered a grand fundamental law,’—“ the fundamental law 
of the development of the human mind;” .... “the grand 
law which I have indicated in the first part of my system of 
Positive Politics, . . . . where I have divulged, for the first 
time, the discovery of this law.” Now, what, it may be 
asked, is this marvellous discovery, which bids so fair both to 
immortalize its author and to enlighten the world? It is 
stated briefly in the first, and illustrated at greater length in 
the fourth and following volumes of his work. The general 
outline of his theory is thus sketched: “That law consists in 
this,— that each one of our leading conceptions, every branch 
of our knowledge, passes successively through three different 
theoretic states: the state theological or fictitious, the state 
metaphysical or abstract, and the state scientific or positive. 
In other words, the human mind, by its nature, employs suc- 
cessively, in each of its researches, three methods of philoso- 
phizing, whose character is essentially different, and even radi- 
cally opposed: first, the Theological method ; then, the Meta- 
physical ; and, last of all, the Positive. Hence three systems 
of Philosophies, which mutually exclude each other. The first 


1M. Comtz, “Cours de Philosophie Positive,” 1. 3, 6, 14 Te Valk 
653, 656, 708, 711, 723; v. 1, 9. 


HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. 87 


is the necessary starting-point of the human mind ; the third is 
its fixed, ultimate state; the second is purely provisional, and 
destined merely to serve as an intermediate stage.” : 

These are the three great stages through which the collective 
mind of Humanity must necessarily pass in its progressive 
advancement towards a perfect knowledge of truth ; but of 
these three, the first, or the Theological Epoch, is again sub- 
divided, and exhibited as commencing with Fetishism, then 
advancing to Polytheism, and finally consummated in Mono- 
theism. 

Frrisnism is supposed to have been the first form of the 
Theological Philosophy; and it is described as consisting in 
the ascription of a life and intelligence essentially analogous to 
our own to every existing object, of whatever kind, whether 
organic or inorganic, natural or artifical. It is traced to a 
primitive tendency, supposed to exist equally in man and in 
the lower animals, to conceive of all external objects as ani- 
mated, and to ascribe to them the same, or similar, powers and 
feelings with those which belong to the living tribes them- 
selves? “Let an infant, for example, or a savage, on the one 
hand, and, on the other hand, a dog or a monkey, behold a 
watch for the first time, there will doubtless be no immediate 
profound difference, unless in respect to the manner of repre- 
senting it, between the spontaneous conception which will 
represent to the one and the other that admirable product of 
human industry as a sort of veritable animal, having its own 
peculiar tastes and inclinations ; whence results, consequentially, 
in this respect, a Fetishism fundamentally common to both, 
the former only having the exclusive privilege of being able 
ultimately to get out of it.” This instinctive and spontaneous 
belief —the natural, and, indeed, the necessary result of a 


1M. Comte, “Cours de la Philosophie Positive,” 1. 3. 
2 Ibid, v. 30, 42, 50, 96, 98, 101. 


- 


88 MODERN ATHEISM. 


® 


tendency inherent in living beings —is conceived to have been 
an indispensable and a most useful provision for the primeval 
state of man, and to have exerted a highly salutary influence 
on the progressive development of human thought. It is con- 
trasted with the subsequent but more advanced stage of Poly- 
theism ;* and the latter is held to denote a spontaneous belief 
in supernatural beings, distinct from and even independent of. 
matter, since it is passively subject to their will; while the 
former considers matter itself as animated, and has no idea of 
any higher or more spiritual form of being. It is further sup- 
posed that idolatry, properly so called, belongs to Fetishism 
only, and not at all to Polytheism, for this singular, but not 
very conclusive reason, among others, that if Polytheism be 
justly chargeable with idolatry because it recognizes many wills 
superior to Nature and having power over it, Catholicism 
would be equally liable to the same charge in respect of the 
homage which it renders to saints and angels!” 

But Fetishism is only the initial step in the process of our 
intellectual development; and it passes: into Polytheism, not 
suddenly and per saltum, but slowly and gradually, through 
the intermediate stage of “Astrolatrie,” or the worship of the 
heavenly bodies. The mind is imperceptibly divested of the 
idea that everything around it is animated, and, by a process 
of real, but as yet imperfect generalization, it rises from Fetish- 
ism to Polytheism; in which latter system of belief an order 
of powers superior to Nature is recognized, while as yet there 
is no conception of a supreme and all-perfect Mind. The — 
Polytheistic system, which prevailed so universally in the 
ancient world, and which still prevails among Heathen nations, 
is supposed to have been, not a declension from a purer and 
better state, not a corruption either of natural or revealed re- 
ligion, but a step in advance of the primary faith of mankind, a 


r 1M. Comrs, “Cours,” v. 37, 75, 91, 101. 
2 Tbid., v. 58, 87, 94, 105, 125, 278. 


HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. 89 


result of growing intelligence, a vast and most beneficial change 
in the right direction. It was the first great product of the 
metaphysical spirit, the result of an early but imperfect gen- 
eralization; it constituted the principal era of the theological 
history of mankind; it was admirably adapted, and, indeed, 
indispensably necessary, to the exigencies of society at the 
time when it prevailed; it was more intensely religious than 
Monotheism itself, since it brought man habitually into contact 
with a multitude of gods, whose symbols were always present 
and visible to the eye, while it exerted a wholesome influence 
on Science, on Poetry, on Industry, on Morals, and, indeed, on 
the whole process of man’s mental and social development." 
But Polytheism, although indispensable and salutary as a 
provisional belief, was not destined to be permanent ; it was to 
be superseded in due time, at least in the case of the élite of 
humanity, by the higher and still more abstract system of 
Monotheism, which is regarded as the natural and inevitable 
product of human intelligence, independently of all supernat- 
ural teaching, at a certain stage of its development. But here, 
as in the former instance, the change is not effected suddenly ; 
the human mind advances gradually from Polytheism to Mono- 
theism, through the intermediate stage of the idea of Immuta- 
bility or Destiny, —an idea suggested partly by the study of 
the invariable order of Nature, and partly by the irresistible 
domination of one great temporal power, such as the iron 
empire of Rome. Historically, indeed, Monotheism is said 
to have spread in Europe through the Jews, who derived it 
from Egypt; but it is added that, had there been no Jews, 
others would have given birth to a system so necessary for the 
development of human thought. The prevalence of Mono- 
theism, for a limited time, was useful, and even necessary, as 


1M. Comrz, “Cours,” v. 107, 115, 119, 124, 186, 148, 162, 167, 207, 224, 
229. 
2 Ibid., v. 128, 164, 268, 279, 284, 290. 
g* 


90 MODERN ATHEISM. 


the natural result of the great law of human progress, and the 
indispensable precursor of a new and brighter era; but it was 
temporary and provisional merely,—a stage in the onward 
march of development, not the ultimate landing-place of 
human thought. It is conceived to be radically incompatible 
with the recognition of invariable natural laws, and even with 
the exercise of the industrial arts. It is, however, the last 
and highest form of the Theological Philosophy; and, having 
reached this stage, the human mind necessarily advances be- 
yond it, until it arrives at a point where all theology disap- 
pears, and where it is entirely and forever emancipated from 
all the beliefs, the hopes, and the fears which have any refer- 
ence to an invisible spiritual world. 

The ultimate goal of speculative thought is “the Positive 
Philosophy,” which treats only of the Facts of Nature, and of 
their codrdination under general laws, to the utter exclusion 
of all supernatural powers, and of all knowledge of causes, 
whether efficient or jinal. But this goal cannot be reached, 
it seems, by a sudden or abrupt transition from the Theological 
to the Atheistic creed. There must be an intermediate stage, 
—the era, in short, of Metaphysics, —during which the process 
of Criticism will operate as a solvent on all previous beliefs, 
and by producing Skepticism, in the first instance, in regard to 
all other systems, will tend at length to Concentrate the atten- 
tion of mankind exclusively on the truths of Inductive Science. 
The Metaphysical Philosophy is held to be the necessary, but 
temporary stage of transition from the theological to the posi- 
tive method in science. - It is destined to supersede the one, 
and to introduce’ the other. It is conceived to be equally at 
variance with both; and the era of its ascendency is described 
as a critical, destructive, revolutionary age, useful only as it 
delivers mankind from the shackles of former beliefs, and 


1M. Comte, “Cours,” v. 297, 325, 461, 470; vz. 231. 


HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. 91 


prepares them for the adoption of a new and purely natural 
system of thought. During this era of decomposition there 
will commence the reconstruction of human opinion on new 
and more solid foundations; and the transition from Monothe- 
ism to Positive Science will be the greatest achievement of 
the race, greater far than the advancement from Fetishism to 
Polytheism, or even from Polytheism to Monotheism itself. 
The culminating point of human progress is. absolute and uni- 
versal Atheism. 

Surely such a prospect may well arrest the most thoughtless, 
and prompt them to inquire, with some measure of moral 
earnestness, What zs this Positive Philosophy, this ultimate 
landing-place of human thought, this final goal of human 
progress? Is it nothing else than the Inductive Science of 
Bacon, but under a new and less attractive name? or is ita 
philosophy radically different from it, and entitled, therefore, 
to be regarded as an original method? ‘The author tells us 
that he might have called it “Natural Science,” or “the Phi- 
losophy of Nature,” since it treats of Facts and their Laws; 
but that he had been induced to prefer the distinctive title of 
positive, as one better fitted to mark the contrast between it 
and the negative character of those metaphysical and theologi- 
cal systems which it is destined to supersede. And yet it will 
be found that, in so far as it differs at all from the Inductive 
Science of Bacon, it is purely negative, since its chief charac- 
teristic is the negation of all Theology, and the entire exclu- 
sion from the domain of human knowledge, of Causes, whether 
efficient or final. It adds nothing to the sum of human thought 
which might not be reached by Bacon’s method; it only sud- 
tracts whatever has reference to the Divine and Supernatural, 
and especially everything connected with the theory of Causa- 
tion. It makes no new contribution to the general stock, 


1M. Comte, “Cours,” v. 479, 487, 496, 505; v1. 2. 


92 MODERN ATHEISM. 


unless, indeed, it be the hitherto unknown law of development 
which is supposed to regulate and determine the progress of 
humanity from primeval Fetishism to ultimate Atheism; and 
it takes away Theology, with all its ennobling beliefs and 
blessed hopes, not by grappling with and solving, but by 
merely discarding the problem both of the origin and end of 
the world. 

That this is a correct account of the new theory is evident 
from his-own words: “The fundamental character of the 
Positive Philosophy is, to regard all phenomena as subjected 
to invariable natural /aws, the precise discovery of which, and 
their reduction to the least possible number, is the end of all 
our efforts; while we regard the investigation of what are 
called causes, whether first or final, as absolutely ¢naccessible 
and void of sense for us.” . .. . “We have no preten- 
sion to expound the producing causes of the phenomena, for in 
that we can never do more than push back the difficulty; we 
seek only to analyze with exactitude the circumstances of 
their production, and to connect them with one another by the 
normal relations of succession and similitude.’—“In the posi- 
tive state of science, the human mind, acknowledging the 
impossibility of obtaining absolute knowledge, abandons the 
search after the origin and destination of the universe, and the 
knowledge of the secret causes of phenomena.” } 

It is thus plainly announced that the Positive Philosophy is 
the science of facts and their laws, exclusive of all reference 
to causes, efficient or final; and it is even admitted that The- 
ology could not be excluded, were it deemed legitimate or 
possible for the human mind-to investigate the causes of 
phenomena. 

Viewing the theory in this light, we submit the following 
remarks as a sufficient antidote to this daring but impotent 


1 ComTE, “Cours,” 1. 4, 10; rv. 664, 669, 676, 702. 


HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. 93 


- 


attempt to exclude Theology from the domain of human 
knowledge. 

1. It is worthy of notice how completely the Infidel party 
have shifted their ground and changed their tactics since the 
era of the first French Revolution; and how utterly inconsist- 
ent are the arguments of M. Comte and the Positive School 
with those of Voltaire and the Encyclopedists. Formerly, 
Religion was wont to be ascribed to priestcraft; it was sup- 
posed to have been invented by fraud, supported by falsehood, 
and professed in hypocrisy; and the Church, but especially 
the hierarchy of Rome, was the object of incessant ridicule or 
malignant abuse. But now, Religion is discovered to be the 
natural, necessary, and salutary result of the legitimate action 
of the human faculties in the earlier stages of their develop- 
ment, the initial impellent of social progress, the indispensable 
condition of advancing civilization; and, on the broad, general 
principle that sincerity of conviction is essential to wide-spread 
success, the theory which ascribes its origin to the fraud or the 
policy, whether of kings, or priests, or fanatics, is scouted as a 
mere delirium of Voltaire, or as one of those revolutionary 
prejudices of his disastrous era which were alike irrational 
and injurious. And the Church, so far from being ridiculed 
or maligned, is lauded above measure as the highest extant 
product of Awnan wisdom; Catholicism is even preferred to 
Christianity itself, as a manifest improvement on the more 
primitive form of faith and worship; it is declared to be the 
indispensable basis of the future reorganization of society, 
which, when it shall have been freed from all theological 
influence, its only point of weakness, will still survive, with 


its separate speculative class, its imposing public forms, and its 


splendid hierarchy,—an Atheistic society, but still Catholic 


and One The change, in this respect, between the opinions 


1M. Comte, “Cours,” v. 299, 326, 345; v1. 62, 72, 157, 234, 503, 864. 


94 ; MODERN ATHEISM. 


which prevailed, respectively, at the era of the first and that 
of the second Revolution, is at once striking and instructive. 
It shows how variable and vacillating is the wretched creed 
of Infidelity, and how the firm maintenance of’ truth will event- 
ually compel the homage, even where it may not succeed in 
carrying the convictions, of speculative minds. That Religion 
in all its successive forms, from the rudest Fetishism up to the 
sublimest Christian Monotheism, has been the natural and 
genuine product of human intelligence, working ever onward 
and upward to a still higher stage of development, —that its 
existence was inevitable, and its influence, on the whole, highly 
beneficial,—and that, even when it shall have passed away, 
society will still be largely indebted to it for the impulse, yet 
unspent, which it has imparted to the cause of civilization and 
progress,—all this is admitted and even maintained by M. 
Comte, in direct and often derisive opposition to the theorists 
who once ascribed its origin to fraud, and its prevalence to 
priestcraft; nay, he elevates it to the rank of a primordial and 
indispensable element of human progress, a necessary and 
legitimate result of the great law of human development. 
We know of no parallel instance of a change of opinion so 
great and sudden, unless it be the marvellous transition of cer- 
tain modern Rationalists who were wont to ridicule ‘the doc- 


trine of the Trinity as absurd and incomprehensible, but who 


have now arrived at the conclusion that it is the fundamental 
law of human thought !} 

Still, with all this outward homage to Religion, considered 
as a mere matter of history, the theory of M. Comte is essen- 
tially and even avowedly Atheistic. It is mainly designed to 
account for the origin of all Religion, whether Natural or 
Revealed, without having recourse to the supposition either of 
the existence of God, or of his interposition at any time in the 


1 Abe Maret, “ Theodicée Chretienne,” p. 218. 


-—— 


HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. 95 


affairs of men. He seems to have proposed to himself a two- 
fold object: first, to account for the prevalence of the various 
forms of natural religion and superstition, without recognizing 
any valid evidence for the existence of supernatural powers ; 
and, secondly, to account for the origin of Judaism and Chris- 
tianity, or, as he calls it, of Monotheism, without recognizing 
the reality of any Divine Revelation. And he attempts to 
accomplish both objects by means of the same law —a law 
of development which, in primitive éimes, produced Fetishism 
—which then produced Polytheism; then Monotheism; then 
the Metaphysical transition era, during which all Theology is 
undergoing a process of disintegration and decay; and, last of 
all (the noblest, because the latest, birth of time), the Posi- 
tive Philosophy, under whose predicted ascendancy all Theol- 
ogy must die and be buried in everlasting oblivion. His 
theory is not merely Anti-Protestant, although it is bitterly 
so;1 nor merely Anti-Christian, as opposed to all Revelation ; 
but it is Anti-Theological, as opposed to all Religion. It pro- 
poses to eliminate Theology from the scheme of our knowledge, 
by showing that it is utterly inaccessible to our faculties, and 
neither necessary to society nor useful to morals.’ It antici- 
pates the time, as being near at hand, when it shall have no 
existence, save on the historic page. 

2. This Atheistic theory rests entirely on a supposed dis- 
covery of M. Comte,—the discovery of a law of human devel- 
opment, which serves at once to account for the origin and prev- 
alence of Theological beliefs in the past, and to insure their 
utter disappearance in the future; a law which, like the ma- 
gician’s wand, can raise the apparition, and then lay it again! 
Now, of this law we affirm and undertake to prove that it is 
utterly groundless; that it has no solid basis of evidence on 
which it can be established; that it is contradicted by the 


1M. Comte, “Cours,” v. 327, 344, 369, 538, 582, 684; v1. 137. 
2 Ibid., v. 428, 597, 684, 836; vr. 419, 521, 860. 


96 MODERN ATHEISM. 


history of the world, and opposed to our own experience at 
the present day. af 

Jt can scarcely be imagined that a man accustomed, as M. 
Comte has been, to the severe pursuits of Science, could give 
publicity to a law of this kind, and claim the credit of a great 
original discovery, without having some plausible reasons to 
plead for it; and he does assign certain reasons for his belief, 
which are, it may be safely affirmed, as frivolous and inconclu- 
sive as any that have evem been offered in support of the most 
baseless revery. They may be reduced to THREE; the first, 
derived from our cerebral organization; the second, from the 
history of a certain portion of our species; the ¢hird, from the 
analogy of our individual experience. 

He founds, in the first instance, on our cerebral organization. 
He is an ardent admirer of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim, and has 
no scruple in avowing himself a decided Materialist. It is 
unnecessary here to enter on a discussion of Materialism, or 
even of Phrenology,—that will be done hereafter; in the mean 
time it is enough merely to indicate the fact that the theory | 
proceeds on that ground, and then to inquire how the funda- 
mental law of Development is deduced from it. How does the 
theory of Materialism, or even of Phrenology, were it assumed 
on the one side and admitted on the other, contribute to the 
establishment or verification of that law? Suppose it to be 
conceded that every mental faculty or propensity has a distinct 
cerebral organ, or, more generally, that the brain may be 
divided into three parts, representing, respectively, the animal 
propensities, the more elevated sentiments, and the intellectual 
faculties; could it be rationally inferred from this concession 
that human nature must necessarily develop itself after a cer- 
tain order or method, and especially in the precise way that is 
indicated in M. Comte’s law? Would it prove that Man must 


1M. ComrTe, “Cours,” 1. 44, 141; rv. 673; v. 45, 303. 


HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. 97 


needs pass, in the process of his mental and social develop- 
ment, through three distinct and successive stages,— the pre- 
paratory Theological state, the transitory Metaphysical state, 
and the final Positive state? Would it prove that Religion 
must first exist as Fetishism, then as Polytheism, then as 
Monotheism, and thereafter disappear from the earth alto- 
gether on the advent of M. Comte? He seems to think that 
there is a real connection between the cerebral theory and his 
creat fundamental law ; but it is not easy for a common reader 
to discern or to explain it. Considering the cranium, accord- 
ing to what he conceives to be the true anatomical theory, as 
simply a prolongation of the vertebral column,— the primitive 
centre of the whole nervous system,—he argues that the func- 
tions, intellectual and emotional, which are proper to the upper 
and anterior parts of it, are less energetic than the animal pro- 
pensities, whose organs lie in the lower and posterior region, 
just in proportion as they are further removed from the spine ; 
and that, for this reason, the latter must first come into action, 
then the intermediate organs of sentiment, and, last of all, the 
intellectual powers. And this doctrine he applies to the verifi- 
cation both of his otherwise admirable classification of the 
Sciences, and of his far more doubtful law of human develop- 
ment. We conceive that if it were applicable at all to the 
problem of human progress, it might possibly be applied to 
indicate the probable development of an individual mind, in 
the successive stages of infancy, youth, and manhood; but that 
it does not admit of the same application to the history of the 
race, otherwise than by the aid of a very fanciful analogy. 
We have no faith in the a priori methods of constructing the 
chart of human history, and tracing the necessary course of 
social progress, which have recently become so popular in Ger- 
many and France. We cannot, with M. Comte, undertake to 
solve the problem,— Given three lobes of the brain, represent- 
ing the propensities, affections, and intellectual powers, but 
9 


7 


98 MODERN ATHEISM. 


differing from each other in size and situation, what will be 
the future history of the race,— religious, xsthetic, industrial, 
metaphysical, social? We cannot, with M. Cousin, undertake to 
solve the problem, — Given three terms, the finite, the infinite, 
and the relation between the two, what will be the develop- 
ment of human thought, first, in the experience of individuals, 
and, secondly, in the history of society?! All such problems 
‘are too high for us. The history of the human race must be 
ascertained from the authentic records and extant monuments 
of the past, not constructed by theories, or divined by a 
priori speculations. 

But M. Comte does appeal, in the second instance, to his- 
tory in confirmation of his views. He is far from affirming, 
however, that the progress of the race, under the operation of 
his great law of development, has been either uniform or inva- 
riable; on the contrary, he admits, with regard to India, China, 
and other nations, comprising probably the majority of man- 
kind, whose state, intellectually and socially, has been station- 
ary for ages, that they afford little or no evidence in support 
of his theory; and for this, among other reasons, he confines 
himself to the history of what he calls the élite, or advanced 
guard of humanity, and in this way makes it a very “abstract” 
history indeed!? Beginning with Greece, as the representa- 
tive of ancient civilization, and surveying the history of the 
Roman empire, and of its successors in Western Europe, he 
endeavors to show that the actual progress of humanity has 
been, on the whole, in conformity with his general law. He 
gives no historical evidence, however, of the prevalence of 
Fetishism in primitive times; that is an inference merely, 
depending partly on his theory of cerebral organization, and 
partly on the assumption that. in the savage state, which is gra- 


1 Victor Cousin, “Introduction a Histoire de la Philosophie,” 1. 121. 
Ibid., ‘‘ Cours de la Philosophie,” 111. 2, 464. 
2M, Comte, “Cours,” v. 3, 5, 22; vi. 32, 481. 


HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. 99 


tuitously supposed to have-been the primitive condition of man, 
there must have been a tendency to regard every object, natu- 
ral or artificial, as endowed with life and intelligence. Poly- 
theism, again, he conceives to have been a step in advance, an 
improvement on the preéxisting state of things, instead of being, 
as it really was, a declension from a purer and better faith, an 
aberration from the light of Nature, not less than from the les- 
sons of Revelation. He conceives Monotheism, whether as 
taught to the Jews by Moses, or to the world at large by Christ 
and his apostles, to have been the natural product of man’s 
unaided intelligence ; and he assumes this, without making a 
single reference to the supernatural events by which its publica- 
tion, in either instance, is said to have been accompanied, or to 
the sacred books in which they are recorded; nay, he does not 
even name the Founder of the Christian faith, otherwise than 
by describing him as “the founder, real or imaginary, of this 
great religious system.” * 

In treating, again, of the Critical or destructive system of 
Metaphysics, and of the Positive or reconstructive system of 
the New Philosophy, he adduces no evidence to show that the 
same element is negatived by the one and restored by the other ; 
on the contrary, were his statement true in all respects, it 
would only serve to prove that the Theological element, which 
is slowly dissipated by Metaphysics, is formally and finally 
abjured by Positivism. He assumes and asserts, on very 
insufficient grounds, that there is a real, radical, and necessary 
contrariety between the facts and laws of Science and the first 
principles of Theology, whether natural or revealed; and he 
anticipates, therefore, that in proportion as Science advances, 
Theology must recede, and ultimately quit the field. He ought 
to have known that there are minds in every part of Europe 
as thoroughly scientific as his own, and as deeply imbued with 


1M. Comte, “ Cours,” v. 382, ‘Premier fondateur, réel ou ideal, de ce 
grand systéme religieux.” 


100 MODERN ATHEISM. 


the spirit of modern Inductive Philosophy, who, so far from 
seeing any discordance between the results of scientific inquiry 
and the fundamental truths of Theology, are in the habit of 
appealing to the former in proof or illustration of the latter; 
and who, the further they advance in the study of the works 
of Nature, are only the more confirmed in their belief of a 
Creative Intelligence and a Governing Power. It may be 
that, in his own immediate circle at Paris, there is a tendency 
towards Atheism; but, assuredly, no such tendency exists in 
the highest and most scientific minds of modern Europe. The 
faith of Bacon, Newton, and Boyle, of Descartes, Leibnitz, and 
Pascal, in regard to the first principles of Theology, is still the 
prevailing creed of the Sedgwicks, the Whewells, the Her- 
schells, and the Brewsters of the present day. Vv 

The only plausible part of his Historical Survey, and that 
which, in our apprehension, is the most likely to make some 
transient impression on the popular mind, is his elaborate 
attempt to show, with regard to each branch of Science, in 
detail, that it was enveloped during its infancy in a cloud of 
superstition ; and that just in proportion as the light shone 
more clearly, or was more distinctly discerned, the cloud was 
gradually dissipated and dispersed, until, one after another, 
they were all emancipated from their supposed connection 
with supernatural causes, and reduced under fixed natural 
laws. Confounding Theology with Superstition, or failing, at 
least, to discriminate duly between the two, M. Comte draws a 
vivid picture of the successive inroads which Science has made 
on the consecrated domain of Religion, and represents the one 
as receding just in proportion as the other advances. For as 
the darkness disappears before the rising sun, whose earliest 
rays gild only the loftier mountain peaks, but whose growing 
brightness spreads over the lowly valleys and penetrates the 
deepest recesses of nature, so Theology gradually retires 
before the advance of Science, which first conquers and brings 


HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. 101 


under the rule of natural law the simplest and least compli- 
cated branches, such as Mechanics and Astronomy; then 
attacks the more complex, such as Chemistry and Physiology ; 
and, last of all, advances to the assault of the most difficult, 
such as Ethics and Sociology; until, having emancipated each 
of them successively from their previous connection with super- 
natural beliefs, it effects the entire elimination of Theology, first 
from the philosophic, and afterwards from the popular creed 
of mankind. M. Comte conceives that the religious spirit has 
been steadily decreasing throughout the whole course of human 
development, from the time when it was universal, in the 
form of Fetishism, till it reached its most abstract, but least 
influential form in Monotheism; and that now the period of its 
decline and fall has arrived, when it is subjected to the power- 
ful solvent of a Metaphysical and Skeptical Philosophy, and 
when its ultimate extinction is certain under the action of 
Positive Science. 

We deem this by far the most dangerous, because it is the 
most plausible part of his speculations; so plausible that, even 
where his reasonings in support of it may fail to carry the full 
conviction of the understanding, they may yet leave behind 
them a certain impression unfavorable to faith in Divine 
things, since they appeal to many palpable facts in the history 
of Science, too well attested to be doubted, and too important 
to be overlooked. The theory itself— whatever may be 
thought of the peculiar form which it has assumed in the hands 
of M. Comte — cannot be regarded, in its main and essential 
features, as one of his original discoveries; for the general idea 
on which it rests had been announced with equal brevity and 
precision by the celebrated La Prac: “Let us survey the 
history of the progress of the human mind and of its errors ; 
we shall there see final causes constantly pushed back to the 
boundaries of its knowledge. These causes, which Newton 
pushed back to the limits of the solar system, were, even in his 

gx 


102 MODERN ATHEISM. 


time, placed in the atmosphere to explain meteoric appear- 
ances. They are nothing else, therefore, in the eyes of a 
philosopher, than the expression of our ignorance of the true 
causes.” Supposing this to be a correct account of the fact, 
the inference which M. Comte deduces from it might seem to 
follow very much as a matter of course,— the inference, viz., 
that in proportion as Science advances and succeeds in sub- 
jecting one department of Nature after another to fixed and 
invariable laws, Theology, or the doctrine of Final Causes, 
must necessarily recede before it, and, at length, disappear 
altogether, when human knowledge has reached its highest 
ultimate perfection. But is it a correct account of the fact ? 
Is it true that the doctrine of Final Causes is less generally 
admitted, or more dubiously maintained, in regard to those 
sciences which have already reached their maturity, than in 
regard to those other sciences which are still comparatively in 
their infancy? Or is it true that it has lost instead of gaining 
ground by the progress of scientific discovery, so as to occupy 
a narrower space and to hold a more precarious footing, now, 
than it did in the earlier ages of ignorance and superstition ? 
Did Final Causes disappear from the view of Newton when he 
discovered the law which regulates the movements of the 
heavenly bodies? Did Galen or did Paley discard them when 
they surveyed the human frame in the light of scientific 
anatomy? or Harvey, when, impelled and guided by this doc- 
trine as his governing principle, he discovered the circulation 
of the blood? In what departments of Nature, and in what 
branches of Science, does the Theistic philosopher or the 
Christian divine find the clearest and strongest proofs of order, 
adaptation, and adjustment? Is it not in those very depart- 
ments of Nature whose laws have been most fully ascertained ? 
in those very branches of Science which have been most 
thoroughly matured? Did we believe Comte and La Place, 


HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. 103 


we should expect to find that the doctrine of Final Causes and 
the science of Theology could now find no footing in the 
domain of Astronomy, of Physics, or of Chemistry, since in 
these departments the phenomena have been reduced, by many 
successive discoveries, to rigorous general laws; and that they 
could only survive for a brief time by taking refuge in the yet 
unconquered territory of Meteorology, Biology, and Social 
Science. But is it so? Examine the Series of Bridgewater 
Treatises, or any other recent philosophical exposition of the 
Evidence of Natural Theology, and it will be apparent, on the 
most cursory review, that in point of fact the arguments and 
illustrations are derived almost entirely from the more advanced 
sciences ; and that, so far from receding or threatening to dis- 
appear, Final Causes have only become more prominent and 
more striking in proportion as inquiring men have succeeded 
in removing the vail from any department of Nature. 

It were easy, indeed, to cull from the records of the past 
many facts which might seem to give a plausible aspect to the 
theory of M. Comte. We might be told of the early history 
of Astronomy, when the astrologer gazed upon the heavens 
with a superstitious eye, and spoke of the mystic influence of 
the planets, and constructed the horoscope for the calculation 
of nativities and the prediction of future events. We might be 
told of the early history of Anatomy, when, from the entrails 
of birds aud animals, the haruspex prognosticated the fate of 
empires and the fortunes of battle. We might be told of the 
early history of Chemistry, when alchemists sought in their 
concoctions a panacea for all human evils, and in their crucibles 
an alkalest or universal menstruum. We might be told of the - 
early history of Zodlogy, when the augur watched the flight, 
the singing, the feeding of birds, and applied them to the pur- 
poses of divination. We might be told of Aéromancy as the 
earliest form of Meteorology, and of Geomancy as the earliest 


104 MODERN ATHEISM. 


form of Geology.! And we might be told of the popular super- 
stitions which lingered, till a very recent period, among the 
peasantry of our own country, and which are now gradually 
disappearing in proportion as the light of Religion and Science 
is diffused. These facts, which appear on the surface of 
human history, do unquestionably prove that there has been a 
process of gradual advancement, by which each of the sciences 
has been, in succession, purged of its earlier errors, and placed 
on amore solid and enduring basis. _But they prove nothing 
more than this: they do not prove that these sciences must 
ultimately supersede Theology, or that they have a necessary 
tendency towards Atheism. On the contrary, we hold that 
they afford a valid presumption from analogy on the other side. 
For suppose, even, that Religion, following the same law of 
development which determines the progress of every other 
branch of human knowledge, had become incorporated, in its 
earlier stages, with many fond and foolish superstitions, the 
analogy of the other sciences would lead us to conclude that, 
just as the reveries of Astrology had passed away and given 
place to a solid system of Astronomy,— and as the vain specu- 
lations of Alchemy had been superseded by the useful dis- 
coveries of Chemistry,—and as the arts of Augury and 
Divination had finally issued in the inductive science of true 
Natural History,— so Theology might also purge itself from 
the fond conceits which had been for a time incorporated with 
it, and still survive, after all superstition had passed away, as a 
sound and fruitful branch of the tree of knowledge. 

This is not the precise light, however, in which M. Comte 
regards Theology. He does not speak of it as a distinct and 
independent science, but rather as a method of Philosophy, 
which has been applied to the explanation of all the depart- 


1“Encye. Britan.,” articles “Augury” and “Divination.” Dr. Tuom- 
son’s “ History of Chemistry.” 
2 Mr. H. Mitier’s “Scenes and Legends of the North of Scotland.” 


HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. 105 


ments of Nature; and, viewed in this light, he objects to it on 
the ground that Positive Science peremptorily demands the 
elimination of all causes, efficient and final, and, consequently, 
the exclusion of all reference to God, or to any supernatural 
power, in connection with the laws either of the material or 
moral world. This is the fundamental basis of his theory. It 
is assumed that the recognition of natural laws is incompatible 
with the belief in supernatural powers, and that these laws 
must be invariable and independent of any superior will. 
Hence the supposed antagonism between Theology and Physi- 
cal Science, which is strongly affirmed by M. Comte?; as if the 
laws of Nature could not exist unless they were independent 
of the Divine will, or as if the arts of industry could not be 
pursued, on the supposition of a Providence, without sacri- 
legious presumption. The laws for which he contends must 
have had no author to establish, and can have no superior will 
to control them ; they had no beginning, and can have no end; 
they cannot be reversed, suspended, or interfered with; they 
are necessary, immutable, and eternal, not subordinate to 
God, but independent of Him; they are, in short, nothing less 
than Destiny or Fate, the same that Cudworth describes as 
the Democritic, Physiological, or Atheistic Fate, which con- 
sists in “the material necessity of all things without a God.” 2 
Now, we have no jealousy of natural laws. We believe in 
their existence ; we believe, also, in their regular operation in 
the ordinary course of Nature; but we deny that they must 
needs be independent of a supreme will, and affirm that, being 
subordinate to that will, they are not necessarily ¢nvardable. 
They are expressly recognized and cordially maintained by 
divines, not less than by men of science; but in such a sense 
as to be perfectly compatible both with the doctrine of a primi- 
tive creation, and also with the possibility of a subsequent 


1M. Comte, “Cours,” r. 13; v. 461, 470; v1. 86, 126, 148. 
2Dr. CupwortTH, “Intellectual System,” 1. 33. 


106 MODERN ATHEISM. 


miraculous interposition. The Westminster Divines explicitly 
declare that “ God, the First Cause, by His providence, ordereth 
all things to fall out according to the nature of second causes, 
either necessarily, freely, or contingently ;” and that “in His 
ordinary providence, He maketh use of means, but is free to 
act without, above, and against them at His pleasure.”* But 
M. Comte will have no laws, however regular, unless they be 
also invariable, and independent of any superior will. And, 
doubtless, if this were the sense in which Science has estab- 
lished the doctrine of natural laws, it would be at direct 
variance with Theology, both Natural and Revealed; and the 
antagonism between the two might afford some ground for the 
belief that, sooner or later, Theology must quit the field. But 
it is not the existence of these natural laws, nor even their 
regular operation in the common course of Providence, that is 
hostile to our religious beliefs, — it is only the supposition that 
they are unoriginated, independent, and invariable; and to 
assume this without proof, as if it were a self-evident or 
axiomatic truth, or to apply it in a process of historical deduc- 
tion respecting either the past development or the future pros- 
pects of the race, is such a shameless begging of the whole 
question, that we know of no parallel to it except in the 
kindred speculations of Strauss, who assumes the same radical 
principle, and gravely tells us that whatever is supernatural 
must needs be unhistorical.? 

There is absolutely no evidence, properly historical, that 
there is any necessary tendency in the recognition of established 
natural laws to supersede Theology, or to introduce an era of 
universal Atheism. Some such tendency might exist were 
these laws conceived of as necessary, independent, and invari- 
able. But this hypothesis, equally unphilosophical and 


1“ Westminster Confession of Faith,” chap. v. § 2, 3. 
2Srrauss, “Life of Jesus,” 1. 88. Henry Rocers, “Reason and 
Faith,” Appendix, p. 96. 


HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. 107 


irreligious, is not and never has been maintained by the great 
body of Inductive inquirers, who see no contradiction either 
between the established order of Nature and the supposition of 
its Divine origin, or between the operation of natural laws and 
the recognition of a supreme, superintending Providence. Nor 
should it be forgotten, in this connection, that the evidence in 
favor of Theism depends not so much on the mere laws as on 
the dispositions and adjustments that are observable in Nature. 
There is, therefore, no historical proof to establish the supposed 
law of human development, and no rational ground to expect 
that the progress of Inductive Science will ever supplant or 
supersede Theology. It is true that Theology, although a dis- 
tinct and independent science, is so comprehensive in its range 
that it gathers its proofs and illustrations from every depart- 
ment of Nature, and that, were it excluded from any one of 
these, it might, for the same reason, be excluded from all the 
rest; but it is not true that there is any real or necessary 
antagonism between the laws of Nature and the prerogatives 
of God. On the contrary, let our knowledge advance until all 
the phenomena both of the Material and Moral worlds shall be 
reduced under so many general laws, even then Superstition 
might disappear, but Theology would remain, and would only 
receive fresh accessions of evidence and strength, in proportion 
as the wise order of Nature is more fully unfolded, and its most 
hidden mysteries disclosed. 

We scarcely know whether it is needful to advert at all to 
the argument in favor of his theory which M. Comte founds on 
the analogy of individual experience. It is a transparent 
fallacy. He tells us that the race is, like an individual man, 
Religious in infancy, Metaphysical in youth, and Positive — 
that is, Scientific, without being Religious—in mature man- 
hood? Now, this analogical argument, to have any legitimate 


1 Dr. Cuatmers’ Works, 1. ‘‘ Natural Theology.” 
2M. Comte, “ Cours,” 1. 7. 


108 MODERN ATHEISM. 


weight, must proceed on the assumption of two facts. The . 


first is, that the law of individual development commences, in 
the case, at least, of all who belong to the é/v¢e of humanity, with 
Theology, and terminates in Atheism; and the second is, that 
the individual is, in this respect, the type or pattern of his race, 
and that the experience of the one is only an outline in minia- 
ture of the history of the other. It would be difficult, we think, 
to establish the truth of either of these positions by evidence, 
that could be satisfactory to any reflecting mind. We cannot 
doubt, indeed, for experience amply attests, that the religious 
sensibilities of childhood have often been sadly impaired in the 
progress from youth to manhood, and that, after the tumultuous 
excitements, whether of speculation or of passion, not a few 
have sought a refuge from their fears in the cold negations of 
Atheism. But is this the law of development and progress? 
Is it a law that is uniform and invariable in its operation? Are 


there no instances of an opposite kind? Are there no instances. 


of men whose early religious culture had been neglected, and 
who passed through youth without one serious thought of God 
and their relation to Him, but who, as they advanced in years, 
began to reflect and inquire, and ultimately attained to a firm 
religious faith? If such diversities of individual experience 
are known to exist, then clearly the result is not determined 
by any necessary or invariable law of intellectual development; 
but must be ascribed to other causes, chiefly of a moral and 
practical kind, which exert a powerful influence, for good or 
evil, on every human mind. Montaigne speaks of an error 
maintained by Plato, “that children and old people were most 
susceptible of Religion, as if it sprung and derived its credit 
from our weakness.”? And we find M. Comte himself com- 
plaining, somewhat bitterly, that his guwondam friend, the cele- 
brated St. Simon, had exhibited, as he advanced in years (cette 


1 MonTaiGNeE, “ Apology for Raimond de Sebonde,” Essays, 11. 148. 


HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. 109 


tendance banale vers une vague religiosité), a tendency towards 
something like Religion.' Cases of this kind are utterly fatal 
to his supposed law of individual development, and they must 
be equally fatal to his theory of the progress of the human 
race. ' 

Hitherto we have considered merely the reasons which M. 
Comte urges in support of his theory, and have endeavored to 
show that they are utterly incapable of establishing it as a valid 
scientific doctrine. It may be useful, however, to advert, in 
conclusion, to some considerations which afford decisive objec- 
tions against it, arising from the testimony of authentic history 
and the plainest principles of reason. 

In so far as the testimony of history and tradition is con- 
cerned, nothing can be more certain than that the progress of 
the race has followed a very different course from that which 
M. Comte has traced out for it by his grand fundamental law. 
The theory of a primitive state of ignorance and barbarism, in 
which a rude Theology existed, in the form of Fetishism, is 
opposed not more to the authority of Scripture, the earliest 
record of our race, than to the unanimous voice of antiquity, 
which attests the general belief of mankind in a primeval 
state of light and innocence. There is a sad but striking con- 
trast between the views which are generally held by the Chris- 
tian Theist, and those which are avowed by M. Comte on this 
subject. The Christian Theist admits the doctrine of a 
primeval Revelation and a pristine state of purity and peace ; 
M. Comte maintains the doctrine of a primitive barbarism and 
a natural aboriginal Superstition. The Christian Theist 
believes in a fall subsequent to the creation of man, and 
ascribes the ignorance and error, the superstition and idolatry 
which ensued, to the perversion and abuse of his intellectual 
and moral powers; M. Comte affirms that man did not fall, 


Comte, “ Cours,” vi., Preface, IX. 


10 


110 MODERN ATHEISM. 


that he did actually rise by a process of slow but progressive 
self-elevation, and that, in advancing from Fetishism to Poly- 
theism, and from Polytheism to Monotheism, and from Mono- 
theism to Atheism, he has all along been determined by the 
law of his normal development. In the view of the Christian 
Theist, Revelation was the sun which shed its cheering rays on 
the first fathers of mankind, and which, after having been 
obscured, for a time, by the clouds and darkness of Superstition, 
shines out again, clear and strong, under the dispensation of 
the Gospel; in the view of M. Comte, Science is the only sun 
that is destined to enlighten the world, —a sun which has not 
yet fully risen, but which has sent before, as the harbingers 
of its speedy advent, a few scattered rays to gild the lofty 
mountain peaks, while all beneath is still buried in Cimmerian 
darkness. The Christian Theist anticipates the time when the 
true light which now shineth shall cover the whole earth 5 i 
Comte predicts its utter and final extinction, when Positive 
Science shall have risen into the ascendant. His theory is 
contradicted by the history of the past; let us hope that the 
events of the future will equally belie his prediction. _ For 
Christianity is the only hope of the world. The prospects of 
man would be dark indeed on the supposition of its being 
abolished. “There might remain among a few of the more 
enlightened some occasional glimpses of religious truth, as we 
find to have been the case in the Pagan world; but the 
degradation of the great mass of the people to that ignorance, 
and idolatry, and superstition, out of which the Gospel had 
emancipated them, would be certain and complete. This 
retrograde movement might be retarded by the advantages 
which we have derived from that system, whose. influence we 
should continue to feel long after we had ceased to acknowl- 
edge the divinity of its source. But these advantages would 
by degrees lose their eflicacy, even as mere matters of specu- 
lation, and give place to the workings of fancy, and credulity, 


HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. Lai 


and corruption. A radiance might still glow on the high 
places of the earth after the sun of Revelation had gone down ; 
and the brighter and the longer it had shone, the more gradual 
would be the decay of that light and warmth which it had left 
behind it. But every where there would be the sad tokens of 
a departed glory and of a coming night. Twilight might be 
protracted through the course of many generations, and still 
our unhappy race might be able to read, though dimly, many 
of the wonders of the eternal Godhead, and to wind a dubious 
way through the perils of the wilderness. But it would be 
twilight still; shade would thicken after shade ; every succeed- 
ing age would come wrapped in a deeper and a deeper gloom ; 
till, at last, that flood of glory which the Gospel is now pouring 
upon the world would be lost and buried in impenetrable 
darkness.” * 

M. Comte’s theory is liable to another objection, the force 
of which he seems, in some measure, although inadequately, to 
have felt and acknowledged. The three states or stages, which 
he describes as necessarily successive, are, in point of fact, simul- 
taneous. They do not mark so many different eras in the 
course of human progress, — they denote the natural products 
of man’s intelligence, the constituent elements of his knowledge 
in all states of society. The Theological, the Metaphysical, 
and the Scientific elements have always coéxisted. Diverse 
as they may be in other respects, they resemble each other in 
this; — they are all the natural and spontaneous products of 
man’s intelligent activity. That they were, toa certain extent, 
simultaneous at first, and that they are simultaneous still, is 

actually admitted by M. Comte, while he conceives, never- 
theless, that they are radically incompatible with each other; ° 


1 Dr. ANDREW THOMSON, “Sermons on Infidelity,” p. 62. 

2M. Comrs, “Cours,” rv. 709 : “Je puis affirmer n’avoir jamais trouvé 
d’argumentation sérieuse en opposition & cette loi, depuis dix-sept ans que 
j’ai eu le bonheur de la decouvrir, si ce n’est celle que Von fondait sur la 


112 MODERN ATHEISM. 


and their coexistence hitherto is felt by him to be a serious 
objection to his fundamental law, which represents them not 
only as necessarily successive, but also as mutually exclusive. 
The fact is admitted, and that fact is fatal to his whole theory. 
For if the three methods have coexisted hitherto, why may 
they not equally coexist hereafter? And what ground is left 
for the reckless prediction that Theology is doomed, and must 
fall before the onward march of Positive Science? If man 
was able from the beginning to observe, to compare, to 
abstract, and to generalize, and if the fundamental laws of 
human thought have been ever the same, it follows that there 
must have been a tendency, coeval with the origin of the race, 
towards ‘Theological, Metaphysical, and Inductive Speculation, 
and that the same tendency must continue as long as his 
powers remain unchanged. It can only, therefore, be a pre- 
ponderance, more or less complete, of one of the three methods 
over the other two, that we should be warranted in expecting, 
even under the operation of M. Comte’s Javorite law ; and yet 
he boldly proclaims the utter exclusion of Metaphysics, and the 
entire and everlasting elimination of Theology, as branches of 
human knowledge! 

M. Comte’s theory is still more vulnerable at another point. 
The fundamental assumption on which it is based is utterly 
groundless. It amounts to this, that all knowledge of causes, 
whether efficient or final, is interdicted to man, and incapable 
of being reached by any exertion of his faculties! He tells us 
that Theology is impossible, for this reason, that, in the view 


consideration de la simultaneité jusqici necessairement tres commune, des 
trois philosophies chez les mémes intelligences.” Cours,” 1. 27, 50, 10 : 
“L’emploi simultané des trois philosophies radicalement tncompatibles,”? — 
“la coéxistence de ces trois philosophies opposées.” See also 1y. 683, 694; 
V.28, 39, 41, 57, 171; v1. 26, 31,34, 155. : 

1M. Comrr, “Cours,” 1. 14 : “ En considerant comme absolument inac- 
cessible et vide de sens pour nous la recherche de ce qu’on appelle les causes, 
soit premieres, soit finales.” 


HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. 1138 


of the Positive Philosophy, all knowledge of causes is abso- 
lutely excluded; nay, he admits that Theology is inevitable if 
we inquire into causes at all. We know of no simpler or more 
effectual method of dealing with his specious sophistry on this 
subject, than by showing that, if his general principle be con- 
clusive against the knowledge of God, it is equally conclusive 
against the knowledge of any other being or cause; just as Sir 
James Mackintosh dealt with the skeptical philosophy of 
Hume, when, with admirable practical sagacity, he said: “ As 
those dictates of experience which regulate conduct must be 
the objects of belief, all objections which attack them, in 
common with the principles of reasoning, must be utterly 
ineffectual. Whatever attacks every principle of belief, can 
destroy none. As long as the foundations of knowledge are 
allowed to remain on the same level with the maxims of 
life, the whole system of human conviction must continue 
undisturbed. . . . . Skepticism has practical consequences of 
a very mischievous nature. This is because its universality is 
not steadily kept in view and constantly borne in mind. If it 
were, the above short and plain remark would be an effectual 
antidote to the poison. But, in practice, it is an armory from 
which weapons are taken to be employed against some opinions, 
while it is hidden from notice that the same weapons would 
equally cut down every other conviction. It is thus that Mr. 
Hume’s theory of causation is used as an answer to arguments 
for the existence of the Deity, without warning the reader that 
it would equally lead him to expect — that the sun will not rise 
_ to-morrow.” * 

The exclusion of all knowledge of causes is so indispensable 
to M. Comte’s theory that he admits “the inevitable tendency 
of our intelligence towards a philosophy radically Theological, 
as often as we seek to penetrate, on whatever pretext, into the 


1 Str James Macx1nrT0su, “ Encyc., Britan.,” Preliminary Dissertation, 
p. 304. 
iy* 


114 MODERN ATHEISM. 


intimate nature of the phenomena.”? The exclusion of such 
knowledge would, of course, be fatal to’'Theology, since, without 
taking some account of causes, efficient and final, we cannot 
rise to God as the author of the universe. But did it never 
occur to M. Comte that the self-same principle may possibly be 
destructive of his present, or, at least, of his posthumous fame, 
as the author of the Positive Philosophy? For, if we can know 
nothing of efficient causes, in what sense, or on what ground, 
shall any one presume to ascribe the authorship of this system 
to M. Comte? ‘True, it may be said,— Here is an effect which 
exhibits manifest signs of intelligence, order, and scientific skill ; 
its parts are regularly adjusted and all directed to a common 
end; and, reasoning after the teleological method, we must infer 
that it proceeded from a very clever, but somewhat eccentric 
mind ; but, unfortunately, final causes are as expressly inter- 
dicted as efficient ones; and, on the principles of his own 
theory, the “Course of Positive Philosophy ” can never be 
warrantably ascribed to the authorship of M. Comte. _ 

A still more serious objection to M. Comte’s theory respect- 
ing the law of human development arises from the false view 
which it exhibits of the nature and history of Truth, considered 
as the object of human knowledge. It is a favorite opinion 
with him, that man can have no absolute knowledge ; that truth 
is not fixed, but fluctuating ; that what was believed in one age, 
and believed necessarily, according to the fundamental laws of 
thought, is as necessarily disbelieved in the next; and that 
there is no standard of truth at any time better or surer than 
the public opinion, or general consent, of the most advanced 
classes of society.” This theory of Truth, as necessarily mobile 
and fluctuating, has a tendency, we think, to engender uni- 
versal skepticism, even when it is stated, with various impor- 
tant modifications, by such writers as Lamennais and Morell § 


1M. Comre, “Cours,” rv. 664. 
2 Thid., vi. 728, 730, 760, 826, 835, 866. 


HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. Ito 


but, in the hands of M. Comte, it becomes more dangerous still, 
since it represents the human race as having been from the 
beginning, through a long series of ages, subject to a law of 
development which not only permitted, but actually compelled 
them to believe a lie; and thus casts a dark shade of suspicion 
both on the constitution of man and on the government of 
God. 

Such a theory would seem also to preclude all rational cal- 
culations respecting the future progress and prospects of the 
race. For what ground can exist for any prognostication in 
regard to the ulterior advancement or ultimate destiny of man, 
if it be true that, in his past history, Fetishism has passed into 
Polytheism, and Polytheism into Monotlteism, without any 
extraneous instruction, and by the mere action of those inherent 
laws to which humanity is subject? And, still more, if it be 
further true that even now the human mind is in a state of 
transition, passing through the crisis of Metaphysical doubt 
towards the goal of Positive Atheism, who shall assure us 
that this will be its last and final metamorphosis? It does 
appear to us to be one of the most singular and perplexing 
anomalies of his elaborate system, that he can dogmatize so 
confidently on the terminus ad quem of human progress, when 
from the terminus a quo there has been, according to his own 
account, a series of variations so wonderful, and a succession 
of states so diverse and opposite, as those which he describes. 
And yet he pronounces oracularly that Positive Science is the 
ultimate landing-place of human thought, and that universal 
Atheism is the final barrier which must needs close and 
terminate the long series of developments. 

We have spoken sternly of his system; we have no wish to 
speak harshly of the man. Had we any disposition'to do so, 
there is more than enough in the personal explanation, pre- 
fixed to the closing volume of his work, effectually to disarm 
us. We have too much sympathy with the trials of a vigorous 


116 MODERN ATHEISM. 


but eccentric mind, struggling in untoward circumstances, and 
against an adverse tide, to maintain a position of honorable 
independence, to say a word that could wound the feelings or 
injure the prospects of a man of science. But it is not unkind 
to add that his life might have been amore prosperous one 
had he devoted himself to the pursuits of Science, without 
assailing the truths of Religion; and that his fame would 
have been at once more extensive and more enduring had it 
been left to repose on his Classification or Hierarchy of the 
Sciences, without being associated with the more doubtful 
merits of his fundamental law of Man’s Development. 


SECTION IV. 


THEORY OF ECCLESIASTICAL DEVELOPMENT.—J. H. NEWMAN. 


This particular phase of the general theory bears less 
directly on the subject of our present inquiry than either of 
the three which have already passed under review, and yet it 
has recently been applied in such a way as may entitle it toa 
passing notice. 

For while the theory of Ecclesiastical Development has a 
direct relation only to the question in regard to the Rule of 
Faith, it has also an indirect or collateral relation to the truths 
of Natural as well as of Revealed Religion; and this relation 
demands for it, especially in the existing state of theological 
speculation, the earnest attention of all who are concerned for 
the maintenance even of the simplest and most elementary 
articles of Divine truth. 

The most elaborate and systematic exposition of this theory 
is exhibited in the “Essay on the Development of Christian 
Doctrine, by Joun Henry Newman;” an Essay primarily 
directed to the discussion of the points of difference between 


ECCLESIASTICAL DEVELOPMENT. 117 


the Popish and the Protestant Churches, but which will be 
found to have an important bearing, also, on some doctrines 
which are common to both, and especially on the fundamental 
articles of Natural Religion itself. 

It is thus stated by Mr. Newman :' “That the increase and 
expansion of the Christian Creed and Ritual, and the varia- 
tions which have attended the process in the case of individual 
writers and churches, are the necessary attendants on any 
philosophy or polity which takes possession of the intellect 
and heart, and has had any wide or extended dominion ; that, 
from the nature of the human mind, time is necessary for the 
full comprehension and perfection of great ideas; and that the 
highest and most wonderful truths, though communicated to 
the world once for all by inspired teachers, could not be com- 
prehended all at once by the recipients, but, as received and 
transmitted by minds not inspired, and through media which 
were human, have required only the longer time and deeper 
thought for their full elucidation. This may be called the 
Theory of Developments.” 

It is further illustrated as follows: “It is sometimes said 
that the stream is clearest near the spring. Whatever use may 
fairly be made of this image, it does not apply to the history 
of a philosophy or sect, which, on the contrary, is more equa- 
ble, and purer, and stronger, when its bed has become deep, 
and “broad, and full. It necessarily rises out of an existing 
state of things, and, for a time, savors of the soil. Its vital 
element. needs disengaging from what is foreign and tempo- 
rary, and is employed in efforts after freedom, more vigorous 
and hopeful as its years increase. Its beginnings are no 
measures of its capabilities, nor of its scope. At first, no one 
knows what it is, or what it is worth. It remains, perhaps, 
for a time, quiescent; it tries, as it were, its limbs, and proves 


1 Newman’s “ Essay on Development,” p. 27. 


118 MODERN ATHEISM. 


the ground under it, and feels its way. From time to time it 
makes essays which fail, and are, in consequence, abandoned. 
It seems in suspense which way to go; it wavers, and, at 
length, strikes out in one definite direction. In time it enters 
upon strange territory ; points of controversy alter their bear- 
ing ; parties rise and fall about it; dangers and hopes appear 
in new relations, and old principles reappear under new forms; 
it changes with them, in order to remain the same. Ina higher 
world it is otherwise ; but here below to live is to change, and 
to be perfect is to have changed often.” 

In answer to the objection, “that inspired documents, such 
as the Holy Scriptures, at once determine the doctrines which 
we should believe,” it is replied, “that they were intended to 
create an idea, and that idea is not in the sacred text, but in 
the mind of the reader; and the question is, whether that idea 
is communicated to him, in its completeness and minute accu- 
racy, on its first apprehension, or expands in his heart and 
intellect, and comes to perfection in the course of time. Nor 
could it be maintained without extravagance that the letter of 
the New Testament, or of any assignable number of books, 
comprises a delineation of all possible forms which a Divine 
message will assume when submitted to a multitude of minds.’”2 

What relation, it may be asked, can this theory respecting 
the development of revealed or Christian truth bear to the 
question of the being and perfections of God? We answer, 
that it is founded on a general philosophical principle which 
may affect the truths of natural as well as those of revealed 
Religion ; and that it is applied in such a way as to show that, 
as it has already led to the worship of angels and saints, so it 
may hereafter issue in the deification of N ature, which is Pan- 
theism, or in the separate worship of its component parts, 
which is Polytheism ; and, in either case, the personality and 


1 NeEwMan’s “ Essay on Development,” p. 38. 2 Thid., p. 95. 


ECCLESIASTICAL DEVELOPMENT. 119 


supremacy of the one only, the living and the true God, would 
be effectually superseded, if not explicitly denied. 

But, is there any real danger of such a disastrous consum- 
mation? We answer, that the mere coexistence of the theory 
of Ecclesiastical Development with the infidel speculations on 
the doctrine of Human Progress is of itself an ominous symp- 
tom; and, further, that the mutual interchange of compliment- 
ary acknowledgments between the Infidel and Popish parties 
is another, especially when both are found to coincide in some 
of the main grounds of their opposition to Scripture as the 
supreme rule of faith, and when the homage which the advo- 
cates of Development render to the theory of progress is 
responded to by glowing eulogiums from the infidel camp on 
the genius of Catholicism as the masterpiece of human policy. 
But there are other grounds of apprehension, arising more 
directly out of the very nature of the theory of Development 
itself. 

That theory has been described by Dr. Brownson — him- 
self a convert to Catholicism —as the product of “a school 
formed, at first, outside of the Church, but now brought within 
her communion,” and compared, in regard to its dangerousness, 
with the speculations of Hermes and Lamennais.t And a 
still more competent judge— Professor Sedgwick, of Cam- 
bridge has characterized it as “a monstrous compound of 
Popery and Pantheism,” according to which “the Catholic 
faith is not a religion revealed to us in the Sacred Books we 
call canonical, and in the works of the Fathers which are sup- 
posed to contain the oral traditions of the Apostles and their 
followers; but a new Pantheistic element is to be fastened on 
the faith of men,—a principle of Development which may 
overshadow both the verbum Dei seriptum and the verbum Dei 


1 Brownson’s “ Quarterly Review,” No. 1, p. 43. 
2 SeEDGWIcK’s “ Discourse,” Fourth Edition. Preface, cccxctril. 


120 MODERN ATHEISM. 


non scriptum of the Romish Church, and change both the form 
and substance of primitive Christianity.” 

It is only justice to Mr. Newman to say that he appears to 
have been aware of this possible objection to his theory, and 
that he makes an attempt to obviate it. Speaking of the diffi- 
culty which the Church experienced in keeping “ Paganism 
out of her pale,” he adverts to “the hazard which attended on 
the development of the Catholic ritual,—such as the honors 
publicly assigned to saints and martyrs, the formal veneration 
of their relics, and the usages and observances which followed.” 
And he asks: ‘“ What was to hinder the rise of a sort of refined 
Pantheism, and the overthrow of Dogmatism pari passu with 
the multiplication of heavenly intercessors and patrons? If 
what is called in reproach ‘ Saint-worship’ resembled the Poly- 
theism which it supplanted, or was a corruption, how did Dog- 
matism survive? Dogmatism is a religious profession of its 
own reality as contrasted with other systems; but Polytheists 
are liberals, and hold that one religion is as good as another. 
Yet the theological system was developing and strengthening, 
as well as the monastic rule, all the while the ritual was assimi- 
lating itself, as Protestants say, to the Paganism of former 
ages.” + 

It seems to be admitted in these words, that, in the past his- 
tory of the Church, the development of the Catholic ritual 
was attended with some danger of infection from Paganism or 
Pantheism; and there may be equal reason to fear that, in the 
future history of the Church, still working on the principle of 
development, that danger may be very considerably aggravated 
by the general prevalence of theories utterly inconsistent with 
the faith of primitive times. What the Church has already 
done in the exercise of her developing power may be only a 
specimen of what she may hereafter accomplish. She has 


1 Newman’s “ Essay,” p. 447, 


ECCLESIASTICAL DEVELOPMENT. 121 


already developed Christianity into a system which bears a 
striking resemblance to Polytheism; she may yet develop it 
more fully, so as to bring it into accordance with philosophical 
- Pantheism; or, retaining both forms, — for they are not neces- 
sarily exclusive of each other,—she may use the first in deal- 
ing with the ignorant, and reserve the second as a sort of 
esoteric doctrine for minds of higher culture. Nor let it be 
said that we are either unjust or uncharitable towards the 
Romish Church, in suggesting the possibility of some such 
development; for what she has already done, and what she 
still claims the power of doing, afford very sufficient ground 
for our remarks. When Dr. Conyers Middleton published his 
celebrated “ Letter from Rome,” showing an exact conformity 
between Popery and Paganism, and that “the religion of the 
present Romans is derived from that of their Heathen ances- 
tors,’ many liberal Catholics resented the imputation as an 
insult to their faith; but now Mr. Newman not only admits 
the fact that the Church did assimilate its ritual to the Pagan- 
ism of former ages, but vindicates her right to do so, and 
ascribes to her a power of assimilation to which it seems im- 
possible to assign any limits. “There is, in truth,” says this 
writer, “a certain virtue or grace in the Gospel, which changes 
the quality of doctrines, opinions, usages, actions, and personal 
characters, which become incorporated with it, and makes them 
right and acceptable to its Divine Author, when before they 
were either contrary to truth, or, at best, but shadows of it.” — 
“ Confiding, then, in the power of Christianity to resist the infec- 
tion of evil, and to transmute the very instruments and appen- 
dages of demon worship to an Evangelical use,... . the rulers 
of the Church from early times were prepared, should the occa- 
sion arise, to adopt, or imitate, or sanction the existing rites and 
customs of the populace, as well as the philosophy of the edu- 
cated class.” —“ The Church can extract good from evil, or, at 
least, gets no harm from it. She inherits the promise made to 
11 


122 MODERN ATHEISM. 


the disciples, that they should take up serpents, and, if they 
drank any deadly thing, it should not hurt them.”— “It has 
borne, and can bear, principles or doctrines which, in other 
systems of religion, quickly degenerate into fanaticism or infi- 
delity.” This marvellous power of assimilation, which made 
“those observances pious in Christianity” that were “super- 
stitions in Paganism,” advanced rapidly in its work, and suc- 
cessively introduced the deification of man, the eultus of angels 
and saints, and the beatification of Mary as Queen of heaven 
and earth. The sanctification, or rather the devfication of the 
nature of Man, is one of these developments. Christ “is in 
them, because He is in human nature; and He communicates 
to them that nature, deified by becoming His, that it may deify 
them.” The worship of saints is another of these develop- 
ments: “"[Those who are known to be God’s adopted sons in 
Christ are fit objects of worship on account of Him who is in 
PRODI, 5: sn Sune Worship is the necessary correlative of glory ; 
and, in the same sense in which created nature can share in the 
Creator’s incommunicable glory, do they also share in that 
worship which is His property alone.” But a “new sphere” 
was yet to be discovered in the realms of light, to which the 
Church had not yet assigned its inhabitant. “There was ‘a 
wonder in heaven;’ a throne was seen, far above all created 
powers, mediatorial, intercessory ; a title archetypal; a crown 
bright as the morning star; a glory issuing from the Eternal 
Throne; robes pure as the heavens; and a sceptre over all. 
And who was the. predestined heir of that Majesty? Who - 
was that Wisdom, and what was her name ?—‘the Mother of 
fair love, and fear, and holy hope, exalted like a palm-tree in 
Engaddi and a rose-plant in Jericho, created from the begin- 
ning before the world in God’s counsels, and ‘in Jerusalem was 
her power.’ The vision is found in the Apocalypse, a Woman 
clothed with the Sun, and the Moon under her feet, and upon 
her head a crown of twelve stars.” The DrrricaTion of Mary 


ECCLESIASTICAL DEVELOPMENT. Zs 


is decreed. The doctrine of her Immaculate Conception is a 
further. development at the present moment, and who can tell 
what other developments may be in store for the future ? 

We advert to this form of the theory only in so far as it 
stands related to our great theme, —the existence, perfections, 
and prerogatives of the one only, the living and the true God ; 
and it can scarcely be questioned, we think, that it has already 
introduced doctrines and practices into the Church which have 
a manifest tendency to obscure the lustre and impair the evi- 
dence of some of the most fundamental articles of Natural 
Religion. Let it still advance in the same direction, and who 
shall assure us that it may not develop into still grosser idol- 
atry, or even into Pantheism? Why should it not develop, for 
example, into Sun worship? “On the new system,” says Pro- 
fessor Butler, “a modern growth of Christian Guebres might 
make out no feeble case; the public religious recognition of this 
great visible type of the True Light is but a fair development 
of ‘the typical principle ;’ the justifiable imitation of the guilt 
of heathens in its adoration is but an instance of the transform- 
ing powers of ‘the sacramental principle ;’ while it requires but 
the most moderate use of the great instrument of orthodoxy, 
‘mystical interpretation,’ to find the duty hinted (clearly enough 
for watchful faith, though obscurely to the blinded or undevout) 
in those passages that speak of a ‘tabernacle for the Sun,’ or 
Deity itself being ‘a Sun,’ or the rising of ‘the Sun of right- 
eousness.’ . . . - Indeed, the whole body of the righteous are 
promised to ‘shine as the Sun’ in the heavenly kingdom, — an 
expression which, though it appear superficially to refer to a 
period not yet arrived, the Church has correctively developed 
into an assurance of their present beatification, and consequent 
right to worship; while it must be at once manifest that, if any 
representative emblem of the Deity may demand religious 
prostration in our Churches, the analogous emblem of the 
‘deified, in the great temple of the Material Universe, may 


124 MODERN ATHEISM. 
o 


fairly expect a participation in that honor. It is true there is 
an express command, ‘Take heed lest, when thou seest the 
Sun,... . thou shouldst be driven to worship them ;’ but so 
there is a command, at least as distinct and imperative, against 
the worship of Jmages, which, Mr. Newman instructs us, has 
been repealed under the Gospel, and was never more than a 
mere Judaic prohibition, ‘intended for mere temporary observ- 
ance in the letter.” ? 

If it be said that, in the case of the Church of Rome, there 
is not only a process of development, but an infallible develop- 
ing power, and that this affords a guaranty, strong as the Divine 
promise itself, against that risk of error which is attendant on 
the ordinary methods of human teaching,— we answer, that 
this is a mere assumption, which requires to be proved, and 
that it cannot be proved in the face of the facts which attest 
the historical variations of the Romish Creed, as these are 
admitted and defended by Mr. Newman himself. For some 
of these variations are not consistent developments of the 
primitive articles of faith, but involve either a corruption or a 
contradiction of these very principles; and if her infallibility 
has not preserved her from the deification of saints, what 
security have we that it will preserve her from the deification 
of Nature? If it has already introduced a Christian Poly- 
theism, why may it not issue in a Christain Pantheism ? 

Admit the principle of development, and it may lead to the 
deification of man, as well as to the worship of Mary; toa 
sacred Calendar of Heroes, as well as of Saints.2 It may ter- 
minate either in Infidelity or in Superstition, according to the 
mental temperament of the individual by whom it is adopted. 


1 Letters of Rev. W. A. BurtEeR on the “Development of Christian 
Doctrine,” p. 116. 

2 PreRRE Leroux, “ Sur Humanite.” Avcustus ComrTs, “ Positive 
Calendar.” The author gave some account of this in an article contrib- 
uted to the “‘ North British Review,” May, 1851. 


ECCLESIASTICAL DEVELOPMENT. 125 


and applied. “An organ of investigation being introduced, 
which may be employed for any purpose indifferently, the 
tendency of such a theory of religious inquiry will just tell 
according to the spirit in which it acts. A skeptic will develop 
the principle into Infidelity, a believer into Superstition; but 
the principle itself remains accurately the same in both.”! The 
connection between the theory of Ecclesiastical Development 
and the infidel theory of Progress has not escaped the notice 
of many acute and profound thinkers in recent times, nor the 
danger resulting from it to the most fundamental articles of 
faith. “ Modern Spiritualists tell us that Christianity is a 
development, as the Papists also assert, and the New Testa- 
ment is its first and rudimentary product; only, unhappily, as_ 
the development, it seems, may be things so different as Popery 
and Infidelity, we are as far as ever from any criterium as to 
which, out of the ten thousand possible developments, is the 
true; but it is a matter of the less consequence, since it will, 
on such reasoning, be always something future.”* One of the 
most pernicious tenets of the Neologists beyond the Rhine is 
thus expressed by themselves: “ Christianity renews itself in 
the human heart, and follows the development of the human 
mind, and invests itself with new forms of thought and lan- 
guage, and adopts new systems of Church organization, to 
which it gives expression and life.” .... “But are these 
teachers the only destroyers of Faith and Morals? Are not 
they also chargeable with precisely the same offence who com- 
mand us to submit implicitly to the so-called divinely-inspired 
Spirit of ‘one living Infallible Judge’ or ‘Developing Power’? 
Can we have fixed articles of faith and morals in this system, 
any more than in the other? No. ‘Unus utrisque error, sed 
variis illidet partibus” ‘There is the same evil in both, but it 
operates in different ways; in the former, every one develops 


1 PROFESSOR BuTLER’s “ Letters,” p. 87. 
2“ Eclipse of Faith,” p. 13. 
ti” 


126 MODERN ATHEISM. 


for himself; in the latter, the Pope develops for every one. 
You look with fear on the progress of Rationalism; and what 
hope can any man derive from that of Romanism?”?* 


We have examined, each on its own peculiar merits, the 
various forms of the Theory of Development which have been 
propounded in modern times, and applied to account for the 
origin of planets and astral systems, of vegetable and: animal 
races, and of the different successive systems of human opinion 
and belief. We have found that, imposing as it may seem to 
be, and high as its pretensions are, that theory has no claim to 
the character of a scientific doctrine; that it is a mere hypoth- 
esis, and nothing more; a speculative figment, which may be 
injurious to those who thoughtlessly dally with it, but which 
can have no power to hurt any one who will resolutely lay 
hold of it, and examine its claims. 


“ Gently, softly, touch a nettle, 
And it stings you for your pains; 
Grasp it, like a man of mettle, 
And it soft as silk remains.” 


It is only necessary to add, that the same general principle 
seems to be involved in all the forms of this theory, —the 
principle, namely, that we are bound to account for the past 
- only by causes known to be in actual operation at the present 
day. M. Comte lays it down in the following terms: “ Our 
conjectures on the origin or formation of our world should 
evidently be subjected to this indispensable condition, — not to 
allow of the interposition of any other natural agents than 
those whose influence we clearly discern in our ordinary phe- 
nomena, and whose operations, then, would only be on a greater 
scale. Without this rule, our work can have no truly scientific 


1DR. WorpDsworth, “Letters to M. Gondon,” p. 153. 


THE COMMON PRINCIPLE. 127 


character, and we shall fall into the inconvenience, so justly 
made a ground of reproach to the greater number of geological 
hypotheses, —that of introducing, for the purpose of explain- 
ing the ancient revolutions of the globe, agencies which do not 
exist at the present day, and whose influence it is impossible, 
for that very reason, to verify or even to comprehend.” The 
same principle is strongly stated, but with due limitation, by 
Sir Charles Lyell, who insists on the explanation of all terres- 
trial changes by means of causes and according to laws known 
to be in operation at the present day: “During the progress of 
Geology, there have been great fluctuations of opinion respect- 
ing the nature of the causes to which all former changes in 
the earth’s surface are referable. The first observers con- 
ceived that the monuments which the Geologist endeavors to 
decipher relate to a period when the physical constitution of 
the earth differed entirely from the present, and that, even 
after the creation of living beings, there have been causes in 
action distinct in kind or degree from these now forming part 
of the economy of nature. These views have been gradually 
modified, and some of them entirely abandoned.” * 

The general principle which is involved in these and similar 
statements may be perfectly sound, when it is applied merely 
to natural events, occurring in the ordinary course, and accord- 
ing to the established constitution of the material and moral 
world; but it is manifestly inapplicable to supernatural events, 
such as the creation of the world, or the revelation of Divine 
truth, since these events cannot be accounted for by any known 
natural cause, and must be ascribed to the immediate agency 
of a Higher Power. Without some such limitation, the gen- 
eral principle cannot be admitted, since it would involve an 
egregious fallacy. We must not limit Omnipotence by circum- 
scribing the range of its possible exercise within the narrow 


1 LYELL, “ Principles of Geology,” 1. 75. 


+ 


128 MODERN ATHEISM. 


bounds of the existing economy, or of our actual experience. 
We are not warranted to assume that the origin of the world, 
on the one hand, or the establishment of Christianity on the 
other, may be accounted for by natural causes still known to 
be in actual operation. In regard to natural events the princi- 
ple is sound, and it is rigorously adhered to by the expounder 
of Natural Theology ; in regard to swpernatural events it can 
have no legitimate application, except in so far as it is com- 
bined with the doctrine of efficient and final causes, which leads 
us up to the recognition of a Higher Power. It might be safe 
and legitimate enough, when we find a fossil organism imbedded 
in the earth, to ascribe its production to the ordinary law of 
generation, even although we had not witnessed the fact of its 
birth, provided the same species is known to have existed pre- 
viously ; but when we find new races coming into being, for 
which the ordinary law of derivation cannot account, we are 
not at liberty to apply the same rule to a case so essentially 
different, and still less to postulate a spontaneous generation, or 
a transmutation of species, for which we have no experience at 
all. In such a case, we can only reason on the principle that 
hike effects must have lke causes, that marks of design imply a 
designing cause, and that events which cannot be accounted for 
by natural causes must be ascribed to a Power distinct from 
nature, and superior to it. It is manifestly unreasonable to 
assume that nothing can be brought to pass in the Universe 
otherwise than by the operation of the same natural laws 
which are now in action; or that, in the course of our limited 
and partial experience, we must necessarily know all the agen- 
cies that may have been at work during the long flow of time. 
And, in accordance with these views, Sir Charles Lyell ex- 
pressly limits the general principle to natural events, and shows 
that “Geology differs as widely from Cosmogony as specula- 
tions concerning the Creation of Man differ from his History.” 


CHAPTER III. 


THEORIES OF PANTHEISM. 


Ar the commencement of the present century, Pantheism 
might have been justly regarded and safely treated as an obso- 
lete and exploded error,—an error which still prevailed, in- 
deed, in the East as one of the hereditary beliefs of Indian 
superstition, but which, when transplanted to Western Europe 
by the daring genius of Spinoza, was found to be an exotic too 
sickly to take root and grow amidst the fresh and bracing air 
of modern civilization. 

But no one who has marked the recent tendencies of specu- 
lative thought, and who is acquainted, however slightly, with 
the character of modern literature, can have failed to discern a 
remarkable change in this respect within the last fifty years. 
German philosophy, always prolific, and often productive of 
monstrous births, has given to the world many elaborate sys- 
tems, physical and metaphysical, whose most prominent feature 
is the deification of Nature or of Man. France, always alert 
and lively, has appropriated the ideas of her more ponderous 
neighbors, and has given them currency through educated 
‘Europe on the wings of her lighter literature. And even in 
England and America there are not wanting some significant 
tokens of a disposition to cherish a kind of speculation which, 
if it be not formally and avowedly Pantheistic, has much of the 
same dreamy and mystic character, and little, if any, harmony 


130 MODERN ATHEISM. 


with definite views of God, or of the relations which He bears 
to man. 

One of the most significant symptoms of a reaction in favor 
of Pantheism may be seen in the numerous republications and 
versions of the writings of Spinoza which have recently 
appeared, in the public homage which has been paid to his 
character and genius, and in the more than philosophic toler- 
ance — the kindly indulgence — which has been shown to his 
most characteristic principles. He is now recognized by many 
as the real founder both of the Philosophie and of the Exe- 
getic Rationalism, which has been applied, with such disastrous 
effect, to the interpretation alike of the volume of Nature and 
of the records of Revelation. In Germany his works have 
been edited by Paulus (1803) and by Gfrérer (1830); in 
France they have been translated by Emile Saisset, Professor 
of Philosophy in the Royal College; while a copious account 
of his life and writings has been published, by Amand Saintes, 
the historian of Rationalism in Germany.’ All this might be 
accounted for by ascribing it simply to the admiration of philo- 
sophical thinkers for the extraordinary talents of the man; and 
it might be said that his writings have been reprinted, just as 
those of Hobbes have been recently reproduced in England, 
more as a historical monument of the past than as a mirror 
that reflects the sentiments of the present age. But it is more 
difficult to explain the eulogiums with which the reappearance 
of Spinoza has been greeted, and the cordiality with which his 
daring speculations have been received. He has not only 
been exculpated from the charge of Atheism, but even pane- 
gyrized as a saint and martyr! “That holy and yet outcast 
man,” exclaimed Schleiermacher,— “he who was fully pene- 
trated by the universal Spirit, — for whom the Infinite was the 
beginning and the end, and the Universe his only and ever- 


1 AmAND SaInTES, “ Histoire de la Vie et des Ouvrages de Spinoza, 
Fondateur de l’Exegése et de la Philosophie, Modernes.” 


PANTHEISM. 131 


lasting love, —he who, in holy innocence and profound peace, 
delighted to contemplate himself in the mirror of an eternal 
world, where, doubtless, he saw himself reflected as its most 
lovely image,— he who was full of the sentiment of religion, 
because he was filled with the Holy Spirit!” “Instead of 
accusing Spinoza of Atheism,” says M. Cousin, “he should 
rather be subjected to the opposite reproach.” 1 «He has been 
loudly accused,” says Professor Saisset, “ of Atheism and im- 
piety. .... The truth is that never did a man believe in 
God with a faith more profound, with a soul more sincere, 
than Spinoza. Take God from him, and you take from him 
his system, his thought, his life.” “ Spinoza, although a Jew,” 
says the Abbé Sabatier, a member of the Catholic clergy, 
“always lived as a Christian, and was as well versed in our 
divine Testament as in the books of the ancient Law. If he 
ended, as we cannot doubt he did, in embracing Christianity, 
he ought to be enrolled in the rank of saints, instead of being 
placed at the head of the enemies of God.” 

Contrast the language in which Spinoza is now compared to 
Thomas 4 Kempis, and proposed as a fit subject for canon- 
ization itself, with the terms in which he was wont to be 
spoken of by men of former times ; and the startling difference 
will sufficiently indicate a great change in the current of Euro- 
pean thought. And if we add to this the contemporaneous 
reappearance of such writers as Bruno and Vanini, whose 
works have been_reprinted by the active philosophical press of 
Paris, we may be well assured that it is not by overlooking or 
despising such speculations, but by boldly confronting and 
closely grappling with them, that we shall best protect the 
mind of the thinking community from their insidious and pesti- 
lent influence. | 


1M. Cousrn, “Cours de Histoire de la Philosophie,” 1. 403. See also 
“Fragmens Philosophiques,” Preface, second edition, p. xxviI.; “ Nou- 
veaux Fragments,” pp. 9, 160. 


132 MODERN ATHEISM. 


But we are not left to infer the existence, in many quarters, 
of a prevailing tendency towards Pantheism, from such facts as 
have been stated, significant as they are; we have explicit 
testimonies on the point, in a multitude of writings, philo- 
sophical and popular, which have recently issued from the 
Continental press. In a report presented to the Academy of 
‘Sciences, M. Franck, a member of the Institute, represents 
Pantheism as the last and greatest of all the Metaphysical 
systems which have come into collision with Revelation; and 
describes it as a theory, “according to which spirit and matter, 
thought and extension, the phenomena of the soul and of the 
body, are all equally related, either as attributes or modes, to 
the same substance or being, at once one and many, finite and 
infinite, — Humanity, Nature, God.” Conceiving that the 
older forms of error— Dualism and Materialism —have all 
but disappeared; and that Atheism, in its gross mechanical 
form, cannot now, as Broussais himself said, “find entrance 
into a well-made head which has seriously meditated on 
nature,’ M. Franck concludes that Pantheism alone, such as 
has been conceived and developed in Germany, is likely to 
have the power of seducing serious minds, and that it may for 
a season exert considerable influence as an antagonist to Chris- 
tianity." M. Javari gives a similar testimony. He tells us 
that “that great lie, which is called Pantheism (ce grand men- 
songe quon appelle le Pantheisme), has dragged German philos- 
ophy into an abyss;” that it is fascinating a large number of 
minds among his own countrymen; and that it is this doctrine, 
rather than any other, which will soon gather around it all 
those who do not know or who reject the truth.”? The 
Biographer of Spinoza, referring to the recent progress and 
prospective prevalence of these views, affirms that “the ten- 
dency of the age, in matters of Philosophy, Morals, and 


1M. Ap. Franox, “ De la Certitude,” Preface, p. xx1. 
2M. A. Javanrt, “ De la Certitude,” p, 509. 


PANTHEISM. 133 


Religion, seems to incline towards Pantheism ;” that “the time 
is come when every one who will not frankly embrace the pure 
and simple Christianity of the Gospel will be obliged to 
acknowledge Spinoza as his chief, unless he be willing to 
expose himself to ridicule;” that “Germany is already satu- 
rated with his principles;” that “his philosophy domineers 
over all the contemporary systems, and will continue to govern 
them until men are brought to believe that word, ‘No man 
hath seen God at any time, but He who was in the bosom of 
the Father hath revealed Him;’” that it is this “ Pantheistic 
philosophy, boldly avowed, towards which the majority of 
those writers who have the talent of commanding public in- 
terest are gravitating at the present day;” and that “the 
ultimate struggle will be, not between Christianity and Philos- 
ophy, but between Christianity and Spinozism, its strongest 
and most inveterate antagonist.”? And the critical reviewer 
of Pantheism, whose Essay is said to have been the first effec- 
tive check to its progress in the philosophical schools of Paris, 
gives a similar testimony. He tells us that it was his main 
object to point out “the Pantheistic tendencies of the age;” to 
show that Germany and France are deeply imbued with its 
spirit; that both Philosophy and Poetry have been infected by 
it; that this is “the veritable heresy of the nineteenth century ; 
and that, when the most current beliefs are analyzed, they 
resolve themselves into Pantheism, avowed or disguised.” ? 

A few specimens of this mode of thinking may be added in 
confirmation of these statements. Lessing, as reported by 
Jacobi, expressed his satisfaction with the poem “ Prome- 
theus,” saying: “This poet’s point of view is my own; the 
orthodox ideas on the Divinity no longer suit me; I derive no 


1 AmMAND SarntTEs, “ Histoire de la Vie et des Ouvrages de Spinoza,” 
pp. 208, 210. 
2 ABBE Maret, “ Essai sur le Panthéisme dans les Sociétés Modernes,” 
pp. 6, 11, 31. Ibid., “‘ Theodicée Chretiénne,” pp. 437, 444, 449. 
12 


1384 MODERN ATHEISM. 


profit from them: ¢v xai wav,— (un et tout, the one and the all), 
—I know no other.” Schelling, in his earlier writings, while 
he was Professor at Jena, and before the change of sentiment 
which he avowed at Berlin, represented God as the one only 
true and really absolute existence ; as nothing more or less 
than Being, filling the whole sphere of reality ; as the infinite 
Being (Seyn) which is the essence of the Universe, and evolves 
all things from itself by self-development. Hegel seeks unity 
in every thing and every where. This unity he discovers in 
the identity of existence and thought, in the one substance 
which exists and thinks, in God who manifests and develops 
himself in many forms. “The Absolute produces all and 
absorbs all; it is the essence of all things. The life of the 
Absolute is never consummated or complete. God does not 
properly exist, but comes into being: ‘ Gott ist in werden.— 
Deus est in fiert. With him God is not a Person, but Person- 
ality, which realizes itself in every human consciousness as so 
many thoughts of one eternal Mind..... Apart from, and 
out of the world, therefore, there is no God; and so, also, 
apart from the universal consciousness of man, there is no 
Divine consciousness or personality. God is with him the 
whole process of thought, combining in itself the objective 
movement, as seen in Nature, with the subjective, as seen in 
Logic ; and fully realizing itself only in— the universal spirit 
of Humanity.”? 

We select only two specimens from the recent literature of 
France ; they might be multiplied indefinitely. Pierre Leroux, 
the editor of the “ Encyclopedie Nouvelle,” says, in his “ Essay 
on Humanity,” dedicated to the poet Beranger: “It is the God 
immanent in the Universe, in Humanity, in each Man, that I 
adore.” ——“ The worship of Humanity was the worship of Vol- 
taire.”—“ What, is Humanity considered as comprehending all 


1 Mr. Morert’s “ Historical and Critical View,” 11. 104, 153. 


PANTHEISM. 135 


men? Is it something, or is it nothing but an abstraction of 
our mind? Is Humanity a collective being, or is it nothing 
but a series of individual men? ”—“ Being, or the soul, is 
eternal by its nature. Being, or the soul, is infinite by its 
nature. Being, or the soul, is permanent and unchangeable by 
its nature. Being, or the soul, is one by its nature. Being, 
or the soul, is God by its nature.”—“Socrates has proved our 
eternity and the divinity of our nature.”* The next specimen 
is a singular but very instructive one. It is derived from the 
treatise of M. Crousse, who holds that “intelligence is a prop- 
erty or an effect of matter;” “that the world is a great body, 
which has sense, spirit, and reason;” that “matter, in appear- 
ance the most cold and insensible, is in reality animated, and 
capable of engendering thought.” It might be amusing, were 
it not melancholy, to refer to one of his proofs of this position : 
“Une horologe mesure le temps; certes, c’est 1a un effet intel- 
lectuel produit par une cause physique!”* His grand prin- 
ciple is the doctrine of what he calls “ Unisubstancisme,” and it 
is applied equally to the nature of God and the soul of man. 
God is admitted, but it is the God of Pantheism,— Nature, 
including matter and mind, but excluding any higher power. 
“ God is the self-existent Being, which includes all, and beyond 
which no other can be imagined. The Infinite is identical with 
the Universe.” ——“ God is and can only be the whole of that 
which exists. Let us proclaim it aloud, that the echoes may 
repeat it, God, the Great Being, is the All, and the All is 
One. God is every thing that exists; the Universe, that is 
the supreme Being. In it are life eternal, power, wisdom, 
knowledge, perfect organization, all the qualities, in a word, 
that are inseparable from the Divinity. Beyond the universe, 


1 PIERRE LEROUX, “De l’Humanité,” 1. vi. 3, 295. 
2L. D. Crousss, “ Des Principes, ou Philosophie Premiére,”’ 2d Edition, 
Paris, 1846. 


136 MODERN ATHEISM. ~ 


or apart from it, there is nothing (neant); above the visible 
world and its laws there is for man — nullité.” 

It is deeply humbling to think that, in the light of the nine- 
teenth century, and in the very centre of European civiliza- 
tion, speculations such as these should have found authors to 
publish, and readers to purchase them. Need we wonder that 
several Catholic writers on the continent, conversant with the 
works which are daily issuing from the press, and familiar 
with the state of society in which they live, have publicly ex- 
pressed their apprehension that, unless some seasonable and 
effective check can be given to the progress of this fearful 
system, we may yet witness the restoration of Polytheistic 
worship and the revival of Paganism in Europe?! 

The most cursory review of the history of Pantheism? will 
serve to convince every reflecting reader that it must have its 
origin in some natural but strangely perverted principle of the 
human mind; and that its recent reappearance. in Europe 
affords an additional and very unexpected proof that, like the 
weeds which spring up, year after year, in the best cultivated 
field, it must have its roots or seeds deep in the soil. In the 
annals of our race, we find it exhibited in two distinct forms; 
Just, as a Religious doctrine, and, secondly, as a Philosophical 
system. It had its birthplace in the East, where the gorgeous 
magnificence of Nature was fitted to arrest the attention and to 
stimulate the imagination of a subtle, dreamy, and speculative 
people. The primitive doctrine of Creation was soon sup- 
planted by the pagan theory of Emanation. The Indian 
Brahm is the first and only Substance, infinite, absolute, inde- 
terminate Being, from which all is evolved, manifested, devel- 
oped, and to which all returns and is reabsorbed. The Vedanta 
philosophy is based on this fundamental principle, and it has 


1 ABBE Maret, “ Theodicée Chretienne,” p. 94. 
2 ABBE GoscHLER, sur “1’Histoire du Pantheisme.” ABBE MARET, 
*“ Essai,””’ chap. Iv. 


PANTHEISM. 137 


been well described as “the most rigorous system of Pan- 
theism which has ever appeared.” . 

We learn from the writings of Greece that a similar system 
prevailed in Egypt, different, indeed, in form, and expressed in 
other terms, but resting on the same ultimate ground; and we 
know that Christianity found one of its earliest and most for- 
midable antagonists in the philosophical school of Alexandria, 
which was deeply imbued with a Pantheistic spirit, and which, 
perhaps for that reason, has recently become an object of much 
interest to speculative minds in France and Germany. The 
Gnostic and the Neoplatonic sects maintained, and the writings 
of Plotinus and Proclus still exhibit, many principles the same 
in substance with those which have been recently revived in 
Continental Europe. In the earlier as well as the later litera- 
ture of Greece we find traces of Pantheism, while the Poly- 
theistic worship, which universally prevailed, was its natural 
product and appropriate manifestation. The ancient Orphic 
doctrines, which were taught in the Mysteries, seem to have 
been based on the oriental idea of Emanation. Even in the 
masculine literature of Rome we find numerous passages 
which are still quoted, with glowing admiration, by the Pan- 
theists of modern times. There is, indeed, but too much 
reason to believe that the numerous references which occur in 
the Classics to the existence of one absolute and supreme 
Being, and which Dr. Cudworth has so zealously collected, 
with the view of proving “the naturality of the idea of God,” 
must be interpreted, at least in many instances, in a Panthe- 
istic sense, and that they imply nothing more than the recog- 
nition of one parent Substance, from which all other beings 
have been successively developed. 


1Prerre Leroux, “De V’Humanité,” 1. 249. M. Crovussz, “Des 
Principes,” pp. 199, 211, 296. Bayxe, “ Pensées,” 111. 67. The well- 
known lines of the sixth Aneid, “ Principio ccelum, ac terras, camposque 
liquentes,” &c. are thus applied. 


12* 


138 MODERN ATHEISM. 


We find some lingering remains of Pantheism in the writings 
of the middle age. Scot Erigena, in his work, “ De Divisione 
Nature,” sums up his theory by saying: “All is God, and God 
is all.” Amaury de Chartres made use of similar language. 
And it must have been more widely diffused in these times 
than many may be ready to believe, if it be true, as the Abbé 
Maret affirms, and as M. de Hammer offers to prove, that the 
Knights of the Order of the Temple were affiliated to secret 
societies in which the doctrines of Gnosticism and the spirit 
of Pantheism were maintained and cherished It reappeared 
in the philosophical schools of Italy before the dawn, and during 
the early progress, of the revival of letters and the Reforma- 


2 and even now, after three centuries of sci- 


tion of Religion ; 
entific progress and social advancement, it is once more rising 
into formidable strength, and aspiring to universal ascendancy. 

From this rapid survey of the history of the past, it is clear 
that Pantheism is one of the oldest and most inveterate forms 
of error; that in its twofold character, as at once a philosophy 
and a faith, it possesses peculiar attractions for that class of 
minds which delight to luxuriate in mystic speculation; and 
that, in the existing state of society, it may be reasonably 
regarded as the most formidable rival to Natural and Revealed 
Religion. We are far from thinking, indeed, that the old 
mechanical and materialistic Atheism is so completely worn ~ 
out or so utterly exploded as some recent writers would have 
us to believe;® for M. Comte and his school still avow that 
wretched creed, while they profess to despise Pantheism, as a 
system of empty abstractions. We do think, however, that 
the grand ultimate struggle between Christianity and Atheism 
will resolve itself into a contest between Christianity and Pan- 
theism. For, in the Christian sense, Pantheism is itself Athe- 


1 ABBE Maret, “Essai,” pp. 152, 156, 221. 
2 Dr. MERLE D’AvUBIGNE, “History of Reformation,” v. 84. 
3 ABBE Maret, “ Essai,” p. 89; “Theodicée,” p. 368. 


PANTHEISM. 139° 


istic, since it denies the Divine personality, and ascribes to the 
universe those attributes which belong only to the living God; 
but then it is a distinct and very peculiar form of Atheism, 
much more plausible in its pretensions, more fascinating to the 
imagination, and less revolting to the reason, than those colder 
and coarser theories which ascribed the origin of the world to 
a fortuitous concourse of atoms, or to the mere mechanical laws 
of matter and motion. It admits much which the Atheism of 
a former age would have denied; it recognizes the principle 
of causality, and gives a reason, such as it is, for the existing 
order of Nature; it adopts the very language of Theism, and 
speaks of the Infinite, the Eternal, the Unchangeable One; it 
may even generate a certain mystic piety, in which elevation 
of thought may be blended with sensibility of emotion, spring- 
ing from a warm admiration of Nature; and it admits of 
being embellished with the charms of a seductive eloquence, 
and the graces of a sentimental poetry. It may be regarded, 
therefore, not indeed as the only, but as the most formidable 
rival of Christian Theism at the present day. 

We have sometimes thought that the recent discoveries of 
Chemical Science might have a tendency, at least in the case 
’ of superficial minds, to create a prepossession in favor of Pan- 
theism; for what does modern Chemistry exhibit, but the spec- 
tacle of Nature passing through a series of successive transmu- 
tations ?—the same substance appearing in different forms, and 
assuming in every change different properties, but never anni- 
hilated, never destroyed; now existing in the form of solid 
matter, again in the form of a yielding fluid, again in the form 
of an élastic gas; now nourishing a plant, and entering into its 
very substance; now incorporated with an animal, and forming 
its sinews or its bones; now reduced again to dust and ashes, 
but only to appear anew, and enter once more into other com- 
binations. The facts are certain, and they are sufficiently 
striking to suggest the question, May not Nature itself be the 


140 MODERN ATHEISM. 


one Being whose endless transformations constitute the history 
of the universe? This question may be naturally suggested, 
and it may even be lawfully entertained; but it cannot be sat- 
isfactorily determined by any theory which leaves the evident 
marks of Intelligence and Design in the whole constitution 
and course of Nature unaccounted for or unexplained. 
Influenced by these and similar considerations, many thought- 
ful men have recently avowed their belief that the two grand 
alternatives in modern times are, Christianity and Pantheism. 
The Abbé Maret and Amand Saintes differ only in this: that 
by Christianity the former means Catholicism, the latter means 
the Gospel, or the religion of the primitive church; but both 
agree that Pantheism is the only other alternative. Schlegel 
contrasts the same alternatives in the following impressive © 
terms: “Here is the decisive point; two distinct, opposite, or 
diverging paths lie before us, and man must choose between 
them. The clear-seeing spirit, which, in its sentiments, 
thoughts, and views of life, would be in accordance with itself, 
and would act consistently with them, must, in any case, take 
one or the other. Either there is a living God, full of love, 
even such a One as love seeks and yearns after, to whom faith . 
clings, and in whom all our hopes are centred (and such is the 
personal God of Revelation), —and on this hypothesis the world 
is not God, but is distinct from Him, having had a beginning, 
and being created out of nothing,—or there is only one 
supreme form of existence, and the world is eternal, and not 
distinct from God; there is absolutely but One, and this 
eternal One comprehends all, and is itself all in all; so that 
there is no where any real and essential distinction, and even 
that which is alleged to exist between evil and good is only a 
delusion of a narrow-minded system of Ethics... .. Now, 
the necessity of this choice and determination presses urgently 
upon our own time, which stands midway between two worlds. 


PANTHEISM. 141 


Generally, it is between these two paths alone that the decision 
is to be made.” * 

We have made the preceding remarks on purpose to show 
that the distinctive doctrines of Pantheism, as a system differ- 
ent, in some respects, from the colder forms of Atheism, de- 
mand the careful study of the Divines and the Philosophers 
of the present age; and that any statement of the evidence in 
favor of the being and perfections of God, which overlooks the 
prevalence of these doctrines, or makes only a cursory refer- 
ence to them, must be alike defective in itself, and ill adapted 
to the real exigencies of European society. Let this be our 
apology for attempting, as we now propose, to exhibit an out- 
line of the Pantheistic system, to resolve it into its constituent 
elements and ultimate grounds, to examine the validity of the 
reasons on which it rests, and to contrast it with the doctrine 
of Christian Theism, which speaks of a living, personal. God, 
and of a distinct but dependent Creation, the product of His 
supreme wisdom and almighty power. The task is one of con- 
siderable difficulty, — difficulty arising not so much from the 
nature of the subject, as from the metaphysical and abstruse 
- manner in which it has been treated. We must follow Spinoza 
through the labyrinth of his Theological Politics and his Geo- 
metrical Ethics; we must follow Schelling and Hegel into the 
still darker recesses of their Transcendental Philosophy ; for 
a philosophy of one kind can only be met and neutralized by 
a higher and a better, and the first firm step towards the refu- 
tation of error is a thorough comprehension of it. But hav- 
ing an assured faith in those stable laws of thought which are 
inwoven with the very texture of the human mind, and in the 
validity and force of that natural evidence to which Theology 
appeals, we have no fear of the profoundest Metaphysics that 


1FrEeD. VON SCHLEGEL, “Philosophy of Life,” p. 417. See, also, Dr. 
TuoLucK’s remarks on the same point in the “Princeton Theological 
Essays,” I. 559, 


¥ 


142 MODERN ATHEISM. 

can be brought to bear on the question at issue, provided only 

they be not altogether unintelligible. é ’ 
Pantheism has appeared in several different forms; and it 

may conduce both to the fullness and the clearness of our 


. exposition if we offer, in the first instance, a comprehensive 


outline of the theory of Spinoza, with a brief criticism on its 
leading principles, and thereafter advance to the consideration 
of the twofold development of Pantheism in the hands of 
Materialists and Idealists, respectively. — 


SECTION I. 
THE SYSTEM OF SPINOZA. 


The Pantheistic speculations which have been revived in 
modern times can scarcely be understood, and still less ac- 
counted for or answered, without reference to the system of 
Spinoza. That system met with little favor from any, and 
with vigorous opposition from not a few, of the divines and 
philosophers of the times immediately subsequent to its publi- 
cation. It was denounced and refuted by Muszus, a judicious 
and learned professor of divinity at Jena; by Mansvelt, a 
young but promising professor of philosophy at Utrecht; by 
Cuyper of Rotterdam; by Wittichius of Leyden; by Pierre — 
Poiret of Reinsburg; by Fenelon, Archbishop of Cambray ; 
by Huet, Bishop of Avranches; by John Howe, and Dr. 
Samuel Clarke, as well as by many others? whose writings 


1Muszxvs, “Tractatus Theologico-politicus ad veritatis lumen exami- 
natus,” 1674. ReGNERI A MANSVELT, “ Adversus anonymum Theo- 
logico-politicum, Liber singularis,” 1674. Francois Cuyrrr, * Arcana 
Atheismi Revelata,” 1676. Joun Brepenroune, “Enervatio Tractatus 
Theol.-polit.” Curist. Wirricntt, “ Anti-Spinoza, sive Examen,” 1690. 
PIERRE Porret, “Fundamenta Atheismi Eversa, sive Specimen Absur- 
ditatis Spinozianz.” Fune.on, “De l’Existence de Dieu,” p. 11., ¢. 1Il., 


. 


SPINOZA. ' 148 


served for a time to preserve the Church from the infection of 
his most dangerous errors. But gradually these views became 
an object of speculative interest to Metaphysical inquirers, and 
found fayor even with a growing class of Philosophical 
Divines ;! partly by reason of the strong intellectual energy 
with which they were conceived and announced, and, partly, 
also, there is reason to fear, on account of a prevailing ten- 
dency to lower the authority of Scripture, and to exalt the’ 
prerogatives of reason, in matters of faith. The system of 
Spinoza, as developed in his “ Tractatus Theologico-politicus,” 
and, still more, in his “ Ethica,’—a posthumous publication, 
—may be said to contain the germs of the whole system both 
of Theological and Philosophical Rationalism which was subse- 
quently unfolded, —in the Church, by Paulus, Wegscheider, and 
Strauss, —and, in the Schools, by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. 
Theological Rationalism consists in making Reason the sole 
arbiter and the supreme judge in matters of faith; in setting 
aside or undermining the authority of Revelation, partly by 
denying or questioning the plenary inspiration of Scripture, 
partly by explaining or accounting for miracles on natural 
principles, partly by assuming, as Strauss assumes, that what- 
ever is‘ supernatural must necessarily be unhistorical; in 
reducing every article of the creed, by a new method of critical 
exegesis, to a mere statement of some natural fact or some 
moral doctrine, embellished, in the one case, by mythical 
legends, and accommodated, in the other, to local and tempo- 
rary prejudices, but amounting substantially to nothing more 
than a natural development of human thought. The prolific 
germs of this Neologian method of the interpretation of Serip- 
ture are to be found every where in the writings of Spinoza. 


“Refutation du Spinozisme.” Huet, “La Conformité de la Raison avec 
la Foi,” 1692. Howe, “ Living Temple,” 1.262. §S. CuarKs, “Discourse 
on the Being and Attributes of God,” pp. 25, 44, 58, 80. 

1 Jean Corerus, “Vie de Spinoza,” reprinted by Saisset, p. 4. 


- 


144. MODERN ATHEISM. 


Philosophical Rationalism, again, although often, or rather 
generally, blended with the Theological, is yet, in some respects, 
distinct from it. The one has been developed in the Church, 
the other in the Schools. ‘The former, cultivated by divines 
who acknowledged more or less explicitly the authority of 
Scripture, has directed its efforts mainly to the establishment 
of a new method of Biblical exegesis and criticism, by which 
‘all that is peculiar to Revelation, as a supernatural scheme, 
might be enervated or explained away. ‘The latter, cultivated 
by Philosophie speculators who were not bound by any author- 
ity, nor fettered by any subscription to articles of faith, has 
sought, without reference to Revelation, to solve the great 
problems relating to God, Man, and the Universe, on purely 
natural principles; and, after many fruitless efforts, has taken 
refuge, at last, in the Faith of Pantheism and the Philosophy 
of the Absolute. The prolific germs of this method of the 
interpretation of Nature are also to be found in the writings 
of Spinoza. : 

The circumstance, indeed, which, more than any other, 
seems to have commended his system to some of the most 
inquisitive minds in Europe, is 7s apparent completeness. It is 
not a mere theory of Pantheism, nor a mere method of Exe- 
gesis, nor a mere code of Ethics, nor a mere scheme of Poli- 
tics, although all these are comprehended under it; but it is a 
system founded on a few radical principles, which are exhibited 
in the shape of axioms and definitions, and unfolded, by rigor- 
ous logical deduction, in a series of propositions, with occa- 
sional scholia and corollaries, after the method of Geometry; a 
system which undertakes to explain the rationale of every part 
of human knowledge, to interpret alike the Book of Nature 
and the Book of Revelation, to determine the character of 
prophetic inspiration, and to account for apparent miracles on 
natural principles, to establish the real foundations of moral 
duty, and the ultimate grounds of state policy; and all this 


SPINOZA. 145 


on the strength of a few simple definitions, and a series of 
necessary deductions from them. It is important to mark this 
characteristic feature of his system; for while we have directly 
nothing to do with by far the larger part of his speculations, 
which relate to questions foreign to our present inquiry, yet 
the fact that his ethical and political conclusions are deduced 
from the same principles on which his Pantheistic theory is 
founded, serves at once to account for the extensive influence 
which his writings have exerted on every department of modern 
speculation, and also to show that, in opposing that system, we 
are entitled to found on the conclusions which he has himself 
deduced from it, for the purpose of disproving the fundamental 
principles on which it rests. For if, on the one hand, the 
principles which he assumes in his definitions and axioms do 
necessarily involve the conclusions which are propounded in 
his Ethics and Politics; and if, on the other hand, these con- 
clusions are found to be at variance with the highest views of 
Morality and Government, then the more logical the process 
by which they have been deduced, the more certain will it be 
that there is some fundamental flaw in the basis on which the 
whole superstructure is reared. In other cases, it might be 
doubtful how far the consequences that may seem to be dedu- 
cible from a theory could be legitimately urged in argument, 
especially when these consequences are disavowed by the 
author of it; but, in the present case, the consequences are 
explicitly declared, not less than the principles,—they are 
even exhibited as corollaries rigorously deduced from them ; 
and thus the very comprehensiveness of the system, which gives 
it so much of the aspect of completeness, and which has fasci- 
nated the minds of speculative men, always fond of bold and 
sweeping generalizations, may be found to afford the most con- 
clusive proof of its inherent weakness, and to show that it 
comes into fatal collision, at all points, not only with the 
13 


146 MODERN ATHEISM. 


doctrines of Natural and Revealed Religion, but also with the 
practical duties and political rights of mankind. 

We may present, in brief compass, a comprehensive sum- 
mary of the doctrine of Spinoza. The fundamental principle 
of his whole theory is contained in the assumption with which 
he sets out,—that the entire system of Being consists only of 
three elements, “ Substance, Attributes, and Modes,” and in the 
definitions which are given of these terms respectively. With 
him, Substance is Being; not this or that particular being, nor 
even being in general, considered in the abstract, but absolute 
Being,— Being in its plentitude, which comprehends all exis- 
tences that can be conceived without requiring the concept of 
any other thing, and without which no other thing can either 
exist or be conceived.' By an “Attribute” he means, not 
substance, but a manifestation of substance, yet such a mani- 
festation as belongs to its very essence; and, by a “ Mode,” he 
means an affection of substance, or that which exists in another — 
thing, and is conceived by means of that thing. ‘These are the 
three fundamental ideas of his system.? 

The “Substance” of which he speaks is God, the infinite, 
self-existent, eternal Being, whose essential nature is defined 
in terms which might seem to be expressive of a great truth, 
for he says: “I understand by God an absolutely infinite 
Being, that is to say, a Substance constituted by an infinity of 
Attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite 
essence.” But, on closer inspection, we find that the God of 
whom he speaks is not the Creator and Governor of the world, 
not a living, personal Being, distinct from Nature and superior 
to it, not the Holy One and the Just, possessing infinite 
moral perfections, and exercising a supreme dominion over 


1 Sprnoza, “ Ethica,” Definitions 111., Iv., v. 

2 “Tl construit le syst@me entiere des étres avec ces trois seuls elements; 
Ja substance, Vattribut, et le mode.”’—“ Voila Vidée mere de la meta- 
physique de Spinoza.” — SaIssET. 


SPINOZA. 147 


. His works; but, simply, absolute Being, the necessary self- 
existent Substance, whose known “ Attributes” are extension 
and thought, and whose affections, or “ Modes,” comprehend all 
the varieties of finite existence; in short, it is Nature that is 
God, for every possible existence may be included under the 
twofold expression of Natura naturans and Natura naturata. 
Accordingly, the principle of Unisubstancisme is broadly 
avowed, and the very possibility of creation denied. He 
affirms, and, indeed, according to his definition, he is entitled 
to affirm, that there is not and cannot be more than one sub- 
stance; for by “Substance” he means a self-existent, necessary, 
and eternal Being. And, on the same ground, he affirms that 
the creation of such a substance is impossible; for, having 
excluded every finite thing — everything that does not exist 
of itself— from his definition of Substance, he is warranted in 
saying that anything called into being by a creative act of 
Divine power could not be a “substance,” iz his sense of that 
term. He sets himself to prove, by a series of propositions 
whose logical correctness, as deductions from his fundamental 
assumption, may be freely and most safely admitted, that the 
production of. a “substance” is absolutely impossible; that 
between two “substances,” having different “attributes,” there 
is nothing in common; that where two things have nothing in 
common, the one cannot be the cause of the other; that two 
or more distinct things can only be discriminated from each 
other by the difference of the “attributes” or “affections” of 
their. “substance ;” and that, in the nature of things, there can-— 
not be two or more substances of the same kind, or possessing 
the same attributes. He holds, of course, that Nature is as 
necessary as God, or, rather, that God and Nature are one; 
there being but one Substance, appearing only in different 
aspects, as cause and effect, as substance and mode, as infinite 
and yet finite, as one and yet many, as ever the same and yet _ 
infinitely variable. 


148 MODERN ATHEISM. 


It is only necessary to add, that the sole attributes of this 
Substance which are capable of being known by our limited 
intelligence, and which are discerned by an immediate “intu- 
ition of reason,” are two, namely, extension and thought. We 
know nothing, and can know nothing, of God beyond this: He 
has no will, or his will is mere intelligence or thought; He has 
no law, or His law is merely His thought embodied in the 
arrangements of nature; He has no moral properties that are 
cognizable by the human faculties. It follows that God is not 
the creator of the world, for creation implies an act of will, 
and God has no will; that He is not the Lawgiver or Gov- 
ernor of the world, for there is no law emanating from a 
superior, but such only as is created by human compact or 
agreement, and there is “no natural obligation to obey God,” 
‘no invariable standard of right and wrong. The principles 
which are thus assumed in regard to the nature of God are 
afterwards applied to many important questions, relating, first, 
to the soul of man; secondly, to the science of Ethics; thirdly, 
to the doctrine of political right and liberty; and, fourthly, to 
the supposed claims of Revelation. And they are carried out, 
with inexorable logic, into all their most revolting results. 

Such is a concise, but, as we believe, a correct outline of the 
leading principles of the system of Spinoza. We shall now 
offer a few remarks upon it, directed to the object of showing 
wherein consists the radical fallacy on which it rests, and what 
are the considerations by which thoughtful men may be most 
effectually secured against its pernicious influence. 

It has been well said by Professor Saisset, that the fallacy 
of this system does not lie in any one proposition of the series, 
but that it is a vicious circle throughout; that the paralogism 
is not in this or that part of the “Ethics,” —it is everywhere; 
and that the germ of the whole is contained in the defimitions, 
which are assumed, but not proved.’ Our attention, therefore, , 


1 Sasser, “Introduction,” p. XXXIX. 


SPINOZA. 149 


must be given, in the first instance, to the fundamental assump- 
tions on which the whole superstructure is built. 

1. It is assumed, without proof, that the entire system of 
Being may be ranked’ under the three categories of Substance, 
Attributes, and Modes. It is assumed, equally without proof, 
that there can be no substance which is not self-existent, neces- 
sary, and eternal, and that every being which does not possess 
these properties must be only a “ mode” or affection of another 
being to whom they belong. It is further assumed, also with- 
out proof, that extension and thought are necessary “ attributes” 
of the one self-existent “ substance,” each of the two exhibiting 
only a different aspect of his eternal essence, while both are 
equally essential and equally infinite. And, finally, it is 
assumed, still without proof, that Nature comprehends a two- 
fold series of existences, distinct from each other, but devel- 
oped, as it were, in parallel lines, — Corporeal and Intellectual 
beings, which correspond respectively to the Divine attributes 
of extension and thought,—which partake of the essential 
nature of these attributes, but exhibit them in finite and tran- 
sient forms, as mere modes or manifestations of the one infinite 
“substance.” These are some of the fundamental assumptions 
on which he proceeds; they are not proved, nor even attempted 
to be proved; for, although several are stated in the form of 
distinct propositions, and accompanied with a formal demon- 
stration, the most cursory inspection of the pretended proof is 
sufficient to show that it consists entirely in a series of deduc- 
tions from principles previously assumed, and that its validity 
must ultimately rest on the definitions in which these principles 
are embodied. 

Now, let any one examine these “ definitions,” and he will 
find that they are wholly arbitrary, and that he is not bound 
by any law of his intellectual nature to admit them, still less 
entitled, on any ground of experience, to assume and found 
upon them, as if they were self-evident or axiomatic truths. 

13* 


150 MODERN ATHEISM. 


It is possible, and it may even be legitimate and useful for the 
purposes of philosophical speculation, to classify the various 
objects of human knowledge by ranging them under the cate- 
gories of Substance, Attributes, and Modes. But is it a self 
evident truth, that there can be no substance in nature except-. 
ing such as is self-existent and eternal? Is it a self-evident 
truth that man, with his distinct personality and individual 
consciousness, is a mere “ mode” or affection of another being? 
Is it a self-evident truth that the ape, the lizard, and the worm 
are equally “modes” of the same substance with the angel 
and the seraph? Is it a self-evident truth that extenscon and 
thought are equally expressive of the uncreated Essence and 
necessary “attributes” of the Eternal? Is it a self-evident 
truth that no being can exist in nature otherwise than by devel- 
opment out of the Divine substance, and that the creation of a 
distinct but dependent being is impossible? In regard to ques- 
tions such as these, the appeal must lie to that common sense, 
or those laws of thought, which are the heritage of every 
thinking mind, and which cannot be cramped or fettered by 
the arbitrary definitions of any philosophical system whatever. 
These definitions must commend themselves as true, either by 
their own self-evidencing light, or by their manifest conformity 
with experience, before they can be assumed and founded on 
in any process of reasoning; and we are very sure that those 
which have been specified cannot be candidly examined with- 
out appearing to be, as they really are, the grossest instances 
of a petitio principti that have ever been offered to the world. 
For these “definitions” constitute the foundation of the whole 
superstructure ; they contain the germ, which is subsequently 
expanded and developed in a long series of propositions ; and, 
as they are assumed without proof, while they are far from 
being self-evident, no amount of logical power and no effort of 
dialectic skill can possibly extract from them any doctrinal 


SPINOZA. lol 


a 


results, whether theological, ethical, or political, possessing 
ereater evidence than what belongs to themselves. This is our 
Jirst objection. 

2. The philosophical method of Spinoza, as applied to our 
special subject, is radically vicious. It is not the inductive or 
experimental method; it is an argument a priort, a deductive 
process of reasoning. Now, this method, suitable as itis toa 
certain class of subjects, such as those of Geometry, in which 
clear and precise definitions are attainable, is either utterly 
inapplicable to another class of subjects, such as most of those 
of which Spinoza treats, or itis peculiarly dangerous, especially 
in the hands of a daring speculator, since, in the absence of 
adequate definitions, he may be tempted to have recourse to 
such as are purely arbitrary. All the possible properties of a 
circle may be deduced from the simple definition of it; but it 
will not follow that all the possible forms of being in nature 
may be deduced from the definition of “substance.” The 
reason is clear; we cannot have such a definition of substance 
as we may have of acircle. We do not object merely to the 
geometrical form of his reasoning,—that is a mere accessory, 
and one which renders the “ Ethica” much more dry and less 
attractive than the “'Tractatus,” in which he gives~freé scope 
to his subtle intellect, unfettered by any such artificial plan,— 
but we object to the essential nature of his system, to the a 
priort and deductive method by which he attempts to solve 
some of the highest problems of philosophy respecting God, 

‘Nature, and Man. Here, if anywhere, is a field of inquiry 
which demands for its due cultivation an enlarged experience 
and a patient spirit of induction. Yet, with him, the starting- 
point of philosophy is the highest object of human thought. 
He begins with the idea of self-existent Being, without which, 
as he imagines, nothing else can be conceived ; and then, fol- 
Jowing the line of a descending series, he attempts to deduce 


- 


152 MODERN ATHEISM. 


from it the philosophy of the whole system of the universe !! 
His Metaphysics must borrow nothing from experience ; his 
very Psychology must be purely deductive. From the intui- 
tive idea of “substance” he deduces the nature and existence 
of God; from the nature of God, the necessity of a Divine 
development; from the necessity of a Divine development, the 
existence of a universe comprising souls and bodies; and no- 
where does he condescend to take notice of the facts of expe- 
rience, except in two of his axioms, in which he assumes that 
“man thinks,” and that “he feels his body to be affected in 
various ways.” His whole philosophy resolves itself ulti- 
mately into an intellectual intuition, whose object is Substance 
or Being, with its infinite attributes of extension and thought, 
—an intuition which discerns its object directly and immedi- 
ately, in the light of its own self-evidence, without the aid of 
any intermediate sign, and which is as superior, in a philosoph- 
ical point of view, to the intimations of sense, as its objects 
are superior to the fleeting phenomena of Nature. 

Now, we submit that this method of ¢onstructing a philos- 
ophy of Nature is radically vicious, and diametrically opposed 
to the only legitimate, the only possible way of attaining to 
sound knowledge. He is not content to tell us what is the 
order of things; he aspires, forsooth, to show what the order 
of things must be. We have no wish to disparage Metaphys- 
ical Science; it has a natural root in human reason, and a 
legitimate domain in the ample territory of human thought; 
but we protest against any attempt to extend it beyond its 
proper boundaries, or to apply it to subjects which belong to 
the province of experience and observation. The schemes 
which have been recently broached in Germany, and imitated 
in France, for constructing, at one time, a deductive Psychol- 
ogy, at another a deductive Physics, at a third a deductive 


1 Spinoza, “ De Intellectis Emendatione.” This treatise contains the 
exposition of his method. 


SPINOZA. 153 


Ethics, at a fourth a deductive Theory of Progress, at a fifth a 
deductive History of Religion, afford more than sufficient evi- 
dence that hitherto the spirit of the Baconian philosophy has 
been little understood, and still less appreciated, by our conti- 
nental neighbors; and that the efforts of the highest genius 
have been sadly. frustrated, in attempting the impracticable 
task of extracting from mere reason that knowledge which can 
only be acquired in the school of experience. This is our 
second objection. 

3. The system of Spinoza is vicious, because it applies a 
mere abstraction of the human mind to account for whatever 
is real and concrete in the universe. We have no sympathy 
with those who rail at all abstract ideas, as if they were imag- 
inary essences or mere illusions; we recognize the faculty of 
abstraction ‘as one of the wisest provisions of Nature, and one 
of the most useful powers belonging to the mind of man,—a 
power which comes into action with the first dawn of infant 
intelligence, and is only matured as reason rises into manhood, 
till it becomes the internal spring of all Philosophy and 
Science. Nor do we hold that an abstract idea is necessarily 
an unreality, or a mere negation; for, without reviving the 
controversy between the Nominalists and Realists, or pro- 
nouncing any decision on the intricate questions which that 
controversy involved, we may say, in general terms, that the 
idea of a circle, of a square, or of a triangle, is neither unreal 
nor negative, but a very positive, and, withal, intelligible thing. 
It is the idea of that which is essential to the nature of each of 
these figures respectively, and common to all possible figures 
of the same class, whatever may be their accidental varieties, 
whether in point of dimension or form. And so the idea of 
Being or Substance, although it be highly abstract, is not 
necessarily unreal or negative; it is the idea of existence, or of 
that which is common to everything that 7s, abstraction being 
made of every diversity by which one being is distinguished 


~ 


154 MODERN ATHEISM. 


from another. Conscious that we ourselves exist, and observ- 
ing that other beings exist around us, we strike off the pecu- 
liarities which belong to individuals, and form the general idea 
which includes nothing but what is common to all, and yet con- 
tains a positive element, which is the object of one of the 
strongest convictions of the human mind! The conception of 
Infinite Being contains the positive element of being, abstrac- 
tion being made of all Limitation or bounds. That this is a 
real, legitimate, and useful conception, we have no disposition 
to deny; we cannot divest ourselves of it; it springs up spon- 
taneously from the innermost fountain of thought. But we 
cannot accept the account which Spinoza has given of its 
nature and origin, and still less can we assent to the applica- 
tion which he has made of it. He describes it as the idea of 
absolute, necessary, self-existent, eternal Being; and he traces 
its origin, not to the combined influence of experience and 
abstraction, acting under the great primitive law of causality, 
but to an immediate perception, or direct cntuition, of reason. 
Now, we submit that the concept of being, and the concept of 
absolute self-existent being, are perfectly distinct from each 
other, and that they spring from different laws of thought. 
The concept of beng applies to everything that exists, without 
reference to the cause or manner of its existence; and this 
springs simply from experience and abstraction. The concept 
of self-existent being, which is equally suggested by the laws of 
our mental constitution, does not apply to everything that 
exists, but only to that whose existence is not originated or 
determined by any other being; and this concept springs also 
from experience and abstraction, combined, however, with the 
law or principle of causality, which teaches us that no change 
can occur in Nature, and that nothing can ever come into being, 
without a cause, and prompts us to infer from the JSact of existence 


*M. F. Perron, “ Essai d’une Nouvelle Theorie sur les Idées Fonda- 
meniales,” 1843. 


SPINOZA. 155 


now, the conclusion that something must have existed from 
all eternity. The origin of each of these concepts may thus be 
naturally accounted for by the known laws of our mental con- 
stitution, without having recourse to any faculty of intellectual 
intuition such as Spinoza describes, —a faculty independent of 
experience, and superior to it, —a faculty which gazes direct 
on Absolute Being, and penetrates, without the aid of any 
intermediate sign or manifestation, into the very essence of 
God. Spinoza has not discriminated aright between these two 
concepts, in respect either of their nature or their origin. He 
has not overlooked, indeed, the distinction between abstract 
ideas and the intellectual intuitions, of which he speaks; but he 
confounds the concept of being with the concept of self-exestent 
being, as if the two were identical, or as if being could not be 
predicated of anything, otherwise than as it is a “mode” or 
affection of the one only “substance.” A sounder Psychology 
has taught us that our conception of existence arises, in the 
first instance, from our own conscious experience; and that, 
when this conception subsequently expands into the idea of 
Absolute Being, and results in the belief of a necessary, self- 
existent, and eternal Cause, the new element which is thus 
added to it may be accounted for by the principle of causalaty, 
which constitutes one of the fundamental laws of human 
thought, and which, if it may be said to resemble ¢twition in 
the rapidity and clearness with which it enables us to discern 
the truth, differs essentially from that ¢mmediate intuction of 
which Spinoza speaks, since it is dependent on experience, 
and, instead of gazing direct on Absolute Being, makes use of 
intermediate signs and manifestations, by which it rises to the 
knowledge of “the unseen and eternal.” y 

We submit, further, that a system which rests on the mere 
idea of Being as its sole support, cannot afford any satisfactory 
explanation of real and concrete existences. ‘The idea of Being 
is one of our most abstract conceptions; it is associated, indeed, 


156 MODERN ATHEISM. 


with an’ invincible belief in the reality of Being, — a belief 
which springs up spontaneously, along with the idea itself, 
from our own conscious experience. It is even associated with 
an invincible belief in necessary, self-existent, and eternal 
Being, —a belief which springs from the principle of causality, 
or that law of thought whereby, from the fact that something 
exists now, we instinctively conclude that something must have 
existed from all eternity. But neither the simple concept of 
Being, which is derived from experience and framed by 
abstraction, nor the additional concept of self-existent Being, 
which springs from the action of our rational faculties on the 
data furnished by experience, can afford any explanation of 
the nature and origin of the real, concrete existences in the 
universe. These must be studied in the light of their own 
appropriate evidence; they must be interpreted, and not 
divined; they cannot be inferred deductively from any, even 
the highest and most abstract, conception of the human mind. 
Yet the philosophy of Spinoza attempts to explain all the phe- 
nomena of the universe by the idea of Absolute Being; it 
accounts for the concrete by the abstract; it represents all 
individual beings as mere modes or affections of one universal 
substance; in other words, it realizes the abstract idea of 
thought and extension, but denies the existence of bodies and 
souls, otherwise than as manifestations of these eternal essences. 

4, The system of Spinoza is vicious, because his whole rea- 
soning on the subject of Creation is pervaded by a transparent 
fallacy. He affirms the impossibility of Creation, and attempts 
to demonstrate his position. But how? By proving that a 
“substance” cannot be produced. And why may not “a sub- 
stance” be produced? Because, by the definition, “a sub- 
stance” is that which is “self-existent.” In other words, a 
self-existent substance cannot be created,—a truism which 
scarcely required the apparatus of a geometrical proof by 
means of propositions, scholia, and corollaries, or, as Professor 


SPINOZA. 157 


Saisset says, with laconic naiveté, “ce qui a a peine besoin 
d@étre demontré.” But, while the only proof that is offered 
extends no further than to self-existent or uncreated substance, 
it is afterwards applied to everything that exists, so as to exclude 
the creation even of that which is not self-existent; and this on 
the convenient assumption that whatever exists must be either 
or a “mode.” And thus, 


partly by an ambiguity of language, partly by an arbitrary and 


a “substance,” or an “attribute,” 


gratuitous assumption, he excludes the possibility of Creation 
altogether. Surely it might have occurred to him that by proy- 
ing the necessary existence of an uncreated Being — a doctrine 
held by every Christian Theist — he did not advance one step 
towards the disproof of the possibility of creation, nor even 
towards the establishment of his favorite theory of wnisubstan- 
cisme; for, grant that there is an uncreated and self-existent 
Being; grant, even, that there can be no more than one, — 
would it follow that there can be no created and dependent 
beings, or that they can only exist as “modes” or “ affections ” 
of that absolute Essence? Might they not exist as creatures, as 
products, as effects, without partaking of the nature of their 
cause?! Yet, if there be one idea more,than another which 
Spinoza is anxious to extirpate, it is that of creation, and he 
summons the whole strength, both of his logic and sarcasm, 
when he has to deal with the argument from “ final causes.” 
And no marvel; for the doctrine of a creation would cut up 
his system by the roots. The radical difference, in fact, be- 
tween Theism and Pantheism mainly consists in this: that the 
former regards creation as distinct from the Creator, as the 
product of His omnipotent and free will, as the object of His 


1 “Toi, a prendre les mots dans le sens ordinaire, il semble qu’il soit 
demontré qui la Creation est impossible, principe justement cher au Pan- 
theisme ; tandis qu’au fond, tout ce qui est demontré, c’est que U’ Etre 
en soi est necessairement incréé,— verité incontestable, dont le Pantheisme 
na rien a tirer”’ — Pro. SAIsseET, Introduction, p. XLII. ' 


14 


158 MODERN ATHEISM. 


constant providential care, as the subject of His supreme control 
and government; whereas the latter represents it asa neces- 
sary emanation from the Divine substance, as an eternal devel- 
opment of the uncreated Essence; the finite, in all its forms, 
being a “mode” of the infinite, and the temporary phases of 
nature so many transient but ever-renewed manifestations of 
the unchangeable and eternal. These two conceptions are 
diametrically opposed; they cannot admit of conciliation or 
compromise ; and hence the daring attempt of Spinoza to prove 
the impossibility of creation, even when he admits the existence 
of an Infinite and Eternal Being. 

5. The system of Spinoza is vicious, because it involves 
erroneous conclusions respecting both the dody and the soul. 
He denies that they are “substances.” And why ? Because, 
by the definition, “a substance” is that which: is self-existent, 
and may be conceived without reference to any other being. 
Be it so. What does this argument amount to? Why, simply 
to this, that they are not gods. What, then, are they? Created 
beings? No. And why? Because creation is impossible, 
and, also, because whatever exists must be either a “substance,” 
or an “attribute,” or a “mode.” What then? Clearly not an 
“attribute,” for the only attributes known to us are extension 
and thought, and these attributes are as infinite as “the sub- 
stance” to which they belong; they must therefore be “ modes” 
or “affections” of that “ substance.’ But in what sense? In 
the sense of being created, and therefore dependent, existences, 
whose nature and origin cannot be conceived of or accounted 
for without reference to the Being who produced them at first, 
and still continues to maintain them? No; for in that sense 
all Theists admit the derivation and dependence of every finite 
being; but they must be “modes” or “affections” of the one 
uncreated essence, mere phenomenal manifestations of it.’ The 
soul, whose essence is thought, is a mere succession of ideas. 
The body is a mere “mode” of the Divine “attribute” of 


SPINOZA. 159 


extension; and neither the one nor the other can be described 
as a distinct being. They are affections, and nothing more, of 
the one infinite “substance.” 

It is important to remark that, according to this theory, the 
distinct personality of man is excluded, not less than the distinct 
personality of God. It is not easy, indeed, to explain this part 
of Spinoza’s theory; for he has a subtle disquisition on the 
relation subsisting between the soul and the body, by means of 
which he attempts to explain the phenomena of self-conscious- 
ness, and to show that individual personality is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the doctrine which represents man as a mere 
“mode” of the Divine “substance.” But one thing is clear: 
there is no room in the system of Spinoza for the distinct per- 
sonality of man, in the ordinary acceptation of that expression. 
The unity, especially of the human soul, its individuality, its 
self-consciousness, its identity, as a being, dependent, indeed, on 
God, but really distinct from Him, must be sacrificed, if the 
system is to be saved; and no other being can be recognized 
but the absolute “substance,” with its infinite “attributes” and 
its finite “modes.” This consideration appears to us to be 
fatal to the whole theory. For it shows that the Pantheistic 
speculations, which are directed against the personality of God, 
are equally conclusive, if they be conclusive at all, against: the 
personality of Man; that they run counter to the intuitive 
knowledge of the human mind; and that they cannot be 
embraced without doing violence to some of our clearest and 
surest convictions. Jor what clearer or surer conviction can 
there be than that of my own personal existence, as a distinct, 
self-conscious, intelligent, active, and responsible being? And 
yet the existence of our own bodies and souls is denied, except 
in so far as they are mere “modes” or affections of the one 
uncreated “substance,” which is known, not by experience or 
observation, but by a transcendental faculty of intuition. 

And, finally, the system of Spinoza is vicious, because the 


160 MODERN ATHEISM. 


exposition of it is replete with the most manifest and glaring 
self-contradictions. His logical power has been so much 
admired, and his rigorous geometrical method so highly ex- 
tolled, that his Philosophy has acquired a certain prestige, 
which commends it to many ardent, speculative minds. Yet 
there are few philosophical writers who have made a larger 
number of gratuitous assumptions, or who have abounded 
more in contradictory statements. The “Antinomies” of 
Spinoza might make the subject of an amusing, and even 
instructive, dissertation. Thus, by way of specimen, take the 
following : 

God is extended; but, nevertheless, incorporeal. 

God thinks; but, nevertheless, has no intelligence. 

God is active; but, nevertheless, has no will. 

The soul isa “mode” of the Divine thought; but, never- 
theless, there is no analogy between God’s thought and man’s 
thought. 

The love of God is the supreme law of man; but, never- 
theless, it is equally lawful for man to live according to appe- 
tite or to reason. 

The will of man, is, in no sense, free; but, nevertheless, 
there is a science of human ethics. 

Man is under no ‘natural obligation to obey God; but, 
nevertheless, God is his highest good. 

God is neither a Lawgiver nor a Governor; but, neverthe- 
less, a future state is necessary, that every man may have his 
due. 

Might is Right, and Government has power to restrain “ the 
liberty of Prophesying ;” but, nevertheless, has no power to 
restrain “the liberty of Philosophizing.” 

These are only a few specimens of the gratuitous assump- 
tions and flagrant contradictions with which his writings 
abound; but they afford a sufficient proof of the reckless 
character of his genius, and of the utter fallacy of the system 


MATERIAL PANTHEISM. 161 


which he promulgated as a rival, or as a substitute, for Natural. 
and Revealed Religion. 

On a review of what has been advanced, it must be manifest 
that the Pantheistic system of Spinoza is founded on principles 
assumed without proof, and embodied in his “ definitions ;” 
that it is constructed according to a philosophical method which 
is radically vicious; that it abounds in self-contradictory state- 
ments; and that it is opposed, at many points, to some of the 
clearest lessons of experience, and to some of the surest con- 
victions of reason. It is a system which is not demonstrated, 
but merely developed. The germ of it exists in the “ defi- 
nitions ;” deny these, and you destroy his whole philosophy. It 
cannot, therefore, be held sufficient to foreclose the question 
respecting the existence of a living, personal God, distinct from 
Nature and independent of it ; nor can Pantheism, in this form, 
become the successful rival of Christian Theism, until the 
human mind has lost the power of discriminating between the 
different kinds of evidence to which they respectively appeal. 


a 


SECTION II. 


MATERIAL OR HYLOZOIC PANTHEISM. 


In the system of Spinoza, the two “attributes of extension 
and thought,” and the corresponding “ modes” of body and soul, 
were equally recognized, and were employed jointly, in con- 
nection with his favorite doctrine of Unisubstancisme. They 
constituted the opposite poles of his theory, but were both 
essential to its completeness. But most of his followers, 
influenced by an excessive desire for simplification, have 
attempted to blend the two into one; and have either merged 
the spiritual in the corporeal, or virtually annihilated the 
material by resolving it into the mental. Hence two distinct, 

14* 


462 MODERN ATHEISM. 


and even opposite forms of Pantheism,—the material or 
hylozoic, and the ideal or spiritual. 

The former was the first in the order of historical develop- 
ment, so far as modern Europe is concerned. It was most in 
accordance with the Sensational Philosophy which prevailed in 
the school of Condillac,! and which continued to maintain its 
ascendancy until it was assailed by the reviving spirit of Ideal- 
ism. It was the characteristic feature of the Atheism of the 
last century, and was fully exhibited in the “Systéme de la 
Nature.” The recent revival of Idealism has done much to 
check its progress, but it has not effected its destruction; on 
the contrary, the theory of Material or Hylozoic Pantheism is 
an error as inveterate as it is ancient, and it is continually 
reappearing even in the light of the intellectual and spiritual 
Psychology of the nineteenth century. 

This theory, although it has been propounded as a religious 
creed, rests mainly on a philosophical dogma. It is based ulti- 
mately on the supposition that nothing exists in the universe 
except matter and its laws; that mind is the product of material 
organization ; and that all the phenomena of thought, of feeling, 
of conscience, and even of religion, may be accounted for by 
ascribing them to certain powers inherent in matter, and 
evolved by certain peculiarities of cerebral structure. This 
fundamental assumption, on which the whole theory of Hylozoic 
Pantheism ultimately rests, will be subjected to examination in 
the sequel. We think that it may be best discussed separately 
and apart, for this among other reasons, that it stands equally 
related to the old mechanical Atheism and the new material 
Pantheism, and that, in point of fact, it has been applied indif- 
ferently to the support of both. Our remarks at present, 
therefore, will be directed, not to the refutation of Materialism, 
but to the exposition and exposure of the Pantheism which has 
been founded upon it. 


1M. ABBE DE ConDILLAC, “ Traité des Sensations,” 2 vols. 


MATERIAL PANTHEISM. 163 


It is not easy — perhaps it might be found, on trial, to be im- 
possible — to show that there is any real difference, except in 
name, between mechanical Atheism and material Pantheism. 
Both equally affirm the self-existence and eternity of the Uni- 
verse; both equally deny the fact of creation, and the doctrine 
of a living, personal God, distinct from nature, and superior to 
it. The only apparent difference between the two consists in 
this, —that the former speaks more of the rude materials, and 
the cold, hard, unbending laws, which exist in Nature; the 
latter speaks more of the vital powers, the subtle and ethereal 
forces, which are at work in her bosom, and which may seem 
to impart warmth and animation to a system that would other- 
wise be felt to be cold, inert, and deathlike. But the mechan- 
ical Atheist never denied the vital powers of Nature, he only 
attempted to account for them without an intelligent first 
Cause; and the material Pantheist has little, if any, advantage 
over him, except in this, that he has combined Chemistry with 
Mechanics in attempting to account for the phenomena of the 
universe, and has drawn his analogies from the laboratory and 
the crucible, the process of vegetation, and the laws of repro- 
duction and growth, not less than from the formule of Physical 
Science. 

The theory of Material Pantheism runs insensibly into one 
or other of the forms of naked Atheism to which we have 
already referred. Ignoring the existence of mind, or of any 
spiritual Power distinct from Nature and superior to it, it must 
necessarily hold the eternal existence of matter; and, in this 
respect, it coincides entirely with the Atheistic hypothesis. It 
may, or it may not, hold also the eternal existence of the 
present order of Nature, including all the varieties of vegetable 
and animal life. In the one case, it harmonizes with the ancient 
theory of Atheism, as maintained by Ocellus Lucanus; in the 
other, it must run into the modern theory of Development, if it 
makes any attempt to account for the origin of new races, as 


164 MODERN ATHEISM. 


made known by the researches of Geologists. In either case, 
it is equivalent to Atheism, and dependent on one or other of 
the various theories which have been applied to the defence of 
the Atheist’s creed. 

It is worthy of remark, in this connection, how frequently 
those who are the most daring and decided advocates of 
Atheism or Pantheism do nevertheless ascribe to Nature 
many of the attributes which belong to God only. This fact is 
admirably illustrated by the distinguished founder of the Boyle 
Lectureship ;+ and it is abundantly confirmed by examples 
which have been furnished by more recent times. The author 
of the “System of Nature,” which appeared before the first 
French Revolution, was an avowed and most reckless Atheist ;? 
yet he ascribes to Nature most of the attributes which are 
usually supposed to belong to God, such as self-existence, 
eternity, immutability, infinitude, and unity; and if the dntel- 
lectual and moral attributes may seem to be omitted, as they 
must be, to some extent, in any system of Atheism, yet thought, 
design, and will, are expressly ascribed to Nature.2 And the 
only difference between the Theist and the Atheist is said to 
be, that the latter ascribes all the phenomena of Nature “to 
material, natural, sensible, and known causes,” while the 
former ascribes them to “ spiritual, supernatural, unintelligible, 


? 


and unknown causes;” or, in other words, “to an occult 


cause.”* It is manifestly a matter of indifference whether this 


1The Hon. Ropert Bor te, ‘ Theological Works,” 11. 79.—‘ A Free 
Inquiry into the Received Notion of Nature.” 

2 “ Systéme de la Nature,” 11. 75, 110, 115. 

3“ Tout est toujours dans Vordre rélativement ala Nature, ot tous les 
€tres ne font que suivre les loix qui leur sont imposées. Il est entré dans 
son plans que de certaines terres produiroient des fruits delicieux, tandis 
que d’autres ne fourniroi¢ént que des épines, des vegetaux dangereux. 
Elle a volu que puelques societés produise des sages,” &c. — Vol. 1. 265, 
also 267. 

4 Systéme de la Nature,” 11. 102. 


MATERIAL PANTHEISM. 165 


method of: accounting for the phenomena of Nature be called 
Atheism or Pantheism; in either aspect it is essentially the 
same. 

The more recent advocates of Atheism or Pantheism have 
often made use of similar language. M. Crousse affirms that 
«all nature is animated by an internal force which moves its? 
that this is the true spontaneity, the causality, which is the 
origin of all sensible manifestations, for “mens agitat molem et 
magno se corpore miscet;” that “matter, the most cold and 
indifferent, is full of life, capable of engendering thought, and 
containing mind in it, at least potentially ;” and that, to every 
man who has true insight, “ the world feels, moves, speaks, and 
thinks.”! The author of “The Purpose of Existence ” makes 
it his grand object to show that “the evolvement of mind out 
of matter” is the primary law and final cause of the universe ; 
that “this process commences with vegetation, extracting from 
matter the spirit of vitality ;” that “this spirit is preserved 
amid the decay of vegetables, and transfused into animals, 
thus establishing the great working-principle of Nature, that 
spirit is extracted from matter by organized bodies, and sur- 
vives their dissolution.”? Of course, if matter have the power 
of evolving intelligent and even immortal minds by its own 
inherent properties and established laws, it will not be difficult 
to find in Nature a sufficient substitute for God. 

But the most revolting specimen of that material Pantheism, 
which is only another name for absolute Atheism, that has 
recently appeared, occurs in the Letters of Atkinson and 
Martineau: “ We require no supernatural causes, when we can 
recognize adequate natural causes, inherent in the constitution 
of Nature ;” “nor are, more causes to be admitted than are suf- 
ficient to produce any particular change or effect.” —“ Man has 


1M. Crovssn, “ Des Principes,” Paris, 1846, pp. 81, 93: “ Pour qui sait 
voir, le Monde sent, se meut, parle, et pense.” 
2 “The Purpose of Existence,” pp. 85, 89. London, 1850. 


166 MODERN ATHEISM. 


his place in Natural History; his nature does not essen- 
tially differ from that of the lower animals; he is but a fuller 
development, and varied condition, of the same fundamental 
nature or cause, — of that which we contemplate as matter, and 
its changes, relations, and properties. Mind is the consequence 
or product of the material man, its existence depending on the 
action of the brain.” — “Its highest object seems to be, a sense 
of the infinite and abstract power,—the inherent Jforce and 
principle of Nature.” } 

From these specimens it must be evident that whatever 
nominal distinction may exist between Material Pantheism and 
avowed Atheism, they are radically identical, and that, for all 
practical purposes, they may be treated as one and the same. 
From the same specimens we may derive some useful hints 
respecting the essential conditions and the right conduct of the 
Theistic argument. It is not enough to show that there must 
be a self-existent, eternal, and infinite First Cause, for this is 
admitted by the advocate of Material Pantheism, who substi- 
tutes Nature for God. It is further necessary to show that the 
actual phenomena of the Universe cannot be accounted for by 
means of any properties or powers inherent in itself; and that 
they must be ascribed to a living, intelligent, and powerful 
Being, distinct from Nature and superior to it. The theory of 
Materialism must be discussed on its own proper and peculiar 
merits, and if we find good cause to reject it, the main pillar of 
Material Pantheism will fall to the ground. In the mean time 
we shall only further observe, that this form of Pantheism 
cannot be maintained without the help either of the doctrine 
of the Eternity of Matter or of the Theory of Development, 
or, rather, without the aid of both; and that, if it could be 
established, Polytheism would be its natural product, if not its 
inevitable result. 


1“ Letters on the Laws of Man’s Nature and Development.” By H. G. 
ATKINSON and HaRRIET Martineau. London, 1852. 


IDEAL PANTHEISM. 167 


SECTION III. 
IDEAL PANTHEISM. 


We have already seen that the system of Spinoza equally 
recognized the two “attributes” of extension and thought, and 
the two corresponding “modes” of body and soul, in connec- 
tion with the one infinite and eternal “Substance.” We have 
also seen that most of his followers have taken a one-sided 
view of the subject, and have either merged the spiritual into 
the corporeal, so as to educe a Material or Hylozoic Pantheism, 
or have virtually annihilated the material by resolving it into 
the mental, so as to educe a system of Ideal or Spiritual Pan- 
theism. 

“In Spinoza,” says Mr. Morell, “we see the model upon 
which the modern Idealists of Germany have renewed their 
search into the absolute ground of all phenomena;” and there 
can be no doubt that his speculations contain the germ of Ideal 
as well as of Material Pantheism. The historical filiation of 
modern Pantheism cannot be satisfactorily explained, in either 
of its two forms, without reference to his writings; and yet its 
precise character, as it is developed in more recent systems, 
demands for its full elucidation some knowledge of the course 
and progress of philosophical speculation in the interval which 
elapsed between the death of Spinoza and the subsequent 
developments of his theory. 

We cannot here attempt to trace the history of German 
Idealism, from its source in the writings of Leibnitz, through 
the logical school of Wolfius and his successors, till it reached 
its culminating point in the philosophy of Hegel:—we shall 
content ourselves with a brief reference to the fundamental 
principles of Kant’s system, which may be justly said to have 
eontained the prolific germs, or, at least, to have determined 


168 MODERN ATHEISM. 


the prevailing character, of all the subsequent speculations of 
the German schools. For if modern Pantheism be indebted 
to Spinoza for its substance, it is equally indebted to Kant for 
its form; and no intelligible account can be given of the 
phases which it has successively assumed, without reference to 
the powerful influence which his Philosophy, in one or other 
of its constituent elements, has exerted on all his successors in 
the same field of inquiry. 

The Philosophy of Kant has a most important bearing on 
the whole question as to the validity of the natural evidence 
for the being and perfections of God. We shall confine our 
attention to those parts of his system which give rise to the 
speculations that have issued in the recent theories of Ideal or 
Spiritual Pantheism. 

In attempting to explain the nature and origin of the whole 
system of human knowledge, Kant divides our intellectual 
being into three distinct faculties, — sensation, understanding, 
and reason. He supposes that from sensation we derive the 
whole matter of our knowledge; that from the understanding 
we derive its form, or the manner in which it is conceived of 
by us; and that from reason we derive certain general or ab- 
stract notions, which are highly useful, since they give a sys- 
tematic unity to human thought, but which have no objective 
validity, that is, either no reality in nature that corresponds to 
them, or none, at least, that can be scientifically demonstrated. 
From this fundamental principle of his system it follows, that 
the only part of our knowledge which has any objective reality 
is that which is derived from our sense-perceptions, all else 
being purely formal or subjective, and arising solely from the 
laws of our own mental nature, which determine us to con- 
ceive of things in a particular way; and that even that part 
of our knowledge which is derived from sense-perception is 
purely phenomenal, since we know nothing of any object 
around us beyond the bare fact that it exists, and that it 


IDEAL PANTHEISM. 169 


appears to us to be as our senses represent it. Hence the skep- 
tical tendency of Kant’s speculations, in so far as the scientific 
certainty of our knowledge is concerned. The practical utility 
of that knowledge is not disputed, but its objective reality, or 
the possibility of proving it, is, to a large extent, denied. Still 
he admits a primitive dualism, and a radical distinction between 
the subject and the object, between the mind which thinks and 
the matter of its thoughts. The matter comes from without, 
the form from within; and the senses are the channels through 
which the phenomena of nature are poured into the mould of 
the human mind. All knowledge implies this combination of 
matter with form, and is possible only on the supposition of 
the concurrent action both of the object and subject; not that 
either of the two is known to us in its essence, or that their 
real existence can be scientifically demonstrated, for we know 
the subject only in its relation to the object, and the object 
only in its relation to the subject; but that this relation neces- 
sarily requires the joint action of both, by which alone we can 
acquire the only knowledge of which we are capable, and 
which is supposed to be purely phenomenal, relative, and sub- 
jective. It is true that we are capable of forming certain 
grand ideas, such as that of God, the universe, and the soul; 
but these are the pure products of Reason, the mere personifi- 
cations of our own modes of thinking, and have no objective 
reality, at least none that can be scientifically demonstrated. 
But, while “the Speculative Reason” is held to be incompe- 
tent to prove the existence of God, “the Practical Reason” is 
appealed to; and in the conscious liberty of the soul, and its 
sense of incumbent moral duty,—“the Categorical Impera- 
tive,” — Kant finds materials for reconstructing the. basis and 
fabric of a true Theology, not scientifically perfect, but practi- 
cally sufficient for all the purposes of life. 

It was scarcely possible that Philosophy could find a per- 
manent resting-place in such a theory as this; for, while it 

15 


170 MODERN ATHEISM. 


recognized both the “object” and the “ subject” as equally 
indispensable, the one for the matter, the other for the form, 
of human knowledge, it did not hold the balance even between 
the two. It assigned so much io the “subject,” and so little to 
the “object,” and made so large a part of our knowledge 
merely formal and subjective, that it could neither be regarded 
as a self-consistent system of Skepticism, nor yet as a satisfac- 
tory basis for Scientific Belief. It was almost inevitable that 
speculative minds, starting from this point, should diverge into 
one or other of ¢hree courses; either following the line of the 
“subject” exclusively, and treating the “object” as a superflu- 
ous incumbrance, so as to reach, as Schulz and Maimon did, a 
pure Subjective Idealism, akin to utter Skepticism; or follow- 
ing the line of the “object,” and giving it greater prominence 
than it had in the system of Kant, so as to lay the foundation, 
as Jacobi and Herbart did, of a system of Objective Certitude ; 
or keeping both in view, and attempting, as Fichte, Schelling, 
and Hegel did, to blend the two into one, so as to reduce them 
to systematic unity. 

In Kant’s system a dualism was admitted, a real distinction 
between the “subject” and “object” of thought; but he had 
ascribed so much to the subject, and so little to the object, that 
Fichte conceived the idea of dispensing with the latter alto- 
gether, and constructing his whole philosophy on a purely 
subjective basis. Since Kant had taught that all objects are 
conceived of either according to the forms of our sensational 
faculty, or the categories of our understanding, or the ideas of 
pure reason, it seemed to be unnecessary to suppose the exist- 
ence of any object distinct from the mind itself. For if it be 
the mind which furnishes the form of Space, and gives us the 
idea of Substance, of Cause, of Being, the mind alone might 
suffice to account for the whole sum of human knowledge. 


1 Mr. More tt, “History of Philosophy,” 11. 71. 


IDEAL PANTHEISM. leg! 


Fichte was followed by Schelling, and Schelling by Hegel, 
each differing from his predecessor, but all concurring in the 
attempt to ¢dentify “Seyn,” or absolute Being, with Thought, 
and to represent everything in the universe as a mere mode or 
manifestation of one Infinite Essence. The ddentity of Exist- 
ence and Thought is the fundamental principle of Hegel’s doc- 
trine. With him, Being and the Idea of being, are the same ; 
and Being and Thought are combined in the “ Absolute,” which 
is at once ideal and real (l’étre and Vidée). With him, the idea 
of God is that of a logical process of thought, “ever unfolding 


itself, but never unfolded,’ —a dialectic movement rather than a 
Divine Being, which realizes itself, and reaches a state of self- 
consciousness in man. God, nature, and man, are but one 
process of thought, considered in different aspects; all finite 
personalities are only so many thoughts of one eternal mind; 
God is in man, and man is in God, and the progress of human- 
ity, in all its stages, is a Divine development. 

This bare outline of these systems must suffice for our pres- 
ent purpose, and we now proceed to offer a few remarks on 
the doctrine of Ideal as distinguished from Material Pantheism. 

1. The whole system of “Idealism,” as propounded in the 
German schools, is utterly baseless, and contradicts the intui- 
tive, the universal convictions of the human mind. For what 
is Idealism? Reduced to its utmost simplicity, and expressed 
in the briefest formula, it amounts, in substance, to this: that 
the whole universe is to us a mere process of thought, and that 
nothing exists, or, at least, can be known by us, beyond the 
ideas of our own minds. And what is the ground on which it 
rests? It rests entirely on the assumption, that, since we can 
know nothing otherwise than through the exercise of our men- 
tal faculties, these faculties must be the sole sources of all our 
knowledge, and altogether independent of any external object. 
According to this theory, the mind is not informed or instructed 
by the universe, but the universe is created by the mind; the 


172 MODERN ATHEISM. 


objective is developed from the subjective; and there is no 
reality anywhere except in the region of consciousness. Na- 
ture is Seen only as it is imaged in the mirror within; and to 
us it is a mere phantasmagoria, a series of phenomena, a suc- 
cession of thoughts. “The sum total,” says Fichte, “is this; 
there is absolutely nothing permanent, either without me or 
within me, but only an unceasing change. I know absolutely 
nothing of any existence, not even of my own. I myself know 
nothing, and am nothing. Images there are; they constitute 
all that apparently exists; and what they know of themselves 
is after the manner of images; images that pass and vanish 
without there being aught to witness their transition; that 
consist, in fact, of the images of images, without significance and 
without an aim. I myself am one of these images; nay, I am 
not even thus much, but only a confused image of images. All 
reality is converted into a marvellous dream, without a life to 
dream of, and without a mind to dream,— into a dream made 
up only of a dream itself. Perception is a dream; thought — 
the source of all existence, and all the reality which I imagine 
to myself of my existence, of my power, of my destination — 
is the dream of that dream.” ? 

The tendency of such speculations as these towards univer- 
sal Skepticism, or even absolute Nihilism, with the exception 
only of certain fleeting phenomena of Consciousness, is too 
apparent to require any formal proof; and it must be equally 
evident that they contradict some of the most universal and 
deeply-rooted convictions of the human mind. The ultimate 
ground of every system of Idealism which excludes the 
knowledge of an external world must be one or other of these 
two assumptions, or a combination of both: either, that our 
knowledge cannot extend beyond the range of consciousness, 
which takes cognizance only of ideas, or of subjective mental 


1$rr WM. Hamruron’s Edition of Dr. Rur’s “ Works,” p. 129. 


IDEAL PANTHEISM. 173 


states; or that any attempt to extend it beyond these limits, so 
as to embrace external objects as really existing, can only be 
successful on this condition,—that we prove, by reasoning 
from the subjective to the objective, that there is a necessary 
logical connection between the state of the one and the reality 
of the other. Each of these assumptions is equally groundless. 
It is true that consciousness, strictly so called, takes cognizance 
only of what passes within; it is not true that consciousness, 
in this restricted sense, is commensurate with our entire 
knowledge. It is true that we acquire our knowledge only 
through the exercise of our mental faculties ; it is not true that 
our mental faculties are the only sources of our knowledge, 
nor even that, without the concurrence of certain objects, they 
could give us any knowledge at all. It is true that there must 
be a connection between the subjective and the objective ; it is 
not true that this connection must be established by reasoning, 
or that we must prove the existence of an external world dis- 
tinct from the thinking mind, before we are entitled to believe 
init. Fora great part of our knowledge is presentative, and 
we directly perceive the objects of Nature not less than the 
phenomena of Consciousness. 

When it is said, in the jargon of the modern German philos- 
ophy, that “the Ego has no immediate consciousness of the 
Non-Ego as existing, but that the Non-Ego is only represented 
to us in a modification of the self-conscious Ego, and is, in fact, 
only a phenomenon of the Ego,”—a plain, practical English- 
man, little tolerant of these subtle distinctions, might be ready, 
if not deterred by the mere sound of the words, to test them 
by a particular example. What am I to think, he might say, 
of my own father and mother? They are familiarly known to 
me. I have seen them, and talked with them, and loved them 
as my own soul. I have hitherto believed that they existed, 
and that they were really a father and mother to me. But 

‘now I am iaught that they are—mere modifications of my 
in 


174 MODERN ATHEISM. 


own mind ; that they are nothing more than simple phenomena 
of the self-conscious Ego; and that, so far from being the 
earthly authors of my existence, they are themselves— the 
creation and offspring of my own thought. And on what-. 
ground am I asked to receive this astonishing discovery ? 

Why, simply because I can be sure of nothing but the facts of 

consciousness. But how are these facts proved? 'They “need 

no proof; they are self-evident; they are immediately and 

irresistibly believed.” Be it so. I can just as little doubt of 

the existence of my body, of the distinct personality of my 

parents, and the reality of an external universe, as of any fact 

of consciousness. May it not be, whether we can explain it or 

not, that the one set of facts is as directly presented, and needs 

as little to be proved, as the other ? 

2. The doctrine of “Identity” constitutes a prominent and 
indispensable part of the theory of Idealism, and is the ground- 
principle of Philosophical Pantheism. It amounts, in sub- 
stance, to the proposition, that Existence and Thought are one, 
that the “subject” and “object ” of knowledge are one. “If 
the doctrine of Identity means anything, it means that Thought 
and Being are essentially one ; that the process of thinking is 
virtually the same as the process of creating ; that in construct- 
ing the universe by logical deduction, we do virtually the same 
thing as Deity accomplishes in developing himself in all the 
forms and regions of creation ; that every man’s reason, there- 
fore, is really God; in fine, that Deity is the whole sum of 
consciousness immanent in the world.”! It is through the 
medium of this doctrine of Identity that Idealism passes into 
Pantheism,— not, indeed, the Idealism of Berkeley, which 
recognized, consistently or otherwise, the existence of the 
human mind and of the Divine Spirit, while it denied the 


1 Mr. Moret, “ History of Philosophy,” 11.127. M. Maret, “¢ Essai 
sur le Pantheisme,” pp. 129, 133, 143, 192, 276. Ibid., “ Theodicée,” pp. 5, 
123, 192, 199. 


IDEAL PANTHEISM. 179 


independent existence of matter,— but the Idealism of Fichte 
and others, which resolved mind into a mere process of thought, 
a continuous stream or succession of ideas. To such a theory 
the doctrine of Identity was indispensable. Its advocates were 
bound to show that nothing existed, or could be proved to 
exist, in the universe but thought, and that, in every case, the 
subject and object of thought might be identified as one. We 
find, accordingly, that from the earliest ages down to the 
present time, the idea of “ absolute unity,” or “universal iden- 
tity,” has been frequently exhibited in connection with the 
speculations of philosophical Idealists. The disciples of the 
Eleatic school in ancient Greece, not less than those of the 
modern schools of Germany, insisted on the identity of thought 
and its object, and regarded everything that might seem to be 
external to the mind as a mere illusion. 

It may be difficult for the British mind, familiarized from 
infancy with the philosophy of common sense, to grasp the 
idea which this doctrine involves; but, on the principles of 
absolute Idealism, it may be easily explained, and may even 
seem to have some foundation in facts that must be acknowl- 
edged by all. There are two cases, particularly, which may 
serve to illustrate, if they cannot suffice to prove, it. . The first 
is that of the Supreme Intelligence, conceived as existing 
before the production of a created universe, when He was 
himself the sole “subject” and the sole “object” of thought ; 
in other words, the absolute “ Subject-Object.” The second is 
that of the human consciousness, conceived as occupied solely 
with certain subjective mental states, when the mind may be 
said to be at once the “subject” and the “object” of its own 
thought. There are cases, then, in which mind may be re- 
garded as a “subject-object;” the case of human conscious- 
ness, when the mind takes cognizance of its own states or acts, 
and the case of the Divine consciousness, while as yet the 
created universe had not been called into being. But the 


176 MODERN ATHEISM. 


question is, whether, in all cases, the “subject” and “object” 
of thought are the same? or, whether existence and thought 
are universally identical? An affirmative answer to this ques- 
tion would imply, that nothing whatever exists except only in 
the mind that perceives it; that, according to Bishop Berkeley, 
“the existence of unthinking things without any relation to 
their being perceived” is an absurd or impossible supposition ; 
that “their esse is percipt,” that is, that their being consists in 
their being perceived or known; whence it would follow, as 
Berkeley himself admits, that we have no reason to believe in 
the continued existence of the desk at -which we write, after 
we have left the room in which we see it, excepting such as 
may arise from the supposition, that if we returned to that 
room we might still see it, or that in our absence it may still 
be perceived by some other mind. Existence is identified 
with thought, and nothing exists save only as it is thought of. 
Why? Simply because it can become known to us only 
through the medium of consciousness, and that, too, in no other 
character than as a phenomenon of our own minds. 

That this doctrine is at direct variance with the universal 
convictions of mankind, is too evident to require the slightest 
proof. That it 1s unphilosophical, as well as unpopular, may 
be made apparent by two very simple considerations. The 
jirst is, that it assumes without proof the only point in ques- 
tion, namely, that the objects of our knowledge are nothing but 
the ideas of our own minds; whereas it is affirmed, on the 
other side, and surely with at least an equal amount of appar- 
ent reason, that we are so constituted as to have a direct 
perception of external objects as well as of internal mental 
states. The second is, that the very formula of Idealism, 
which represents the “ Non-ego” as a mere modification of the 
conscious “ Ego,” seems to involve a palpable contradiction ; 
since it recognizes, in a certain sense, the difference between the 
“Hao and the Non-ego,” and yet, in the same breath, annihilates 


* 


IDEAL PANTHEISM. 177 


that difference, and proclaims their “identity.” Fichte admits, 
indeed, that we have the idea of something which is not-self ; 
but instead of ascribing it to an external object, he accounts for 
it by a law of our mental nature, which constrains us to create 
a limit, so as to give a determinate character to our thought. 
The three technical formule, therefore, which are said? to 
express, respectively, —the affirmation of self,—the affirma- 
tion of not-self,—and the determination of the one by the 
other, —are all equally the products of our own mental laws, 
and do not necessarily require the supposition of any external 


' object; and hence it follows that Self is the one only absolute 


principle, and that everything else that is conceived of is con- 
structed out of purely subjective materials. The question 
whether the “object” be the generative principle of the “idea,” 
or vice versa, is thus superseded; for there is no longer any 
distinction between “object” and “subject ;” existence is iden- 
tified with thought; the Ego and the Non-ego unite in one 
absolute existence; and Self becomes the sole Subject-object, 
the percipient and the perceived, the knowing and the known. 
Of course, on this theory, there is no knowledge of God, 
just as there can be no knowledge of Nature, and no knowl- 
edge of our fellow-men, as distinct objective realities; it is a 
system of pure Idealism, which, if consistently followed out, 
must terminate in utter skepticism in regard to many of the 
most familiar objects of human knowledge; or, rather, in the 
hands of a thoroughly consequent reasoner, it must issue, as 
Jacobi endeavored to show, in absolute Mihilism ; since we can 
have no better reason for believing in the existence of Self than 


1 §rr WILLIAM HAMILTON’s edition of Rerp’s “Works,” p. 281. Sir 
William does not seem to admit that there is a contradiction such as I 
have noted. 

24. “The ego or mot affirms itself.” 2. “The ego or mot affirms a non- 
ego or non-moi.”” 3. “The ego or moi affirms itself to be determined by 
the non-ego or non-mot.” 


178 MODERN ATHEISM. 


we have for believing in the reality of an external world, and 
the coexistence of our fellow-men. Each of these beliefs is 
equally the spontaneous product of certain mental laws, which 
are just as trustworthy, and need as little to be proved, in the 
one case as in the other. 

Fichte seems to have become aware of this fundamental 
defect of his system; and, at a later period, he attempted to 
_ give it a firmer basis by representing se/f, not as individual, 
but as Divine, that is, as the Absolute manifesting itself in 
Man. He now admitted what, if he had not denied, he had 
overlooked before, an essential reality as the substratum both 
of the Hgo and Non-ego ; a reality of which all things, whether 
within or without, are only so many “modes” or manifesta- 
tions. And it is at this point that his subjective Idealism 
passes into Pantheism, and that we mark the close affinity 
between his speculations and those of Spinoza. There is, in 
some respects, a wide difference between the two; Spinoza 
assumed, Fichte denied, the existence of matter; the former 
affirmed Substance to be the absolute and infinite Essence ; the 
latter proclaimed a spiritual universe, whose essence was the 
infinite reason, or the Divine idea: but still, with these and 
other points of difference, there existed a real, radical affinity 
between the two systems, that of Fichte, not less than that 
of Spinoza, being based on the ¢dentity of existence and thought ; 
and both systems being directed to show that there is but one 
Absolute Being, of which all phenomena, whether material or 
mental, are only so many modes or manifestations. 

3. The philosophy of “the absolute,” as applied in support 
of German Pantheism, depends on the doctrine of “ Identity,” 
and must stand or fall along with it. The “absolute” is 


1M. Marner, “Essai,” pp. 129, 142, 146, 175, 192, 225, 276. Ibid., 
“ Theodicée,” pp. 193, 366, 378, 386, 394. Mr. MorxExt, “ History,” 11. 
127, 138. 


IDEAL PANTHEISM. 179 


described as being at once ideal and real, pure being and pure 
thought, and as developing itself in a great variety of forms. 
The philosophy. of the “absolute ” ig represented as the only 
science, properly so called: it is assumed that there can be no 
science of the finite, the variable, the contingent, the relative, 
but only of the absolute, the unchangeable, and the infinite. 
To constitute this science, the doctrine of “identity” is indis- 
pensable; the subject and the object of thought, knowledge 
and being, must be reduced to scientific unity. Realism and 
Idealism are thus blended together, or rather identified in the 
philosophy of the “absolute.” The idea of the “absolute,” in 
which being and thought are identical, is the only foundation of 
science, and the ultimate ground of all certitude. And Pan- 
theism is inferred from this idea; for the “ absolute,” in which 
being and thought are identified, is properly the sole existence, 
which develops and manifests itself in a great variety of finite 
forms. 

We are not disposed to treat the philosophy of the “abso- 
lute” either with levity or with scorn. We feel that it brings 
us into contact with some of the most profound and most 
deeply mysterious problems of human thought. Finite as we 
are, we are so constituted that we cannot avoid framing the 
idea, although we can never attain to a comprehension, of the 
Infinite. There are absolute truths, and necessary truths, 
among the elements of human knowledge. Account for them 
as we may, their reality cannot be reasonably denied, nor their 
importance disparaged. There is a tendency —and a most 
useful one —in the human mind, to seek unity in all things, to 
trace effects to causes, to reduce phenomena to laws, to resolve 
the complex into the simple, and to rise from the contingent to 
the absolute, from the finite to the infinite. There are few 
more interesting inquiries in the department of Psychology 
than that which seeks to investigate the nature, the origin, and 
the validity of those ideas which introduce us into the region 


180 "MODERN ATHEISM. 


of absolute, eternal, and immutable Truth; and it were a 
lamentable result of the erratic speculations of Germany did 
they serve to cast discredit on this inquiry, or even to excite a 
prejudice against it, in the more sober, but not less profound, 
minds of our own countrymen. But there need be little appre- 
hension on this score, if it be clearly understood and carefully 
remembered, that the philosophy of the absolute, as taught in 
Germany and applied in support of Pantheism, rests ultimately 
on the theory of Idealism and the doctrine of Identity, by 
which all is resolved into one absolute “subject-object,” and 
existence is identified with thought. This system may be dis- 
carded, and yet there may still remain a sound, wholesome, and 
innocuous philosophy of the “absolute ;” a philosophy which 
does not seek to identify things so generically different as exis- 
tence and thought, or to reduce mind and matter, the finite and 
the infinite, to the same category; but which, recognizing the 
differences subsisting between the various objects of thought, 
seeks merely to investigate the nature and sources of that part 
of human knowledge which relates to absolute or necessary 
truths. The former of these rival systems may be favorable 
to Pantheism, the latter will be found to be in entire accordance 
with Christian Theism. 

The fundamental principle of philosophical Pantheism is 
either the unity of substance, as taught by Spinoza, or the tden- 
tity of existence and thought, as taught, with some important 
variations, by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The Absolute is 
conceived of, not as a’living Being to whom a proper person- 
ality and certain intelligible attributes may be ascribed, but as 
a vague, indeterminate somewhat, which has no distinctive 
character, and of which, in the first instance, or prior to its - 
development, almost nothing can be either affirmed or denied. 
But this absolute existence, by some unknown, inherent neces- 
sity, develops, determines, and limits itself: it becomes being, 
and constitutes all being: the infinite passes into the finite, the 


IDEAL PANTHEISM:« 181 


absolute into the relative, the necessary into the contingent, the 
one into the many; all other existences are only so many 
modes or forms of its manifestation. Here is a theory which, 
to say the very least, is neither more intelligible, nor less mys- 
terious, than any article of the Christian faith. And what are 
‘the proofs to which it appeals, what the principles on which it 
rests? Its two fundamental positions are these; that finite 
things have no distinct existence as realities in nature, and that 
there exists only one Absolute Being, manifesting itself in a 
variety of forms. And how are they demonstrated? Sim- 
ply by the affirmation of universal “Identity.” But what if 
this affirmation be denied? What if, founding on the clearest 
data of consciousness, we refuse to acknowledge that existence 
is identical with thought?! What if we continue to believe 
that there are objects of thought which are distinct from 
thought itself, and which must be presented to the mind before 
‘they can be represented by the mind? What if, while we rec- 
ognize the idea both of the finite and the infinite, the relative 
and the absolute, the contingent and the necessary, we cannot, 
by the utmost effort of our reason, obliterate the difference 
between them, so as to reduce them to one absolute essence ? 
Then the whole superstructure of Pantheism falls along with 
the Idealism on which it depends; and it is found to be, not a 
solid and enduring system of truth, but a frail edifice, ingeniously 
constructed out of the mere abstractions of the human mind. 

The advocates of this system assume that the relations which 
subsist between beings are the same as the relations which sub- 
sist between our ¢deas, and infer that logic is sufficient to con- 
struct a system of metaphysic. But Professor Nicolas has well 
said, that “while it is certain we cannot know things but by 
the notions which we have of them, and a certain parallelism 
may thus be established between what exists and what we think 


1 Prornssor Nicoxas, “ Quelques Considerations sur le Pantheisme,” 


pp. 29-31. = 
16 


182 MODERN ATHEISM. 


of that which exists, yet from this to the identity of being and 
thought, such as Pantheism requires, there is a vast distance, 
and we have no ground for believing that the logical relations 
of our ideas are identical with the real relations of beings. 
Speculative Pantheism is wholly built on this assumption. It 
describes the relations of being according to the logical-relations 
of our thought; and it takes logic for a kind of metaphysic. 
It confounds the laws of thought with the laws of being. It 
seeks to solve the question, What is the first Being, and what 
are its relations to other beings? That Being must necessarily 
be the condition of all other beings, and must virtually contain 
them all; nay, it must be capable of becoming all things. It 
must therefore be simple, indeterminate, indifferent, possessing 
no essential character, resembling nothing that we actually 
know. All this is true of our ddeas, but not of beings. The 
highest idea, — that which is the logical condition of all others, 
and also the most general, the most abstract, the most indeter- 
minate, — this idea contains all others, and by receiving this or 
that determination, it becomes this or that particular idea. 
But what is true of the ¢dea is not true of the being; no such 
vague, indeterminate, indifferent being exists; and yet Pan- 
theism confounds the idea with the being, and rests entirely on 
that confusion of thought.” 


In bringing our review of Modern Pantheism to a close, we 
may offer a few remarks illustrative of its nature and tendency, 
whether considered as a system of speculative thought, or as a 
substitute for religious belief. 

In this view, it is important to observe, first of all, that the 
theory of “Idealism,” and the doctrine of “Identity,” which 
constitute the groundwork of the more spiritual form of Pan- 
theism, are not more adverse to our belief in the existence and 
personality of God, than they are to our belief in the reality of 
an external world, or in the existence and personality of man 


PANTHEISM. 183 


himself. They stand equally related to each of these three 
topics; and, if they be accepted at all, they must be impartially 
applied, and consistently carried out into all their legitimate con- 
sequences, as the only philosophical solution of the whole ques- 
tion of Ontology. Perhaps this is not understood; certainly 
it has not been duly considered by the more superficial littera- 
teurs, who have been slightly tinctured with Pantheism ; but it 
will be acknowledged at once by every consistent Idealist, who 
understands his own philosophy, and who is honest or bold 
enough to carry it out into all its practical applications. . He 
knows very well, and, if sufficiently candid, he will frankly 
confess, that the principles on which he founds, if they be con- 
clusive against the existence of a living, personal God, are 
equally conclusive against the reality of an external world, 
and against the doctrine of our own personality or that of our 
fellow-men. With most minds, this consideration would be of 
itself a powerful counteractive to all that is most dangerous in 
the theory of Idealism, were it only clearly apprehended and 
steadily kept in view; for an argument which proves too much 
is justly held to prove nothing, and that theory which leaves us 
no right to believe in the existence of Nature, or in the distinct 
personality of our fellow-men, can scarcely be held sufficient to 
disprove the existence of God. 

It may be observed, further, that Ideal Pantheism has a 
strong tendency to engender a spirit either of Mysticism, on 
the one hand, or of Skepticism on the other. It terminates in 
Mysticism when, seeking to avoid Skepticism, it takes refuge 
in the doctrine of an “intellectual intuition,” such as gives an 
immediate knowledge of the Absolute: and it terminates in 
Skepticism when, seeking to avoid Mysticism, it rejects the 
doctrine of “intellectual intuition,” and discovers that it has no 
other and no higher claims to our confidence than such as are 
equally possessed by any one of our common faculties, whose 
testimony the Idealist has been taught to distrust and doubt. 


184 MODERN ATHEISM. 


It is further worthy of remark, that the philosophy of the 
Absolute, as taught in the German schools, has been applied to 
the whole circle of the Sciences, not less than to Theology, and 
that it has given birth to numerous speculative systems, in 
Physics, in Chemistry, in Ethics, in History, and in Politics, 
all strongly marked by the same characteristic feature —the 
substitution of @ priort and deductive speculation for the more 
sober and legitimate method of Inductive inquiry. The prov- 
ince of Natural Science, in which, if anywhere, we should be 
guided by the light of experience and observation, has been 
rudely invaded by this transcendental philosophy, which offers 
to construct a theory of universal knowledge on the basis of a 
certain self-development of the Absolute. We are indebted to 
Mr. Morell for a specimen,! alike amusing and instructive, of 
Schelling’s speculations on this subject. We shall not attempt 
to interpret its meaning, for, in sooth, we do not pretend to 
understand it: but one thing is clear, the laws of Matter, of 
Dynamics, of Organic structure and life, the laws of Knowl- 
edge, of Action, and of Art, are all exhibited as mere deduc- 
tions or corollaries from the “idea of the Absolute ;” and in 
the name of Natural Science, not less than on behalf of Theol- 
ogy, we.protest against this vicious method of Philosophy, and 
do most earnestly deprecate the substitution of Fichte, Schelling, 
and Hegel, in the place of our own Bacon, and Boyle, and 
Newton, as models of scientific thought. 

The practical influence of Pantheism, in so far as its peculiar 
tendencies are not restrained or counteracted by more salutary 
beliefs, must be deeply injurious, both to the individual and 
social welfare of mankind. In its Ideal or Spiritual form it 
may be seductive to some ardent, imaginative minds; but it is 
a wretched creed notwithstanding; and it will be found, when 
calmly examined, to be fraught with the most serious evils. It 


1 Mr. MoRELL, “History of Philosophy,” 11. 129. 


PANTHEISM. 185 


has been commended, indeed, in glowing terms, as a creed 
alike beautiful and beneficent, as a source of religious life 
nobler and purer than any that can ever spring from the more 
gloomy system of Theism: for, on the theory of Pantheism, 
- God is manifest to all, everywhere, and at all times ; Nature, 
too, is aggrandized and glorified, and everything in Nature is 
invested with a new dignity and interest; above all, Man is 
conclusively freed from all fantastic hopes and superstitious 
fears, so that his mind can now repose, with tranquil satisfac- 
tion, on the bosom of the Absolute, unmoved by the vicissitudes 
of life, and unscared even by the prospect of death. For what 
+s death? The dissolution of any living organism is but one 
stage in the process of its further development; and whether 
it passes into a new form of self-conscious life, or is reabsorbed 
into the infinite, it still forms an indestructible element in the 
vast sum of Being. We may, therefore, or, rather, we must, 
leave our future state to be determined by Nature’s inexorable 
laws, and we need, at least, fear no Being higher than Nature, 
to whose justice we are amenable, or whose frown we should 
dread But, even as it is thus exhibited by some of its warm- 
est partisans, it appears to us, we own, to be a dreary and 
cheerless creed, when compared with that faith which teaches 
us to regard God as our “Father in heaven,” and that “hope 
which is full of immortality.” It is worse, however, than 
dreary ; it is destructive of all religion and of all morality. If 
it be an avowed antagonist to Christianity, it is not less hostile 
to Natural Theology and to Ethical Science. It consecrates 
error and vice, as being, equally with truth and virtue, neces- 
sary and beneficial manifestations of the “ infinite.” It is a 
system of Syncretism, founded on the idea that error is only an 


1M. Crovssz, “Des Principes.” M. Maret, “Essai,” pp. 69, 86, 
150 ; “ Theodicée,” pp. 311, 314, VALROGER, “ Etudes Critiques,” pp. 
97, 101, 115, 151, 412. 


16* 


186 MODERN ATHEISM, 


incomplete truth, and maintaining that truth must necessarily 
be developed by error, and virtue by vice. According to this 
fundamental law of “human progress,” Atheism itself may be 
providential; and the axiom of a Fatalistic Optimism — 
“Whatever is, is best” — must be admitted equally in regard 
to truth and error, to virtue and vice. 

It may be further observed, that modern Pantheism, whether 
in its Material or Ideal form, is nothing else than the revival 
of some of the earliest and most inveterate Principles of Pa- 
ganism, — the same Paganism which still flourishes among the" 
“theosophic” dreamers of India, and which exhibits its prac- 
tical fruits in the horrors of Hindoo superstition. For Pan- 
theism, although repeatedly revived and exhibited in new 
forms, has made no real progress since the time when it was 
first taught in the Vedanta system, and sublimed in the schools 
of Alexandria. Christianity, which encountered and triumphed 
over it in her youth, can have nothing to fear from it in her 
mature age, provided only that she be faithful to herself, and 
spurn every offered compromise. But there must be no truce, 
and no attempt at conciliation between the two. The Pan- 
theists of Germany have made the most impudent claims to the 
virtual sanction of Christianity ; they have even dared to make 
use of Bible terms in a new sense, and have spoken of Revela- 
tion, Inspiration, Incarnation, Redemption, Atonement, and 
Regeneration, in such a way as to adapt them to the Panthe- 
istic hypothesis. Common honesty is outraged, and the con- 
science of universal humanity offended, by the conduct of indi- 
viduals — some of them wearing the robes of the holy ministry 
—who have substituted the dreams of Pantheism for the doc- 
trines of Jesus Christ, and assailed, both -from the pulpit and 
the press, the sacred cause which they had solemnly vowed to 


x 


o 
1M. Maret, “ Essai sur Pantheisme,” p. 107. ‘‘ Le Christianisme saura 


vaincre dans son 4ge miir l’ennemi qu’il a terrassé en naissant.” 


PANTHEISM.. 187 


maintain. But even in Germany itself a powerful reaction has 
commenced; and the learning and labors of such men as 
Olshausen, and Tholuck, and Hengstenberg, may be hailed as 
the dawn of a better and brighter day. 

It may be observed, finally, that Pantheism stands directly 
opposed to Christian Theism in several distinct respects. The 
following are the principal points of collision between the two: 

1. Pantheism denies, — Christian Theism affirms, the exis- 
tence of a living, personal God, distinct from Nature, and 
superior to it. 

2. Pantheism supersedes, — Christian Theism reveals, the 
doctrine of a real creation. 

3. Pantheism contests, — Christian Theism confirms, the 
doctrine of the constant providence and moral government of 
God. ; 

4. Pantheism disowns,— Christian Theism declares, the 
doctrine of a conscious, personal immortality. 

5. Pantheism rejects, — Christian Theism receives, the whole 
scheme of Revelation, considered as a supernatural code of 
Divine truth. The one accounts for its origin on the principle 
of natural development, the other on that of supernatural 
interposition. 

6. Pantheism has no living, self-conscious, personal God, no 
loving Father, no watchful Providence, no Hearer of Prayer, 
no Object of confiding trust, no Redeemer, no Sanctifier, no 
Comforter: it leaves us with nothing higher than Nature as 
our portion here, and nothing beyond its eternal vicissitudes as 
our prospect hereafter. 


oy ‘ad ‘Bhs:  guchonotl Loh fines ae 
Are poietic! bea AcrskiocllS foes yintasaly | 
scan “hS aeedenuinyhel leeqeuminiind iigeanenie oth 
i ate Macanltacet easit teinta; Prbvancbeniteh Yama! 

) rN aalpnie ia Bae ov » OF wane dnl gpa tS) ads feast 
PRON aSeiveh ee eter: iy esheets 
aes wet: nee gat eT. iieleadanetrete tances tania ak, 

a ~ anions Sands aan eenain we Beate XR  evielbiyes Aap eretegt. 4 
PAKiie tee ‘8 a " widens eae ¢ leis cy lt al ; 
a ae (it iia ae ee 
; | ON Una B is. ay Bly 2 lata Rag tonal 
al rec tase piiacalatenlouanbads eecairb anal. a 
Pes roles iat ise joteen tiers. acersentins Sacer tly | 

wean. Werseel ee, ay Renae MPS eae ats ae ees) . 
ho SME Sapeeed a laces: eee j 
Bt MA, Sa a on 2 se erento ggsR ‘ 
ah ne ere ani eth neler 
ties Ce ea ce 
Sh RPMS oot os SN: 6 nat UR ie hee } re apie pig diab icnpneviad ; 
| ieee cee fab arena sanleh at Ce 
pg are rit eBay iosinbea one 
: Ea eg age lds ac ie svipth fae: PesantipeoneD. 4 
cath: finan pitcher xan are aairecgation a 
Ae ll a sea hain ce ae ic i Soees Gone 
i ip ; Be Ae Lyi ie 
iy Pies: Da wonky 
mp Pei i ota aa 


TE 
Wet 


a) 
, 


~: faa ain ‘dl 


eo Ha Stel 


CHAPTER IV. 


THEORIES OF MATERIALISM. 


Tun doctrine of Materialism stands equally related to the 
“mechanical” form of Atheism, and to the “ hylozoic” form 
of Pantheism. It is subsumed in both, and is the fundamental 
postulate on which they respectively depend. 

It has no natural affinity with the more “ideal” or “ spirit- 
ual” form of Pantheism. We must not conclude, however, 
that it has no historical connection with it. For it is instruc- 
tive to mark, in tracing the history of philosophic speculation, 
that its course resembles not so much the uniform current of a 
stream, as the alternate flowing and ebbing of the tide; or, if 
we may change the figure, that its movement may be likened 
to the oscillation of a pendulum, which no sooner reaches its 
highest elevation on the one side, than it acquires a tendency 
to rush to the opposite extreme on the other. There can be 
little doubt that the recent revival of speculative “ Idealism” 
was the result, at least in part, of a strong reaction against the 
“sensational” philosophy, which had degenerated in the school 
of Priestley at home, and in that of Condillac abroad, into a 
system of gross and revolting Materialism. For the same 
reason, we may now, I think, anticipate a speedy reaction the 
other way, —a reaction against the extravagances of “ideal- 
istic” and “transcendental” speculation, and a tendency towards 
a more practical and matter-of-fact philosophy. This tendency, 


190 MODERN ATHEISM. 


if guided by the true spirit of the Baconian method, may give 
a powerful impulse to Inductive Science in all its departments; 
but, if biased by partial and one-sided views, may issue either 
in the temporary ascendancy of the Positive School, or the 
partial revival of some other form of Materialism. 

Some such tendency might have been expected to arise as 
soon as Idealism should have reached its culminating point. 
For, on a comprehensive view of the whole history of specu- 
lative thought, we find that there are just four great systems 
of Metaphysics, which are perpetually recurring, as it were, in 
cycles. The first is the system of Dualism,—not the Dualism 
of Christian Theology, which speaks of God and nature, the 
Creator and the creature, —but the Dualism of ancient Pagan- 
ism, which held Matter and Spirit to be equally uncreated and 
eternal: the second is Materialism, which resolves all into 
Matter and its laws: the third is Idealism, which resolves all 
into Mind and its modifications: and the fourth is Pantheism, 
which identifies Existence with Thought, and resolves all into 
the Absolute.’ In the present age, Idealism is in the ascend- 
ant, and has risen to the height of Pantheism; but, by a 
natural reaction, many are beginning to desiderate a more sub- 
stantial and practical philosophy, while the rapid progress of 
physical science is directing their thoughts more and more to 
the wonders of the material world. In these circumstances, 
there may be a tendency to relapse into the Materialism of 
the last century, which attempted to explain the whole theory 
of the universe by the laws of matter and motion ; or at least 
to embrace some modification of the Positive Philosophy, which 
excludes all causes, whether efficient or final, from the field of 
human knowledge, and confines our inquiries to the mere phe- 
nomena and laws of material nature. 

There are not wanting various significant indications of the 


1M. Ap. Franck, “ Rapport a Academie,” Preface, p. XxX1. 


MATERIALISM. 191 


existence of this tendency at the present day. It is sufficiently 
indicated, in some quarters, by the mere omission of all refer- 
ence to Mind or Spirit as distinct from Matter; and, in others, 
by elaborate attempts to explain all the phenomena of life and 
thought by means of physical agencies and organic laws. The 
writings of Comte, Crousse, Cabanis, and Broussais,’ afford 
ample evidence of its growing prevalence in France; and 
although it has been said by a recent historian of Philosophy 
that in England there has been no formal avowal, or at least 
no recognized school, of Materialism, since the publication of 
Dr. Thomas Brown’s reply to Darwin’s Zodnomia, yet there 
is too much reason to believe that it was all along cherished 
by not a few private thinkers, who had imbibed the spirit 
of Hobbes and Priestley; and now it is beginning to speak 
out, in terms too unambiguous to be misunderstood, in such 
works as “The Purpose of Existence” and the “ Letters” of 
Atkinson and Martineau. But apart from the opinions of 
individual inquirers, it must be remembered that there is a 
tendency in certain studies, when exclusively pursued, to gen- 
erate a frame of mind which will tempt men either to adopt 
the theory of Materialism, or at least to attach undue impor- 
tance to physical agencies and organic laws. This tendency 
may be observed in the study of Physiology, especially when 
it is combined with that of Phrenology and Animal Magnet- 
ism; not that there is any necessary or strictly logical connec- 
tion between these studies and Materialism, for some of their 
ablest expounders, including Cabanis, Gall, and Spurzheim, 
have explicitly disavowed that theory; but simply that, in 
prosecuting such inquiries, the mind is insensibly led to bestow 
an undue, if not exclusive, attention on the phenomena and laws 


1M. Comte, “Cours,” 1. 44, 89, 141; rv. 675; v. 45, 303. M.Crovusss, 
“Des Principes,” pp. 16, 20, 84, 88. M.Casanis, “Rapports du Phisique 
et du Moral de Homme,” 3 vols. M, Broussais, “ Traité de Physiologie 
appliquée a la Pathologie,” 1828. 


192 MODERN ATHEISM. 


of our material organization, so as to become comparatively 
unmindful of what is mental, moral, and spiritual in the consti- 
tution of man. For these reasons, and considering, especially, 
the close connection of Materialism both with the mechanical 
Atheism of the past, and the hylozoic Pantheism of the pres- 
ent age, we deem it necessary to subject its claims to a rigorous 
scrutiny, in connection with the subject of our present inquiry. 
What, then, is the doctrine of Materialism? What are the 
forms in which it has appeared, and what the ground on which 
it rests? How does it stand related to.the question concern- 
ing the nature and existence of God, or the constitution and 
destiny of Man? A brief answer to these questions will be 
sufficient to show that this theory cannot be safely disregarded 
in any attempt to construct a comprehensive and conclusive 
argument on the first principles of Natural ‘Theology. 


SECTION If. 
DISTINCT FORMS OF MATERIALISM. 


The doctrine of Materialism has assumed several distinct 
phases or forms in the hands of its different advocates; and 
these must be carefully discriminated from each other, if we 
would either estimate aright their respective merits, or do 
justice to the parties by whom they have been severally main- 
tained. 

The grossest and most revolting form of Materialism is that 
which ¢dentifies mind with matter, and thought with motion. It 
denies that there is any real or radical difference between 
physical and moral phenomena, and affirms that life and 
thought are so entirely dependent on material organization, 
that the dissolution of the body must necessarily be the destruc- 
tion of conscious existence, and that death can only be an 


DISTINCT FORMS OF MATERIALISM. 193 


eternal sleep. This is the doctrine of Materialism which was 
taught in a former age, by the author of the “Systeme de la 
Nature,” and which has recently been revived by M. Comte in 
France, and by Atkinson and Martineau in England. A few 
extracts will sufficiently illustrate its character and tendency. 
“Men have evidently abused the distinction,” says Baron 
D’Holbach, “which is so often made between man physical 
and man moral: man moral is nothing else than that physical 
being considered in a certain point of view, that is, with refer- 
ence to some modes of action which belong to his peculiar 
organization.” —“The universe —that vast assemblage of 
everything that exists — exhibits nowhere anything else than 
matter and motion.” —“If we are asked, what is man? we 
reply, that he is a material being, organized or framed so as to 
feel, to think, and to be affected in certain ways peculiar to 
himself, according to his organization.”’ More recently, M. 
Comte has affirmed that “the subject of all our researches is 
one,” and that “all natural phenomena are the necessary results 
either of the laws of extension or of the laws of motion;” 
while M. Crousse is quite clear that “ intelligence is a property 
or effect of matter,” and that “body and spirit together consti- 
tute matter.” In our own country, Atkinson and Martineau 
have not shrunk from the avowal of the same doctrine, or the 
adoption of the most revolting consequences that can be deduced 
from it. “Instinct, passion, thought, are effects of organized 
substances.”—- “ Mind is the consequence or product of the 
material man; it is not a thing having a seat or home in the 
brain, but it is the manifestation or expression of the brain in 
action, as heat and light are of fire, and fragrance of the 


flower.” ? 


1 “ Systéme de la Nature,” 1. 2, 10, 86, 101, and passim. This eloquent 
text-book of the Atheism of the last century is dissected and refuted by 
M. Bereter in his “ Examen du Materialisme,” 2 vols. Paris, 1771. 


2M. Comres, “ Cours,” 1. 44, 141. M. Crovussn, “ Des Principes,” pp. 
17 


194 MODERN ATHEISM. 


The doctrine of Materialism, as formerly taught by Dr. 
Priestley and his followers, is in some respects similar to that 
which we have just noticed, but in other respects differs from 
it, if not in its essential nature, at least in its collateral adjuncts 
and its practical applications. It resembles the theory of 
D’Holbach and Comte, in so far as it affirms the doctrine of 
unisubstancisme, and rejects the idea of a dualism such as is 
implied in the common doctrine of Matter and Spirit. But it 
differs from that theory, inasmuch as it is combined, whether 
consistently or otherwise, with the recognition of a personal 
God, a resurrection from the dead, and a future state of reward 
and punishment. Dr. Priestley seems to have fluctuated for a 
time between two opposite extremes, —that of spiritualizing 
Matter, and that of materializing Mind; for, in a very remark- 
able passage, we find him saying, “This scheme of the imma-— 
tervality of Matter, as it may be called, or rather, the mutual 
penetration of Matter, first occurred to my friend Mr. Mitchell 
on reading ‘ Baxter on the Immateriality of the Soul.’”! But 
at length he settled down in the fixed belief of Materialism, as 
he had always held the principle of wnisubstancisme. He held 
throughout that “Man does not consist of two principles so 
essentially different from each other as Matter -and Spirit, but 
the whole man is of one uniform composition; and that either 
the material or the immaterial part of the universal system is 
superfluous.”? He attempts, therefore, to show, that sensation, 
perception, and thought, —the common properties of mind, — 
are not incompatible with extension, attraction, and repulsion, 


84,86. ATKINSON and MARTINEAUD, “ Letters on the Laws of Man’s Na- 
ture and Development.” 

1 Dr. PRIESTLEY, “ Discoveries relating to Vision, Light, and Colors.” 
Mr. DuGALD STEWaRT, “ Philosoph. Essays,” p. 187. 

2 Dr. PRIESTLEY, “ Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit; ” “Free 
Discussion of the Doctrine of Materialism; ” ‘Correspondence between 
Dr. Priestley and Dr. Price.” 


DISTINCT FORMS OF MATERIALISM. 195 


which he conceives to be the only essential properties of matter ; 
that both classes of properties may possibly belong to the same 
subject; and that hence no second substance is necessary to 
account for and explain any of the phenomena of human 
nature. In this respect, his theory is precisely the same with 
that which has been already noticed; but the peculiarity by 
which it is distinguished from the Atheistic and Antichristian 
speculations of D’Holbach and Comte is twofold. In the first 
place, while he ascribes to mere matter the power of sensation, 
thought, and volition, he admits that these powers, and all 
others belonging to matter, were communicated to it at the 
first, and are still continued, by the Divine will, thus recog- 
nizing the doctrine both of Creation and Providence ; and in 
the second place, while he denies the natural immortality of the 
soul, and even the possibility of its conscious existence in a 
state of separation from the body, he does not deny the immor- 
tality of man, but receives it, as well as the doctrine of future 
rewards and punishments, on the authority of that Divine 
Revelation which speaks of “the resurrection of the dead,” and 
of “a judgment to come.” In these respects, his theory is 
widely different from that of the “Systéme de la Nature,” 
while the two are substantially the same in so far as they 
relate simply to the constitution of human nature. He is not 
an Atheist, but a Theist, and a Theist, too, who, believing in 
Revelation, admits the immortality of man, and a future state 
of retribution. But it must be evident that as in these respects 
he founds entirely on the authority of Scripture, so he may be 
confronted with the same authority when he denies the spirit- 
uality of the soul; and in that case the question would resolve 
itself into one of Biblical exegesis, and would fall to be decided, 
not by metaphysical reasoning, but by Scriptural proofs. 
Another variety of the theory is presented by Dr. Good in 
his “ Life of Lucretius.” It agrees with the doctrine of Priest- 
ley in representing the soul as material; but differs from it in 


196 MODERN ATHEISM. 


holding the possible existence of the soul in a separate state, 
during the interval between the dissolution and resurrection of 
the body. It speaks of the body as being composed of gross 
material particles ; and of the soul as consisting of more subtle, 
refined, and ethereal matter. This modification of the theory 
may be illustrated by the following extract: “ Perception, con- 
sciousness, cognition, we continue to be told, are qualities 
which cannot appertain to matter; there must hence be a 
thinking and an immaterial principle ; and man must still be a 
compound being. Yet, why thus degrade matter, the plastic 
and prolific creature of the Deity, beyond what we are author- 
ized to do? Why may it not perceive, why not think, why 
not become conscious? What eternal and necessary impedi- 
ment prevents? or what self-contradiction and absurdity is 
hereby implied? Let us examine Nature as she presents her- 
self to us in her most simple and inorganized forms; let us 
trace her through her gradual and ascending stages of power 
and perfection. In its simplest form, matter evinces the desire 
of reciprocal union, or, as it is commonly called, the attraction 
of gravitation. Increase its mass, arrange it in other modi- 
fications, and it immediately evinces other powers or attrac- 
tions; and these will be perpetually, and almost infinitely, 
varied, in proportion as we vary its combinations. If ar- 
ranged, therefore, in one mode, it discloses the power of mag- 
netism; in another, that of electricity or galvanism; in a 
third, that of chemical affinities; in a fourth, that of mineral 
assimilations. Pursue its modifications into classes of a more 
complex, or rather, perhaps, of a more gaseous or attenuate 
nature, and it will evince the power of vegetable or fibrous 
irritability : ascend through the classes of vegetables, and you 
will at length reach the strong stimulative perfection, the pal- 
pable vitality of the mimosa pudica, or the hedysarum gyrans, 
the former of which shrinks from the touch with the most 
bashful coyness, while the latter perpetually dances beneath 


DISTINCT FORMS OF MATERIALISM. 197 


the jocund rays of the sun. And when we have thus attained 
the summit of vegetable powers and vegetable life, it will 
require, I think, no great stretch of the imagination to conceive 
that the fibrous irritability of animals, as well as vegetables, is 
the mere result of a peculiar arrangement of simple and unirri- 
table material atoms.”—“ Hence, then, animal sensation, and 
hence, necessarily and consequently, ideas, and a material soul 
or spirit, rude and confined, indeed, in its first and simplest 
mode of existence, but, like every other production of Nature, 
beautifully and progressively advancing from power to power, 
from faculty to faculty, from excellence to excellence, till at 
length it terminate in the perfection of the human mind.” ? 

According to this theory, the mind is supposed to have a 
real existence, as a substance distinct from the grosser forms 
of matter, and capable even of surviving its separation from 
them. It is supposed to be “a combination of the most vola- 
tile auras or gases, diffused over the whole body, though traced 
in a more concentrate form in some organs than in others ;” 
and it is described as “the very texture of that separate state 
of existence which ve infallible page of Revelation ees 
indicates will be ours.” 

A form of the theory very nearly resembling this has been 
recently reproduced. It consists in representing the Mind or 
Spirit of man, not as a mere fleeting phenomenon of the brain, 
or an evanescent effect of its organization, but as a distinct 
substantive product, generated, indeed, from matter, and par- 
taking, therefore, of its nature, but so exquisitely subtle and 
ethereal that it has no resemblance to the grosser materials of 
the body, and admits only of being compared with the Dynam- 
ides — the imponderable elements and forces of Nature. This 
“spirit” is generated in man by his peculiar organization, and 
especially by the action of the brain ; it is capable of surviving 

1Dr. Joun Mason Goon, “ Life of Lucretius,” prefixed to his poetical 


version of “The Nature of Things,” 1. XXXVIII. 


ii” 


198 “MODERN ATHEISM. 


the dissolution of the body, of retaining its individual conscious- 
ness after death, of passing into new spheres of being, and of 
rising from lower to higher states, according to a law of eternal 
progression. Such is the theory of Davis, the “ Poughkeepsie 
Seer;” and such also, with some variations, is that of the 
author of “The Purpose of Existence.” 

“Matter and Spirit,” says Davis, “have heretofore been 
supposed to constitute two distinct and independent substances, 
the latter not having any material origin.” . . . . “Instead of 
making material and spiritual existence totally disconnécted, 
the object and intention of the foregoing has been to prove, by 
acknowledged laws and principles of matter, the production of 
intelligence, the perfection of which is spirit;” to show that 
“the Organizer uses Nature and all things therein as an effect, 
to produce spirit as an end and designed ultimate.” The 
author of “'The Purpose of Existence” adopts a similar view. 
He tells us, indeed, that “the first simple forms or states of 
existence are admitted to be fwo, spirit and matter,— the first 
the moving power, the second the moved substance ;” that of 
the positive essence of either we can arrive at no knowledge ; 
and that “whether spirit be a refined, etherealized portion of 
matter, or a distinct dynamic principle, we cannot ascertain.” 
And yet, one of the leading objects of his work is to account 
for “the origin and development of the human mind;” and 
this he does by ascribing it to “a self-dynamic spirit which is 
resident in matter,’ and which he denominates “the spirit of 
vitality.” The spirit exists in vegetables, and is extracted by 
means of the organs of the animals which feed upon them, and 
then, “by a delicate work of distillation, it is converted into 
spirit!” —“Nature proclaims one of her great working prin- 
ciples to be, that spirit is evolved out of matter, and outlives the 
body in which tt is educated.” —“ Matter is full of spirit. This 
spirit is brought out of matter by vegetation. By means of 
vegetation, it is conveyed into animal frames, in which its 


‘ 
eS a 


DISTINCT FORMS OF MATERIALISM. 199 


purest essence centres in the brain... .. This is no idle 
theory,” he adds, “no vain hypothesis, for making matter think. 
It is a clear proposition, showing how matter is employed by 
the Supreme Intelligence for evolving, training, and educating 
spirit.” —“ We conclude that Progression is the great law of 
the universe, the purpose for which its present arrangement 
was ordained; and that the object of this progression is the 
evolvement of mind out of matter.” 

This is a new and very singular phase of Materialism. It 
is widely different from the doctrine which was taught by the 
infidel writers of the last century. They had recourse to the 
theory of Materialism chiefly with the view of excluding a 
world of spirits, and of undermining the doctrine of a future 
state: here it is applied to prove the constant development and 
indestructible existence of minds generated from matter, but 
destined to survive the dissolution of the body; nay, every 
particle of matter in the universe is supposed to be advancing, 
in one magnificent progression, towards the spiritual state. The 
danger now is, not that Religion may be undermined by 
Materialism, but that it may be supplanted by a fond and foolish 
superstition, in which the facts of Mesmerism and the fictions 
of Clairvoyance are blended into one ghostly system, fitted to 
exert a powerful but pernicious influence on over-credulous 
minds. * 

On a review of the various forms which the theory of 
Materialism has assumed, it must be evident that we should be | 


1The “fictions of Clairvoyance” may be studied at large in “The 
Principles of Nature and her Divine Revelations,” by AND. J. Davis, the 
Poughkeepsie Seer, 2 vols. ; and in “The Celestial Telegraph,” by M. 
Canacner. An attempt has been made to popularize the doctrine by 
introducing it into the light literature of the Continent. See “ Memoirs of 
a Physician, Joseph Balsamo,” by ALEXANDER DuMAS, I. 15, 21, 82; II. 
50, 62, 70. Whether the cases reported by Dr. Gregory deserve to be 
ranked as facts or fictions is a question which we need not wait to solve, 
before we reject the “ Revelations ” of Davis. 


200 MODERN ATHEISM. 


doing great injustice to their respective advocates, did we place 
them all on the same level in relation to Theology, or pro- 
nounce upon them one indiscriminate censure. In the hands of 
D’Holbach and Comte, it was associated with the avowal of Athe- 
ism, and the denial of a future state: in the hands of Priestley, 
it was associated with the recognition of a God, and the Chris- 
tian doctrine of a resurrection: in the hands of Dr. Good, it 
was combined with the principles of Theism, and even with the 
revealed doctrine of the separate existence of the soul during 
the interval between death and the resurrection : and in the 
hands of Davis and the author of the « Purpose of Existence,” 
it is exhibited in connection with a theory of Progression, 
widely different, indeed, from the doctrine of Scripture, but 
equally different from the infidel speculations of the last century. 
Still, with all these shades of difference, there is that common to 
all the forms in which it can be presented which shows that 
they are radically one and the same: they all deny the existence 
of any generic difference between Matter and Mind, 

Confining our attention to this common element, and omitting 
the consideration of minor diversities, we may now inquire 
into the grounds on which the theory rests, and the most 
plausible reasons which have been urged in support of it. 

To some minds it has been recommended by its apparent 
simplicity. It speaks only of one substance as existing in 
Nature under various modifications. It represents the universe, 
so far as created being is concerned, as entirely composed of 
matter, more or less refined; and thus excludes the complica- 
tion which must necessarily arise from the Supposition of two 
substances, generically different, yet intimately and indissolubly 
related. The principle, therefore, which prompts us to seek 
unity in diversity, and to reduce, by some comprehensive 
generalization, a multitude of phenomena under one general law, 
has led some to adopt the theory of unisubstancisme in prefer- 
ence to the opposite doctrine of dualism. Not content with the 


DISTINCT FORMS OF MATERIALISM. 201 


seneralization, alike safe and legitimate, which ranks both mind 
and matter under the generic head of substance, they have 
sought to reduce them to the same category, and to give to 
matter a monopoly of the universe, at least of created being. 
In support of their views, they remind us of the fundamental 
principle of philosophy as laid down by Sir Isaac Newton, 
that “we are to admit no more causes of things than are 
sufficient to explain appearances.”! The principle is a sound 
one; and the only question is, whether matter alone is sufficient 
to account for mental phenomena? On ¢his question the two 
parties are at irreconcilable variance; and the controversy 
cannot be determined, brevt mand, by the mere assumption of 
the simplicity and uniform composition of everything in 
Nature ; it can be settled only by an appeal to the facts as they 
are known to exist. It is the aim of science, undoubtedly, to 
reduce all compound substances to the smallest possible number 
of constituent elements, and all complex phenomena to the 
smallest possible number of general laws. But we feel that, 
desirable as this simplification may be, we are not warranted in 
identifying light with heat, or even electricity with magnetism, 
however closely connected with each other, simply because 
there are certain observed differences between them, which 
could not be explained, in the present state of our knowledge, 
consistently with any such theory of their absolute identity: 
and so, there are such manifest differences between Mental and 
Material phenomena, that we cannot yield to the temptation of 
ascribing them to one cause or origin, until it has been satis- 
factorily proved that the same cause is sufficient to account for 
appearances so diverse. It should be considered, too, in con- 
nection with this pretence of greater simplicity, that even if we 
could succeed in getting rid of the dualism of Mind and Matter 
in the constitution of man, we never can get rid of it with 


1 Dr. Prrestiey, “ Disquisitions,” p. 2. 


202 MODERN ATHEISM. 


reference to the universe at large, otherwise than by denying 
the spirituality of God himself: for the grand, the indestructi- 
ble, the eternal dualism would still remain, —the distinction 
between God and His works,— between the Creator and the 
universe which He has called into being, — between the finite, 
contingent, and transitory, and the infinite, necessary, and 
eternal. And this is a distinction that cannot be obliterated, 
although it may be obscured, by the speculations of Pantheism. 

Another reason which has induced some to adopt, or at least 
to regard with favor, the theory of Materialism, is —the diffi- 
culty of conceiving of the union of two substances so incon- 
gruous as Mind and Matter are supposed to be,—and still 
more the difficulty of explaining how they could have any 
mutual action on each other. Dr. Priestley largely insists on 
this, as well as on the former reason, as one of the main induce- 
ments which led him to abandon the commonly-received doc- 
trine. “Many doubts occurred to me,” he says, “on the 
subject of the intimate union of two substances so entirely hetero- 
geneous as the soul and body were represented to be.” And 
he was led to conclude, that “man does not consist of two 
principles so essentially different from one another as matter 
and spirit, which are always described as having no one common 
property by means of which they can affect or act upon each 
other.” In the “Systéme de la Nature,” the same argument is 
often urged. It is boldly and repeatedly affirmed that “ an 
immaterial cause cannot produce motion ;” and this is applied 
equally to the soul and to God. “ How can we form an idea 
of a substance destitute of extension, and yet acting on our 
senses, that is, on material organs which are extended? How 
can a being without extension be capable of motion, and of 
putting matter into motion ?” —“ It is as impossible that. spirit 
or thought should produce matter, as that matter should produce 


spirit or thought.” ! 


1 “‘ Systéme de la Nature,” 1. 97, 108. 


DISTINCT FORMS OF MATERIALISM. 203 


Now, it is not denied by any, —it is admitted on all hands, 
that the union between the’Soul and the body is a great 
mystery, and that we are not able, in the present state of our 
knowledge, to explain either the action of matter on mind, or 
the action of mind on matter. The mode of the union between 
them, and the nature of the influence which they mutually 
exercise, are to us inscrutable: but the facts of our most 
familiar experience are not the less certain, because they 
depend on causes to us unknown, or stand connected with mys- 
teries which we cannot solve. Besides, the theory of unisub- 
stancisme itself, were it adopted, would still leave many facts 
unexplained, and the inmost nature of man would continue to 
be as inscrutable as before. There is nothing inconceivable, 
impossible, or self-contradictory in the supposition of a non- 
material or spiritual substance ; nor is there any reason @ priort 
to conclude that such a substance could not be united to a 
material frame, although the nature of their union, and the 
mode of their reciprocal action, might be to us inexplicable. 

There is still another reason which is urged by some, derived 
from the dependence of the mind on the body, and its liability to 
be affected, beneficially or injuriously, by mere physical 
influences. “The faculty of thinking,” says Dr. Priestley, “in 
general ripens and comes to maturity with the body; it is also 
observed to decay with it.” — “If the brain be affected, as by a 
blow on the head, by actual pressure within the skull, by sleep, 
or by inflammation, the mental faculties are universally affected 
in proportion. Likewise, as the mind is affected in consequence 
of the affections of the body and brain, so the body is liable to 
be reciprocally affected by the affections of the mind, as is evi- 
dent in the visible effects of all strong passions, — hope or fear, 
love or anger, joy or sorrow, exultation or despair. These are 
certainly irrefragable arguments that it is properly no other 
than one and the same thing that is subject to these affections.” * 


1 Dr. PRIESTLEY, “ Disquisitions,” pp. 27, 38, 60. 


204 MODERN ATHEISM. 


Mr. Atkinson urges the same reason. “The proof that mind 
holds the same relation to the body that all other phenomena 
do to material conditions, may be found,” he tells us, “in the 
whole circumstances of man’s existence, his origin and growth ; 
the faculties following the development of the body in man and 
other animals; the direction of the faculties being influenced 
by surrounding circumstances; the desires, the will, the hopes, 
the fears, the habits, and the opinions, being effects traceable to 
causes, —to natural causes, —and becoming the facts of His- 
tory and Statistics. We observe the influence of climate, of 
sunshine and damp, of wine and opium and poison, of health 
and disease.” .... “ When a glass of wine turns a wise man 
into a fool, is it not clear that the result is the consequence of a 
change in the material conditions ?”} 

Now, these facts are sufficient to show that, in the present 
life, there is a very close and intimate union between the soul 
and the body, and that they exert a reciprocal and very power- 
ful influence. This is admitted by the firmest advocates of 
Spiritualism; nay, it is necessarily involved in the doctrine 
which they maintain, relative to the union of two distinct, but 
mutually dependent, principles in the present constitution of 
human nature. But it is far, very far, from affording any 
ground or warrant for the idea, that Matter may be identified 
with Mind, or Thought with Motion. 

There are certain Theological considerations which, if they 
have not been pleaded as reasons, may yet have been felt as 
inducements, to the adoption of the theory of Materialism. Not 
to speak of the difficulty which has been felt in explaining “ the 
traduction or propagation of human souls,” occasionally referred 
to in this controversy, it is plain that many Deists in the last 
century, and that not a few Atheists still, have been induced to 
embrace and avow Materialism, with the view of undermining 


1 Mr. ATKINSON, “Laws of Man’s Nature,” p. 17. 


DISTINCT FORMS OF MATERIALISM. 205 


the doctrine of man’s immortality, and of a future state of 
rewards and punishments. It is equally certain that Dr. 
Priestley was influenced by his peculiar views as a Socinian ; 
for he tells us himself that the doctrine of Materialism com- 
mended itself to his mind as a sure and effectual means of dis- 
proving the preéxistence of Christ. “The consideration,” he 
says with singular candor, “ that biases me as a Christian, 
exclusive of philosophical considerations, against the doctrine 
of a separate soul, is, that it has been the foundation of what 
appears to me to be the very erossest corruptions of Christi- 
anity, and even of that very Antichristianism that began to 
work in the apostles’ times, and which extended itself so amaz- 
ingly and dreadfully afterwards. I mean the Oriental philos- 
ophy of the ‘preéxistence of souls” which drew after it the 
belief of the preéxistence and divinity of Christ, the worship of 
Christ and of dead men, and the doctrine of Purgatory, with 
all the Popish doctrines and practices that are connected with 
them, and supported by them.” —“ This doctrine (of the pre- 
existence of Christ) is the point to which all that I have 
written tends, it being the capital inference that I make from 
the doctrine of Materialism.” There is also abundant reason 
to believe that both Atheists and Pantheists have had recourse 
to the theory of Materialism with the view of excluding the 
doctrine of a living, personal God, and explaining all the 
phenomena of Nature by the eternal laws of matter and motion. 
Now, if the question stands related in any way to such themes 
as these,—the immortality of man, the preéxistence and 
divinity of Christ, and the personality and spirituality of God, 
it must be confessed to have at least a very high relative 
importance, as it bears on some of the most momentous articles 
of our religious faith; and the question naturally arises, What 
relation it bears to the fundamental principles of Theism, and 
how far it comports with right views of God, as the Creator 
and Governor of the world? 
18 


206 MODERN ATHEISM. 


We cannot, in the face of direct evidence to the contrary, 
bring an indiscriminate charge of Atheism, or even of irreligion, 
against all the advocates of Materialism. It is true that it has 
often, perhaps most generally, been associated with infidel 
opinions, and that in the hands of D’Holbach, Comte, and 
Atkinson, it has been applied in support of Atheism; but it is 
equally true, that in the hands of Dr. Priestley and Dr. Good, 
it is combined with the professed, and, as we believe, the 
sincere recognition of a personal God and of a future state. In 
point of fact, then, all Materialists have not been Atheists ; and 
even were we convinced that Materialists professing religion 
were illogical or inconsequent reasoners, we should not be 
justified in ascribing to them those consequences of their system 
which they explicitly disclaim and disavow. Still it is com- 
petent, and it may be highly useful, to entertain the question, 
What are the grounds on which the theory of Materialism 
rests? And whether, if these grounds be valid, they would 
not lead, in strict logic, to conclusions at variance with some 
of the most vital and fundamental articles of the Christian 
faith ? 

In attempting to discuss the merits of that theory, we propose 
to state, confirm, and illustrate a few propositions which are 
sufficient, in our opinion, to show that the grounds on which it 
rests, and the reasons to which it appeals, are not such as to 
warrant or justify any prejudice against the articles of Natural 
or Revealed Religion. 


PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM. 207 


SECTION Il. 
— PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM. 


I. Our first proposition is, that the recent progress of 
Natural Science, great and rapid as it has been, has not 
materially altered “the state of the question” respecting the 
distinction between Mind and Matter, however much it may 
have extended our knowledge respecting the properties of both, 
and of the relation subsisting between the two. — 

We place this proposition on the foreground, because we 
have reason to believe that a very different impression prevails 
in certain quarters, associated in some cases with the hope, in 
others with the apprehension, that the advances which have 
been made in physical science may ultimately lead to the 
obliteration of the old distinction between Mind and Matter. 
This impression has been deepened by every successive 
addition to the doctrines of Physiology ; and especially by the 
recent speculations on Phrenology, Animal Magnetism, and 
Clairvoyance. Now, we think that these speculations, even if 
they were admitted into the rank of true sciences, would not 
materially alter the “state of the question ” respecting the dis- 
tinction between Mind and Matter, as that question was 
discussed in former times. 

Take the case of Phrenology. It had always been admitted 
that the mind has certain external organs, through which it 
receives various impressions from without, and holds com- 
munication with the sensible universe. The existence and use 
of these organs were held to be perfectly compatible with the 
doctrine that the soul itself is immaterial. Phrenology appears, 
and professes to have discovered certain other organs, certain 
cerebral developments, which stand connected with the various 


208 MODERN ATHEISM. 


functions of thought and feeling; in other words, to the Sivé 
senses which are universally recognized, it adds thirty or Sorty 
organs in the brain, not hitherto known to exist. But how 
does this discovery, even supposing it to be fully established, 
affect the state of the question respecting the radical distinction 
betwixt Mind and Matter? A material organization, in the case 
of man, was always admitted; and the only difference which 
that discovery could be supposed to make, must arise from the 
addition of certain organs to those which were previously estab- 
lished. But why should the spirituality of the soul be more 
affected by the one set of organs than it was by the other? 
The ablest advocates of Phrenology have repudiated Material- 
ism. Dr. Spurzheim expressly disclaims it. “I incessantly 
repeat,” says he, “that the aim of Phrenology is never to 
attempt pointing out what the mind is in itself. Ido not say 
that the organization produces the affective and intellectual 
faculties of man’s mind, as a tree brings forth fruit or an 
animal procreates its kind; I only say that organic conditions 
are necessary to every manifestation of mind.” — “If the mani- 
festation of the faculties of the mind depend on organization, 
Materialism, it is said, will be established. .... When our 
antagonists, however, maintain that we are Materialists, they 
ought to show where we teach that there is nothing but matter. 
The entire falsehood of the accusation is made obvious by a 
review of the following considerations. The expression ‘organ’ 
designates an instrument by means of which some faculty pro- 
claims itself, The muscles, for example, are the organs of 
voluntary motion, but they are not the moving power; the 
eyes are the organ of sight, but they are not the faculty of 
seeing. We separate the faculties of the soul, or of the mind, 
from the organs ; and consider the cerebral parts as the instru- 
ments by means of which they manifest themselves. Now, 
even the adversaries of Phrenology must, to a certain extent, 
admit the dependence of the soul on the body... .. We are, 


PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM. 209 


therefore, no more Materialists than our predecessors, whether 
anatomists, physiologists, or physicians, or the great number 
of philosophers and moralists, who have admitted the depen- 
dence of the soul on the body. For the Materialism is essen- 
tially the same, whether the faculties of the mind be said to 
depend on the whole body, on the whole brain, or individual 
powers on particular parts of the brain; the faculties still 
depend on organization for their exhibition.”! We conclude, 
therefore, that Phrenology, even supposing it to be fully estab- 
lished, could not materially affect the state,of the question 
respecting the radical distinction between Mind and Matter. 
Similar remarks apply to the case of Mesmerism or Animal 
Magnetism. It had always been known and admitted that the 
soul is liable, by reason of its connection with the body in the 
present state, to be affected by certain influences, —from light, 
from heat, from electricity, from the atmosphere, and from other 
sources. Mesmerism appears, and professes to have discov- 
ered another influence by which the nervous system is pecu- 
liarly affected; in other words, it merely adds a new influence 
to the number of those which were universally acknowledged 
before, it matters little whether it be the Magnetism of Mes- 
mer, or the Odyle of Reichenbach, or the Dia-magnetism of 
Faraday. But how could this discovery, even supposing it to 
be fully established, affect the state of the question respecting 
the radical distinction between Mind and Matter? If we were 
Immaterialists before, while we acknowledged the influence of 
the atmosphere, of light, of heat, and of electricity, may we 
not be Immaterialists still, notwithstanding the addition of Odyle 
to the class of dynamides? May we not admit the stranger, 
with the strange name, if suitably attested, without the slight- 
est apprehension of thereby weakening the grounds on which 


1 Dr. SpurRzHEIM, “ Philosophical Principles of Phrenology,” pp. VI., 
86, 100. Proressor Dop, “ Princeton Theological Essays,” 11. 376. 


18* : 


210 MODERN ATHEISM. 


we hold Mind to be essentially different from Matter, and in- 
capable of being identified with it? It were a foolish and dan- 
gerous expedient, and one to which no enlightened advocate of 
Immiaterialism will have recourse, to denounce the professed 
discoveries either of Phrenology or of Mesmerism, on the 
ground of their supposed tendency to obliterate the distinction 
between Mind and Matter. For the fact, that certain “organs” 
exist, by means of which the mind acquires a large portion of 
its knowledge, and that certain “influences” are known to affect 
it from without, is too well established to be called in question ; 
and the mere extension of that fact by the discovery of other 
organs and other influences, hitherto unknown, could have no 
tendency to shut us up, more than before, to the adoption of 
the theory of Materialism. It is the part of wisdom, then, to 
leave ample scope and verge for the progress of Physiological 
research in this as in every other department, and to rest in 
the confident persuasion that whatever discoveries may yet be 
made in regard to the connection between mind and body, they 
can have no effect in disproving a radical distinction between 
the two. And this we deem a much safer ground than that 
which Professor Gregory has adopted, when he first of all 
denies the possibility of defining either matter or spirit, and 
then leaves the existence of “a thinking principle or soul dis- 
tinct from the body” to rest merely on “our instinctive con- 
sciousness.” We think it, in every point of view, a safer 
course to meet all objections by saying, that the admission of 
the odylic or any other influence of a similar kind, would not 
in the least affect the grounds of our belief in the existence of 
an immaterial mind. 

We are disposed to pursue the same line of argument a step 
further, and to apply it to the case of “ Hypnotism” or “Clair- 
voyance.” It had always been known that the mind, in its 


1 Dr. Grecory, “Letters on Animal Magnetism,” p. 57. 


€ 


PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM. 211 


present state of connection with the body, is liable to be affected 
by sleep and by dreams ; and the phenomena of natural sleep 
and of ordinary dreams were never supposed to be incompati- 
ble with the distinction between mind and body. But the Hyp- 
notist or the Clairvoyant appears, and announces a state of 
magnetic sleep, with a new set of phenomena dependent on it, 
resembling the dreams and visions of the night. The facts are 
strange and startling; but, after recovering from our first sur- 
prise, we may calmly ask, what effect these facts, if established, 
should have in modifying our convictions respecting the essen- 
tial nature of mind and matter; and we shall find that they 
afford no sufficient reason for relinquishing the doctrine of an 
“immaterial spirit,’ but that, on the contrary, these very facts, 
were they sufficiently verified, would open up a new view of 
the powers and activities of “ spirit,” such as might well fill us 
with wonder and awe. “I have heard, times innumerable,” 
says Professor Gregory, “religious persons declare, on seeing 
these phenomena, that nothing could more clearly demonstrate 
the immateriality, and consequently the immortality of the 
soul. ‘In clairvoyance, say these persons, ‘we observe the 
mind acting separate from the body, and entirely independent 
of it. How beautiful a proof of the infinite difference between 
spirit and matter’” It is a proof that we would be slow to 
adduce, for the facts are doubtful as well as obscure; but, for 
our present purpose, it is not necessary either to admit or to 
deny the truth of these facts; it is sufficient to say that the 
phenomena of Mesmeric sleep and the visions of Clairvoyance 
are not more inconsistent with the doctrine of an immaterial 
soul than the more familiar, but scarcely less mysterious, phe- 
nomena of natural sleep and common dreams. It is, indeed, 
not a little remarkable that the profound and sagacious Butler 
expressed himself in the following terms, long before the phe- 
nomena of Magnetism and Clairvoyance were spoken of as 
subjects of scientific study: “That we have no reason to think 


212 MODERN ATHEISM. 


our organs of sense percipients . .. . is confirmed by the 
experience of dreams, by which we find we are at present pos- 
sessed of a latent, and what would otherwise be an unimagined, 
unknown power of perceiving sensible objects, in as strong and 
lively a manner, without our external organs of sense as with 
them.” + 

On the whole, we think it clear that neither by Phrenology, 
which adds merely to the number of our material “ organs,” 
nor by Mesmerism, which adds one to the number of the “in- 
fluences” by which we are affected, nor by Clairvoyance, 
which adds the phenomena of magnetic to those of natural 
sleep, is the state of the question materially altered from what 
it was before these additions were made to Physiological specu- 
lation. And hence those who are well versed in our older 
writers on the doctrine of “spirit” and “ matter,” will be suf- 
ficiently furnished with weapons for repelling the more recent 
assaults of Materialism. If any one has read and digested 
the Treatises of Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his replies to Dodwell, 
Collins, and Leibnitz; the “Free Discussion” between Dr. 
Priestley and Dr. Price; the “Examen du Materialisme ” by 
Bergier, in reply to the “Systéme de la Nature;” and the 
writings of Andrew Baxter, Drew, Ditton, and others, on the 
same subject, he will find little difficulty in grappling with the 
arguments of Comte, Atkinson, and Martineau. He will see 
at once that the main, the fundamental question, is not materi- 
ally atfected by the advances which have been made in Physio- 
logical discovery. These discoveries may have extended our 
knowledge respecting the relations which subsist between the 
“mind” and the “ body ;” they have in no degree served to 
obliterate the distinction betwixt the two. 

In perfect consistency, however, with this conviction, we may 
frankly avow our opinion, that some of the older opponents of 


1 Bisuop BurxeErR, “ Analogy,” p. 1. ¢. 1, p. 170. 


PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM. 213 


Materialism adopted a method of stating their argument which 
appears to us to be liable to just exception, and which the 
progress of Physical, and especially of Chemical science, has 
tended greatly to discredit. They seem to have been appre- 
hensive that by ascribing any peculiar properties or active 
powers to matter, they might incur the hazard of weakening 
the grounds on which they contended for the spirituality of 
man and the supremacy of God. Thus, in the “Inquiry into 
the Nature of the Human Soul,” by Andrew Baxter, the exist- 
ence of any active property or power in matter is explicitly 
denied, and the only property which is ascribed to it is a cer- 
tain passive power, or “vis inertiz,” by which it is incapable 
of changing its state, whether of rest or of motion. This “ vis 
inertix ” is not only supposed to be the sole property of matter, 
but is even held to be inconsistent with, and exclusive of, any 
active power whatever; and all the effects which are usually 
said to be produced by it are ascribed to the power of an im- 
material Being. We are told that “vis inertia,” or “a resist- 
ance to any change of its present state, is essential to matter, 
and inconsistent with any active power in it;” that “all grav- 
ity, attraction, elasticity, repulsion, or whatever other tenden- 
cies to motion are observed in matter (commonly called natural 
powers of matter), are not powers implanted in matter or pos- 
sible to be made inherent in it, but impulse or force impressed 
upon it ab extra;” and that “the cause of its motion must be 
sought for in something not matter, in some immaterial cause or 
being.” —* Gravity,” for instance, “is not the action of matter 
upon matter, but the virtue or power of an immaterial cause 
or being, constantly impressed upon it.” Nor has this doctrine 
been confined to such metaphysical reasoners as Andrew Bax- 
ter. Professor Playfair tells us, that when he was introduced 
to Dr. Horsley, the Bishop “expressed great respect for Lord 
Monboddo, for his learning and his acuteness, and (what was 
more surprising) for the soundness of his judgment. He 


214 MODERN ATHEISM. 


talked very seriously of the notion of mind being united to all 
the parts of matter and being the cause of motion. So far as I 
could gather, Dr. Horsley supposes that every atom of matter 
has a soul, which is the cause‘of its motion, its gravitation, &e. 
What has made him adopt this strange unphilosophical notion 
I cannot tell, unless it be the fear that his study of natural 
philosophy should make him suspected of Atheism, or at least 
of Materialism. or it is certain that there is at present a 
prejudice among the English clergy that natural philosophy 
has a tendency to make men Atheists or Materialists. This 
absurd prejudice was first introduced, I think, by that illiberal, 
though learned, prelate, Dr. Warburton.”! A similar opinion 
has been recently reproduced by Dr. Burnett in his “ Philos- 
ophy of Spirits in relation to Matter,” in which he attempts to 
show that the forces and laws of Nature cannot be proved to 
be the result of anything inherent in matter alone, and that they 
ought to be ascribed to some substantive and distinct, but 
immaterial and dependent spirits, called “the spirit of life,” 
“the spirit of electricity,” “the spirit of heat.? 

All these statements are only so many modifications of the 
same theory, and they agree in denying the existence of any 
active powers in matter, while they ascribe the phenomena of 
motion, life, and thought to an immaterial principle. There is, 
as it seems to us, a mixture of truth and error in this theory. 
It affirms a great truth, in so far as it declares the impossibility 
of accounting for the phenomena of motion, life, and thought, 
without ascribing them ultimately to a spiritual, intelligent, and 
voluntary cause; but it adopts a dangerous, and, as we con- 
ceive, a perfectly gratuitous assumption, when it denies that 
matter is capable of possessing any other properties or powers 
than those of extension, solidity, and “vis inertix.” We know 


1 Dr. Jonny Prayrarr, “ Works,” 1., Preface, xxix. 
2C. M. Burnett, M. D., “ Philosophy,” &c. London, 1850. 


PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM. 215 


little of the nature of those fluids, forces, or powers, which have 
been denominated “ dynamides” or “ imponderables ;” but, un- 
questionably, they possess properties and produce phenomena 
very different from any that can be reasonably ascribed to 
mere “vis inertiz.” Nor is their possession of these properties 
incompatible with that law, when it is correctly understood. 
For what is the real import of the law of: “vis inertie?” It 
amounts simply to this, as stated by Baxter himself, “that a 
resistance to any change of its present state, — whether of mo- 
tion or rest, — is essential to ‘matter, ” he adds, indeed, “ and 
inconsistent with any active power in it;” but this is an assump- 
tion which is true only in a sense that would make it inconclu- 
sive with reference to the point at issue. It is true, if it means 
merely that matter is destitute of spontaneity and self-motion, 
such as belongs to living, voluntary agents ; but it is not true, if 
it means that matter is destitute of all inherent properties and 
powers. Indeed, the “vis inertia” which is ascribed to matter 
is itself a power, and a very formidable one; it is described by 
Baxter himself as “a kind of positive or stubborn inactivity,” 
as “something receding further from action than bare inac- 
tivity,” for “matter ts so powerfully inactive a thing!” Now, 
if such a power as this may be ascribed to matter, why may it 
not be admitted with equal safety that God has bestowed on it 
certain other properties and powers, not inconsistent with this, 
but additional to it; and that He has established such relations 
and affinities between different substances as that they may act 
and react— mechanically or chemically—on one another? 
The phenomena of chemical affinity, the motions, and other 
changes, produced by the contact, or even the juxtaposition, of 
certain substances, and the variety of the resulting products, do 
certainly evince the operation of other powers besides that of 
“vis inertiz ;” and we cannot see why these powers should be 
ascribed to “immaterial spirits,” any more than that of “vis 
inertiz ” itself, or why it would be a whit more dangerous to 


216 MODERN ATHEISM. 


ascribe them to matter than to created spirits. All that is 
required, as it appears to us, to establish the dependence of the 
creature on the Creator and to vindicate the truth of Christian 
Theism, is to maintain these two positions: first, that what- 
ever properties or powers belong either to “matter” or to 
“mind,” were originally conferred on them, respectively, at the 
time of their creation by the will of God; and, secondly, that 
by the same will, these properties and powers are continually 
sustained, governed, and controlled. These two positions are 
held by all enlightened Theists, and are abundantly sufficient, 
if proved, to vindicate their doctrine against every assault; but 
we think it unwarrantable and dangerous to go further, and to 
ascribe, on the strength of mere gratuitous assumptions, all the 
activity, motion, and change which occur in the universe to 
created spirits or immaterial causes. These assumptions are 
extremely different from the common-sense notions of men, and 
they are utterly unnecessary for the support of any doctrine 
which we are concerned to defend. 

On the whole, we venture to conclude that the radical dis- 
tinction between Mind and Matter has not been materially 
affected by the recent progress of Physiological research, and 
that the old arguments against Materialism are still available, 
except in so far as they were founded on a too limited view of 
the properties of matter, which the advancing Science of 
Chemistry has done so much to unfold and to illustrate. 

If. Our second proposition may be thus stated: That were 
we reduced to the necessity of embracing any form of the 
theory of “unisubstancisme,” there could not be less, —- there 
might even be greater, — reason for spiritualizing matter, than 
for materializing mind. 

On the supposition that one or other of the two must be dis- 
pensed with, the question still remains, which of them can be 
most easily spared? or, which of them can be most conclusively 
proved? Mankind have generally thought that they had 


PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM. Si7 


equally good evidence for the existence of both; that in the 
direct and irresistible evidence of Consciousness, they had 
proof sufficient of a thinking, voluntary, and active spirit, and 
in the less direct, but not less irresistible, evidence of Percep- 
tion, proof sufficient of the existence of a material world. But 
each of these convictions has been in its turn assailed by the 
cavils of skepticism; and men have been asked to prove by 
reasoning what needed, and, indeed, admitted of no such proof, 
_—the existence of Matter as distinct from Mind, and the exis- 
tence of Mind as distinct from Matter. The latter is denied 
by Materialists, the former is equally denied by Idealists; and 
what we affirm is, that each of these opposite theories is one- 
sided and partial, and that, on the supposition of our being 
reduced to the necessity of adopting the idea of “ unisubstan- 
cisme,” we should still have greater reason to reduce all to the 
category of “spirit,” than to reduce all to the category of 
“matter.” Many seem to think that it 1s more easy, or, per- 
haps, that it is less necessary, to prove the distinct existence 
of matter, than to prove the distinct existence of mind. They 
are so familiar with matter, and so continually surrounded by 
it, that they cannot conceive of its non-existence as possible, 
and scarcely think it necessary to inquire after any evidence in 
the case. But can it be justly said that they are more familiar 
with matter and its movements than they are with a living 
spirit within them, which feels, and thinks, and wills, and by 
means of which alone the phenomena of external nature itself 
can become known to them? If they receive the testimony of 
Perception as a sufficient proof of the existence of Matter, why 
should they not also receive the still more direct and immediate 
testimony of Consciousness as a sufficient proof of the existence 
of Mind? Or, if they refuse the latter, and admit the former, 
are they quite sure that,on their own partial principles, they 
could offer any conclusive answer to the “ Idealism ” of Berke- 
ley? That ingenious and amiable prelate will tell them that 
19 


218 MODERN ATHEISM. 


“the objects of sense cannot exist otherwise than cn a mind 
perceiving them ;” that “their esse is percip?, nor is it possible 
that they should have any existence out of the minds, or think- 
ing things, which perceive them ;” and that “all the choir of 
heaven and the furniture of the earth,—in a word, all those 
bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not 
any subsistence without a mind.”’! Nay, others who are not 
Idealists, but who believe equally in the existence of “mind” 
and “matter,” will tell them that Berkeley’s arguments are 
conclusive, at least to the extent of showing that the existence 
of “matter,” as a thing external to us, cannot be proved without 
presupposing the existence of “mind.” “For wha »” says 
Lord Brougham, “is this matter? Whence do we derive any 
knowledge of it? How do we assure ourselves of its exis- 
tence? What evidence have we at all respecting either its 
being or its qualities? We feel, or taste, or smell something ; 
that is, we have certain sensations, which make us conclude 
that something exists beyond ourselves.” . . . . “But what are 
our sensations? The feelings or thoughts of our own minds. 
Then what we do is this: from certain ideas in our minds, pro- 
duced no doubt by, and connected with, our bodily senses, but 
independent of and separate from them, we draw certain con- 
clusions by reasoning; and these conclusions are in favor of 
the existence of something other than our sensations and our 
reasonings, and other than that which experiences the sensa- 
tions and makes the reasonings, passive in the one case, active 
in the other. That something is what we call—Mind. But 
plainly, whatever it is, we owe to it the knowledge that matter 
exists; for that knowledge is gained by means of a sensation 
or feeling, followed by a process of reasoning; it is gained by 
the mind having first suffered something, and then done some- 
thing. Therefore, to say there ¢s no such thing as matter would 


1 BisHop BERKELEY, “ Works,” 1. 89. 


PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM. 219 


be a much less absurd inference than to say there is no such 
thing as mind.” .... “ The truth is, that we believe in the 
existence of ‘matter’ because we cannot help it. The infer- 
ences of our reason from our sensations impel us to this con- 
clusion, and the steps are few and short by which we reach it. 
But the steps are fewer, and shorter, and of the self-same 
nature, which lead us to believe in the existence of Mind, for 
of that we have the evidence within ourselves.” * 

Tt follows that were we reduced, as we are not, to the neces- 
sity of adopting the theory of “ unisubstancisme,” we might 
with at least as good reason dispense with the existence of 
“matter” as with the existence of “mind;” for, in the words 
of Dugald Stewart, “it would no more be proper to say of 
‘mind’ that it is material, than to say of ‘body’ that it is 
spiritual.” * 

TI. Our ¢hird proposition is, That we are not reduced to 
the necessity of adopting any theory of “ unisubstancisme,” 
since there is nothing inconceivable or self-contradictory in the 
supposition of two distinct substantive beings, possessing diverse 
properties, such as “mind” and “ body,” or “ spirit” and “ mat- 
ter,” are usually held to be. 

Let any one endeavor to assign a reason for the sole, exclu- 
sive existence either of “matter” or of “spirit,” or a distinct, 
specific ground for the opinion that they are necessarily incom- 
patible with each other, and he will be compelled to own that 
the theory of “unisubstancisme,” however plausible by reason 
of its apparent simplicity, is really nothing more than a gra- 
tuitous assumption. It cannot be admitted with reference even 
to nature and man without confounding the simplest elements 
of human knowledge; and with reference to God and the wni- 
verse, it is attended with still more fatal consequences, since it 


1 Lorp BrovaHam, “ Discourse of Natural Theology,” p. 238. 
2 Stewart, “ Elements of Philosophy,” 1.5, 


220 MODERN ATHEISM. 
a 


must lead, if consistently followed out, to undisguised Panthe- 
ism. Why should it be supposed that there is, or can only be, 
one substance in Nature? one substance invested with all those 
properties and powers which exist, in such manifold diversity, 
in the organic and inorganic kingdoms? The wonder might 
rather seem to be that any two substances should be capable 
of accounting for such a variety of phenomena as the universe 
exhibits. A “dualism” is unavoidable, unless we are to mate- 
rialize God as well as man; and why may there not be a 
“dualism” in the case of created mind and matter, as there 
must be, on any supposition except that of Pantheism, in the 
case of the uncreated mind and the material universe? We 
see variety and gradation in all the works of God; we see 
thousands of substances, simple and compound, possessing 
various properties, even in the inorganic world; we sce differ- 
ent forms of life, vegetable and animal, ascending by steps of 
regular gradation, from the lowest to the highest; we see, in 
the animal kingdom, various propensities, instincts, and powers, 
which constitute the characteristics of distinct species; at length 
we rise to Man, with his rational, responsible, and immortal 
nature. Why may not Man be the nexus between a world 
of “matter” and a world of “spirits,” Man, who is equally 
connected with the material world by his body, and with the 
spiritual by his soul,— who is, as it were, “mind incarnate,” 
spirit in flesh? And why may there not be higher spirits still, 
whether embodied in subtler and more refined vehicles, or ex- 
isting apart from all material forms, in those other worlds which 
Astronomy has brought to light? No reason can be assigned 
for a negative answer to these and similar queries, unless it be 
that we cannot conceive of pure spirit without bodily form ; 
and this may be true, if it be meant merely to affirm that we 
can find no sensible image for it, nothing by which it can be 
represented to our sight, or pictured in our imagination, as visi- 
ble things may be; but it is not true, if it be meant to imply 


PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM. 921 


that we have no distinct notion of “mind” or “ spirit,” for it is 
as clearly known by its properties, of thought, feeling, volition, 
and consciousness, as matter itself can be; and who will ven- 
ture to define, or to depict, or to form any image of the sub- 
stance of matter, apart from the properties which belong to it? 

We are under no necessity, then, of adopting the theory of 
“unisubstancisme,” and we cannot found upon it in argument 
without building on a mere gratuitous assumption. 

IV. Our fourth proposition is, That the same reason which 
warrants us in ascribing certain properties and phenomena to 
a distinct substance called “matter,” equally warrants us in 
_ ascribing certain other properties and phenomena to a distinct 
substance called “mind;” and that the difference between 
their respective properties and phenomena is so great as to 
justify the belief that the substances are different and ought to 
be denominated by distinctive names. 

When Materialists affirm, as they do, the existence of one 
only substantive being in Nature, and represent all our mental 
phenomena as the mere results of physical organization, they 
assume that “matter,” at least, is a real entity; that it is a sud- 
stance or substratum in which certain powers or qualities inhere; 
and that its existence, as such, is evident and undeniable. We 
are entirely relieved, therefore, by their own admission or 
assumption, from the necessity of discussing the more general 
problem of Ontology; the problem, whether we can prove the 
existence of any being, properly so called, from a mere series 
of phenomena, a succession of appearances. They virtually 
admit, since they evidently assume, that the phenomena must 
have a substance under them, the qualities a substratum in 
which they inhere. Now, the very same reason which war- 
rants, or rather obliges them to recognize “matter” as a sub- 
stance and not as a shadow, —as an entity which really exists 
and manifests itself by its properties and effects, —must equally 
warrant, or rather oblige them to recognize “mind” or “spirit” 

i9* 


222 MODERN ATHEISM. 


also as a distinct substantive being, unless it can be shown either 
that its properties are the same with those of matter, or that 
they may be accounted for by some peculiar modification of 
matter, some law of physical organization There can be no 
reason for admitting the existence of “matter” as a substance, 
which does not apply also to the existence of “mind” as a 
distinct substance, if it shall be found that their properties are 
essentially different. We know, and can know, nothing of swb- 
stance otherwise than by its properties or powers: we know 
nothing of “matter,” — it would, in fact, be to-us non-existent, 
but for its extension, solidity, and other properties; we know 
nothing of “mind,” —it would equally be to us non-existent, 
but for its consciousness, its thoughts, feelings, and desires ; 
and if it be right to ascribe the one set of properties to a sub- 
stantive being, called “matter,” it cannot be wrong to ascribe 
the other set of properties also to a substantive being, called 
“ mind.” 

If it could be shown, indeed, that the properties of the one 
substance might either be identified with, or accounted for, by 
those of the other; if animal feeling could be identified with 
or derived from, mere physical impulse ; if intellectual thought 
could be reduced to material motion; if desire and aversion, 
hope and fear could be explained by the natural laws of attrac- 
tion and repulsion, then we might blend the two substances 
into one, and speak of “mind” as a mere modification of 
“matter.” But as long as the properties or powers by which 
alone any substance can be known are seen to be generically 
different, we cannot confound the substances themselves, or 
reduce them to one category, without violating the plainest 
rules of philosophical inquiry. 

And yet to these rules Dr. Priestley refers, as if they war- 
ranted the conclusions at which he had arrived. He desires 
his readers “to recur to the universally received rules of phi- 
losophizing, such as are laid down by Sir Isaac Newton at the 


PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM. 223 


beginning of his third book of “ Principia.” “The first of 
these rules, as laid down by him, is that we are to admit no 
more causes than are sufficient to explain appearances ; and the 
second is, that to the same effect we must, as far as possible, 
assign the same cause.” We cheerfully accept these canons of 
philosophical inquiry ; and it is just because no one substance 
is sufficient, in our estimation, to account for all the appear- 
ances, that we equally reject the “spiritualism” of Berkeley, 
who would resolve all phenomena into “mind,” and the “ mate- 
rialism” of Priestley, who would resolve all phenomena into 
“matter.” Matter and Mind may, indeed, be said to resemble 
each other in some respects, —in their being equally existent, 
equally created, and equally dependent; but their essential 
properties are generically different, for there is no identity, but 
a manifest and undeniable diversity, between thought, feeling, 
desire, volition, and conscience, and the various qualities or 
powers belonging to matter, such as extension, solidity, and vis 
inerti@, or even the powers of attraction and repulsion. On 
the ground of this manifest difference between the properties 
by which alone any substance makes itself known, we hold 
ourselves warranted to affirm that the “mind” is immaterial, 
and to ascribe mental phenomena to a distinct substantive being, 
not less than the material phenomena of Nature. 

Some ingenious thinkers, on both sides of the question, have 
not been fully satisfied with this method of stating the grounds 
of our opinion. It has been said by our opponents, that if we 
found merely on the acknowledged difference between two sets 
of properties or phenomena, while we admit that the substance 
or substratum is in itself entirely unknown to us, or known 

only through the medium of the properties to which we refer, 
'—then the dispute becomes a purely verbal one, and can 
amount to nothing more than this, whether a substance of 
whose essence we are entirely ignorant should be called by the 
name of “matter” or by the name of “spirit.” But the dispute 


224 MODERN ATHEISM. 


is not a purely verbal one, even on the suppositions which 
have been stated. For it is essential to a right “ philosophy 
of nature,” that every substance possessing peculiar properties 
should have a distinctive name. Thus, even in the material 
world itself, we distinguish sulphur from soda, gold from 
granite, and magnesia from electricity or odyle. Why? Be- 
cause, while they have some properties in common, in virtue 
of which we rank them in the same category as “material 
substances,” they have, severally, certain distinctive or peculiar 
characteristics, which forbid us to call the one by the same 
name as the other. And for precisely the same reason, when 
we find another class of properties and powers existing in 
certain beings, which are totally different from those belonging 
to mere material substances,— incapable not only of being 
identified with them, but also of being accounted for by means 
of them, — we are equally warranted in ascribing these prop- 
erties to a substance, and in affirming that this substance, of 
which we know nothing except through its properties, is radi- 
cally different from “ matter.” That there is something more 
than a mere verbal difference between us and our opponents 
might seem to be admitted by themselves, when they evince so 
much zeal in assailing our position and defending their own; 
-but it becomes strikingly apparent as soon as we extend our 
inquiry so as to embrace the grand question respecting the dis- 
tinction, if any, between God and the material universe. 

Some, again, who are substantially, at least in all important 
respects, on our side of the question, have not been satisfied 
with showing that the two sets of properties are generically 
different, and that the same reason exists for ascribing the one 
to a distinct substantive being called “mind,” as for ascribing 
the other to a substantive being called “matter.” They have 
been anxious to advance a step further; and to show that the 
two sets of properties are mutually exclusive, and that they 
could not possibly coexist in the same subject. This is the 


PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM. oo 


declared object of Baxter’s Work on the Soul, which professes 
to prove that the only power belonging to “matter,” namely, 
its vis ¢nerti@, or resistance to any change in its present state, 
is inconsistent with its possession of any active power. It is 
not held sufficient to show that the properties are generically 
different, and that the substances in which these properties 
inhere may and should be designated by distinct names, as 
matter and spirit, soul and body; but it must be further proved 
that they are so heterogeneous and inconsistent as to be mutu- 
ally exclusive, and incapable of coexisting in the same sub- 
stance. To a certain extent, we think this mode of reasoning 
may be admitted. We do not conceive that “vis inertia” is 
the only property belonging to matter, or that it is necessarily 
exclusive of attraction and repulsion, and the other powers 
which may belong to its specific varieties; but we do con- 
ceive that the “vis inertie” of mere matter is utterly incon- 
sistent with the self-activity, the self-moving power, which 
belongs to “mind:” and we are confirmed in this conviction 
by the anxiety which our opponents have evinced to explain 
the phenomena of mind by purely mechanical laws, and to 
establish a system, not of moral, but of material necessity, in 
opposition to the doctrine of man’s spontaneity and freedom. 
We are further of opinion, that extension cannot be predicated 
of “mind,” without also being predicated- of “thought ;” and 
that to ascribe it to either would lead to ridiculous absurdities, 
such as have been noted, and perhaps caricatured, by Dr. 
Thomas Brown. We think, too, that the unity and continuity 
of consciousness, with the intimate sense of personal identity, 
that belongs to all rational and responsible beings, are utterly 
irreconcilable with the continual flux and mutation that are 
incident to matter, and that they cannot be accounted for with- 
out the supposition of a distinct substance, existing the same 
throughout all the changes that occur in the material receptacle 
in which it dwells. To this extent we think that the argument 


226 MODERN ATHEISM. 


is alike legitimate and valid; but when it goes beyond this, 
and attempts either to divest matter of all active properties, or 
_ to demonstrate that, in the very nature of things, sensation and 
thought could not possibly be annexed to a material substance, 
we think that it advances beyond the real exigencies of the 
case, and that it undertakes a task which is somewhat too ardu- 
ous for our present powers,—a task which many of the ablest 
advocates of Immaterialism would humbly, but firmly, decline. 

In this connection, it may be useful to remark that it is only 
with reference to this advanced and more arduous part of the 
general argument, that such writers as Locke and Bonnet, 
whose authority is often pleaded in opposition to our views, 
ever felt the slightest difficulty. They were both “Imma- 
terialists,” because they both discerned the radical difference 
between mental and material phenomena, and because they 
both admitted the reasonableness of ascribing them, respec- 
tively, to a distinct substance. But they were not convinced 
by the more metaphysical arguments of those who professed to 
show that none of the phenomena of “ mind” could possibly be 
exhibited by matter, or, at least, they declined to take that 
ground. That Locke was an Immaterialist is evident from 
many passages in his writings. “By putting together,’ he 
says, “the ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty and power of 
moving themselves and other things, we have as clear a per- 
ception and notion of immaterial substances as we have of 
material. For putting together the ideas of thinking and 
willing, &c., joined to substance, of which we have no distinct 
idea, we have the idea of an immaterial spirit ; and by putting 
together the ideas of coherent solid parts and a power of being - 
moved, joined with substance, of which likewise we have no 
positive idea, we have the idea of matter: the one is as clear 
and distinct an idea as the other.”? But notwithstanding this 


1 Locky’s “ Essay,” b. 11. c. 23, § 15. Ibid., b. rv. ¢. 8, § 6. 


PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM. 7 


explicit statement, he demurred to the doctrine of those who 
maintained that the power of thinking could not possibly be 
superadded to matter, and this because he deemed it presump- 
tuous to set limits to the Divine omnipotence, or to pronounce 
any judgment on a question of that kind. “We have the 
ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able 
to know whether any mere material being thinks or no; it 
being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, 
without Revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not 
given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to 
perceive and think. .... I see no contradiction in it that the 
first eternal thinking Being should, if He pleased, give to 
certain systems of created senseless matter, put together as He 
sees fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought.” * 

In these and similar passages, Locke did not mean, we 
think, to retract or modify the doctrine which he had taught 
respecting the radical distinction betwixt mind and matter ; 
he intended merely to intimate that, in adopting that doctrine, 
he proceeded on grounds different from those which had been 
assumed by some other writers ; that his belief rested mainly 
on the essential difference between the properties belonging to 
the two substances, and not on the mere metaphysical argu- 
ments by which some had attempted to prove that God him- 
self could not impart to matter the power of thinking. He 
shrunk from pronouncing a positive decision on dhs one point 5 
and yet his words have ever since been quoted with triumph 
by the advocates of Materialism as affording a virtual sanction 
to the possibility at least of that for which they contend. And 
on the same account, Locke has been severely blamed by some 
modern “ spiritualists.” Mr. Carlyle, speaking of “ Hartley’s 
and Darwin’s, and all the possible forms of Materialism, — the 
grand Idolatry, as we may rightly call it, by which at all times 


1 Locks, “ Letter to Bishop of Worcester,” Works, Iv. 31. 


228 MODERN ATHEISM. 


the true worship, that of the invisible, has been polluted and 
withstood” 
himself a clear, humble-minded, patient, reverent, nay religious 
man, had paved the way for banishing religion from the world. 
Mind, by being modelled in men’s imaginations into a Shape, 
a Visibility, and reasoned of as if it had been some composite, 
divisible, and reunitable substance, some finer chemical salt, or 
curious piece of logical joinery, began to lose its immaterial, 


adds the following characteristic remarks: “Locke, 


mysterious, divine, though invisible character: it was tacitly 
figured as something that might, were our organs fine enough, 
be seen. Yet who had ever seen it? who could ever see it? 
Thus, by degrees, it passed into a Doubt, a Relation, some 
faint Possibility, and, at last, into a highly probably Nonentity. 
Following Locke’s footsteps, the French had discovered that 
‘as the stomach secretes chyle, so does the brain secrete 
thought.’ ”? 
The sentiments of Bonnet of Geneva, as stated in his 
“ Palingenesie,” are substantially in accordance with those of 
Locke, and have met with similar treatment. He is not a 
Materialist ; he admits a real distinction, as well as a close 
union, between the soul and the body; he speaks even of the 
possible existence of disembodied souls or pure spirits ; he 
affirms the immateriality of the thinking principle; and ex- 
pressly assigns his reasons for not being a Materialist.2 But 
he appears to have thought, as Locke did, that possibly: the 
power of thinking might be superadded to matter, by the 
Creator’s omnipotent will, and that there is nothing in this 
supposition which could seriously affect either the doctrine of 
Theism or the “immortality ” of man. And hence he affirmed, 
in words which Dr. Priestley selected for the motto of his 
“ Disquisitions,” that “if any one should ever demonstrate the 


1 THOMAS CARLYLE, “ Essays,” 1.77, 214. 
2 C. Bonnet, “ Palingenesie Philosophique,” 4 vols., 1.7, 47, 52. 


PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM. 229 


soul to be material, far from being alarmed at this, we should 
only admire the power which could give to matter the power 
of thinking.” 

We conceive that the language both of Locke and Bonnet 
on this particular point amounts to a dangerous and very 
unnecessary concession. Were it meant merely to affirm that 
God could so unite a thinking spiritual being with a material 
organism, as to make the two mutually dependent and sub- 
servient, this is no more than is admitted by all the advocates 
of Immaterialism, and it is actually exhibited in the consti- 
tution of human nature. But if it were meant to admit that 
the power of “thinking” and “willing” might be superadded 
as a property or quality to matter itself, without any substan- 
tive being other than matter as a substratum, then we conceive 
it to be at variance with the grounds on which Locke and 
Bonnet themselves had previously declared their belief in the 
distinct existence both of matter and spirit. We shall only 
add, that the prejudice against our doctrine, which is founded 
on the union of two substances apparently so heterogeneous as 
mind and matter in the same person, is, to say the least, fully 
counterbalanced -by the difficulty, incident to the theory, of 
demonstrating the coexistence of two sets of properties, appar- 
ently so diverse and disparate as thought and extension, “ vis 
inertia ” and spontaneity, in the same substance. 

On the whole, we conclude that the same reason which war- 
rants us in ascribing certain properties or phenomena to a 
distinct substance called “matter,” equally warrants us in 
ascribing certain other properties or phenomena to a distinct 
substance called “mind;” and that the difference between 
their properties and phenomena is so great as to justify the 
belief that the substances are different, and ought to be denom- 
inated by distinctive names. 

V. Our fifth proposition is, That it is impossible to account 
for the phenomena of thought, feeling, desire, volition, and 

20 


230 MODERN ATHEISM. 


self-consciousness, by ascribing them, as Materialists do, either 
to the substance of “ matter,” or to its form; that is, either to 
the atomie particles of which it consists, or to the peculiar 
organization in which these particles are arranged. 

It is too manifest to admit either of doubt or denial, that the 
power of thinking, feeling, and willing, does not belong to every 
form of matter. It is not, therefore, one of its essential proper- 
ties; and if it belong to it at all, it must be either a quality 
superadded to the ordinary powers of matter, or a product 
resulting from its configuration in an organized form. 

If it be a quality superadded merely to the ordinary powers 
of matter, then it must exist equally in every part of the mass 
to which it is attached; every particle of the matter in which 
it inheres must be sentient, intelligent, voluntary, and active; 
and, on this supposition, it will remain a ditficult, if not des- 
perate problem, to account for the wnity of consciousness by 
such a diversity of parts, and especially for the continuity of 
consciousness, when the material elements are confessedly in a 
state of constant flux and mutation. It would seem, too, that 
if thought be thus connected with an extended, divisible, and 
mutable substance, it must be itself extended, and, of course, 
divisible; and, accordingly, Dr. Priestley does not hesitate to 
affirm that our 7deas, as well as our minds, possess these char- 
acters. “Whatever ideas,” he says, “are in themselves, they 
are evidently produced by external objects, and must therefore 
correspond to them; and since many of the objects or arche- 
types of ideas are divisible, it necessarily follows that the ideas 
themselves are divisible also.” ... . “If the archetypes of ideas 
have extension, the ideas which are expressive of them, and are 
actually produced by them according to certain mechanical 
laws, must have extension likewise ; and, therefore, the mind 
in which they exist, whether it be material or immaterial, 
must have extension also... .. I am, therefore, obliged to 
conclude that the sentient principle in man, containing ideas 


PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM. 231 


which certainly have parts, and are divisible, and consequently 
must have extension, cannot be that simple, indivisible, and 
immaterial substance that some have imagined it to be, but 
something that has real extension, and therefore may have the 


other properties of matter.” ? 


He argues that zdeas must be 
extended and divisible because their objects or archetypes are 
so; and, further, that the mdnd itself must be material, because 
these properties belong to the ideas which inhere in it as their 
subject or seat. Now, this argument is fairly met by the 
reasoning, or the ridicule, call it which you will, of Dr. Thomas 
Brown: “In saying of mind that it is matter, we must mean, 
if we mean anything, that the principle which thinks is hard 
and divisible ; and that it will be not more absurd to talk of the 
twentieth part of an affirmation, or the guarter of a hope, of the 
top of a remembrance, and the north and east corners of a 
comparison, than of the twentieth part of a pound, or of the 
different points of the compass, in reference to any part of the 
globe. The true answer to the statement of the Materialist, — 
the answer which we feel in our hearts, on the very expression 
of the plurality and divisibility of feeling, —is that it assumes 
what, far from admitting, we cannot even understand, and that, 
with every effort of attention which we can give to our mental 
analysis, we are as incapable of forming any conception of what | 
is meant by the quarter of a doubt, or the half of a belief, as 
of forming to ourselves an image of a circle without a central 
point, or of a square without a single angle.”? 

But the theory which supposes the soul to be extended and 
divisible, and its ideas, feelings, and volitions to be extended 
and divisible also, has given place to another, which does not 
represent the mental qualities as inhering in every particle of 
the matter with which they are associated, but rather as the 


1 Dr. Priester, “ Disquisitions,” pp. 37, 38. 
2Dr. Toomas Brown, “ Lectures,” No. XCVI. 


232 MODERN ATHEISM. 


products of organization, the results, not of the atomic elements, 
but of the form, or figure, into which they are cast. It seems 
to have been felt that it would be unsafe to ascribe the power 
of thinking to every particle of the brain, and it is now repre- 
sented as the result or product of “the brain in action, as light 
and heat are of fire, and fragrance of the flower.”! This idea 
is illustrated by a great variety of natural examples, in which 
certain effects are produced by the arrangement of matter, 
which could not be produced by its individual particles, exist- 
ing separate and apart, or combined in other forms. Nor is 
this a new phase of the theory, or an original discovery of the 
present age; it was familiarly known and fully discussed ? in 
the days of Clarke and Collins, and every similitude which is 
now employed to illustrate it may be found dissected in their 
writings. Collins had undertaken to prove that “an individual 
power may reside in a material system which consists of sepa- 
rate and distinct parts,” —“an individual power which is not in 
every one, nor in any one, of the particles that compose it, 
when taken apart and considered singly :” and he had adduced 
as an example the very similitude which Atkinson employs, 
namely, “fragrance from the flower ;” for he adds, “a rose, for 
example, consists of several particles, which, separately and 
singly, want a power to produce that agreeable sensation we 
experience in them when united.” Other instances are given ; 
such as “the power of the eye to contribute to the act of 
seeing, the power of a clock to show the hour of the day, the 
power of a musical instrument to produce in us harmonious 
sounds ;” these, he says, “are powers not at all resulting from 
any powers of the same kind inhering in the parts of the sys- 
tem;” and he infers that “in the same manner the power of 
thinking, without being an aggregate of powers of the same 


1 Arxrnson, “Letters,” p. 17. 
* Dr. Sam. CLARKE’S “Third Defence,” in reply to Collins, pp. 5, 8, 17. 


PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM. G50 


kind, may yet inhere in a system of matter.” But these exam- 
ples, so far from confirming, serve rather to confute, the theory 
in whose support they are adduced. Could it be shown, 
indeed, that the eye possesses 7m ttself the power of vision, and 
that sight results solely from its peculiar texture; or, that a 
clock is really an “intellectual machine,” and produces an 
“intellectual effect ;” or, that a musical instrument possesses in 
itself the soul of melody, and is conscious of its own sweet 
sounds, — then it might be possible to entertain the supposition 
that, ¢n like manner, an organized brain may have the power 
of producing thought, and feeling, and will. But what is the 
matter of fact? Let Dr. Clarke’s answer with reference to the 
case of a timepiece suffice for all: “That which you call the’ 
power of a clock to show the time of the day is evidently 
nothing in the clock ttself, but the figure and motion of its parts, 
and, consequently, not anything of a different sort or kind from 
the powers inherent in the parts. Whereas ‘thinking,’ if it 
was the result of the powers of the different parts of the 
machine of the body, or of the brain in particular, would be 
something really inhering in the machine itself, specifically 
different from all and every one of the powers of the several 
parts out of which it resulted; which is an express contradic- 
tion, a supposing the effect to have more in it than the cause.” 
-.... “That particular and determinate degree of velocity in a 
wheel, whereby it turns once round precisely in twelve hours, 
is that which you call the power of a clock to show the time of 
the day; and because such a determinate velocity of motion is 
made use of by us for the measure of time, is it therefore really 
a new quality or power distinct from the motion itself?” The 
same answer is equally applicable to all the other examples, 
and it may be stated generally as amounting to this, that “it is 
absolutely false in fact, and impossible in the nature of things, 
that any power whatsoever should inhere or reside in any 
20* 


234 MODERN ATHEISM. 


system or composition of matter, different from the powers 
residing in the single parts.”! 

The two great difficulties which adhere to the theory of 
Materialism, and which must ever prove insurmountable, are 
these: first, to account for the power of thinking by means of 
material atoms, which are individually destitute of it; and 
secondly, to account for the unity and continuity of human 
consciousness by means of material atoms which are constantly 
undergoing flux and mutation. For the first end, recourse has 
been had to the theory which ascribes the power of thinking, 
not to the particles of matter, but to their order, arrangement, 
or organization; and for the second, the continuous sense of 
personal identity is supposed to be sufficiently accounted for by 
supposing that, as the particles which compose the brain are 
changed, the retiring atoms leave their share of the general 
consciousness as a legacy to their successors. And both these 
expedients for surmounting the difficulty are exquisitely carica- 
tured in the “Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus,” in a chapter 
which is justly described as “an inimitable ridicule on Collins’ 
argument against Clarke, to prove the soul only a quality.” 
The Society of Freethinkers, addressing Martinus, propose to 
send him an answer to the ill-grounded sophisms of their oppo- 
nents, and likewise “an easy mechanical explanation of percep- 
tion or thinking.”—“One of their chief arguments,” say they, 
“is that self-consciousness cannot inhere in any system of 
matter, because all matter is made up of several distinct beings 
which never can make up one individual thinking being. This 
is easily answered by a familiar instance. In every jack there 
is a meat-roasting quality, which neither resides in the fly, nor 
in the weight, nor in any particular wheel, of the jack, but 
is the result of the whole composition. .... And as the 


1Dr. Sam. CLARKE, “ First Defence,” pp. 11, 16; “ Second Defence,” 
pp. 4, 10. 


PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM. 235 


general quality of meat-roasting, with its several modifications, 
does not inhere in any one part of the jack, so neither does 
consciousness, with its several modes of sensation, intellection, 
volition, &c., inhere in any one, but is the result from the 
mechanical composition of the whole animal.” And then, in 
regard to the second difficulty: “The parts,” say they, “of 
an animal body are perpetually changed, . . . . from whence 
it will follow that the idea of individual consciousness must 
be constantly translated from one particle of matter to another. 
.... We answer, this is only a fallacy of the imagination. 
They make a great noise about this individuality, how a man 
is conscious to himself that he is the same individual he was 
twenty years ago, notwithstanding the flux state of the parti- 
cles of matter that compose his body. We think this is capable 
of a very plain answer, and may be easily illustrated by a 
familiar example. Sir John Cutler had a pair of black worsted 
stockings, which his maid darned so often with silk, that they 
became at last a pair of silk stockings. Now, supposing those 
stockings of Sir John’s endued with some degree of conscious- 
ness at every particular darning, they would have been sensible 
that they were the same individual pair of stockings, both 
before and after the darning!” 

The subject is here presented in a ludicrous point of view, 
and some may doubt whether this is a legitimate method of 
treating it. But it should not be forgotten that while ridicule 
ts no safe test of truth, it may be the most effective exposure of 
nonsense and folly. 


236 MODERN ATHEISM. 


SECTION III. 
THE RELATIONS OF MATERIALISM TO THEOLOGY. 


It has been generally felt and acknowledged, that the doc- 
trine which preserves the distinction between matter and spirit, 
body and soul, is more in accordance with the truths of Natural 
and Revealed Religion, than the opposite theory which identi- 
fies them; and that, on the other hand, a profound and serious 
study of these truths has a tendency to raise our thoughts 
above the low level of Materialism, and to direct them to the 
contemplation of a higher and nobler world, —the world of 
spirits. 

There are many distinct points at which the theory of 
Materialism comes into contact and collision with the truths 
both of Natural and Revealed Religion. By a brief enumera- 
tion of these, the practical importance of the subject may be 
clearly evinced. 

1. The doctrine of “the immortality of the soul” is seriously 
affected by the theory of Materialism. That there is some con- 
nection between the two is apparent from the very anxiety 
with which infidels have labored to undermine the doctrine of 
“spirit,” on purpose to get rid of the doctrine of “ immortality.” 
But in stating the connection between them, we must exercise 
the utmost caution, lest we should unwarily place the truth on 
a precarious or questionable basis. In arguing for the future 
life of the soul, as a doctrine of Natural Religion, some writers 
have spoken as if they supposed that nothing more was need- 
ful to demonstrate its “ immortality ” than the bare fact of its 
being “immaterial,” and that, by its very nature as “ spirit,” it 
is indestructible by God Himself. Now, we do not hold that 
the mere proof of its being an immaterial substance would 
necessarily infer its being also immortal. For ought we know, 


RELATIONS OF MATERIALISM TO THEOLOGY. 337 


the principle of life, sensation, memory, and volition may 
belong to an immaterial substance even in the lower animals, 
who are not supposed to be immortal; and the only use which 
we would make of its “immateriality” in connection with its 
“immortality,” is*simply this,—that not being material, zis 
destruction 1s not necessarily implied in the dissolution of the 
body. It is not in the metaphysical doctrine of its immaterial 
nature, but in the practical evidence of its moral responsibilities 
and religious capacities, that we find the most satisfactory 
natural proof of its immortality. It is perfectly possible to 
hold, on the one hand, that all “immaterial substances” are 
not necessarily indestructible; and yet to hold, on the other 
hand, that sweh an immaterial substance as the soul of man is 
known to be,—endowed with conscience, with intelligence, 
with affections and aspirations, with hopes and fears such as 
can find no suitable object and no adequate range within the 
limits of the present life,— must be destined to an immortal 
existence. The “immortality,” for which alone we ought to 
contend, is such as implies neither a necessity of existence in 
the creature, nor its independence on the will of the Creator. 
The power of God to annihilate the soul is not called in ques- 
tion, but the purpose of God to make the soul immortal is 
inferred from its nature and capacities, its aspirations and hopes 
and fears. And all that is necessarily implied in the doctrine 
of what has been called “the natural immortality of the soul” 
is well stated by Dr. S. Clarke, when he says that, “the soul 
may be such a substance as is able to continue its own duration 
forever, by the powers given to it at its first production, and the 
continuance of those general influences which are requisite for 
the support of created beings in general.” Mr. Baxter, acute 
and metaphysical as he was, placed the argument. substantially 
on the same ground. “It appears,” he says, “that all substance 
equally, as well material as immaterial, cannot cease to exist 
but by an effect of infinite power. .... The human soul, 


238 MODERN ATHEISM. 


having no parts, must be indissoluble in its nature by anything 
that hath not power to destroy or annihilate it. And since it 
hath not a natural tendency to annihilation, nor a power to 
annihilate itself, nor can be annihilated by any being finitely 
powerful only, without an immediate act of the omnipotent 
Creator to annihilate it, it must endlessly abide an active per- 
ceptive substance, without either fear or hopes of dying through 
all eternity, which is, in other words, to be immortal as to the 
agency of all natural or second causes, that is, ‘ naturally 
immortal.’” ? ; 

When thus stated and limited, the argument is at-once safe 
and valid. It is first proved that the Mind is a “ substance,” 
living, perceptive, and active, which is simple and indivisible, 
and not capable, like matter, of being separated into parts pos- 
sessing the same properties or powers; and then this distinc- 
tion betwixt mind and matter is applied to prove that it cannot 
be destroyed by dissolution, as the body may be, but that if it be 
destroyed at all, it must be by annihilation. But no substance, 
material or immaterial, can be annihilated by any finite or 
second cause; it can be annihilated only by the will of him 
who created it; and the question respecting the soul of man 
remains, What are the indications of God’s will concerning it? 
When this question is seriously entertained, we can hardly fail 
to see in the structure of its powers, in the grandeur of its 
capacities, in the moral and responsible consciousness which 
belongs to it, a strong presumptive proof of its being His pur- 
pose that it should continue to live after the dissolution of the 
body. The Metaphysical argument is sufficient to remove 
preliminary objections, the Moral argument furnishes a pre- 
sumptive proof. : ' 

The theory of Materialism, as it assumes different forms, so 
it admits of being associated with different views respecting the 


1Dr. Crarxe’s “Letter to Mr. Dodwell,” pp. 34, 69,72. ANDREW 
BaxTER, “On the Soul,” 1. 227, 233. 


RELATIONS OF MATERIALISM TO THEOLOGY. 239 


future prospects of the soul. When it is held in its grossest 
form, it stands in a relation of direct antagonism to the doctrine 
of “immortality,” as is apparent in the speculations of D’Hol- 
bach, Comte, and Atkinson, who insist at large on the proof of 
Materialism on purpose to undermine and overthrow the doc- 
trine of Immortality. The theory of Materialism has been 
maintained by Dr. Priestley and others, in conjunction with a 
professed, and, as we believe, sincere belief in a future state of 
rewards and punishments. The sleep of the soul during the 
interval between death and the resurrection, and its ultimate 
awakening by an immediate and miraculous interposition of 
Divine power, are equally held to be true,—the one on the 
ground of a natural evidence, the other on that of the authority 
of Revelation. But the natural evidence is defective, since it 
depends entirely on the assumption that “thought ” is produced 
by and dependent on a certain material organization, without 
which it could not exist ; and the supernatural authority is still 
less to be relied on, since it seems, at least, to recognize the ex- 
istence of disembodied spirits, and unequivocally declares that 
the soul cannot be killed as the body may. If the soul be 
material, as Dr. Priestley says it is, it must be, equally with 
the body, affected by the stroke of death; yet our Lord says, 
—and His authority cannot be declined when the doctrine of a 
future resurrection is made to depend on the mere testimony 
of Scripture, —“ Fear not them which kill the body, but are 
not able to kill the soul; but rather fear Him which is able to 
destroy both soul and body in hell.”? And the soul is repre- 
sented as existing in a state of conscious happiness or misery, 
even during the interval between death and the resurrection, in 
the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, as well as in the 
statement of the apostle that “he was in a strait betwixt two, 
having a desire to depart and to be with Christ, which is far 


1 Matthew 10: 28. 


240 MODERN ATHEISM. 


better.”! In its most recent and refined form, the theory of 
Materialism represents “mind” as a subtle product, evolved 
out of matter, and destined to an endless existence, — an ever- 
ascending progression; and in this form of it, the doctrine of a 
distinct, personal immortality is, no doubt, far better preserved 
than in its earlier and grosser forms, which spoke of the utter 
destruction of individual consciousness at the hour of death, 
and of our material particles passing merely into other kinds 
of organic or inorganic being. But then, it is placed on a very 
precarious ground,—the mere supposition of a material prod- 
uct, which can never be established by proof, and which, if 
there were no other objection to it, might well seem to be suf- 
ficiently discredited by the mere fact that it ascribes to the ejfect 
properties and powers, of a very high and peculiar order, 
which do not exist in the cause. 

2. The doctrine of “future rewards and punishments,” or of 
“man’s responsibility” as a subject of the Divine government, 
is also materially affected by the theory of Materialism, in 
some, at least, of its forms. When it is connected, as it often 
has been, with the doctrine of “ Mechanical Necessity,” which 
represents every thought, opinion, emotion, desire, and habit, 
as the unavoidable result of mere physical influences acting on 
the brain, and makes no account of the spontaneity or freedom 
which belongs to man as an intelligent, moral, and responsible 
agent, it is manifestly impossible to discover any ground for 
the doctrine of future rewards and punishments. And accord- 
ingly, D’Holbach, Comte, and Atkinson describe man as if he 
were the mere creature of circumstances, and deny that his 
character could possibly have been different from what it is. 
But even when it is not associated with fatalism, the theory, 
which denies the distinct existence of the soul as a substantive 
being, has a tendency to shake our belief in the doctrine of a 


1 Luke 16: 22; Phil. 1: 23. 


‘RELATIONS OF MATERIALISM TO THEOLOGY. 241 


“future retribution,’ properly so called, since that doctrine 
rests on the assumption of our continued personal identity, or 
the unity and continuity of our consciousness, as dying yet 
immortal beings; whereas, if there be no “ soul,” or substan- 
tive spiritual being, and if the “body” be in a state of perpet- 
ual flux and mutation, it is difficult to see how the same being 
that sinned can suffer, or how the doctrine of “ retribution,” 
properly so called, can be consistently maintained. 

3. The doctrine of “the spirituality” of the Divine nature 
must be seriously affected, in different ways, by the theory of 
Materialism. 

It is said. in Scripture that “God made man in His own 
image,” and that He “breathed into his nostrils the breath of 
life, and man became a living soul.” Deny the existence of 
“ spirit” or “soul,” as God’s living image on earth, and what 
ground of evidence, or what help of analogy, remains for either 
conceiving or proving aright the existence of Him who is “a 
Spirit » and “the Father of the spirits of all flesh?” And if 
the “spirituality ” of the Divine nature be called in question, 
many of the Divine attributes must also suffer; for it is only 
as “a spirit” that God can be omnipresent, and his omnipres- 
ence is presupposed in his omniscience and omnipotence. For 
these reasons, we incur the greatest risk of entertaining limited 
and false conceptions of God, by obliterating the distinction 
between “matter” and “spirit.” 

It is, no doubt, competent, and it may even be highly useful, 
to entertain the question, how far the theory of Materialism 
should be held to affect the grounds on which we believe ina 
living, personal, spiritual God? In answer to this question, 
we have no hesitation in avowing our conviction that the theory 
of Materialism, however it may be modified, has a tendency to 
impair the evidence of that fundamental article of faith. God 
is “a Spirit,” and man was made “in the image of God.” 
Take away all spiritual essences ; reduce every known object 

21 


242 MODERN ATHEISM. 


in nature to matter, gross or refined; let mental and moral 
phenomena be blended with the physical, and what remains to 
constitute the groundwork of a “spiritual” system, or to con- 
duct us to the recognition of a supreme, immaterial Mind ? 
If the material body, with its peculiar organization, be capable 
of producing human thought, and sufficient to account for the 
intelligence of man, why may not the material universe, with 
its mysterious laws and manifold forces, be held sufficient to 
explain whatever marks of a higher intelligence may appear 
in Nature? and why may we not at once embrace Pantheism, 
and conceive of God only as “the soul of the world?” Dr. 
Priestley’s reply to this question appears to us to be a mere 
evasion of the difficulty. In treating of “the objection to the 
system of Materialism derived from the consideration of the 
Divine essence,” he first of all premises that “in fact we have 
no proper idea of any essence whatever; that our ideas con- 
cerning ‘matter’ do not go beyond the powers of which it is 
possessed, and much less can our ideas go beyond powers, 
properties, or attributes with respect to the Divine Being; ” 
and then adds, “ Now, the powers and properties of the Divine 
mind, as clearly deduced from the works of God, are not only 
so infinitely superior to those of the human mind, when there 
is some analogy between them, but so essentially different from 
them in other respects, that whatever term we make use of to 
denote the one, it must be improperly applied to the other.” 
He specifies several points of “essential difference” between 
the human and the Divine mind: the first is, the limited intel- 
ligence of the one as contrasted with the all-comprehensive 
omniscience of the other; the second is, the omnipotence which 
belongs to God, and in virtue of which He can produce, or 
annihilate, anything at His pleasure: the third is, that “the 
Divine essence cannot be the object of any of our senses, as 
everything else that we call ‘matter’ is.” And on these grounds 
he concludes that “as the Divine powers, so the Divine nature, 


RELATIONS OF MATERIALISM TO THEOLOGY. 243 


must be essentially different from ours, and, consequently, no 
common term, except such comprehensive terms as being, na- 
ture, &c., can be properly used to express both.” He further 
argues that “no proof of the materiality of man can be extended, 
by any just analogy, to a proof or evidence of a similar materi- 
-ality of the Divine nature; for the properties or powers being 
different, the ‘substance’ or ‘essence’ (if it be any convenience 
to us to use such terms at all) must be different also.” 

Now, we conceive this to be a mere evasion of the real diffi- 
culty: first, because the same mode of reasoning, if applied to 
the case of the human mind, would equally serve to prove that 
tt should be distinguished from matter: and, secondly, because 
the alleged differences between the human and the Divine 
mind, great and real as we admit them to be, afford no better 
reason for calling God a “spirit,” than that which may be found 
in the resemblance or analogy between created and uncreated 
intelligence. It is as true of the human as it is of the Divine 
mind, that we know nothing of its essence, except what we 
learn through its properties and powers, that “it cannot be the 
object of any of our senses, as everything that we call ‘matter’ 
is,” and that if it be right to give different and distinctive 
names to substances, expressive of their properties in so far as 
these are known to us, we are warranted in calling the human 
soul a “spirit” and distinguishing it from “matter,” until it can 
be shown that the properties of both are identical. If this be 
denied, we cannot see on what ground the distinction between 
“matter” and “spirit” can be maintained with reference to 
God Himself. Dr. Priestley founds, not on the resemblance or 
analogy, but on the essential difference, between created and un- 
created intelligence ; but, in point of fact, the difference, great 
and real as it is, has no bearing on the only question at issue; 
it is the resemblance or analogy between all thinking beings and 


1 Dr. Priest Ley, “ Disquisitions,”’ p. 103; “ Free Discussion,” pp. 66, 237. 


244 MODERN ATHEISM. 


the Supreme Mind that suggests the reason for classing them 
under the same category as “spirits,” and that enables us to 
rise from the spiritual nature of man to the spiritual nature of 
God. 

The personality of God, as a living, self-conscious, and active 
Being, distinct from the created universe and superior to it, is 
dependent on the “ spirituality ” of His nature; and in so far 
as the latter is affected by the theory of Materialism, the evi- 
dence of the former must also be proportionally weakened. 
We find, accordingly, that many Materialists have exhibited a 
tendency towards a Pantheistic theory of nature, in which the 
material universe is conceived of as the “body,” of which God 
is the “soul.” Some Materialists, indeed, have stopped short 
of Pantheism; but this may have arisen from their being less 
consequent reasoners, or more timid thinkers, than others who 
were prepared to follow out their principles fearlessly to all 
their logical results; for, assuredly, if there be no evidence 
sufficient to show that the “ mind” is distinct from the “ body,” 
it will require a very high kind of evidence to make it certain 
that “God” is distinct from “ Nature.” 

4. The theory of Materialism comes into direct collision, at 
several points, with the doctrines of Revealed Religion. 

The doctrine of Scripture in regard to the “human soul” is 
manifestly at variance with that theory. In the earliest pages 
of Genesis, we have an account of its creation, which, when 
compared with other statements and forms of expression occur- 
ring elsewhere, seems very clearly to imply that the “soul” is 
a distinct substantive being, possessing properties and powers 
peculiar to itself, and, although now united to the “ body,” yet 
capable of existing apart from it, and destined to an immortal 
existence hereafter. That it is a distinct substantive being, 


1 FLAVEL, “Pneumatologia; or, Treatise of the Soul,” 1. 290. Sir M. 
Hate, “Primitive Origination of Mankind,” p. 309. 


RELATIONS OF MATERIALISM TO THEOLOGY. 245 


connected with the body, but not dependent on it, at least in 
the sense of being incapable of existing apart from it, appears 
from various testimonies of the inspired Word. God is there 
pleased to call Himself “the Father of our spirits,’ and that, 
too, in contradistinection to “the fathers of our flesh.” “We 
have had fathers of our ‘flesh’ which corrected us, and we 
gave them reverence; shall we not much rather be in subjec- 
tion unto the Father of ‘spirits’ and live?” He is called 
“the God of the ‘spirits’ of all flesh,” and “the Lord who 
formeth the ‘spirit’ of man within him.” The historical nar- 
rative, too, of man’s creation, which declares that he was “made 
in the image of God,” and that his “soul” was infused by an 
immediate Divine afflatus, seems to imply that there is another 
and a higher relation subsisting between God and the “soul” 
than any that subsists between God and “matter.” In other 
passages, the soul is expressly represented as distinct and dif- 
ferent from the body: —“ Fear not them which can kill the 
‘body,’ but are not able to kill the ‘soul.’” “Into thy hands I 
commit my ‘spirit, ” said our Lord, just as his proto-martyr 
Stephen said, “ Lord Jesus, receive my ‘spirit.’” There are 
other passages still which affirm the separate existence of dis- 
embodied spirits: “'Then shall the dust return to the earth as 
it was, and ‘the spirit, shall return unto God who gave it.” 
“A spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have.” Nay, 
spiritual life, such as clearly presupposes the continuance of 
conscious existence, without interruption and without end, is 
said to be imparted by Christ to his people: —“I am the 
resurrection and the life: he that believeth in me, though he 
were dead, yet shall he live again, and whosoever liveth and 
believeth in me shall never die.” —“Whoso believeth in me 
.... is passed from death unto life.”! Life is said to be 


1 Compare Heb. 12: 9; Num. 16: 22; 27: 16; Zech. 12: 1; Luke 23: 
43,46; Acts 7: 59; Eccles. 12: 7; 2 Cor. 5:8; James 2: 26; Luke 24: 39; 
John 10: 25; John 5: 24. 

21* 


246 MODERN ATHEISM. 


already imparted, such a life as shall survive death, and con- 
tinue without interruption and without end; and surely this is 
utterly inconsistent with that theory of Materialism which 
affirms, either the annihilation of the “soul” at death, or even 
the cessation of its conscious existence during the interval 
between death and the resurrection. 

The revealed doctrine of “angels,” or spiritual intelligences 
existing in other parts of the universe, is also opposed to the 
theory of Materialism. According to the common belief, the 
“soul” of man is the nexus between two worlds or states of 
being, —the world of “matter” and the world of “mind.” In 
man the elements of both worlds are united; by his body he is 
connected with the world of matter, by his soul with the world 
of mind. Death, which dissolves the union between the two, 
consigns the one to the dust, and introduces the other into the 
world of spirits. On this view, there is no difficulty in rising 
to the conception of higher spiritual intelligences; and the 
variety and gradation that are observable in all the works of 
God on earth may impart to that sublime conception such a 
measure of verisimilitude as to make it easily credible on the 
authority of Revelation. But the theory of . Materialism, 
especially as advocated by Dr. Priestley, plainly excludes the 
existence of any order of “spiritual beings” other than the 
uncreated Mind; for if that only is to be termed “spirit” 
which possesses omniscience and the power of producing any- 
thing at pleasure, it is clear that the highest angels and sera- 
phims are no more “spirits” than the souls of men. 

Such being the relation which subsists between the theory 
of Materialism, and some of the most important doctrines of 
Natural and Revealed Religion, it is not wonderful that a 
serious consideration of the latter should lead reflective men to 
abjure the former, or that their aversion to it should increase 
in proportion as their views of Divine truth are extended and 
enlarged. Not a few have yielded, in early youth, to the 


RELATIONS OF MATERIALISM TO THEOLOGY. 247 


charm of speculative inquiry, and fondly embraced the idea 
of “unisubstancisme,” who have lived to exchange it for a 
more Scriptural faith. For just in proportion as men are 
brought under the influence of serious views of God, of the 
soul, and of an eternal world, in the same proportion will they 
become alienated, and even averse, from a theory which con- 
founds “spirit” with “matter,” obscures their conceptions of 
God and of the world of spirits, and degrades men to the level 
of the beasts that perish. This effect of new, or, at least, 
more vivid views of “things unseen and eternal” was instruc- 
tively exemplified in the case of the late Robert Hall. Like 
many an ardent speculatist, he had embraced in early life the 
system of Materialism; and even after he had entered on the 
work of the ministry, he could write to a professedly Christian 
congregation in the following terms: “T am, and have been 
for a long time, a Materialist, though I have never drawn your 
attention to this subject in my preaching, because I have 
always considered it myself, and wished you to consider it, as 
a mere metaphysical speculation. My opinion, however, on this 
head, is, that the nature of man is simple and uniform, that 
the thinking powers and faculties are the result of a certain 
organization of matter, —and that after death he ceases to be 
conscious until the resurrection.”! But speculative inquiry 
was soon to give place to spiritual faith. The death of his 
revered and pious father brought his mind into realizing con- 
tact with an unseen and eternal world; and, in the words of 
his biographer, distinguished alike for profound science and 
deep practical piety, “The death of Mr. Hall’s father tended 
greatly to bring his mind to the state of serious thought with 
which he entered on the pastoral office. Meditating with the 
deepest veneration upon the unusual excellences of a parent 
now forever lost to him, he was led to investigate, with renewed 


1 Dr. OLintHUS GrecoRY, “Life of Hall,” Works, VI. 26. 


248 . MODERN. ATHEISM. 


earnestness, the truth as well as the value of those high and 
sacred principles from which his eminent piety and admirable 
consistency so evidently flowed. He called to mind, too, sev- 
eral occasions on which his father, partly by the force of reason, 
partly by that of tender expostulation, had exhorted him to 
abandon the vague and dangerous speculations to which he was 
prone; Some important changes in Mr. Hall’s sentiments 
resulted from an inquiry conducted under such solemn impres- 
sions, and among these may be mentioned his renunciation of 
Materialism, which, he often declared, he burted in his Sather’s 
grave.” 


CHAPTER V. 


THEORY OF GOVERNMENT BY NATURAL 
LAWS.—VOLNEY.—COMBE. 


Tue theory of “natural laws” has been applied to disprove 
or supersede the doctrine of Creation, by means of the principle 
of Development. It has been further applied to the govern- 
ment, as well as to the creation, of the world; and in this con- 
nection, it has been urged as a reason for disbelieving the 
doctrine of God’s special PROVIDENCE, and employed to 
discredit the efficacy of PRAYER. 

When thus applied, it is often associated with the recognition 
of the Divine existence, and cannot, therefore, be ranked among 
systems avowedly Atheistic. But from the earliest times, it 
has been the belief of seriously reflecting men, that a system 
which professedly recognizes the Divine Being as the Creator 
of the world, but practically excludes Him from the govern- 
ment of its affairs, however theoretically different from Atheism, 
is substantially the same with it. It was against this Epi- 
curean Atheism that Howe contended in his “Living Temple;” | 
an Atheism which acknowledged gods, but “accounted that 
they were such as between whom and man there could be 
no conversation,—on their part by providence, on man’s by 
religion.” And it was against the same Epicurean Atheism 
that Cudworth contended in his “ Intellectual System of the 
Universe,” when he grappled with the objections which had 


1 C1cEeRO, “ De Natura Deorum,” lib. 1. c 44. 


250 MODERN ATHEISM. 


been pee against the doctrine of Providence and the practice 
of prayer. 

It is not wonderful that either Atheists or Bacio should 
discard the doctrine of Providence, or deny the efficacy of 
Prayer. On their principles, there is no room for the recog- 
nition of a supreme intelligent Power governing the world, or 
of a Will capable of controlling the course of human affairs. 
But while neither Atheism nor Pantheism could be expected 
to recognize a presiding Providence, since they equally exclude 
a personal God, it may well seem strange that any system of 
Theism, whether natural or revealed, should omit or oppose 
this fundamental truth. For the doctrine of Providence may 
be established, inductively, by the very same kind of evidence 
to which every Theist has recourse in proving the existence 
and perfections of the Divine Being; and, His existence and 
perfections being proved, the doctrine of Providence may be 
inferred, deductively, from His character, and from the rela- 
tions which He sustains towards His creatures, since it cannot 
be supposed that He who brought them into being, as the 
_ products of His own wisdom, goodness, and power, and 
endowed them with all their various properties for some great 
and noble end, will ever cease to care for them, or deem them 
unworthy of His regard. Yet, strong as is the proof arising 
from these and similar sources, there have occasionally appeared 
in all ages, and especially at a certain stage in the progress of 
philosophical speculation, men who admitted, and even main- 
tained, the existence of the Supreme Being, while they denied, 
nevertheless, the doctrine of Providence and the efficacy of 
Prayer. : 

In certain stages of philosophic inquiry, there is a natural 


1 Howe, “Works,” 1. 104. Cupworrtu, “Intellectual System,” 1. 120, 
144, 

2M. ComrTeE, “ Cours,” vi. 149, 247, 295. Spinoza, “ Tractatus Theol.- 
politicus,” pp. 57, 102, 122, 144, 150, 319. 


GOVERNMENT BY NATURAL LAWS. 201 


tendency, we think, or at least a strong temptation, to substitute 
the laws of Nature in the place of God, or to conceive of him 
as somehow removed to a greater distance from us by means 
of these laws. Every one must be conscious, to some extent, 
of this tendency in his own personal experience; he must have 
felt that when he first began to apprehend any one of the great 
laws of Nature, and still more when he advanced far enough to 
see that every department of the physical world is subject to 
them, so as to exhibit a constant order, an all-pervading har- 
mony, his views of God and Providence became less impressive 
in proportion as the domain of “law” was extended, and that 
he was in imminent danger of sinking, if not into theoretical, at 
least into practical Atheism. “It is a fact,” says Dr. Chan- 
ning, “that Science has not made Nature as expressive of God 
in the first instance or to the beginner in religion, as it was in 
earlier times. Science reveals a rigid, immutable order; and 
this to common minds looks much like self-subsistence, and 
does not manifest intelligence, which is full of life, variety, and 
progressive operation. Men in the days of their ignorance saw 
an immediate Divinity accomplishing an immediate purpose, or 
expressing an immediate feeling, in every sudden, striking 
change of Nature, . . . . and Nature, thus interpreted, became 
the sign of a present, deeply-interested Deity.”* That the 
scientific study of Nature, and especially of certain departments 
of physical inquiry, has often had the effect of deadening our 
sense of a present and presiding Deity, of obscuring or per- 
plexing our views of the connection of God with His works, 
and of virtually removing Him from all efficient control over 
the creatures of His hands, is attested, not only by the pub- 
lished speculations of some, but also by the inward conscious- 
ness of many more, who have never avowed infidel sentiments 


1 Dr. CHANNING, “ Memoirs,” 11. 439. Rost. BOYLE, “Free Inquiry 
into the Notion of Nature,” p. 7. 


252 . MODERN ATHEISM. 


to others, nor even, at least articulately, to themselves. It 
may be useful, therefore, to inquire somewhat particularly, 
whether, and how far, the existence of “natural laws” and the 


> 


operation of “second causes” should affect our views of the 
Providence which God exercises over us, or of the Prayers 


which we address to Him. 


SECTION I. 


THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES. 


The existence of “natural laws,” and the operation of 
“second causes,” are often explicitly recognized, and always 
obviously implied, in Scripture. Revelation is not designed to 
explain the nature or the action of either; but it assumes the 
reality of both.’ It is plainly implied in the very jirst chapter 
of Genesis, that, at the era of creation, God gave a definite 
constitution, implying peculiar properties and powers, to all the 
various classes of objects which were then called into being. 
He created light, with its peculiar properties; He created 
water, with its peculiar properties. He created everything 
“after its kind.” The distinction between one created thing 
and another, such as light and water, and the distinction also 
between “genera” and “species,” especially in the case of 
plants, trees, fish, fowl, cattle, and reptiles, are very strongly” 
marked in the sacred narrative: and this distinction implies 
the existence of certain properties peculiar to each of these 
objects or classes,— properties not common to them all, but 
distinctive and characteristic, which made them to be, severally, 
what they are, and which amount to a distinct definite constitu- 
tion. ‘These properties, account for them as we may, are 


1 Proressor SEpGWICK, “ Discourse,” fifth edition, p. CLIT. Mr. 
ComBE, “ Constitution of Man,” p. 417. 


NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES. 253 


essential to their existence as distinct objects in nature, and 
cannot be separated from them as long as the objects them- 
selves exist. Light has certain properties, and so has water, 
and so has every distinct order of vegetable or animal life, 
which make them to be what they severally are, and which 
cannot be severed from them otherwise than by the destruction 
of their very nature. These properties are known to us by 
their effects; and hence the substances or beings to which they 
respectively belong are regarded by us as causes; and their 
operation as causes is regulated by certain “laws,” imposed: 
upon them by the same Omnipotent Will which called them 
into being and endowed them with all their peculiar properties 
and powers. The operation of these “natural causes,” and the 
existence of certain “established laws” Ify which they are reg- 
ulated, are explicitly recognized or obviously assumed in 
Scripture! “Thou hast established the earth, and it abideth ; 
they continue this day according to thine ordinances, for all are 
thy servants.” 

The established constitution and settled order of Nature, as 
well as the “laws,” “decrees,” or “ordinances” by which it is 
regulated, are thus explicitly recognized in Scripture itself; 
and there are several reasons why this fact should be deliber- 
ately considered. First, because it seems to have been assumed 
by our opponents, that the discovery of “natural laws,” and the 
admission of “second causes,” must necessarily be adverse, and 
may ultimately prove fatal, to the cause of Religion; or, in 
other words, that Faith must recede just in proportion as 
Science advances; whereas the Bible speaks both of natural 
objects, possessing peculiar properties and powers, and also of 
natural laws, as God’s “ ordinances ” both in the heavens and 
the earth, but speaks nevertheless of a presiding Providence or 


1 Proverbs 6 : 27; Psalm 68 :2; 83:14; James 3:12; Matthew 7 : I! 
Proverbs 8 : 29; Job 38 : 11, 33; Psalm 119 : 90; Jeremiah 31:35; 33: 25. 
22 


254 MODERN ATHEISM. 


governing Will, without ever supposing that the two are incom- 
patible or mutually exclusive. Secondly, because some of the 
less intelligent members of the Christian community itself 
seem to be influenced, to a certain extent, by the very same 
error which we ascribe to our opponents; and evince a very 
groundless jealousy of Science, as if they feared that the — 
progress of physical research might have the effect of weaken- 
ing the grounds on which they believe in the care of Providence 
and the efficacy of Prayer; whereas the Bible gives no coun- 
tenance to any jealousies or fears of this kind, but affirms God’s 
providential government and encourages man’s believing 
prayer, at the very time when it founds upon and appeals to 
the established constitution and course of Nature! And 
thirdly, because a right apprehension of the properties and 
powers belonging to created beings, and of the laws to which 
they are severally subject, will be feund to conduce largely to 
a clear and comprehensive view of the relation which God sus- 
tains to His works. His Providence, as it is declared and 
exemplified in Scripture, has a necessary reference to the natural 
constitution of things ; and hence the Westminster Confession, 
in the spirit of the highest philosophy, and with admirable 
discrimination and accuracy, affirms that “God, the Creator of 
all things, doth uphold, direct, dispose, and govern, all creatures, 
actions, and things, from the greatest even to the least, by His 
most wise and holy Providence ;” that “by the same Provi- 
dence, He ordereth all things to fall out according to the 
nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contin- 
gently ;” and that “God in His ordinary Providence maketh 
use of means, yet is free to work without, above, and against 
them at His pleasure.” ? 

“Natural laws” and “second causes” are thus established 
by experience, and explicitly recognized in Scripture. It is 

1 Dr. M’Cosu, “On the Divine Government,” pp. 126, 129, 149. 

2“ Westminster Confession,” c. v., § 11., 111. 


NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES. 255 


necessary, however, especially with reference to certain modern 
speculations, to discriminate between the two; and to show 
that while they are closely related. and equally legitimate 
objects of philosophical inquiry, they are nevertheless radically 
different, as well as easily distinguishable, from each other. It 
is the favorite doctrine of the Positive school in France that 
the knowledge of “causes” is utterly interdicted to man, and 
that the only science to which he should aspire consists exclu- 
sively in the knowledge of “ phenomena,” and their codrdination 
under “general laws.” M. Comte explicitly avows this doc- 
trine, and Mr. Mill and Mr. Lewes give it their implied sanc- 
tion According to their theory, all Science is limited to “the 
laws of the coexistence and succession of phenomena,” and 
“ causes” are not only unknown, but incapable of being known. 
And to such an extent is this doctrine carried that M. Comte 
anticipates the possible ultimate reduction of all “ phenomena ” 
to one all-comprehensive, all-pervading “law,” as the highest 
perfection of Science and the decisive extinction of Religion; 
while Mr. Mill, doubtful of this being possible, thinks it con- 
ceivable, at least, that there may be worlds, different from our 
own, in which events occur without causes of any kind, and even 
without any fixed law. 

In regard to this theory it might well be asked, how it comes 
to pass that human language, which is the natural exponent of 
human thought, should contain, in every one of its multifarious 
dialects, so many expressions which denote or imply “causa- 
tion,” if it be true that all knowledge of causes is utterly inac- 
cessible to the human faculties? Nay, why is it that the axiom 
of causation needs only to be announced to command the 
immediate assent of the whole human race ? 

It will be found, we believe, that even in the case of those 


1M. Comte, “Cours,” rv. 663, 669; Vv. 259, 277: vr. 702, 780. J. 5. 
MILL, “ Logic,” 1. 397, 417, 422; 11. 109, 471. Lewzs, “ Biographical 
History,” 1. 14; 111. 55; Iv. 9, 42. 


256 MODERN ATHEISM. 


who contend for this theory, the instinctive and spontaneous 
belief in “ causation” is not extinguished nor even impaired ; 
but that they seek merely to substitute “laws” for “causes,” or 
rather to represent the laws of nature as the only efficient causes 
of all natural phenomena. ‘They thus identify or confound two 
things which it is of the utmost consequence to discriminate 
and keep distinct. There is an ambiguity, however, in the 
common usage of the term “law,” which may seem to give a 
plausible appearance to their theory, or at least to vail over and 
conceal its radical fallacy. It denotes sometimes the mere 
statement of a general fact, or the result of a comprehensive 
generalization, founded on the observation and comparison of 
many particular facts; it denotes at other times the force or 
power, whatever that may be, which produces any given set of 
phenomena. The “law” of gravitation, for example, is often 
used to denote nothing more than the general fact, ascertained 
by. experience, that all bodies near: the surface of the earth 
tend to its centre with a velocity proportioned directly to their 
mass, and inversely to the square of their distance ; and when 
it is employed in ¢hzs sense, it determines nothing as to the 
“cause ” which is in operation, — it affirms merely a fact, or a 
fact reduced to a formula, and confirmed by universal experi- 
ence. But it is often transferred, at least mentally and almost 
perhaps unconsciously, to denote some “power” which is 
instinctively supposed to be in operation when any change is 
observed, —a “ power” which may be conceived of, either as a 
property inherent in mind or in matter, or as a force, such as 
the Divine volition, acting upon it ab extra ; and it is only in 
the latter of these two senses, as denoting a “ cause,” properly 
so called, and not a mere fact or law, that it can be applied to 
account for any phenomenon. In like manner, the “laws of 
motion” are merely the generalized results of our experience 
and observation relative to the direction, velocity, and other 
phenomena of moving bodies; but “motion,” although it is 


NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES. 257 


regulated, is not produced, by these laws; it depends on a 
“ cause,” whatever that may be, which is not only distinguish- 
able, but different from them all. Yet when we speak of the 
“Jaws of motion,” we may imperceptibly include, in our con- 
ception of them, that force or power which impels the body, as 
well as the mere Jaw or rule which regulates its movements. 
It were a mere unprofitable dispute about words, did we enter- 
tain and discuss the question, whether the import of the term 
“law” might not be so extended as to include under it powers, 
properties, and causes, as well as the rules and conditions of 
their operation: for, even were this question answered in the 
affirmative, there would still be room for a real distinction 
between the two, and there could be no reason for saying that 
the knowledge of “causes,” as distinguished from “laws,” is 
wholly inaccessible to the human faculties. There is thus a 
real and important distinction between “laws” considered 
simply as general facts, and “causes” considered as efficient 
agents; and the two cannot be reduced to the same category, 
otherwise than by giving such an extension to the term “law” 
as shall make it comprehensive of causation; and even then, 
the distinction remains between the mere formulas of Science 
and the actual forces of Nature. “The laws of Nature,” says 
the sagacious Dr. Reid, “are the rules according to which the 
effects are produced, but there must be a cause which operates 
according to these rules. The rules of navigation never 
navigated a ship; the rules of architecture never built a 
house.” * 

It might be shown, were it needful for our present purpose, 
that the object of Science is threefold: first, to ascertain 
particular facts; secondly, to reduce these facts under general 
laws; and, thirdly, to investigate the “causes” by which both 
facts and laws may be accounted for. The exclusion of any 

1 Dr. Rei, “Essays,” 111. 44. Dr. M’Cosu, “Divine Government,” 


88, 91, 111, 114. 
22* 


258 MODERN ATHEISM. 


one of the three would be fatal to Philosophy as well as 
Religion ; and it is prohibited by the “natural laws” of the 
human mind, which has the capacity not only of observing 
particular facts, but of comparing and contrasting them so as to 
deduce from them a knowledge of general laws, and which is 
also imbued with an instinctive and spontaneous tendency to 
ascribe every change that is observed to some “power” or 
“cause” capable of producing such an effect. It might further 
be shown, that in every instance a “cause,” properly so called, 
is a substance or being possessing certain properties or powers, 
— properties which may be called, if you will, the “laws” of 
that substance, but which necessarily include the idea of cau- 
sation or efficiency; that in the case of mere physical agency, 
there must be a plurality of substances so related as that the 
one shall act on the other in certain conditions which are indis- 
pensable to their mutual action; and that these requirements 
leave ample room for those manifold adjustments and adapta- 
tions on which the argument from “design,” in favor of the 
Perfections and Providence of God, is founded. The mere 
recognition of “general laws,” considered simply as the “co- 
ordination of facts,” and especially as exclusive of the idea of 
causation or efficiency, can never satisfy the demands of reason, 
nor exhaust the legitimate functions of Science. For, in the 
expressive words of Sir John Herschell, “ It is high time that 
philosophers, both physical and others, should come to some 
nearer agreement than seems to prevail, as to the meaning they 
intend to convey in speaking of causes and causation. On the 
one hand, we are told that the grand object of physical inquiry 
is to explain the nature of phenomena by referring them to 
their causes; on the other, that the inquiry into ‘causes’ is 
altogether vain and futile, and that Science has no concern but 
with the discovery of ‘laws.’ Which of these is the truth? 
Or are both views of the matter true on a different interpreta- 
tion of the terms? Whichever view we may take, or whichever 


NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES. 259 


interpretation we may adopt, there is one thing certain, — the 
extreme inconvenience of such a state of language. This can 
only be reformed by a careful analysis of the widest of all 
human generalizations, disentangling from one another the 
innumerable shades of meaning which have got confounded 
together in its progress, and establishing among them a rational 
classification and nomenclature... .. A ‘law’ may be a rule 
of action, but it is not action. The great First Agent may lay 
down a rule of action for himself, and that rule may become 
known to man by observation of its uniformity ; but, constituted 
as our minds are, and having that conscious knowledge of eausa- 
tion which is forced upon us by the reality of the distinction 
between intending a thing, and doing it, we can never substi- 
tute the ‘rule’ for the ‘ act, ”* 

But while the existence of “natural laws” and the operation 
of “second causes” are equally admitted, and yet duly dis- 
criminated, large room is still left for diversities of opinion or 
of statement in regard to the precise relation which God sus- 
tains to His works, and especially in regard to the nature and 
method of His agency in connection with the use of “second 
causes.” Hence have arisen the various theories which have 
appeared successively in the history of Philosophy, and which 
have had for their avowed object the explanation of the con- 
nection between God and Nature, or the conciliation of Theology 
with Science. Hence, first of all, the theory of “occasional 
causes,” as taught by Father Malebranche, with the laudable, 
but, as we think, mistaken, design of vindicating the Divine 
agency in Providence by virtually superseding every other 
power in Nature;—a theory which represents physical 
agencies as the mere occasions, and God as the sole cause of all 
changes, which teaches that a healthy eye, with the presence 


1$rr Jonny Herscnext, “ Address to the British Association,” 1845. 
2 Dr. Tuos. Brown, “Essay on Cause and Effect,” p. 86. Dr. Tuos. 
REID, “ Essays,” 1. 136. PreRRE Porret, “ De Deo, Anima, ct Malo.” 


260 MODERN ATHEISM. 


of light, is not the cause of vision, but the occasion only of that 
Divine interposition by which alone we are enabled to see, and 
that a man’s desire or volition to walk is not the cause of his 
walking, but the occasion merely of that Divine interposition 
which alone puts the proper muscles in motion. Hence, 
secondly, the theory of “preéstablished harmony” as taught by 
Leibnitz ;—a theory which was mainly designed to explain 
the relation subsisting between the soul and the body, but 
which involves principles bearing on the general doctrine of 
cause and effect, and applicable to the relation subsisting 
between God and His works. This theory teaches that mind 
and body, although closely united, have no real influence on 
each other, that each of them acts by its own properties and 
powers, and that their respective operations exactly correspond 
to each other by virtue of a “preéstablished harmony ” between 
the two, just as one clock may be so adjusted as to keep time 
with another, although each has its own moving power, and 
neither receives any part of its motions from the other. This 
theory, therefore, denies everything like causal action between 
mind and matter; and when it is extended, as it may legiti- 
mately be, to the relation between God and the world, it would 
seem to imply the coequal existence and independence of both, 
and the impossibility of any causal relation between the two. 
The manifest defects of these theories have given rise to a third, 
which, in one of its forms, has been generally adopted by 
Divines, — the theory of “instrumental causes.” 

This theory has assumed two distinct and very different 
forms. In the first, all natural effects are ascribed to powers 
imparted to created beings, and inherent in them; that is, to 
powers which are supposed to have been conferred at the era 
of Creation, and to be still sustained by God’s will in Provi- 
dence, subject, however, to be suspended or revoked according 
to His pleasure. In the second, which resembles in some 
respects the doctrine of “occasional causes,” all natural effects 


NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES. 261 


are ascribed to powers not ¢mparted, but impressed, not belong- 
ing to the natural agent, but communicated by impulse ab 
extra; and God’s will is represented as the only efficient cause 
in Nature. In both forms of the theory, the agency of God 
and the instrumentality of natural means are, in a certain sense, 
acknowledged ; but in the former, second causes are apt to be 
regarded as if they were self-existent and independent of God ; 
in the latter, second causes are apt to be virtually annulled, 
and all events to be regarded as the immediate effects of Divine 
volition. Both extremes are dangerous. For, on the one 
hand, the operation of second causes cannot be regarded as 
necessary and independent, without severing the tie which con- 
nects the created universe with the will of the Supreme; and, 
on the other hand, the operation of second causes cannot be 
excluded or denied, without virtually making God’s will the 
only efficient’ cause, and thereby charging directly and 
immediately on Him, not only all the physical changes which 
occur in Nature, but also all the volitions and actions of His 
creatures. In order to guard against these opposite and equally 
dangerous extremes, we must hold the real existence and actual 
operation of “second causes;” while we are careful, at the 
same time, to show both that whatever powers belong to any 
created being were originally conferred by God, and also that 
they are still preserved and perpetuated by Him, subject to his 
control, and liable to be suspended or revoked, according to the 
pleasure of His will. We would thus have one first, and 
MANY SECOND CAUSES; the former supreme, the latter sub- 
ordinate; really distinct, but not equally independent, since 
“second causes” are, from their very nature, subject to the 
dominion and control of that Omniscient Mind which called 
them into being, and which knows how to overrule them all for 
the accomplishment of His great designs. 
We are aware that some are unwilling to acknowledge the 

efficiency of any “second causes,” and seek to resolve all events, 


262 MODERN ATHEISM. 


even such as are brought about by the volitions of men, into 
the will of God, as the only Agent in Nature. Others, again, 
admitting the existence of created spirits, and their operation 
as real causes, are unwilling to acknowledge any active powers 
in matter, and are anxious to show that mind, and mind only, 
can be an efficient cause. We see no reason for this extreme 
jealousy of “second causes” either in the mental or the 
material world. In the mental world, they cannot be denied, 
as distinct, although subordinate and dependent, agencies, with- 
out virtually making God’s will the only cause in Nature, and 
thereby representing Him as the cause of sin, if sin, indeed, 
could exist on that supposition, or without destroying the dis- 
tinct individuality and personal responsibility of man. Man 
must be regarded as a distinct, though dependent, agent, and, as 
such, a real, though subordinate, cause; otherwise every action, 
whether good or evil, must be ascribed directly and immedi- 
ately to the efficiency of the Divine will, and to that alone. 
And in the material world, “second causes” can as little be 
dispensed with; for every theory, even the most meagre, must 
acknowledge the existence of some power or property in matter, 
were it only the passive power or vis ¢nerti@ on which all the 
laws of motion depend. And if ¢his can be admitted as a 
power inherent in matter and inseparable from it, we cannot 
see why the existence of other powers, not incompatible with 
this, should be deemed a whit more derogatory to the domin- 
ion and providence of God. In a certain sense, indeed, God’s 
will may be said to be the First, the Supreme Cause of all, 
since nothing can happen without His permission or appoint- 
ment: but, in this sense, the existence of “natural laws” and 
the operation of “second causes” are by no means excluded ; 
they are only held to have been originated at first, and ever 
afterwards sustained by the Divine Will, the latter being 
supreme, the fermer subordinate. It may also be said, in a 


» age tiated id cel Wea A nad dts etnieel 


NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES. 263 


certain sense, that Mind only is active: for all the properties 
and powers of matter are the results of the Divine volition, 
and their mode of action is regulated and determined by 
“laws” which God has imposed; but it were unphilosophical, 
as well as unscriptural, to infer from this that He is the only 
Agent in the Universe; it is enough to say that He created 
the system of Nature, and that He still upholds and governs it 
by His Providence. 

It must be evident that the speculations to which we have 
referred have a close connection with the argument, founded on 
natural evidence, for the being, perfections, and providence of 
God. That argument, in so far as it depends on the mutual 
adaptations between natural objects and the nice adjustments 
of natural laws, might be seriously impaired by supposing that 
there is really only one cause in Nature; whereas the ascrip- 
tion of certain properties and powers to created beings, whether 
mental or material, can have no effect in diminishing its force, 
since the evidence depends not so much on the sama of 
physical, as on those of moral causation. 

On the whole, we conclude that the existence of “natural 
laws” and the operation of “second causes” are recognized 
alike by the sacred writers and by sound philosophy ; and that 
neither the one nor the other ought to be regarded as adverse 
to any doctrine which, as Christian Theists, we are concerned 
to defend. 


1 Dr. THomas Brown, “ Essay on Cause and Effect,” pp. 74, 83, 93, 
108,191. . 


264 MODERN ATHEISM. 


Sr en tee 


THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN CONSIDERED IN ITS RELATION TO 
THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 


“The Constitution of Man considered in Relation to Ex- 


”1__ such is the title of a popular, and, in some 


ternal Objects, 
respects, instructive work, which has obtained, partly through 
the aid of an endowment, extensive circulation among the 
reading class of artisans and tradesmen. Written in a lucid 
style, and illustrated by numerous facts in Natural History and 
Philosophy, it is skilfully adapted to the capacities and tastes 
of common readers, and it is not wonderful that it should have 
exerted considerable influence on the public mind. The char- 
acter of that influence, and its tendency to induce a religious 
or irreligious frame of spirit, has been made a matter of con- 
troversial discussion. On the one hand, Mr. Combe tells us 
that “‘ The Constitution of Man’ not only admits the existence 
of God, but is throughout devoted to the object of expounding 
and proving that He exercises a real, practical, and intelligible 
government of this world, rewarding virtue with physical and 
moral well-being, and punishing vice with want and suffering.” 
On the other hand, it is manifest, beyond the possibility of 
doubt or denial, that if his professed Theism has subjected him 
to the charge of being an inconsequent thinker in some of the 
organs of avowed Atheism,” his favorite arguments in support 
of “ government by natural law” have been applied by him- 
self, and eagerly welcomed by others, as conclusive objections 
to the doctrine of a special Providence and the efficacy of 
Prayer. 

We do not object to the limitation of his inquiry to the one 


1 GEORGE ComMBE, Esq. “Reasoner,” x11. 21, 23. 


i» ; + 
THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN, ETC. 26 


point of the relation subsisting between “the Constitution of 
Man and External Objects,”— that is a perfectly legitimate, 
and might be a highly instructive field of investigation ; but 
we do object to his utter forgetfulness of that limitation in the 
progress of his work, and to his attempt to introduce a variety 
of other topics which are manifestly alien from his professed 
design. If he meant to discuss merely the relation between 
the constitution of man and external objects, he had nothing 
whatever to do with the far higher and more comprehensive 
doctrine respecting the relation between the constitution of 
man and the government of God, and, least of all, with the 
revealed doctrines of a special Providence, of a fall into a state 
of sin, of death as its wages, and of “spiritual influences” by 
which the ruin occasioned by the fall may be redressed; and 
yet these topics, foreign as they are to the professed design of 
his work, are all introduced, and treated, too, in a way that is 
fitted, if not designed, to shake the confidence of his readers in 
what have hitherto been regarded as important articles of the 
Christian faith. It has received this significant testimony, 
“<Combe’s Constitution of Man’ would be worth a hundred 
New Testaments on the banks of the Ganges.” + 

There are two points, especially, on which he comes more 
directly into collision with our present argument : 

1. He speaks as if God governed the universe only by 
“natural laws,” so as to exclude any other dispensation of 
Providence. 

2. He speaks as if the “physical and organic” laws of 
Nature possessed the same authority and imposed the same 
obligation as the “ moral” laws of Conscience and Revelation ; 
and as if the breach or neglect of the former were punishable 
in the same sense, and for the same reason, as the transgression 
of the latter. 


1 HoLyoaxe, “ Grant and Holyoake’s Discussion,” p. 40. 


23 


266 . MODERN ATHEISM. 


Next to the omission of all reference to a future state, and 
the total exclusion of the connection which subsists between 
the temporal and the eternal under the Divine government, we 
hold these two to be the capital defects of his treatise ; and it 
may be useful, in the present state of public opinion, to offer a 
few remarks upon each of them. 

In regard to the jirst, we need not repeat what we have 
already explicitly declared, that God does govern the world zn 
part by means of “natural laws” and “second causes;” but, 
not content with this concession, Mr. Combe speaks as if He 
governed the world only by these means, to the exclusion of 
everything like a “special Providence,” or “Divine influ- 
ences.” It is not so much in his dogmatic statements as in his 
illustrative examples that the real tendency of his theory 
becomes apparent. Thus he speaks of “the most pious and 
benevolent missionaries sailing to civilize and Christianize the 
heathen, but, embarking in an unsound ship, they are drowned 
by their disobeying a physical law, without their destruction 
being averted by their morality ;” and, on the other hand, of 
“the greatest monsters of iniquity” embarking in a staunch 
and strong ship, and escaping drowning “in circumstances 
exactly similar to those which would send the missionaries to 
the bottom.” Thus, again, he speaks of plague, fever, and 
ague, as resulting from the neglect of “organic laws,” and as 
resulting from it so necessarily that they could be averted 
neither by Providence nor by Prayer; and he illustrates his 
views by the mental distress of the wife of Ebenezer Erskine, 
and the recorded experience of Mrs. Hannah More.’ It can- 
not be doubted, we think, that in all these cases he speaks as if 
God governed the world only by natural laws ; and that he does 
not recognize any special Providence or any answer to Prayer, 
but resolves all events into the operation of these “ laws.” 


1 GEORGE CoMBE, ‘‘Constitution of Man,” pp. 150, 155, 163, 165, 234, 
343, 358. 


_y. -*s vy 


= * Fa on Vee 


THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN, ETC. 267 


Now, there are evidently two suppositions that may be 


“entertained on this subject: either, that God orders all events 


? 


to fall out according to “natural laws” and by means of 
“second causes;” or, that while He generally makes use of 
means in the ordinary course of His Providence, He reserves 
the liberty and the power of interposing directly and imme- 
diately, when He sees cause, for the accomplishment of His 
sovereign will. These two suppositions seem to exhaust the 
only possible alternatives in a question of this kind; and, 
strange as it may at first sight appear to be, it is nevertheless 
true that neither the one nor the other is necessarily adverse 
to the doctrine for which we now contend. Even on the first 
supposition, — that God orders all events to fall out according 
to “natural laws” and by means of “second causes,”— there 
might still be room, not, indeed, for miraculous interposition, 
but for the exercise of a special Providence and even for an 
answer to prayer; for it should never be forgotten that, among 
the “second causes” created and governed by the Supreme 
Will, there are other agencies besides those that are purely 


-physical,—there are intelligent beings, belonging both to the 


visible and invisible worlds, who may be employed, for ought 
we know to the contrary, as “ministers in fulfilling His will,” 
and whose agency may, without any miraculous interference 
with the established order of Nature, bring about important 
practical results, just as man’s own agency is admitted to have 
the power of arranging, modifying, and directing the elements 
of Nature, while it has no power to suspend or reverse any 
“natural law.” And if God is ordinarily pleased to make use 
of means, why should it be thought incredible that He may 
make use of the ministry of intelligent beings, whether they be 
men or angels, for the accomplishment of His designs? But 
on the second supposition, — that while He generally makes 
use of means in the ordinary course of His Providence, He 
reserves the liberty and the power of interposing directly and 


* 


268 MODERN ATHEISM. 


immediately when He sees cause,—the doctrine of a special 
Providence, including every interposition, natural or super- 
natural, is at once established; and we cannot see how Mr. 
Combe, as a professed believer in Revelation, which must of 
course be regarded as a supernatural effect of “ Divine influ- 
ence,” can consistently deny God’s direct and immediate agency 
in Providence, since he is compelled to admit it at least on two 
great occasions, namely, the Creation of the world, and the 
promulgation of His revealed will. 

In regard, again, to the second capital defect or error of his 
system, it may be conclusively shown that he confounds, or 
fails at least duly to discriminate, two things which are radi- 
cally different, when he speaks as if the “ physical and organic 
laws” of Nature had the same authority, and imposed the same 
obligations, as the “ moral laws” of Conscience and Revelation, 
and as if the breach or neglect of the former were punishable, 
in the same sense, and for the same reason, as the transgression 
of the latter. 

The declared object of his treatise is twofold: first, to illus- 
trate the relation subsisting between the “natural laws” and 


the “constitution of man;” 


and, secondly, to prove the znde- 
pendent operation of these laws, as a key to the explanation of 
the Divine government. In illustrating the relation between 
the “ natural laws” and the “constitution of man,” he attempts 
to show that the natural laws require obedience not less than 
the moral, and that they inflict punishment on disobedience : 
“The peculiarity of the new doctrine is that these (the physical, 
organic, and moral laws) operate independently of each other ; 
that each requires obedience to itself; that each, in its own 
specific way, rewards obedience and punishes disobedience ; 
and that human beings are happy in proportion to the extent 
to which they place themselves in accordance with all of these 
Divine institutions.” In regard to these “natural laws,” — 
including the physical, the organic, the intellectual, and the 


THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN, ETC. 269 


moral,— four positions are laid down: first, that they are 
independent of each other; secondly, that obedience or dis- 
obedience to each of them is followed by reward or punish- 
ment ; thirdly, that they are universal and invariable ; and, 
fourthly, that they are in harmony with the “ constitution of 
man.” * 

Now, in this theory of “natural laws,” especially as it is 
applied to the doctrines of Providence and Prayer, there 
seem to be three radical defects : 

1. Mr. Combe speaks of obedience and disobedience to the 
“physical and organic” laws, as if they could be obeyed or 
disobeyed in the same sense and in the same way as the 
“moral” laws, and as if they imposed an obligation on man 
which it would be sinful to disregard. He has not duly con- 
sidered that the moral law differs from the physical and organic 
laws of Nature in two important respects: first, that while the 
former may, the latter cannot, be broken or violated by man ; 
and secondly, that while the former does impose an imperative 
obligation which is felt by every conscience, the latter have 
either no relation to the conscience at all, or, if they have, it is 
collateral and indirect only, and arises not from the mere exis- 
tence of such laws, but from the felt obligation of a moral law 
belonging to our own nature, which prescribes prudence as a 
duty with reference to our personal conduct in the circum- 
stances in which we are placed. 

That the “physical and organic” laws cannot be broken or 
violated in the same sense in which the “moral law” may be 
transgressed, is evident from the simple consideration that the 
violation of a natural law, were it possible, would be not a sin, 
but a miracle! And that these laws impose no real obligation 
on the conscience is further manifest, because we hold it to be 
perfectly lawful to counteract, so far as we can, the operation 


1 Mr. Comse, “Constitution of Man,” vi., IX., 25, 39, 41. 
23* 


270 MODERN ATHEISM. 


of one physical or organic law by employing the agency of 
another, as in the appliances of Mechanics, the experiments of 
Chemistry, and the art of Navigation. When the aéronaut 
inflates his balloon with a gas specifically lighterthan atmospheric 
air, or the ship-builder constructs vessels of wood or iron, so 
that when filled with air they shall be lighter than water, and 
float with their cargo on its surface, each is attempting to 
counteract the law of gravitation by the application of certain 
other related laws: but no one ever dreams of their disobeying 
God in thus availing themselves of one physical agent to coun- 
terpoise another. The “moral law,” however, cannot be treated 
in the same way, and that simply because it is generically 
different. 

It is true, that indirectly the laws of Nature, when known, 
may and ought to regulate our practical conduct ; not, however, 
by virtue of any obligation imposed by them on our conscience, 
but solely by virtue of that law of moral prudence which springs 
from conscience itself, and which teaches us that we ought so 
to act with reference to outward objects as to secure, so far as 
we can, our own safety and happiness, and the welfare of our 
fellow-men. But there can be no greater blunder than to con- 
found the laws of natural objects with the law of human conduct ; 
and into this deplorable blunder Mr. Combe has allowed him- 
self to fall. Throughout the whole of his statements respecting 
the “natural laws,” there are two things included under one 
name, which are perfectly distinct and separate from each 
other. In the first place, there are the laws which belong to 
the constitution of natural objects, and which regulate their 
mutual action on one another: in the second place, there are, 
in the words of a late sagacious layman, “ules which the intel- 
lect of man is able to deduce for the regulation of his own con- 
duct, by means of his knowledge of those laws which govern 
the phenomena of Nature. These last are perfectly distinct 
from the former; and it is a monstrous confusion of ideas to 


J 


THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN, ETC. 271 


mix them up together. . . . . The true state of the case is this, 
—jt is for our interest to study these natural arrangements, 
and to accommodate our conduct to them, as far as we know 
them; and in doing so, we obey, not those laws of Nature, 
physical and organic, but the laws of prudence and good sense, 
arising from a due use of our moral and intellectual faculties.”? 
Another acute writer, who states the substance of the argu- 
ment in very few words, has shown that the theory of “natural 
laws,” as taught by Mr. Combe, is true in one sense and false 
in another : “Tt is true, first, that the Creator has bestowed 
constitutions on physical objects ; in other words, the constitu- 
tions which physical objects possess were given them, given 
during His pleasure ; secondly, that the constitutions of physical 
objects are definite, — that is, they are distinct, individual, and 
incapable of transmutation by natural causes ; thirdly, that no 
power but the power of the Creator can vary their constitu- 
tions. But it is not true, first, that any mode of action of a 
physical object i is otherwise inherent in it, than as it is the will of 
God that that object should now present that mode of action. 
Nor is it true, secondly, that it is beyond the power of God to 
vary, when He pleases, either temporarily or permanently, the 
constitution of physical objects.” He further shows that, on 
Mr. Combe’s principle of “natural laws” being all equally 
Divine institutions which must be obeyed, “human obedience is 
a very complicated and perplexing aflair, so complicated and 
so perplexing as to involve positive contradictions ;” that “ the 
very same act is required by one law, and forbidden by another, 
both laws being equally Divine;” and that “we sometimes 
cannot obey both the ‘organic’ and the ‘moral’ laws.” He 
concludes that “physical laws ought not to be confounded with 
laws of human conduct;” that “these we always must obey, 


1 Mr. Scort, “ Harmony of Phrenology with Scripture,” pp. = 97. 
2 Citizen KENNEDY, “ Nature and Revelation Harmonious,” pp. 70, 
122, 124, 131. 


‘+ 


272 MODERN ATHEISM. 


and those we may often, without deserving blame, boldly dis- 
regard ;” and that “by commingling distinct classes of ‘ natural 
laws, Mr. Combe introduces into his system dangerous error 
and gross absurdity.” 

2. Another radical defect in this theory of “natural laws” 
consists in its representing the consequences of our ignorance 
or neglect of them as punishments in the same sense in which 
moral delinquencies are said to be followed by penal inflictions. 
There is something here which is totally at variance with the 
instinctive feelings and moral convictions of mankind. “Mr. 
Combe affirms that each of the three great classes of “natural 
laws ” requires obedience to itself, and that each, in its own spe- 
cific way, rewards obedience and punishes disobedience. And 
he gives, as one example, the case of the most pious and benev- 
olent missionaries sailing to civilize and Christianize the 
heathen, but embarking in an unsound ship, and being drowned 
by disobeying a “natural law ;” as another, the case of “a child 
or an aged person, stumbling into the fire, through mere lack 
of physical strength to keep out of it;” as another, the case of 
“an ignorant child, groping about for something to eat and 
drink, and stumbling on a phial of laudanum, drinking it and 
dying ;” and as another, the case of “a slater slipping from the 
roof of a high building, in consequence of a stone of the ridge 
having given way as he walked upright along it.”1 In all 
these cases, the accident or misfortune which befalls the indi- 
vidual is represented as the punishment connected with the 
neglect or transgression of a “natural law,” just as remorse, 
shame, conviction, and condemnation may be the punishment 
for a moral offence. In other words, a child who ignorantly 
drinks laudanum is punished with death, in the same sense, and 
for the same reason, that the murderer is punished with death 
for shedding the blood of a fellow-creature ; and the poor slater 


1 Mr. Comsg, “Constitution of Man,” pp. 25, 53, 306, 364. 


* 


THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN, ETC. 273 


who misses his foot, and falls, most unwillingly, from a roof or 
parapet, is punished with death, just as aman would be who 
threw himself over with the intention of committing suicide! 
Surely there is some grave error here, — an error opposed to 
the surest dictates of our moral nature, and one that cannot be 
glossed over by any apologue, however ingeniously constructed, 
to show the evil effects which would follow from a suspension 
of the general laws of Nature. For, in the words of Mr. Scott, 
it is only where “the law is previously known” —and not only 
so, but where the “circumstances which determine the effect 
might be foreseen”— that “the pleasures or pains annexed to 
actions can properly be termed rewards and punishments ;” for 
“these have reference to the state of mind of the party who is to 
be rewarded or punished ; it is the intention or disposition of the 
mind, and not the mere act of the body, that is ever considered 
as obedience or disobedience, or thought worthy, in a moral 
sense, of either reward or punishment.” And as the theory is 
thus subversive of all our ideas of moral retribution, so it 
demands of man a kind of obedience which it is émposszble for 
him to render, since all the laws of Nature, and ail the states 
of particular things at a given time, cannot possibly be known 
by the ignorant many, nor even by the philosophic few. The 
philosopher, not less than the peasant, may perish through the 
explosion of a steam engine, or the unsoundness of a ship, or 
the casual ignition of his dwelling; and that, too, without blame 
or punishment being involved in either case. On Mr. Combe’s 
theory, it would seem to be necessary tliat every one should be 
aman of science, if he would avoid sin and punishment; and 
yet, unfortunately, the ablest man of science is not exempt, in 
the present state of his knowledge, from the same calamities 
which befall his less enlightened, but not less virtuous, 
neighbors. 

These views are strikingly confirmed by the remarks of a 
writer in “The Reasoner,” who blames Mr. Combe for com- 


274 MODERN ATHEISM. 


plicating his argument unnecessarily and uselessly with some 
of the truths of Theism, and who thinks that the doctrine of 
“natural laws” can only be consistently maintained on the 
ground of Atheism. “If the system of Nature,” he says, “be 
viewed by itself, without any reference to a Divine Author or 
all-perfect Creator, — merely as an isolated system of facts, — 
no comparison could be made, no reconciliation would be 
necessary, and the system of Nature would be regarded as the 
result of some unknown cause, a combination of good and evil, 
and no more to be censured or wondered at for being what it 
is, than any single substance or fact in Nature excites censure 
or surprise on account of its peculiar constitution. .... The 
assumption of a Supernatural Being as the author and director 
of the laws of Nature appears to me to be attended with several 
mischievous results. First, you make every infringement of 
the laws of Nature an offence against the supposed Divine 
Legislator, which, to a pious and conscientious mind, must give 
rise to distressing remorse. . . . . Again, under this view, the 
penalties incurred will often be very unjust, oppressive, and 
cruel; as where persons are placed in circumstances that com- 
pel them to violate the laws of Nature, as when they are 
obliged to pursue some unwholesome employment which 
injures their health and shortens their lives; or where the 
penalty is incurred by an accident, as when a person breaks a 
leg or anarm, or is killed by a fall; or where a person is 
materially or fatally injured in endeavoring to save another 
person from injury or death. In such cases as these, to repre- 
sent the unavoidable pain or death incurred or undergone for 
an act of beneficence, as a punishment inflicted for a transgres- 
sion of the laws of God the Divine Legislator, is to violate all 
our notions of justice and right, to say nothing of goodness or 
mercy, and to represent the Divine Being as grossly unjust 
and cruelly vindictive. .... Again, if all suffering, however 
unavoidably incurred, is to be regarded as a punishment from 


bai 


THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN, ETC. 275 


the Divine Legislator, to attempt to alleviate or remove the 
suffering thus incurred would be to fly in the face of the Divine 
authority, by endeavoring to set aside the punishment it had 
inflicted ; just as it would be an opposition to the authority of 
human laws to rescue a prisoner from custody, or deliver a 
culprit from punishment.” ? 

3. We deem it another radical defect in Mr. Combe’s theory 
of “natural laws,” that he represents the distinct existence and 
independent action of these laws as “the key to the Divine 
government,” as the one principle which explains all apparent 
irregularities, and accounts satisfactorily for the casualties and 
calamities of human life. We cannot doubt, indeed, either the 
wisdom or the benevolence of that constitution of things under 
which we live, nor dispute the value and importance of those 
laws according to which the world is ordinarily governed. We 
admit that the suspension of any one of these laws, except 
perhaps on some signal occasion of miraculous interposition, 
would go far to unsettle and derange the existing economy. 
But “natural laws ” — whether viewed individually or collec- 
tively, and whether considered as acting independently of each 
other, or as mutually related and interdependent — cannot 
afford of themselves any key to the Divine government, or any 
solution of the difficulties of Providence. We must rise toa 
far higher platform if we would survey the whole scheme of 
the Divine administration: we must consider, not merely the 
independent operation of the several classes of “natural laws,” 
but also their mutual relations, as distinct but connected parts 
of one vast’system, in which the “physical and organic” laws 
are made subordinate and subservient to the “moral,” under 
the superintendence of that Supreme Intelligence which makes 
the things that are “seen and temporal” to minister to those 
things which are “unseen and eternal;” we must carefully 


1¥. B. Barton, “The Reasoner,” x1. 24, 373. 


- 


276 MODERN ATHEISM. 


discriminate, as Bishop Butler has done, between the mere 
“natural government” which is common to man with the infe- 
rior and irresponsible creation, and the higher “moral govern- 
ment” which is peculiar to intelligent and accountable agents ; 
and we must seek to know how far — the reality of both being 
admitted — the former is auxiliary or subservient to the latter, 
and whether, on the whole, the system is fitted to generate that 
frame of mind, and to inculcate those lessons of truth, which 
are appropriate to the condition of man, as a subject of moral 
discipline in a state of probation and trial. Nothing short of 
this will suffice for the explanation of the Divine government, 
or for the satisfaction of the human mind. It is felt to bea 
mere insult to the understandings, and a bitter mockery to the 
feelings, of men, to talk only of “natural laws,” or even of 
their “independent action” in such a case, to tell a weeping 
mother that her child died, and died too as the transgressor of 
a wise and salutary “natural law” which establishes a certain 
relation betwéen opium and the nervous system: for, grant 
that the law is wise and salutary, grant that evil would result 
from its abolition, grant even that it acts Independently of any 
other law, physical or moral, still the profounder question 
remains, whether such an event as the death of a tender child, 
through the operation of a law of which that child was neces- 
sarily ignorant, can properly be regarded as a punishment in- 
flicted by Divine justice? and whether a theory of this kind 
can afford “a key to the government of God?” 

Such are some of the radical and incurable defects of Mr. 
Combe’s theory of “natural laws.” We ascribe it to him 
simply because he has been the most recent and the most 
popular expounder of it. But it is not original, nor in any 
sense peculiar to him alone. He acknowledges his obligations 
in this respect to a manuscript work of Dr. Spurzheim, 
entitled, “A Sketch of the Natural Laws of Man;” and he 
refers, somewhat incidentally, to Volney’s “ Law of Nature,” 


THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN, ETC. 277 


published originally as a Catechism, and afterwards reprinted 
under the title, “Ia Loi Naturelle; ou, Principes Physiques 
de la Morale” The same theory, in substance, had been 
broached in the “Systéme de la Nature,” and there it was 
applied in support of the atheistic conclusions of that remark- 
able treatise. But it may be said to have been methodized by 
Volney ; and in his treatise it is exhibited in a form adapted 
to popular instruction.’ There is a striking resemblance 
between his speculations and those of Mr. Combe. He, too, 
acknowledges the existence of God; but virtually supersedes 
His Providence by the substitution of “natural laws.” ‘The 
“law of Nature” is defined as “the constant order by which 
God governs the world,” and is represented as the most uni- 
versal “rule of action.” That law is supposed to be a com- 
mand or a prohibition to act in certain cases, accompanied with 
the natural sanction of reward and punishment. After giving 
several examples of “ natural laws,” which are all merely gen- 
eral facts or the generalized results of experience, he describes 
man’s relation to these laws almost in the words of Mr. Combe.’ 
“ Since all these, and similar facts,” he says, “are unchange- 
able, constant, and regular, there result for man as many true 
laws to which he must conform, with the express clause of a 
penalty attached to their infraction, or of a benefit attached to 
‘their observance; so that if a man shall pretend to see well in 
the dark, if he acts in opposition to the course of the seasons 
or the action of the elements, if he pretends to live under 
water without being drowned, or to touch fire without being 
burned, or to deprive himself of air without being suffocated, 
or to drink poison without being destroyed, he receives for 
each of these infractions of the ‘natural laws’ a corporeal 
punishment, and one that is proportioned to his offence; while, 


1 Votney, “ La Loi Naturelle,” which has been translated, and is usu- 
ally appended to his “ Ruins of Empires.” 
24 


278 MODERN ATHEISM. 


on the contrary, if he observes and obeys every one of these 
laws, in their exact and regular relations to him, he will pre- 
serve his existence, and make it as happy as it can be.” 

This code of “natural laws” is then described by Volney as 
possessing no fewer than ten peculiar characteristics, which 
give it a decided preéminence over every other moral system, 
whether human or Divine, — as being primitive, immediate, 
universal, invariable, evident, reasonable, just, peaceful, bene- 
Jicial, and alone sufficient. But it is so only when viewed in 
connection with the miserably low and meagre system of 
morals with which it is avowedly associated. For when 
morals are described as a mere physical science, founded on 
man’s organization, his interests and passions, — when the 
treatise, according to its second title, is professedly an attempt 
to expound the physical principles of morals, —and when, in 
pursuance of this plan, all the principles of Ethics are rigor- 
ously reduced to one, namely, the principle of self-preserva- 
tion, which is enforced, as a duty, by the only sanctions of 
pleasure and pain, — it is not wonderful that, for such an end, 
the “natural laws” might be held sufficient: but it is wonder- 
ful that any mind capable of a moment’s reflection should not 
have perceived that, in such a system, the cardinal idea of 
Deity is altogether omitted, or left unaccounted for, in the case 
of Man, and that no attempt is made to explain or to account 
for anything that is properly moral in the government of God. 


On a review of these speculations, it is important to bear in 
mind that the existence of natural laws is not necessarily 
exclusive of a superintending Providence. Their operation, 
on the contrary, may afford some of the strongest proofs of 
its reality. For, whether considered as a scheme of provision 
or as a system of government, Divine Providence rests on a 
strong body of natural evidence. In the one aspect, it upholds 
and preserves all things; in the other, it controls and overrules 


THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN, ETC. 279 


all things for the accomplishment of the Divine will. Con- 
sidered as a scheme of government, it is either natural or 
moral. To the former, all created beings without exception 
are subject; to the latter, only some orders of being, — such, 
namely, as are intelligent, voluntary, and responsible agents. 
In the case of man, constituted as he is, the Physical, Organic, 
Intellectual, and Moral laws are all combined; and he is sub- 
ject, therefore, both to a natural government, which is common 
to him with all other material and organized beings, and also 
to a moral government, which is peculiar to himself as a free 
and accountable agent. The natural government of God ex- 
tends to all his creatures, and includes man considered simply 
as one of them; and its reality is proved, first, by the laws to 
which all created things are subject, and which they have no 
power to alter or resist; secondly, by the inal causes or bene- 
ficial ends which are obviously contemplated in the arrange- 
ments of Nature, and the great purposes which are actually 
served by them; and, thirdly, by the necessary dependence of 
all created things on the will of Him to whom they owe alike 
the commencement and the continuance of their being. But 
the natural government of God, which extends to all His 
creatures, does not exhaust or complete the doctrine of His 
Providence: it includes also a scheme of moral government, 
adapted to the nature, and designed for the regulation, of His 
intelligent, voluntary, and responsible subjects. And the reality 
of a moral government may be proved, first, by the moral fac- 
ulty, which is a constituent part of human nature, and which 
makes man “a law to himself;” secondly, by the essential 
nature of virtuous and vicious dispositions, as being inherently 
pleasant or painful; thirdly, by the natural consequences of 
our actions, which indicate a sure connection between moral 
and physical evil; and, fowrthly, by the moral atmosphere in 
which we are placed, as being members of a community in 
which the distinction between right and wrong is universally 


280 MODERN ATHEISM. 


acknowledged, and applied in the way of approbation or cen- 
sure. ‘By such proofs, the Providence of God may be shown 
to be a scheme both of natural and moral government, — two 
aspects of the same system which are equally real, yet widely 
different. But the distinction between the two, although 
founded on a real and radical difference, is not such as to imply 
that they have no relation to each other, or no mutual influence, 
as distinct but connected parts of the same comprehensive 
scheme. They are not isolated, but interpenetrating ; they 
come into contact at many points, and the natural is made sub- 
ordinate and subservient to the moral. For there is a beautiful 
gradation in the order of the established laws of Nature. The 
physical laws are made subordinate and subservient to the 
organic; both the physical and organic are subservient to the 
intellectual ; the physical, organic, and intellectual are sub- 
servient to the moral; and the intellectual and moral are sub- 
servient to our preparation for the spiritual and eternal. In 
the words of Bishop Butler, “The natural and moral constitu- 
tion and government of the world are so connected as to make 
up together but one scheme; and it is highly probable that the 
first is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to the 
latter, as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized 
bodies for minds.”! _ 

Every instance of pleasure or pain arising from the volun- 
tary actions of men, is a proof that a relation of some kind has 
been established between all the distinct, but independent, 
provinces of Nature; and the invariable connection between 
moral and physical evil shows how the lower are made sub- 
servient to the higher departments of the Divine government. 
Apart from a scheme of moral discipline, there is no reason 
discernible, @ priori, why pain should be the accompaniment or 
consequent of one mode of action rather than another; and the 


1 BuTier’s “ Analogy,” p. 1. ¢. 7. 


THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN, ETC. 281 


relations which have been established, in the natural constitu- 
tion of things, between sin and misery, affords a strong proof 
not only of the reality of a moral government, but of the subor- 
dination of physical and organic agencies to its great designs. 
This relation between the natural and the moral government 
of God is admirably illustrated by Bishop Warburton: “The 
application of natural events to moral government, in the com- 
mon course of Providence, connects the character of Lord and 
Governor of the intellectual world with that of Creator and 
Preserver of the material. .... The doctrine of the pre- 
established harmony, — the direction of natural events to moral 
government, — obviates all irreligious suspicions, and not only 
satisfies us that there is but one governor of both systems, but 
that both systems are conducted by one scheme of Providence. 
To form the constitution of Nature in such a manner that, 
without controlling or suspending its laws, it should continue, 
throughout a long succession of ages, to produce its physical 
revolutions as they best contribute to the preservation and 
order of its own system, just at those precise periods of time 
when theif effects, whether salutary or hurtful to many, may 
serve as instruments for the government of the moral world: 
for example, that a foreign enemy, amidst our intestine broils, 
should desolate all the flourishing works of rural industry, — 
that warring elements, in the stated order of natural govern- 
ment, should depopulate and tear in pieces a highly-viced city, 
just in those very moments when moral government required a 
warning and example to be held out to a careless world, — is 
giving us the noblest as well as the most astonishing idea of 
God’s goodness and justice... . . When He made the world, 
the free determinations of the human will, and the necessary 
effects of laws physical, were so fitted and accommodated to 
one another, that a sincere repentance in the moral world 
should be sure to avert an impending desolation in the natural, 
not by any present alteration or suspension of its established 
24* 


282 MODERN ATHEISM. 


laws, but by originally adjusting all their operations to all the 
foreseen circumstances of moral agency.” 

Viewed in this light, the course of Providence is wonderfully 
adapted to the constitution of human nature, since it affords as 
much certainty in regard to some things as is sufficient to lay a 
foundation for forethought, prudence, and diligence in the use 
of means, and yet leaves so much remaining uncertainty in 
regard to other things as should impress us with a sense of 
constant dependence on Him “in whom we live, and move, and 


? 


have our being.” The constitution of Nature and the course 
of Providence in the present state seem mainly intended to 
teach these two lessons,—first, of diligence in the use of 
means, and, secondly, of dependence on a Higher Power: for 
there is sufficient regularity in the course of events to encourage 
human industry in every department of labor; and yet there is 
as much uncertainty, arising from the endless complication of 
causes and the limited range of human knowledge, as should 
impress us with a sense of our utter helplessness. The wisdom 
of God in the government of the world may be equally mani- 
fested in the regular order which He has established, and 
which, within certain limits, man may be able to ascertain ‘and 
reckon on as a ground of hopeful activity; and in the apparent 
casualty and inscrutable mystery of many things which can 
neither be divined by human wisdom, nor controlled by human 
power. It matters not whether the remaining uncertainty is 
supposed to arise from some classes of events not being subject 
to regular laws, or from our ignorance of these laws, and the 
variety of their manifold combinations. In either case, it is 
certain that, in our actual experience, and, so far as we can 
judge, in the experience of every creature not possessed of 
omniscient knowledge, these two elements are and must be 
combined, — such a measure of certainty as should encourage 


1 WaRBuRTON’S “ Works,” x. p. 8. 


g 


THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 283 


industry in the use of means, and such a measure of remaining 
uncertainty as should keep them mindful that they are not, 
and never can be, independent of God. 


SECTION III. 


THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 


The doctrine of Providence lays a firm foundation for the 
duty of Prayer. In the case of all intelligent, moral, and 
responsible beings, the mere existence of a Divine government 
to which they are subject, would seem to imply an obligation 
to own and acknowledge it; and this obligation is best fulfilled 
by the exercise of prayer, which is a practical testimony alike 
to man’s dependence and to God’s dominion. 

Prayer, in its widest sense, includes the whole homage which 
man is capable of rendering to God as the sole object of 
religious worship; and it implies the recognition of all His 
supreme perfections and prerogatives as the Creator and Gov- 
ernor of the world. It is usually described’ as consisting, first, 
in “adoration,” — in which we express our sense of His right- 
ful supremacy and absolute perfection, and do homage to Him 
for what He is in himself; secondly, in “thanksgiving,” —in 
which we express our sense of gratitude for all His kindness 
and care, and do homage to Him for the benefits which He has 
bestowed ; thirdly, in “confession,”—in which we express our 
sense of sin in having transgressed His law, and do homage to 
Him as our moral Governor and Judge; and, fourthly, in 
“etition,”—in which we express our sense of dependence 
alike on His providence and grace, and do homage to Him as 
the “Father of lights, from whom cometh down every good 


1 Dr. Prick’s “Dissertations,” p. 198. 


284 MODERN ATHEISM. 


and perfect gift.” Of these, the three first are so evidently 
reasonable and becoming, so necessarily involved in the sim- 
plest idea which we can form of our relations to God and of 
the obligations which result from them, that few, if any, of 
those who admit the existence and providence of the Supreme 
Being, will deny that the sentiments themselves are appropriate 
to our condition, however they may doubt the necessity or the 
duty of giving formal utterance to them in the language of 
religious worship. But in regard to the fourth, which, if it be 
not the most sublime or elevated, is yet the most urgent motive 
to the exercise of devotion, many difficulties have been raised 
and many objections urged, which do not apply, at least in the 
same measure, to the other parts of Prayer, and which, in so 


far as they prevail with reflecting minds, would soon lead to: 


the practical neglect of all religious worship. The practice of 
offering up “ petitions” either for ourselves or others, with the 
view of thereby obtaining any benefit, whether of a temporal 
or spiritual kind, has been denounced, and even ridiculed, as an 
unphilosophical attempt to alter the established course of 
Nature, or the preordained sequences of events. The supposi- 
tion of its “efficacy” has been represented as a flagrant instance 
of superstitious ignorance, worthy only of the dark ages, and 
even as a presumptuous blasphemy, derogatory to the unchange- 
able character of the Supreme. Some have held, indeed, that 
while prayer can have no real efficacy either in averting evil 
or procuring good, it may nevertheless be both legitimate and 
useful, by reason of the wholesome reflex influence which it is 
fitted to exert on the mind of the worshipper; and they have 
recommended the continuance of the practice on this ground, as 
if men, once convinced of its utter inefficacy, would or could 
continue, with any fervency, to offer up their requests to God, 
merely for the sake of impressing their own minds through the 
medium of a sort of conscious hypocrisy! We are told that 
David Hume, “after hearing a sermon preached by Dr. Leech- 


Crees 9 et. oe See 


THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 285 


man, in which he dwelt on the power of prayer to render the 
wishes it expressed more ardent and passionate, remarked with 
great justice, that ‘we can make use of no expression, or even 
thought, in prayers and entreaties, which does not imply that 


these prayers have an influence.” 


This intermediate ground, 
therefore, is plainly untenable, and we are shut up to one or 
other of two alternatives: either there 7s an “ efficacy ” 
prayer as a means of averting evil and procuring good, ste as 
may warrant, and should encourage, us in offering up our 
requests unto God; or, there ¢s no such efficacy in it, and no 
reason why it should be observed by any of God’s intelligent 
creatures, whether on earth or in heaven. 

The principles which are applicable to the decision of this 
important question may be best explained, after adverting 
briefly to some of the particular objections which have been 
urged against the “efficacy of prayer.” Several of these 
objections evidently proceed on an erroneous view of the na- 
ture and object of prayer. When it is said, for example, that 
God, being omniscient, does not need to be informed either of 
the wants or the wishes of any of His creatures, the objection 
involves a great and important truth,—a truth which was 
explicitly recognized by our Lord when He said, “ Your 
heavenly Father knoweth what things ye have need of before 
ye ask Him;” but that truth is grievously misapplied when it 
is directed to prove that prayer is either superfluous or ineffec- 
tual, since the objection virtually assumes that the object of 
prayer is to inform God of what He did not know before, and 
that His omniscience is of itself sufficient to show that prayer 
from men or angels must needs be unavailing. When it is 
said, again, that God being immutable, His will cannot be 
affected or altered by the “petitions” of His creatures, this 
objection, like the former one, involves a great and important 
truth, —a truth which is also explicitly recognized in Scripture 
when it is said that “He is without variableness or the least 


J on a. ©. Pees 


e 


286 - MODERN ATHEISM. 


shadow of turning;” but this truth, too, is grievously misap- 
plied when it is directed to prove that there can be no efficacy 
in prayer, since it might as well be said that the Divine dis- 
pensations must be invariably the same whatever may be the 
conduct of His creatures iz other respects, as that they must be 
the same whether men do or do not pray; or, that His proce- 
dure as a Moral Governor has no reference whatever either to 
the character or conduct of his subjects. But, in the words of 
Dr. Price, “ God’s unchangeableness, when considered in rela- 
tion to the exertion of His attributes in the government of the 
world, consists, not in always acting in the same manner how- 
ever cases and circumstances alter, but in always doing what is 
right, and varying His conduct according to the various actions, 
characters and dispositions of beings. If, then, prayer makes 
an alteration ia the case of the suppliant, as being the discharge 
of an indispensable duty, what would in truth infer changeable- 
ness in Him would be, not His regarding and answering it, but 
His not doing this.” When it is said, again, that there can 
be no “efficacy in prayer,” because there is an established con- 
stitution and regular course of Nature, by which all events, 
whether prosperous or adverse, are invariably determined, and 
which cannot be altered or modified without a miracle, this 
objection, like each of the two former, involves an important 
truth, —a truth which is also explicitly recognized in Scripture 
when it speaks of “the ordinances of the heavens and the 
earth,” and of the peculiar laws and properties of all created 
things; but this truth is also grievously misapplied when it is 
directed to prove that God’s will has no efficient control over 
natural events, or that He has no agencies at His disposal by 
which he can accomplish the desires of them that seek Him. In 
all these objections there is an apparent truth, but there is also 
a latent error; and the false conclusion is founded on an erro- 
neous supposition in regard to the nature and object of prayer. 


1 Dr. Price, “ Dissertations,” pp. 208, 219. 


THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 287 


For this reason, we shall endeavor to separate the truth 
from the error, and to lay down a few positions which may be 
established both by reason and Scripture, and which will be 
sufficient to show that the doctrine which affirms the efficacy 
of prayer is not only credible, but true. 

1. Prayer, in the restricted sense in which we now speak 
of it, as denoting “ petition” or “supplication,” consists in offer- 
ing up “the desires of the heart to God for things agreeable to 
His will.” It is not a mere formal, outward homage, such as 
might be rendered by words or ceremonies ; it is a spiritual 
service, in which the mind and heart of man come into imme- 
diate converse with God Himself. It is offered to Him per- 
sonally, as to the invisible but ever-present “Searcher of 
hearts,” who “hears the desire of the humble,” and whose “ ear 
is attentive to the voice of their supplications.” This implies 
the recognition of His omnipresence and omniscience, but 
these perfections of His nature do not supersede the expres- 
sion of our desires in prayer, just because prayer is designed, 
not to increase His knowledge, but to declare our sense of 
dependence on His will, and to procure His grace to help us 
in every time of need. Our petitions, too, are always bounded 
within certain limits, and subject to at least one indispensable 
condition ; they are offered only “for things agreeable to His 
will;” and when our own will is thus, in the very act of 
prayer, expressly subordinated to that which is alone unerring 
and supreme, we acknowledge at once His rightful sovereignty 
and our dutiful subjection, and we are not justly chargeable 
with the presumption of dictating to God the course of pro- 
cedure which He should pursue towards us. We are pro- 
tected, too, against the evils which our own errors in prayer 
might otherwise entail on us, for “we know not what things to 
pray for as we ought;” and we have an infallible’ security 
that, in the best and highest sense,—that which is most in 
accordance with our real welfare,—our prayers must be 


‘on “a 
ie! 


288 MODERN ATHEISM. 


answered, since our wills are resolved into His will; and His 
will, being omnipotent, cannot be resisted or frustrated in any 
of its designs. Our assurance of the certain efficacy of our 
prayers is so much the greater, in proportion as we have 
reason to believe that the things for which we pray are agree- 
able to His will; and hence we are more confident in asking 
spiritual than temporal gifts; for the former we know to be 
always agreeable to His will and conducive to our own wel- 
fare, while the latter may, or may not, be good for us in our 
present circumstances, and must be left at the sovereign dis- 
posal of Him who knows what is in man, and what is best for 
each of His children. 

2. Considering the relation in which we stand to God as 
His creatures and subjects, it is natural, fit, and proper that we 
should make known our requests to Him, and supplicate the 
aids both of His providence and grace; and if it be our duty 
to pray, it is reasonable to believe that God will have some 
respect to our prayers in His methods of dealing with us; in 
other words, that, as a righteous moral governor, he will make 
a difference between the godly and the ungodly, the men who 
do, and the men who do not, pray. 

In this position it is assumed that there are certain relations, 
-natural or revealed, subsisting betwixt us and God, in virtue 
of which it is our duty to acknowledge His dominion and our 
dependence, by supplicating the aids of His providence and 
grace. That such relations do subsist between God and man, 
is evinced alike by the light of Nature and of Revelation ; 
and they cannot be discerned or realized without immediately 
suggesting the idea of certain corresponding obligations and 
duties. Every one whose conscience has not been utterly 
seared must instinctively feel the force of that appeal, “If I be 
a Father, where is mine honor? and if I be a Master, where is 
my fear?” For, considering God in the very simplest aspect 
of His character as the Creator and Governor of the world, 


sad 


THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 289 


He stands related to us as the Author and Preserver of our 
being, as our rightful Proprietor and constant Benefactor, as 
our supreme Lawgiver, Governor, and Judge; and these 
natural relations, apart altogether from the supernatural which 
are revealed in Scripture, are sufficient to lay a solid ground- 
work for “the duty of prayer” in the case of every intelligent 
being who is capable of knowing God, and acknowledging his 
dependence on the Divine will. In such a case, prayer is felt 
to be a natural, fit, and becoming expression of what is known 
to be true, and what ought, as a matter of duty, to be practi- 
cally avowed. Now, this is the grand design of prayer 5 and 
in its real design, when that is rightly apprehended, it finds its 
noblest vindication. The object of prayer is, neither to inform 
God, as if he were not omniscient, nor to alter His eternal 
purposes, as. if He were not unchangeable, nor to unsettle the 
established course of Nature, as if He were not “a God of 
order ;” but simply to acknowledge His dominion and our 
dependence, and to obtain from Him, in the way of His own 
appointment, the blessings of which we stand in need. 

Tt is not unreasonable to believe that God, as the Governor 
of the world, will have some regard to the dispositions and 
actions of His responsible creatures, as a reason for dealing 
differently with those who own, and those who disown, His 
supremacy; and that He may require the use of certain means, 
such as the exercise of prayer, with the view of our obtaining 
from Him, in a way the most beneficial to ourselves, the bless- 
ings, whether temporal or spiritual, of which we stand in need. 
For if we really be the creatures of God, and, as such, depen- 
dent‘on His providential bounty, and subject to His righteous 
government, it is self-evidently natural and right that we 
should, as intelligent and responsible beings, acknowledge His 
supreme dominion and our absolute dependence by supplicating 
the aids both of His providence and grace. This is our duty, 
considering the relations which He sustains towards us; and 

He 


J) 


290 MODERN ATHEISM. 


if it be fit and proper that we should pray to God, if it be, in 
our circumstances, a duty which we owe to Him, then it is 
most reasonable to believe that it is equally fit and proper in 
God to have some respect to our prayers, and to deal with us 
differently according as we either observe or neglect this 
religious duty. 

Prayer may be regarded in one or other of two distinct 
aspects: either as a duty, the observance or neglect of which 
must be followed, under a system of moral government, with 
different results; or simply as a@ means, the use of which is 
productive of certain effects which are made to depend on this 
special instrumentality. And in either view, its “ efficacy” 
may be affirmed on the same grounds on which we are wont to 
vindicate the use of all other means, and to enforce the observ- 
ance of all other duties, in connection with the system of the 
Divine government. 

3. The efficacy of prayer, so far from being inconsistent 
with, is founded on, the immutability of the Divine purposes 
and the faithfulness of the Divine promises. God’s purposes 
are justly held, in all other cases, to include the means as well 
as the ends; and they are often fulfilled through the instru- 
mentality of “second causes.” His purpose to provide for the 
wants of man and beast has reference not merely to the harvest 
which is the result, but also to the agricultural labor by which, 
instrumentally, the harvest is prepared. May not “ prayer” 
be also a means ordained by God in the original constitution 
of the world, a means towards certain ends which are made 
dependent on its use? If it be such a means, then its “ effi- 
cacy” is established, in the only sense in which we are con- 
cerned to contend for it; while it is shown to be no more 
inconsistent with the immutability of the Divine purposes, than 
any other system of means or instruments that may be em- 
ployed as subordinate agencies in the government of the world. 
This important view is strikingly illustrated in Scripture. 


THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 291 


For some of the purposes of God, which might have been 
undiscoverable in the mere light of Nature, are there explicitly 
declared ; nay, they are thrown into the form of express prom- 
ises, to which the Divine faithfulness is solemnly pledged; and 
yet the exercise of prayer, so far from being superseded - 
by these promises, is rather stimulated and encouraged by 
them; and the believer pleads with increased fervor and con- 
fidence when he simply converts God’s promises into his own 
petitions. He feels that in doing so he is taking God at his 
word; and that his own prayer, in so far as it is warranted 
by His promise, cannot be ineffectual any more than God’s 
faithfulness can fail. 

Thus Daniel “understood by books the number of the years 
whereof the word of the Lord came to Jeremiah the prophet, 
that He would accomplish seventy years in the desolation of 
Jerusalem.” He knew the Lord’s promise, and that the time 
for its fulfilment was at hand; yet so far from regarding either 
the immutability of the Divine purpose, or even the infallible 
certainty of the Divine promise, as a reason for neglecting 
prayer, as if that exercise were superfluous or vain, he was 
stimulated and encouraged to pray just because “he knew the 
word of the Lord.”—“ And I set my face,” he says, “unto the 
Lord God, to seek by prayer and supplications, with fasting, 
sackcloth, and ashes;” and I prayed unto the Lord my God, 
and said, “O Lord! hear; O Lord! forgive; O Lord! hearken 
and do; defer not, for thine own sake, O my God ! wk . "Tian, 
again, when the Lord gave certain great and precious promises 
to His ancient people, assuring them that “He would sprinkle 
clean water upon them, and give them a new heart and a right 
spirit,” it is added, “I will yet for this be inquired of by the 
house of Israel to do it for them.”? Thus, again, when the 
Saviour himself gave to His disciples that promise, which is 


1 Daniel 9: 2, 19. 2 Ezekiel 36: 37. 


292 MODERN ATHEISM. 


emphatically called “the promise of the Father,” assuring them 
that they should be “baptized with the Holy Ghost not many 
days hence,” and directing them to “wait at Jerusalem until 
they should be endued with power from above,” the apostles, 
so far from regarding that “ promise” as superseding the exer- 
cise of “prayer,” betook themselves immediately to an upper 
room, and “all continued with one accord in prayer and sup- 


plication ;” and, at the appointed time, God’s promise was ful- - 


filled, and their prayer answered, when “they were all filled 
with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other tongues 
as the Spirit gave them utterance.” These examples are abun- 
dantly sufficient to show that prayer, so far from being incon- 
sistent with, is founded on, the immutability of the Divine 
purposes, and the faithfulness of the Divine promises. 

A, Our next position is, that the method in which God answers 
the prayers of His people may be, in many respects, mysteri- 
ous or even inscrutable; but no objection to “the efficacy of 
prayer,” which is founded on our ignorance of His infinite 
resources, can have any weight, especially when there are 
several hypothetical solutions, any one of which is sufficient to 
neutralize its force. 

An omnipresent, omniscient, and almighty Being, presiding 
over the affairs of His own world, as the author, upholder, and 
governor of all things, may well be conceived to have infinite 
resources at His command,— such as we can never fully esti- 
mate,—by which he can give effect to prayer in ways that may 
be to us inscrutable. But our ignorance of the mode is no rea- 
son for doubting the reality of His interposition in answer to 
prayer; and even if we were unable to decide on the compara- 
tive merits of the various explanations of it which have been 
proposed, the mere fact that there are several solutions, at once 
conceivable and credible, any one of which may be sufficient, as 
a hypothetical explanation, to neutralize every adverse presump- 
tion, should be held tantamount to a proof that no valid or con- 


THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 293 


clusive objection can be urged against it. Dr. Chalmers has fre- 
quently illustrated the legitimate and important uses of “hypo- 
thetical solutions” in Theology; and has conclusively shown 
that even where they leave us at a loss to determine which of 
various methods of solving a difficulty is the truest or the best, 
they yet serve a great purpose, if they merely neutralize an ob- 
jection, by showing that the difficulty in question mzght be sat- 
isfactorily accounted for, were our knowledge more extensive or 
more precise. Now, with regard to “the efficacy of prayer,” 
there are four distinct solutions, or rather four different meth- 
ods of disposing of the difficulty, any one of which is sufficient 
to vindicate the claims of the doctrine on our faith. We shall 
not discuss the respective merits of these various solutions in 
detail, but shall merely state them, with the view of showing 
that there are several methods of accounting for “the efficacy 
of prayer” in perfect consistency with the established order 
of Nature. : 

The first is the theory of those who hold that there is the 
same relation between prayer and the answer to prayer as be- 
tween cause and effect in any other sequence of Nature. Prayer 
is supposed to be the cause, and the answer the effect; and 
this by an invariable law, established in the original constitu- 
tion, and manifested in the uniform course, of the world. To 
this solution Dr. Chalmers seems to refer when he says, that 
“the doctrine of the efficacy of prayer but introduces a new 
sequence to the notice of the mind,” that “it may add another 
law of Nature to those which have been formerly observed,” 
and that “the general truth may be preserved, that the same 
result always follows in the same circumstances, although it 
should be discovered that prayer is one of those influential 
circumstances by which the result is liable to be modified.” ? 
Now, if it be meant merely to affirm that, in the administration 


1 Dr. CHALMERS, “ Works,” 11. 286. 2 Tbid., 325. 


25* 


294 MODERN ATHEISM. 


of His providential government, God has respect to the prayers 
of men as a consideration which affects their relation to Him 
and His treatment of them, and that this rule is as invariable 
as any other law of Nature, the principle that is involved in 
this solution may be admitted as sound and valid; but if it be 
further meant, that prayer and the answer to prayer are 7 all 
respects similar to any other instance of cause and effect, it 
must be remembered that the answer is not the effect of the 
prayer, at least directly and immediately, but the effect of the 
Divine will; and then the question suggested by Dr. M’Cosh — 
whether causality can properly be ascribed to our prayers with 
reference to the Divine will?—would claim our serious consid- 
eration. But in the former sense, as implying nothing more 
than that, in the original constitution and the ordinary course 
of Providence, the same effect is given to our prayers as to 
any other moral cause or condition, it seems to be exempt from 
all reasonable objection, and to afford a sufficient explanation 
of the difficulty. 

The second “hypothetical solution ” is that of those who hold 
that while God, in answering the prayers of men, does not 
ordinarily disturb the known or discoverable sequences of the 
natural world, yet His interference may be alike real and 
efficacious though it should take place at a point in the series 
of natural causes far removed beyond the limits of our experi- 
ence and observation; and thus “the answer to prayer may be 
effectually given without any infringement on the known 
regularities of Nature.” Dr. Chalmers adverts to this second 
solution in replying to an objection which might possibly be 
raised against the first, namely, that “we see no evidence of 
the constancy of visible nature giving way to that invisible 
agency, the interposition of which it is the express object. of 
prayer to obtain;” and he suggests that, in the vast scale of 
natural sequences, which constitute one connected chain, the 
responsive touch from the finger of the Almighty may be given 


THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 295 


“either at a higher or a lower place in the progression,” and 
that if it be supposed to be “given far enough back,” it might 
originate a new sequence, but without doing violence to any 
ascertained law, since it occurs beyond the reach of our experi- 
ence and observation. This solution we hold to be not so much 
an effective argument in favor of the efficacy of prayer, as a 
conclusive answer to a particular objection against it. It is 
sufficient to show that, with our very limited knowledge, we act 
presumptuously in deciding against the possibility of an answer 
to prayer such as may leave the established course of Nature 
unaltered; but there is no necessity, and no reason, for sup- 
posing that the responsive touch can only be given at a point 
to which our knowledge does not extend, or that, were our 
knowledge extended, we would have less difficulty in admitting 
it there, than in holding it to be possible at any lower term in 
the scale of sequences. 

The third “hypothetical solution” is that of those who hold 
that a Divine answer to prayer may be conveyed through the 
ministry of angels, or the agency of intelligent, voluntary, and 
active beings, employed by God, in subordination to His Prov- 
idence, for the accomplishment of His great designs. The 
existence of such an order, or rather hierarchy, of created 
intelligences is clearly revealed in Scripture ; and it is rendered 
credible, or even probable, by the analogy of Nature, since we 
observe on earth a regular gradation of animal life from the 
insect up to man, and we have no reason to suppose that the 
gradation is suddenly arrested just at the point where the ani- 
mal and the spiritual are combined. But not only their 
existence, their active agency also, as “ministers fulfilling His 
will,” as “ ministering spirits sent forth to minister to them who 
shall be heirs of salvation,” is explicitly and frequently declared 
as well as exemplified in Scripture ; and this, too, would be, on 
the supposition of their existence, in strict accordance with the 
analogy of Nature, which shows that the lower orders of being 


296 MODERN ATHEISM. 


are placed under the care and control of the higher. Mr. 
Boyle, accordingly, makes frequent reference, in his Theologi- 
cal treatises, to the ministry of angels, as subordinate agents, 
through whose instrumentality many of the designs of Provi- 
dence may be carried into effect; and President Edwards 
enlarges on the same theme. 

The fourth “hypothetical solution” is that of those who hold 
that God has so arranged His Providence from the beginning 
as to provide for particular events as well as for general 
results, and especially to provide an answer to the prayers of 
His intelligent creatures. This solution is more general than 
any of the three former, and may even be comprehensive of 
them all. It regards prayer as an element which was taken 
into account at the original constitution of the world, and for 
which an answer was provided, as the result of natural laws or 
of angelic agency, employed for this express end by the omnis- 
cient foreknowledge and wisdom of God. It is the solution 
that has obtained the sanction of some of the highest names in 
Science and Theology. 

“T begin,” says Euler, “with considering an objection which 
almost all the Philosophical Systems have started against 
prayer. Religion prescribes this as our duty, with an assur- 
ance that God will hear and answer our vows and prayers, 
provided they are conformable to the precepts which He hath 
given us. Philosophy, on the other hand, instructs us that all 
events take place in strict conformity to the course of N ature, 
established from the beginning, and that our prayers can effect 
no change whatever, unless we pretend to expect that God 
should be continually working miracles in compliance with our 
prayers. This objection has the greater weight, that Religion 
itself teaches the doctrine of God’s having established the 
course of all events, and that nothing can come to pass but 


1 Hon. Ros. Boy iz, “ Theolog. Works,” 11. 96, 111. 230, PrestpEnt 
Epwarps, “ Works,” x. 1. 


THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 297 


what God foresaw from all eternity. Is it credible, say the 
objectors, that God should think of altering this settled course, 
in compliance with any prayers which men might address to 
Him? But I remark, first, that when God established the 
course of the universe, and arranged all the events that must 
come to pass in it, He paid attention to all the circumstances 
which should accompany each event, and, particularly, to the 
dispositions, desires, and prayers of every intelligent being; 
and that the arrangement of all events was disposed in perfect 
harmony with all these circumstances. When, therefore, a 
man addresses to God a prayer worthy to be heard, that 
prayer was already heard from all eternity, and the Father of 
mercies arranged the world expressly in favor of that prayer, 
so that the accomplishment should be a consequence of the 
natural course of events. It is thus that God answers the 
prayers of men without working a miracle.” * 

“Tt is not impossible,” says Dr. Wollaston, “that such laws 
of Nature, and such a series of causes and effects, may be 
originally designed that not only general provisions may be 
made for the several species of beings, but even particular 
cases, at least many of them, may also be provided for, without 
innovations or alterations in the course of Nature. It is true 
this amounts to a prodigious scheme, in which all things to 
come are, as it were, comprehended under one view, estimated 
and laid together: but when I consider what a mass of wonders 
the universe is in other regards, what a Being God is, incom- 
prehensibly great and perfect, that He cannot be ignorant 
of anything, no not of the future wants and deportments of 
particular men, and that all things which derive from Him, as 
their First Cause, must do this so as to be consistent with one 
another, and in such a manner as to make one compact system, 
befitting so great an Author; when I consider this, I cannot 


1 Ever, “ Letters to a German Prineess,” 1. 274. 


298 MODERN ATHEISM. 


deny such an adjustment of things to be within His power. 
The order of events, proceeding from the settlement of N ature, 
may be as compatible with the due and reasonable success of 
my endeavors and prayers (as inconsiderable a part of the 
world as I am) as with any other thing or phenomena how great 
soever. .... And thus the prayers which good men offer to 
the all-knowing God, and the neglects of others, may find fitting 
effects, already forecasted in the course of Nature, which pos- 
sibly may be extended to the labors of men and their behavior 
in general.” } 

“ If ever there was a future event,” says Dr. Gordon, “which 
might have been reckoned on with absolute certainty, and one, 
therefore, in the accomplishment of which it might appear that 
prayer could have no room or efficacy, it was just the restora- 
tion of the Jewish captives to the land and city of their fathers. 
And yet, so far from supposing that there was no place for 
prayer to occupy, among the various means that were employed 
to bring about that event, it was just his firm belief in the 
nearness and certainty of it that set Daniel upon fervent and 
persevering supplications for its accomplishment. . ... With 
regard to the rank which Daniel’s prayer occupied among the 
various means or agencies that were to be employed in bring- 
ing about the object of it, he had good reason to believe that it 
was neither without a definite place, nor in itself devoid of 
CHICAGY «3. He had been honored to vindicate the power 
and assert the supremacy of the Lord God of Israel; by the 
wisdom of his counsels and the weight of his personal character, 
he had paved the way for that decision in favor of the people 
of God to which the King of Persia was soon to be brought ; 
and the whole business of his active and most laborious life was 
made to bear on the interests and the liberation of his afflicted 
brethren. And if God had thus assigned to the outward actions 


1 Dr. WoLtasTon, “Religion of Nature,” p. 103. 


ert 
* 
sty 


THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 299 


of His servant an sistas place in carrying into effect His 
thoughts of peace towards his penitent people, is it conceivable 
that He had no place in that scheme for the holy and spiritual 
efforts of the same-servant? or that the aspirations of a sancti- 
fied spirit, the travailing of a soul intent upon the accomplish- 
ment of the Divine will and the manifestation of the Divine 
glory, should be less efficient or less essential in the execution 
of the Divine counsels, than the outward and ordinary agency 
of human actions? The whole tenor and the most explicit 
declarations of Scripture stand opposed to such a supposition ; 
nor can I understand how a devout mind should have any difli- 
culty in conceiving that it must be so. The agency of prayer 
is, indeed, a less obvious and palpable thing than that outward 
codperation whereby mankind are rendered subservient to the 
accomplishment of the Divine purposes. But is it not an 
agency of an unspeakably loftier character? Is it not the co- 
operation of an immortal spirit, bearing the impress of the 
Divine image, and at the moment acting in unison with the 
Divine will? Is it not befitting the character of God to set 
upon that codperation a special mark of His holy approbation, 
by assigning to it amore elevated place among the secondary 
causes which He is pleased to employ? And must there not 
be provision made, therefore, in the general principles of His 
administration, for fulfilling the special promise of His word, 
‘The Lord is nigh to all that call upon Hin, to all that call 
upon him in truth.’”? 

“We should blush,” says Bishop Warburton, “to be thought 
so uninstructed in the nature of prayer, as to fancy that it can 
work any temporary change in the dispositions of the Deity, 
who is ‘the same yesterday, to-day, and forever’ Yet we are 
not ashamed to maintain that God, in the chain of causes and 
effects, which not only sustains each system, but connects them 


1 Dr. Rost. Gorpon, “ Sermons,” p. 369. 


3800 MODERN ATHEISM. . 


all with one another, hath so wonderfully contrived, that the 
temporary endeavors of pious men shall procure good and avert 
evil, by means of that ‘preéstablished harmony’ which He 
hath willed to exist between moral actions and natural events.” 


“But should some frigid skeptic, therefore, dare 
To doubt the all-prevailing power of prayer; 
As if *t were ours, with impious zeal, to try 
To shake the purposes of Deity; 
Pause, cold philosopher, nor snatch away 
The last, the best, the wretched’s surest stay. 
Look round on life, and trace its checkered plan, 
The griefs, the joys, the hopes, the fears of man; 
Tell me, if each deliverance, each success, 
Each transient golden dream of happiness, 
Each palm that genius in the race acquires, 
Each thrilling rapture virtuous pride inspires, 
Tell me, if each and all were not combined 
In the great purpose of the Eternal Mind? 

* * * * * * * 
Thus while we humbly own the vast decree, 

Formed in the bosom of Eternity, 
And know all secondary causes tend 
Each to contribute to one mighty end; 
Yet while these causes firmly fixed remain— 
Links quite unbroken in the endless chain, 
So that could one be snapped, the whole must fail, 
And wide confusion o’er the world prevail; 
Why may not our petitions, which arise 
In humble adoration to the skies, 
Be foreordained the causes, whence shall flow 
Our purest pleasures in this vale of woe? 
Not that they move the purpose that hath stood 
By time unchanged, immeasurably good, 
But that the event and prayer alike may be 
United objects of the same decree.” 1 


1Jt is with melancholy pleasure that the author recalls and reproduces, 
after an interval of thirty years, the lines of his early college companion, 
— WILLIAM FRIEND DURANT,— a young man of high promise, removed, 
like his distinguished fellow-student, RoperT PoLLock, by what might 
seem a premature death, but for the prospect of immortality. 


THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 301 


On the whole, we feel ourselves warranted, and even con- 
strained, to conclude that the theory of “government by 
natural law” is defective in so far as it excludes the super- 
sntendence and control of God over all the events of human 
life, and that neither the existence of second causes nor the 
operation of physical laws should diminish our confidence in 
the care of Providence and the efficacy of Prayer. 

26 


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CHAPTER VI. 
THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE. 


WueEn we survey the actual course of God’s Providence, by 
which the eternal purposes of the Divine Mind are carried 
into effect, we discern immediately a marked difference between 
two great classes of events. ‘The one comprehends a multitude 
of events which are so regular, stable, and constant, that we 
feel ourselves warranted in reckoning on their invariable recur- 
rence, in the same circumstances in which they have been 
observed; they seem to be governed by an unchangeable, or at 
least an established law. The other comprehends a different 
set of events, which are so irregular and variable that they 
occur quite unexpectedly, and cannot be reduced to any rule of 
rational computation; they appear,— perhaps from our igno- 
rance,— to be purely accidental or fortuitous. 

In exact accordance with this difference between the two 
creat classes of Providential events, there is a similar difference 
+n our ¢nternal views or sentiments in regard to them. We are 
conscious of two totally dissimilar feelings in contemplating 
them respectively. We have a feeling of certainty, confidence, 
or assurance in regard to the one; and a feeling of uncertainty, 
anxiety, and helplessness in regard to the other; while for an 
intermediate class of events, there is also an intermediate state 
of mind, equally removed from entire certainty and absolute 
doubt, arising from the various degrees of probability that may 


304 MODERN ATHEISM. 


seem to belong to them. These are at once natural and legiti- 
mate sentiments in the circumstances in which we are placed; 
for unquestionably there is much in these circumstances that is 
fitted to produce and cherish them all; and when they are com- 
bined, — especially when they are duly proportioned, in the 
case of “any individual, they induce a habit or frame of mind 
most favorable to the recognition of God’s Providence, and most 
conducive to our welfare, by impressing us with a sense both 
of our dependence on His supreme will, and of our duty to be 
diligent in the use of all appointed means. But when either of 
the two classes of events is exclusively considered, or the senti- 
ments appropriate to them inordinately cherished, there will be 
a tendency, in the absence of an enlightened belief in Provi- 
dence, towards one or other of two opposite extremes : — the 
extreme, on the one hand, of resolving all events into results 
of physical agencies and mechanical laws, acting with the blind 
force of “destiny,” and leaving no room for the interposition of 
an intelligent Moral Ruler; and the extreme, on the other 
hand, of ascribing all events to accidental or fortuitous influ- 
ences, equally exempt from His control. The former is the 
theory of “Fate,” the latter is the theory of “Chance;” and 
both are equally opposed to the doctrine which affirms the 
eternal purpose and the actual providence of an omniscient 
and all-controlling Mind. MT rt | 

It matters little, with reference to our present purpose, 
whether or not every department of Nature be supposed to be 
equally subject to “natural laws;” for even were it so, still if 
these laws were either in part unknown and undiscoverable by 
us, or so related to each other that the results of their manifold 
possible combinations could not be calculated or reckoned on 
by human wisdom or foresight, ample room would be left for 
the exercise of diligence within the limits of our ascertained 
knowledge, and yet for a sense of dependence on a power which 
we feel ourselves unable either to comprehend or control. On 


THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE. 805 


the ground of analogy, we think it highly probable that every 
department of Nature ¢s subject to regular and stable laws; 
and on the same ground we may anticipate that, in the pro- 
gressive advance of human knowledge, many new fields will yet 
be conquered, and added to the domain of Science. But sup- 
pose every law were discovered, — suppose, even, that every 
individual event should be shown to depend on some natural 
cause, there would still remain at least two considerations which 
should remind us of our dependence. 'The first is our ignorance 
of the whole combination of causes which may at any time be 
brought into action, and of the results which may flow from 
them in circumstances such as we can neither foresee nor pro- 
vide against. The second is our ignorance, equally unavoidable 
and profound, of the intelligent and voluntary agencies which 
may be at work, modifying, disposing, and directing that com- 
bination of causes, so as to accomplish the purposes of the 
Omniscient Mind. Our want of knowledge in either case is a 
reason for uncertainty ; and our uncertainty in regard to events 
in which we may be deeply concerned is fitted to teach us our 
dependence on a higher Power. Let it not be thought, how- 
ever, that our argument for God’s Providence is drawn merely 
from man’s tgnorance, or that its strength must diminish in 
proportion as his knowledge of Nature is extended; on the 
contrary, it rests on the assumption that man knows enough to 
be aware that he cannot know ail, and that as long as he is not 
omniscient, he must be dependent on Him who alone “ knows 
the end from the beginning,” and “who ruleth among the 
armies of heaven” as well as “among the inhabitants of this 
earth.” 

It is in the invariable combination and marvellous mutual 
adjustment of these two elements, —the regular and the vari- 
able, the constant and the casual, the certain and the uncertain, 
— that we best discern the wisdom of that vast scheme of Prov- 
idence, which is designed at once to secure our diligence in ihe 

26* 


806 MODERN ATHEISM. 


use of means, and to impress us with a sense of our dependence 
on a higher Power. And the same remark may be equally 
applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the revealed constitution of 
things, since Scripture itself exhibits certain definite truths 
surrounded with a margin of mystery like “lights shining in a 


> 


dark place ;” and while it prescribes and encourages diligence 
in the use of means, teaches us at the same time our depen- 
dence on the Divine blessing which alone can render our efforts 

- effectual. Both elements, therefore, must be taken into account 
and kept steadily in view, if we would form a comprehensive 
conception of the method of the Divine government, or a cor- 
rect estimate of the wisdom with which it is adapted to the 
case of created and dependent, but intelligent, active, and 
responsible beings. But when the one is either dissevered from 
the other, or viewed apart and exclusively by itself, when the 
mind dwells on either, to the neglect of what is equally a part 
of the same comprehensive scheme, then we are in danger of 
adopting a partial and one-sided view of Providence, and of 
lapsing into one or other of the opposite extremes, — the theory 
of “ Chance” or the theory of “ Fate.” : 

A few remarks on each of these theories may be neither 
unseasonable nor useless, if they serve to illustrate the different 
kinds of Atheism which have sprung from them, and to place 
in a clear and strong light the radical difference which subsists 
between both, and the doctrine of Providence, as it is taught 
and exemplified in Scripture. 

1. The theory of “Chance,” which was once the stronghold 
of Atheism, is now all but abandoned by speculative thinkers, 
and exists only, if at all, in the vague beliefs of uneducated and 
unreflecting men. This result has been brought about, not so 
much by the Metaphysical or even the Theological consider- 
ations which were urged against the theory, as by the steady 
advance of Science, and the slow but progressive growth of a 
belief in “law” and “order” as existing in every department 


THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE. 3807 


of Nature. It has been undeniably the effect of scientific 
inquiry to banish the idea of Chance, at least from as much of 
the domain as has been successfully explored, and to afford a 
strong presumption that the same result would follow were our 
researches extended beyond the limits within which they are 
yet confined. To this extent there is truth in the reasonings 
of M. Comte as applied to Chance, while they have no validity 
or value as applied to Providence; and we deem it a noble 
tribute to Science when it can be said of her with truth, that 
she has been an effective auxiliary to Religion in overthrowing 
the once vaunted empire of that blind power. 

At one time some ascribed all the works both of Creation 
and Providence to Chance, and spoke of a fortuitous concourse 
of atoms in the one case, and of a fortuitous concurrence of 
events in the other. The Atomic theory, which, as a mere 
physiological hypothesis, is far from being necessarily Atheistic, 
and which has been adopted and defended by such writers as 
Gassendus and Dr. Goode, was applied by Epicurus and 
Lucretius to account for the fortuitous origin of existing beings,’ 
and also for the fortuitous course of human affairs. No one 
now, in the present advanced state of science, would seriously 
propose to account either for the creation of the world, or for 
the events of the world’s history, by ascribing them to the 
operation of Chance ; the current is flowing in another direc- 
tion; it has set in, like a returning tide, towards the universal 
recognition of “ general laws” and “natural causes,” such as, 
from their invariable regularity and uniformity, are utterly 
exclusive of everything like chance or accident in any depart- 
ment of Nature. Instead of ascribing the creation of the world 
to a fortuitous concourse of atoms, modern speculation would 
refer it to “a law of development” such as is able of itself to 


1 Dr. CupwortTH, “ Intellectual System,” 1. '75, 82, 106, 151; 11. 77, 334. 
GassEnpI, “Syntagma.” Dr. J. M. Goons, “ Lucretius,” Preface. 


308 MODERN ATHEISM. 


insure the production of astral systems in the firmament, and 
also of vegetable and animal races on the earth, without any 
direct or immediate interposition of a higher power; and 
instead of ascribing the events of history and the “ progress” 
of humanity to a fortuitous or accidental origin, modern specu- 
lation would refer them to “a law of social or historical devel- 
opment,” such as makes every succeeding state the natural, 
and, indeed, necessary product of a prior one, and places the 
whole order of sequences — whether physical, moral, political, 
or religious — under the government of “natural law,” as con- 
tradistinguished from that of a “supernatural will.” There 
is thus a manifest tendency to resile from the old theory of 
Chance, and to take refuge in the new asylum of Law, Order, 
or Destiny. There is, apparently, a wide difference between 
the two contrasted systems; and yet the difference maybe, 
after all, more seeming than real: for both the old doctrine of 
“chance” and the new theory of “development” are com- 
pelled to assume certain conditions or qualities as belonging to 
the primordial elements of matter, without which it is felt that 
neither Chance nor Fate can afford a satisfactory account of 
the works either of Creation or Providence. The one party 
spoke more of “Chance,” the other speaks more of “ Law ;” 
but both were compelled to’ feel that neither Chance nor. Law 
could of themselves account for the established order of Nature, 
without presupposing certain conditions, adjustments, and dispo- 
sitions of matter, such as could only be satisfactorily explained 
by ascribing them to a wise, foreseeing, and designing Mind. 
In the present state of philosophical speculation, which 
evinces so strong a tendency to reduce everything to the 
dominion of “Law,” it may seem unnecessary to refer to the 
doctrine of “Chance” at all; but believing as we do that there 
are, and ever must be, certain events in the course of life, and 
certain facts in the complex experience of man, which will 
irresistibly suggest the idea of it, even where the doctrine is 


THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE. 309 


theoretically disowned, we think it right to lay down a distinct 
and definite position on this subject, such as may serve, if duly 
established, at once to neutralize whatever is false and noxious 
in the doctrine of Chance, and at the same time to preserve 
whatever is true and wholesome in it, as having a tendency to 
illustrate the actual scheme of Divine Providence. And the 
position which we are disposed to state and prepared to estab- 
lish is this: That, with reference to God, as an omniscient 
Being, there is, and there can be, no such thing as “ Chance ;” 
while, with reference alike to men and angels, many events 
may be fortuitous or accidental, not as being independent of 
causes, but as depending on causes unknown, or on combina- 
tions of causes whose joint operation may result in effects 
absolutely undiscoverable by our limited intelligence. 

This position consists of ¢wo parts. It affirms that with 
reference to God and His omniscient knowledge, there can be 
nothing that is fortuitous, accidental, or unexpected. It affirms, 
with reference to man and all created intelligences, that there 
may, or even must, be much uncertainty in regard to the products 
of natural causes, especially when they act in combination, and 
come into play in circumstances which we cannot foresee or 
control. Many events may thus be casual, accidental, or unex- 
pected to men, which are not so to the supreme governing 
Intelligence. The first part of the position is proved by the 
general evidence which warrants us in ascribing omniscience, 
and especially an unerring prescience, to the Divine Mind ; 
and it cannot be denied, without virtually ascribing ¢gnorance 
to God. The second part of the position is established by 
some of the most familiar facts of experience. We know and 
feel that however certain all events are to the omniscient 
knowledge of the Most High, many of them are entirely 
beyond the reach of our limited foresight; and this because 
they are either dependent on individual causes which are 
unknown to us, or on a combination of various causes, too 


310 MODERN ATHEISM. 


complex to admit of any rational computation in regard to 
their results. : 

The “ calculation of chances” has been reduced to something 
like scientific accuracy ;} and it has been applied, with bene- 
ficial effect, to the insurance of life and property on land and 
at sea. Even the casual events of human history may be 
said, in a certain sense, to be governed by fixed laws. The 
aggregate result in such cases may be tolerably certain, while 
the individual cases are very much the reverse; and hence 
human wisdom, proceeding on a well-ascertained body of sta- 
tistics, may construct a scheme for securing some against the 
evils to which they would otherwise have been liable, by means 
of the sacrifices of others, who would not have been in fact, 
although they might have been, for ought they know, liable to 
the same. But what is this, if it be not a practical acknowl- 
edgement of the uncertainty in which all are placed in regard 
to some of the most important interests of the present life? or 
how can it be said that chance or accident is altogether, and in 
every sense, exploded, when large bodies of men are found to 
combine, and that, too, at a considerable personal sacrifice, for 
the express purpose of protecting themselves, so far as they can, 
from the hazards to which they are individually exposed ? 

In the sense above explained, we cannot consent to discard 
“Chance” altogether, either at the bidding of those who resolve 
everything into “natural laws,” or even in deference to the 
authority of others who ascribe all events to Divine Provi- 
dence. It may be true that all events, however apparently 
casual or fortuitous, are governed by “natural laws ;” it may 
be equally true that all events are determined, directed, or con- 
trolled by Divine Providence: but as long as some events 
depend on causes which are certainly known, and other events 
on causes which are not known, or on a combination of causes 


1La Pracer, “ Des Probabilities.” 


THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE. abl 


whose results cannot be foreseen, so long will there be room 
for the distinction between the regular and the accidental phe- 
nomena of human experience. This distinction, indeed, is 
explicitly recognized in Scripture itself; for while it speaks of 
all events as being infallibly known to God, it speaks of some 
events that are accidental with reference to man.’ The un- 
known, unforeseen, and unexpected incidents of life, which con- 
stitute all that is apparently casual or accidental, may be, and 
we believe they are, really subject both to natural laws and to 
God’s providential will; but they are removed far beyond our 
comprehension or control; and being so, they are admirably 
fitted, as a part of the complex scheme of His natural and 
moral government, to serve one of the most important practical 
ends for which it is designed, by impressing us with a sense of 
constant dependence on a higher Power, and of dutiful sub- 
jection to a superior Will. 

But while, in this sense and to this extent, the doctrine of 
“ Chance” is retained, it must be utterly rejected as a means 
of accounting either for the creation or government of the 
world. For, on the supposition of a Supreme Being, there can 
be no chance with reference to Him; and without such a sup- 
position, we cannot account for the regularity which prevails in 
the course of Nature, and which indicates a presiding Intelli- 
gence and a controlling Will. 

2. But this very regularity of Nature, when viewed apart 
from the cross accidents of life, is apt to engender the opposite 
idea of “ Fate ” or “ Destiny,” as if all events were determined 
by laws alike necessary and invariable, inherent in the consti- 
tution of Nature, and independent of the concurrence or the 
control of the Divine will. We are not sure, indeed, that the 
idea of Fate or Destiny is suggested solely, or even mainly, by 


1 Eccles. 9: 11; Luke 10: 31; Deut. 19: 5. 


312 _ MODERN ATHEISM. 


the regular sequences of the natural world; we rather think 
that it is more frequently derived from those. unexpected and 
crushing calamities which occur in spite of every precaution of 
human foresight and prudence, and that thus it may be identi- 
fied, in a great measure, with the doctrine of Chance, or, at 
least, the one may run into and blend with the other. But if 
any attempt were made to establish it by proof, recourse would 
be had to the established order and regular sequences of 
Nature, as affording its most plausible verification, although 
they afford no real sanction to it, in so far as it differs from the 
Christian doctrine of Providence. 

Dr. Cudworth discusses this subject at great length, and 
makes mention of three distinct forms of Fatalism. ‘The first, 
which is variously designated as the Democritic, the Physio- 
logical, or the Atheistic Fate, is that which teaches the material 
or physical necessity of all things, and ascribes all natural phe- 
nomena to the mechanical laws of matter and motion. The 
second, which is described: as a species of Divine or Theistic 
Fate, is that which admits the existence and agency of God, 
but teaches that He both decrees and does, purposes and per- 
forms all things, whether good or evil, as if He were the 
only real agent in the universe, or as if He had no moral char- 
acter, and were, as Cudworth graphically expresses it, “mere 
arbitrary will omnipotent:” this he describes as a “ Divine Fate 
immoral and violent.” The third, which is also designated as 
a species of Divine or Theistic Fate, is that which recognizes 
both the existence of God, and the agency of other beings in 
Nature, together with the radical distinction between moral 
good and evil, but teaches that men are so far under necessity 
as to be incapable of moral and responsible action, and unfit 
subjects of praise or blame, of reward or punishment: this he 
describes as “Divine Fate moral and natural.” These three 
are all justly held to be erroneous or defective views of the 


THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE. 315 


Divine government, and, as such, they are strenuously and 
successfully opposed.’ 

But there is room for a fourth doctrine, which may be desig- 
nated as the Christian doctrine of Providence, and which com- 
bines in itself all the great fundamental truths for which Dr. 
Cudworth contends, while it leaves open, or, at least, does not 
necessarily determine, some of the collateral questions on 
which he might have differed: from many of its defenders. 
This doctrine affirms, first, the existence and attributes of God, 
as a holy and righteous Moral Governor ; secondly, the real 
existence and actual operation of “second causes,” distinct 
from, but not independent of, “the First Cause ;” thirdly, the 
operation of these causes according to their several natures, so 
that, under God’s Providence, events fall out “ either neces- 
sarily, freely, or contingently,” according to the kind of inter- 
mediate agency by which they are brought to pass; and, 
fourthly, that in the case of intelligent and moral agents, 
ample room is left for responsible action, and for the conse- 
quent sentence of praise or blame, reward or punishment, not- 
withstanding the eternal decree of God, and the constant 
control which He exercises over all His creatures and all their 
actions. ‘These four positions may be all harmoniously com- 
bined in one self-consistent and comprehensive statement; and, 
in point of fact, they are all included in the Christian doctrine 
of Providence, as that has been usually explained and defended 
by the various sections of the Catholic Church. Not one of 
them is omitted or denied.2 They seem fairly to meet, or 
rather fully to exhaust, the demands of Dr. Cudworth himself, 
when he says: “These three things are, as we conceive, the 
fundamentals or essentials of true religion, first, that all things 


1 Dr. Cupworty, “ Intellectual System,” 1.33. American Edition. 

2Dr. Joun Corztiners, “On Providence.” Dr. Price, “ Disserta- 
tions.” SamvEL RUTHERFORD, “De Providentia Dei.” Dr. CHARNOCK, 
“On Providence.” 


27 


314 MODERN ATHEISM. 


in the world do not float without a head or governor, but that 
there is a God, an omnipotent understanding Being, presiding 
over all; secondly, that this God being essentially good and 
just, there is something in its own nature immutably and 
eternally just and unjust, and not by arbitrary will, law, and 
command only ; and lastly, that there is something ¢@’ ju», or 
that we are so far forth principals or masters of our own 
actions as to be accountable to justice for them, or to make us 
guilty or blameworthy for what we do amiss, and to deserve 
punishment accordingly.” All these fundamentals of true 
religion are explicitly recognized in the Christian doctrine of 
Providence, which stands out, therefore, in striking contrast 
with the Atheistic, and even Theistic, theories of Fate which 
he condemns ; and they are as zealously maintained (whether 
with the same consistency is a different question) by Edwards, 
Chalmers, and Woods, on the one side, as they ever were by 
Cudworth, Clarke, and Tappan, on the other. 

It may be said, however, that the doctrine of Providence, 
especially when taught in connection with that of Predesti- 
nation, does unavoidably imply some kind of necessity, incom- 
patible with free moral agency, and that, to all practical intents, 
it amounts substantially to Fate or Destiny. But we are pre- 
pared to show that there is neither the same kind of necessity 
in the one scheme which is implied in the other, nor the same 
reason for denying moral and responsible agency in the case 
of intelligent beings. In doing so, we must carefully discrimi- 
nate, in the first instance, between the various senses in which 
the term necessity is used. Dr. Waterland has given a com- 
prehensive division of “ necessity ” into four kinds, denominated 
respectively, the Logical, the Moral, the Physical, and the 
Metaphysical. 

“ Logical necessity ” exists wherever the contrary of what is 
affirmed would imply a contradiction; and in this sense we 
call it a necessary truth that two and two make four, that a 


THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE. 315 


whole is greater than any of its parts, and that a circle neither 
is nor can be a square. It amounts to nothing more than the 
affirmation, that the same idea or thing ts what it ts; and it 
relates solely to the connection between one idea and another, 
or between one proposition and another, or between subject 
and predicate. This is “ logical necessity ;” we cannot, with 
our present laws of thought, conceive the thing to be otherwise 
without implying a contradiction. 

“ Moral necessity,” again, denotes a connection, not between 
one idea and another, or between the subject and predicate of 
a proposition, but between means and ends. Itis not necessary 
absolutely that any man should continue to live; but it is 
necessary morally that, if he would continue to live, he should 
eat and sleep, food and rest being, according to the established 
constitution of Nature, a necessary condition or indispensable 
means for the support of life. There is in like manner a 
“moral necessity” that we should be virtuous and obedient, if 
we would be truly happy, virtue and obedience being, accord- 
ing to the established constitution of Nature, an indispensable 
means of true and permanent happiness. This is “moral 
necessity” which has reference solely to the connection be- 
tween means and ends, but that connection, being ordained, is 
immutable and invariable. 

“ Physical necessity,” again, exists wherever there is either 
a causal connection between antecedents and consequents in 
the material world, or even a coactive and compulsory con- 
straint in the moral world. It is physically necessary that fire 
should burn substances that are combustible, that water and 
other fluids should flow down a declivity, and rise again but 
only to a certain level; and there is the like kind of necessity, 
wherever a moral agent is forced to act under irresistible com- 
pulsion,— as when the assassin seizes hold of another’s arm, 
and thrusting a deadly weapon into his hand, directs it, by his 


own overmastering will, to the brain or heart of his victim. 


316 MODERN ATHEISM. 


In this latter case, the unwilling instrument of his revenge or 
malice is not held to be the guilty party, but the more power- 
ful agent by whom that instrument was employed. This is 
“physical necessity,” which relates solely to the connection 
between cause and effect in the material world, and, in the 
moral, to the compulsory action of one agent on another. 


b] 


“ Metaphysical necessity,” again, can be predicated of God 
only, and denotes the peculiar property or prerogative of His 
being, as existing necessarily, immutably, and eternally, or, to 
use a scholastic phrase, the necessary connection in His case 
between essence and existence. ; | 

Omitting the last, which does not fall properly within the 
limits of our present inquiry, we may say with regard to the 
three first, that each of them may exist, and that each of them 
does really operate, in the present constitution of Nature. We 
are subject, unquestionably, to certain “laws of thought,” 
which we can neither repeal nor resist, and which impose upon 
us a logical necessity to conceive, to reason, and to infer, not 
according to our own whim or caprice, but according to estab- 
lished rules. We are equally subject to certain “conditions of 
existence,”— arising partly from our own constitution, partly 
from the constitution of external objects and the relations sub- 
sisting between the two,— which lay us under a moral neces- 
sity of using suitable means for the accomplishment of our 
purposes and plans. And we are still further subject to 
“physical necessity,” in so far as our material frame is liable 
to be affected by external influences, and even our muscular 
powers may be overmastered and subordinated by a more 
vigorous or resolute will than our own. These three kinds of 
“necessity” exist; they are all constituent parts of that vast 
scheme of government under which we are placed; and the 
question arises, Whether, when the existence of these neces- 
sary laws is admitted, we can still maintain the doctrine which 
affirms the providential government of God and the moral 


THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE. 3817 


agency of man; or whether we must not resolve the whole 
series of events, both in the natural and moral worlds, into the 
blind and inexorable dominion of Destiny or Fate ? 

We answer, first, that there is nothing in any one of these 
three kinds of necessity, nor in all of them combined, which, 
when rightly understood, should either exclude the idea of 
Divine Providence, or impair our sense of moral and respon- 
sible agency. We may not be so free, nor so totally exempt 
from the operation of established laws, as some of the advocates 
of human liberty have supposed: but we may be free enough, 
notwithstanding, to be regarded and treated as moral and 
accountable beings. "We may be subject to certain “laws of 
thought,” and yet may be responsible for our opinions and 
beliefs, in so far as these depend on our voluntary acts, on our 
attention or inattention to the truth and its evidence, on our use 
or neglect of the appropriate means, on our love or our hatred 
to the light. And so we may be subject to certain other 
laws, in various departments of our complex experience, 
without being either restrained or impelled by such external 
coaction as alone can exempt creatures, constituted as we know 
and feel ourselves to be, from the righteous retributions of 
God. 

We answer, secondly, that the doctrine of Providence, even 
when it is combined with that of Predestination, represents all 
events as “ falling out according to the nature of second causes, 
necessarily, contingently, or freely;” nay, as falling out so 
“that no violence is offered to the will of the creature, nor is 
the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but 
rather established.” It follows that if there be either on earth 
or in heaven any free cause, or any moral and responsible 
agent, his nature is not changed, nor is the character of his 
agency altered, by that providential government which God 
exercises over all His creatures and all their actions; he still 


continues to develop, within certain limits imposed by unalter- 
27* 


818 MODERN ATHEISM. 


able laws, his own proper individuality, or his personal charac- 
ter, in its relation to the law and government of God. 

We answer, thirdly, that the moral and responsible agency 
of man cannot be justly held to be incompatible with the Provy- 
idence and Supremacy of God, unless it can be shown that, in 
the exercise of the latter, God acts in the way of physical 
coaction or irresistible constraint, and further, that man is not 
only controlled and governed in his actions, but compelled to 
act in opposition to his own will. But no enlightened advocate 
either of Providence or Predestination will affirm that there is 
any “physical necessity,” imposed by the Divine will, which 
constrains men to commit sin, or that God is “the author of 
gin.” “Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of 
God: for God cannot be tempted of evil, neither tempteth He 
any man. But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away 
of his own lusts and enticed.” ? 

We answer, fourthly, that when a “moral necessity” or 
moral inability is spoken of by divines as making sin certain and 
inevitable in the case of man, we must carefully distinguish 
between the constitution and the state of human nature, — its 
constitution as it was originally created, and its state as it at 
present exists. There might be nothing in the original con- 
stitution of human nature which could interfere in any way 
with the freedom of man as an intelligent, moral, and respon- 
sible being; and yet, in consequence of the introduction of sin, 
his state may now be so far changed as to have become a state 
of moral bondage. But the constitution of his nature, in virtue 
of which he was at the first, and must ever continue to be, a 
moral and accountable being, remains unreversed ; from being 
holy, he has become depraved, but he has not ceased to be a 
subject of moral government, and the evils that are incident. to 
his present position must be ascribed, not to God’s creative will, 


1 James 1: 13, 14. See M’Laurin’s profound discourse on this text. 


THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE. 319 


but, in the first instance, to man’s voluntary disobedience, and, 
in the second, to a Divine judicial sentence following there- 
upon. 

And finally, we answer that the theory which ascribes all 
events, both in the natural and moral worlds, to the blind and 
inexorable dominion of Destiny or Fate, leaves altogether 
unexplained many of the most certain and familiar facts of 
human experience. There are two large classes of facts which 
no theory of Fate can possibly explain. The first comprises 
all those manifest indications of provident forethought, intel- 
ligent design, and moral purpose, which appear in the course 
of Nature, and which cannot be accounted for by a blind, un- 
intelligent, undesigning cause. The second comprises all those 
facts of consciousness: which bear witness to the moral nature 
and responsible agency of man, as the subject of a government 
which rewards and punishes his actions, in some measure, even 
here, and which irresistibly suggests the idea of a future reckon- 
ing and retribution. These two classes of facts must either be 
ignored, or left as insoluble, by any theory which advocates 
blind Fate or Destiny, in opposition to the overruling Prov- 
idence and moral government of God. 

These answers are sufficient, if not to remove all mystery 
from the methods of the Divine administration (for who would 
undertake to fathom the counsels of Him “ whose judgments 
are unsearchable and His ways past finding out?”), yet to 
show at least that a Divine Providence is more credible in 
itself, and better supported by evidence, than any theory of 
Destiny or Fate; that the facts to which the latter appeals may 
be explained consistently with the former, while the facts on 
which the former is founded must either be left altogether out 
of view, or at least left unexplained, if the doctrine of Fate be 
substituted for that of Providence. 

We have thus far compared the two theories of Chance and 
Fate, by which some have attempted to explain the system of 


3820 MODERN ATHEISM. 


the universe, and have contrasted both with the Christian doc- 
trine of Providence. On a review of the whole discussion, we 
think it must be evident that the latter combines whatever is 
true and valuable in each of these opposite theories, while it 
eliminates and rejects whatever is unsound or noxious in 
either. It may seem strange that we should speak as if any- 
thing, either true or valuable, could be involved in the theories 
of Chance and Destiny; and, unquestionably, considered as 
theories designed to explain the system of the world, and to 
supersede the doctrine of Providence, they are, in all their dis- 
tinctive peculiarities, utterly false and worthless. But it sel- 
dom, if ever, happens that any theory obtains a wide-spread 
and permanent influence, which does not stand connected with 
some partial truth, or which cannot appeal to some apparent 
natural evidence. We have already seen that there are two 
distinct classes of events in Nature, and two corresponding 
classes of sentiments and feelings in the human mind; that the 
latter point, respectively, to the constant and the variable, the 
certain and the doubtful, the causal and the casual; and that 
were either of the two to acquire an absolute ascendancy over 
us, it would naturally lead to one or other of two opposite ex- 
tremes— the theory of Chance, or the theory of Fate. Now, 
the doctrine of Providence takes account of both these classes 
of phenomena and feelings, so as to combine whatever is true 
and useful in each of the two rival theories, while it strikes out 
and rejects whatever is false in either, by placing all things 
under the government and control of a living, intelligent, per- 
sonal God. 

It is scarcely necessary to add that the views and sentiments 
which the Christian doctrine of Providence inspires are widely 
different from those which must be generated by a belief either 
in Chance or in Fate, as the supreme arbiter of our destiny. 
The doctrine which teaches us to look up and to say, with 
childlike confidence, “ Our FATHER which art in heaven,” is 


THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE. ont 


worth more than all the philosophy in the world! Could we 
only realize it as a truth, and have habitual recourse to it in all 
our anxieties and straits, we should feel that, if it be a deeply 
sérious and solemn fact that “the Lord reigneth,” it is also, to 
all his trusting and obedient children, alike cheering and con- 
solatory; and he who can relish the sweetness of our Lord’s 
words when he spake of “the birds of the air” and the “flowers 
of the field,” will see at once that Stoicism is immeasurably 
inferior, both as a philosophy and a faith, to’ Christian Theism.’ 


1 MronELet has presented a graphic portrait of a Stoic: —“ L’individu 
sous la forme du Stoicisme, —ramassé soi, —appuyé sur soi, —ne deman- 
dant rien aux dicux,—ne les accusant point, —ne daignant pas méme les 
nier.”? — © Introduction a V Historie Universelle.” 


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THEORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM. 


Tue Eclectic method of Philosophy, which was first exempli- 
fied in the celebrated School of Alexandria, and which has 
been recently revived under the auspices of M. Cousin in the 
Schools of Paris, may be regarded, in one of its aspects, as_ the 
most legitimate, and, indeed, as the only practicable course of 
successful intellectual research. If by “eclecticism” we were 
to understand the habit of culling from every system that por- 
tion or fragment of truth which may be contained in it, and of 
rejecting the error with which it may have been associated or 
alloyed,— in other words, the art of “sifting the wheat from 
the chaff,” so as to preserve the former, while the latter is dis- 
sipated and dispersed,—there could be no valid objection to it 
which would not equally apply to every method of Inductive 
Inquiry. But this is not the sense in which “eclecticism ” has 
been adopted and eulogized by the Parisian School. For, not 
content with affirming that the same system may contain both 
truth and error, and that it is our duty to separate the one from 
the other,—which is the only rational “eclecticism,’— M. 
Cousin maintains that error ttself is only a partial or incomplete 
truth; that if it be an evil, it is a necessary evil, and an 
eventual good, since it is a means, according to a fundamental 
law of human development, of evolving, truth and advancing 
philosophy; and that thus the grossest errors may exert a 


324 MODERN ATHEISM. 


salutary influence, insomuch that Atheism ttself may be regarded 
as providential.' In this form, Eclecticism becomes a huge 
and heterogeneous system of SyNCRETISM, including all varie- 
ties of opinion, whether true or false; and it has a natural and 
inevitable tendency to issue in a spirit of INDIFFERENCE to the 
claims of truth, which may assume the form either of Philo- 
sophical Skepticism or of Religious Liberalism, according to 
the taste and temperament of the individual who embraces it. 
In the form of Religious Liberalism, it has often been exem- 
plified in our own country by those who, averse from definite 
articles of faith, and prone to latitudinarian license, have studi- 
ously set themselves to disparage the importance of the peculiar 
doctrines of Christianity, and even to obliterate the distinction 
between the various forms of Religion, natural and revealed, 
by representing them all as so many varieties of the same 
religious sentiment, so many diverse, but not antagonistic, 
embodiments of the same radical principle. In the writings of 
Pope, several expressions occur which are easily susceptible of 
this construction, and which have often been quoted and applied 
in defence of Religious Liberalism, notwithstanding his explicit 
disavowal of it in his letter to the younger Racine, prefixed to 
the collected edition of his works. But on the continent of 
Europe, Syncretism has been much more fully developed, and 
fearlessly applied to every department of human thought. 
Pushed to its ultimate consequences, it obliterates the distinc- 
tion not only between truth and error, but also between virtue 
and vice, nay even between Religion and Atheism; and repre- 
sents them all as constituent parts of a scheme, which is devel- 
oped under a law of “ fatal necessity,’ but which is described 
also as a scheme of “optimism.” Its range is supposed to be 
unlimited: for it has been applied to the History of Philosophy, 


1M. Cousin, “Introduction,” 1. 318, 391, 405, 419; 11. 134. Ibid., 
“¥Fragmens Philosophiques.” Preface, vir. 


& 
A 


THEORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM. 325 


by Cousin, to the theory of the» Passions, by Fourier, to the 
doctrines of Christianity, by Quinet and Michelet, and to the 
Philosophy of Religion, by Benjamin Constant. The practical 
result of such speculations is a growing skepticism or indiffer- 
ence in regard to the distinction between truth and error, and a 
very faint impression of the difference between good and evil. 
The speculations of Pierre Leroux, the head, if not the founder, 
of the Humanitarian School, are strongly tinged with this 
spirit: they amount to a justification of evil, an apotheosis of 
man.” | . 

We do not class these speculations among the formal systems 
of Atheism, although they have often been associated with it; 
but we advert to them as specimens of that style of thinking 
which has a natural tendency to induce an atheistic frame of 
mind The profession of such sentiments is a symptom rather 
of incipient danger, than of confirmed disease. But that danger 
is far from being either doubtful or insignificant. For should 
the distinction between “truth and error” be obliterated or 
even feebly discerned, should it come to be regarded as a matter 
of comparative indifference whether our beliefs be true or false, 
should it, above all, become our prevailing habit to “call 
good evil, and evil good,” we can scarcely fail, in such cir- 
cumstances, to fall into a course of practical Atheism; and this, 
as all experience testifies, will leave us an easy prey, especially 
in seasons of peculiar temptation and trial, to any form of spec- 
ulative Infidelity that may happen to acquire a temporary 
ascendancy. If there be no dogmatic Atheism involved in this 
state of mind, there is at least the germ of skepticism, which - 
may soon grow and ripen into the open and avowed denial of 
religious truth. At the very least, it will issue in that heartless 


1 VALROGER, “Etudes Critiques,” pp. 115, 126, 151, 308, 316. Marnr, 
‘Essai sur Pantheisme,” p. 249. 

2P. Leroux, “ Sur ’Humanité,” 2 vols. 

8 Buppzxws, “De Atheismo et Superstitione,” pp. 184, 212. 


28 


326 MODERN ATHEISM. 


indifference to all creeds and all definite articles of faith, which, 
under the plausible but surreptitious disguise of “ freethink- 
ing” and “liberalism,” is the nearest practical approximation 
to utter Infidelity. | 

The system which is known under the name of Religious 
Liberalism or Indifference has been recently avowed in our 
own country with a frankness and boldness which can leave no 
room for doubt in regard to its ultimate tendency. The late 
Blanco White avowed it as his mature conviction, that “to 
declare any one unworthy of the name of Christian because he 
does not agree with your belief, is to fall into the intolerance 
of the articled Churches ; that the moment the name Christian 
is made necessarily to contain in its signification belief in cer- 
tain historical or metaphysical propositions, that moment the 
name itself becomes a creed,—the length of that creed is of 
little consequence.”? This is the extreme on one side, and it 
plainly implies that no one article of faith is necessary, and 
that a man may be a Christian who neither acknowledges an 
historical Christ, nor believes a single doctrine which He taught! 
But there is an extreme also on the other side, which is exem- 
plified in the singularly eloquent, but equally unsatisfactory, 
treatise of the Abbé Lamennais,’ in which, as then an ardent 
and somewhat arrogant advocate of the Romish Church, he 
attempts to fasten the charge of Indifference or Liberalism on 


1 RicHarp BEenTLEY, “On Freethinking,” Boyle Lectures. VILLE- 
MANDY, “Scepticismus Dehellatus,” 111. His words are remarkable :— 
‘‘Passim haec, aliaque generis ejusdem, placita disseminantur, — neque 
verum neque bonum, qualia sunt in seipsis, posse dignosci; hinc que adeo 
sectandam esse duntaxat ctiim veri, tum boni, similitudinem: que si stent 
ac valeant, —illud omne erit verum, illud omne sequum, —illud omne pium 
et religiosum, —illud omne utile, quod cuiquam tale videatur; privatam 
cujusque conscientiam supremam esse agendorum, vel non agendorum, 
normam.” 

2 JamES MARTINEAUD, “‘ Rationale of Religious Inquiry,” p. 108. 

3. pp LAMENNAIS, “ Essai sur l’Indifference en matiere de la Religion,” 
4 vols. Paris, 1844. 


THEORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM. j27 


the Protestant system, and to prove that there can be no true. 
faith, and of course no salvation, beyond the Catholic pale. 
The chief interest of his treatise depends on his peculiar 
“theory of certitude,” to which we shall have occasion to ad- 
vert in the sequel; in the meantime, we may notice briefly the 
grievous error into which he has fallen in treating of the faith 
which is necessary to salvation. He overstates the case as 
much, at least, as it has been understated by the abettors of 
Liberalism. The latter deny the necessity of any articles of 
faith; the former demands the implicit reception of every doc- 
trine propounded by the Romish Church. He repudiates the 
distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals in 
Religion, and insists that, as every truth is declared by the 
same infallible authority, so every truth must be received with 
the same unquestioning faith. He forgets that while all the 
truths of Scripture ought to be believed by reason of the Divine 
authority on which they rest, yet some truths are more directly 
connected with our salvation than others, as well as more clearly 
and explicitly revealed. Nor are we justly liable to the charge 
of “ Indifference” or “ Liberalism” when we tolerate a differ- 
ence of opinion, on some points, among men who are, in all 
important respects, substantially agreed: for true toleration is 
the fruit, not of unbelief or indifference, but of charity and can- 
dor; and it is sanctioned in Scripture, which enjoins that we 
should “receive those who are weak in the faith, but not to - 
doubtful disputations,’ and that “every man should be fully 
persuaded in his own mind.”* 

But it is not so much in its relation to the articles of the 
Christian faith, agin its bearing on the different forms of true 
and false religion, that the theory of Liberalism comes into 
collision with the cause of Theism, and evinces its infidel ten- 


dencies. If any one can regard with the same complacency, 


1 Romans 14: 1, 5. ° 


328 MODERN ATHEISM. 


or with the same apathetic indifference, all the varieties of 
religious or superstitious belief and worship; if he can discern 
no radical or important difference between Monotheism and 
Polytheism, or between the Protestant and Popish systems; if 
he be disposed to treat each of these as equally true or equally 
false, as alike beneficial or injurious in their practical influence, 
then this may be regarded as a sufficient proof that he is igno- 
rant of the evidence, and blind to the claims, of truth,—a mere 
skeptical dreamer, if not a speculative Atheist. 

An attempt has recently been made to place the theory of 
Religious Liberalism on a philosophical basis, by representing 
religion as a mere sentiment, which may -be equally elicited 
and exemplified in various forms of belief and worship. Sev- 
eral writers, following in the wake of Schleiermacher, who 
gave such a powerful impulse to the mind of Germany, have 
made Religion to consist either in a sense of dependence, or 
in a consciousness of the infinite; and this sentiment, as well 
as the spontaneous intuitions of reason with which it is asso- 
ciated, is said to be alike natural, universal, and invariable, the 
essential principle of all Religion, the root whence have sprung 
all the various forms of belief and wership. These varieties 
are supposed to be more or less rational and salutary, accord- 
ing to the conception which they respectively exhibit of the 
nature and character of God,—a conception which may be 
endlessly diversified by the intellect, or the imagination, or the 
passions of different men; while all the forms of belief are 
radically identical, since they all spring from the same ground- 
principle, and are only so many distinct manifestations of it. 
Thus Mr. Parker tells us that, stripping the “religious senti- 
ment” in man “of all accidental circumstances peculiar to the 
age, nation, sect, or individual, and pursuing a sharp and final 
analysis till the subject and predicate can no longer be sepa- 
rated, we find as the ultimate fact, that the religious sentiment 
is this, —‘a sense of dependence.” ‘This sentiment does not 


THEORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM. 829 


itself disclose the character, and still less the nature and 
essence, of the object on which it depends, no more than the 
senses declare the nature of their objects. Like them it acts 
spontaneously and unconsciously, as soon as the outward occa- 
sion offers, with no effort of will, forethought, or making up the 
mind. But the religious sentiment implies its object; .... 
and there is but one religion, though many theologies.” * 

There is, as it appears to us, a mixture of some truth with 
much grave and dangerous error, in these and similar specula- 
tions. It is an important truth, and one which has been too 
often overlooked in treating the evidences of Natural Theology, 
that the sentiments of the human mind, not less than its intui- 
tive perceptions or logical processes, have a close relation to 
the subject of inquiry; but it is an error to suppose that all 
the sentiments having a religious tendency can be reduced to 
one, whether it be called “a sense of dependence” or “a con- 
sciousness of the infinite,” for there are other sentiments be- 
sides these which are equally subservient to the uses of 
Religion, such as the sense of moral obligation, of the true, of 
the ideal, of the sublime, and of the beautiful. It is also an 
important truth, that there are spontaneous “intuitions of 
reason,” or fundamental and invariable “laws of thought,” 
which come into action at the first dawn of experience, and 
which have a close connection with the proof of the being and 
perfections of God; but it is an error to suppose that the 
proof depends exclusively on these, or that it could be made out 
irrespective of the evidence afforded by the works of Creation 
and Providence. It is further an important truth, that the 
religious sentiment, or religious tendency, is natural to man, 
and that it may appear either in the form of Religion or Super- 
stition: but it-is an error to suppose that “there is but one 


1 THEODORE PARKER, “Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion,” 
pp. 14, 17. 
Zo" 


330 MODERN ATHEISM. 


religion, although many theologies ;” for these theologies must 
spring from fundamentally different “conceptions of God,” and 
what are these conceptions, in their ultimate analysis, but so 
many beliefs, doctrines, or dogmas, which, whether formally 
defined or not in articles of faith, have in them the self-same 
essence which is supposed to belong only to the bigotry of 
“articled churches?” But the fundamental, the fatal error of 
all these speculations, is the denial of any stable and permanent 
standard of objective truth. ‘Truth is made purely subjective, 
and, of course, it must also be progressive, insomuch that the 
truth of a former age may be an error in the present, and the 
supposed truth of the present age may become obsolete here- 
after. So that there is really nothing certain in human knowl- 
edge; and “truth” may be justly described as never existing, 
but only becoming, as never possessed, though ever pursued; it 
is a verité mobile, a truth not in esse, but in fier’. Hence we 
read in recent speculations of a “new Christianity,” of a “new 
Gospel,” and of “the Church of the Future,” as if there could 
be any other Christianity than that of the New Testament, any 
other Gospel than that of Jesus Christ, or any other Church 
than that of apostolic times. 

I have adverted to this theory, because, while it is of little 
value in a speculative point of view, it is often found to exert 
a powerful practical influence, especially on “men of affairs,” 
men who have travelled in various countries, or who have been 
employed in the arts of diplomacy and government; and who, 
finding religious worship everywhere, but clothed in different 
forms, and marking its subserviency to social and _ political 
interests, have been too prone to place all the varieties of belief 
in the same category, if not precisely on the same level, and to 
regard with indifference, perhaps even with indulgence, the 
grossest corruptions both of Natural and Revealed Religion. 
The world is surely old enough, and its history sufficiently 
instructive, to prove, even to the most indifferent statesmen, 


| 


THEORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM. 331 


that truth is always salutary, and error noxious, to the common- 
wealth, and that nowhere is society more safe, orderly, or stable, 
than in those countries which are blessed with “ pure and unde- 
filed religion.” But let the opinion spread from the prince 
to the peasant, from the aristocracy to the artisans, from the 
philosopher to the public, that there is either no difference, or 
only a slight and trivial one, between truth and error, that it 
matters little what a man believes, or whether he believes at 
all: let the general mind of the community become indoctri- 
nated with such lessons, and it needs no prophetic foresight to 
predict a crisis of unprecedented peril, an era of reckless revo- - 
lution. A philosophic dreamer may affect a calm indifference, 
a bland and benignant Liberalism; but a nation, a community, 
cannot be neutral or inert in regard to matters of faith: it must 
and will be either religious or irreligious, it must either love 
the truth or hate it: it is too sharp-sighted, and too much 
guided by homely common sense, to believe that systems so 
opposite as Paganism and Christianity, or Popery and Protes- 
tantism, are harmonious manifestations of the same religious 
principle, or equally beneficial to the State. 


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Rael honbhiet Beeaee Res. maces yaa Blois Dean: eltgbin ya spa q 
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noeamndiven: ann bythe: eat: ween ainhunrensiang 2 ies ata 
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as: “ol sont ai, Peat: eins Ades x staph wy tier ad = 
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‘seiaainoSS.- Sis esas, WO aie Bou ip REN, Pe RE 
‘pase los * panda, bot eoactemeiedd me hag Cala aa RRR 
tue Gye has aN salle cit, kaplan (Maura gehmaneatiang 


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i? gente Bay iy pide. SOME PORES e eohy y ean | = Pika pitts sei 


* ix vee : ‘ 
to + aa eines js i ‘se big iN os Lae Ai, mek te <0 pie dan teh 


CHAPTER VItY 


THEORIES OF CERTITUDE AND SKEPTICISM. 


We formerly adverted to the distinction between Dogmatic 
and Skeptical Atheism; and, believing that the latter is the 
form in which it is most prevalent, as well as most insidious 
and plausible, we now propose to review some recent theories 
both of Certitude and Skepticism, which have sometimes been 
applied to throw doubt on the evidence of Christian Theism. 

The Academy of Moral and Political Sciences in the French 
Institute announced in 1843 the theory of Certitude as the sub- 
ject of a Prize Essay, and issued the following programme as a 
guide to the competitors in the selection of the principal topics 
of discussion : 

“1. To determine the character of Certitude, and what dis- 
tinguishes it from everything else. For example, Is Certitude 
the same with the highest probability ? 

“2. What is the faculty, or what are the faculties, which give 
us Certitude? If several faculties of knowledge are supposed 
to exist, to state with precision the differences between them. 

“3. Of Truth and its foundations. Is truth the reality itself, 
— the nature of things falling under the knowledge of man ? — 
or is it nothing but an appearance,—a conception, necessary 
or arbitrary, of the human mind ? 

“4, To expound and discuss the most celebrated opinions, 
ancient and modern, on the problem of Certitude, and to follow 


334 MODERN ATHEISM. 


them out into their theoretical and practical consequences. ‘Lo 
subject to a critical and profound examination the great monu- 
ments of Skepticism, —the writings of Sextus, Huet, Hume, 
and Kant. . 

“5. To inquire what are, in spite of the assaults of Skep- 
ticism, the certain truths which ought to subsist in the Phi- 
losophy of our times.” 

Such was the comprehensive programme of the French 
Institute ; and many circumstances concurred at the time to 
impart a peculiar interest to the competition. M. Franck’s 
volume’ contains the Report of the Section of Philosophy on 
the papers which had been prepared, and offers a careful 
analysis and critical estimate of their contents. Various other 
works” not concerned in the competition appeared before and 
after it, showing how much the philosophical mind of France 
had been occupied with this great theme, while in Britain it 
was attracting little or no attention. 

This is the most recent discussion, on a great scale, of the 
theory of Certitude. But the question, far from being a new 
or modern speculation, is as old as Philosophy itself, and has 
been perpetually reproduced in every age of intellectual 
activity. Plato discusses it, chiefly in the Theztetus, Sophist, 
and Parmenides; it was agitated by Pyrrho, Enesidemus, and 
Sextus Empiricus, with that peculiar subtlety which belonged 
to the mind of Greece; and in more recent times it has reap- 
peared in the writings of Montaigne and Bayle, Huet and 
Pascal, Glanville, Hume, and Kant. Even during the middle 


1M. A. FrANoK, “Rapport,” Paris, 1847. M. A. Javary, “Ouvrage 
Couronné par l'Institut,” 1847. 

2M. Ep. Mercier, “De la Certitude, dans ses Rapports avec la Science 
et la Foi,” 1844. M. A. Vera, “Probleme de la Certitude,” 1845. ABBE 
GERBET, “Des Doctrines Philosophiques sur la Certitude, dans leur Rap- 
ports avec les Fondemens dé la Theologic.” ABBE DE LAMENNAIS, “Du 
Fondement de la Certitude,” 1826. Vols. 11. and 111. of the “‘ Essai sur 
V’Indifference en Matiére de la Religion.” 4 vols., 1844. 


THEORY OF CERTITUDE. 300 


age, the controversy between the Nominalists and Realists had 
an important bearing on this subject: so that from the whole 
history of Philosophy we derive the impression of its funda- 
mental importance, an impression which is deepened and con- 
firmed by the transcendent interest of the themes to which it 
has been applied. 
In our present argument, we are concerned with it only so 
far as it stands connected with the foundations of Theology, or 
as the right or wrong solution of the general question might 
affect the evidence for the Being and Perfections of God. We 
do no propose, therefore, to offer a full exposition of the phi- 
losophy of Certitude, still less to institute a detailed examination 
of the various theories which have been propounded respecting 
it. It will be sufficient for our purpose if we merely sketch a 
comprehensive outline of the subject, and select some of the 
more prominent points which have the most direct bearing on 
the grounds of our religious belief. Thus much may be 
accomplished by considering, jirst, the statement of the prob- 
lem, and, secondly, the solution of it. ‘ 
In regard to the statement of the problem, it is necessary, in 
the first instance, to ascertain its precise import, by determin- 
ing the meaning of the term Certitude. The programme of 
the Academy very properly places this question on the fore- 
ground, Is Certitude the same with the highest probability ? 
And it is the more necessary to give precedence to this part 
of the inquiry, because it is notorious that there is a wide dif- 
ference between the philosophical and the popular sense of 
Certitude, —a difference which has often occasioned mutual 
misunderstanding between disputants, and a profitless warfare 
of words. In the philosophical sense of the term, that only is 
said to be certain which is either an axiomatic truth, intuitively 
discerned, or a demonstrated truth, derived from the former by 
rigorous deduction ; while all that part of our knowledge which 
is gathered from experience and observation, however credible 


336 MODERN ATHEISM. 


in itself and however surely believed, is characterized as prob- 
able only. In the popular sense of the term, Certitude belongs 
to all those truths, of whatever kind and in whatever way 
acquired, in regard to which we have no reason to be in doubt 
or suspense, and which rest on sufficient and satisfactory evi- 
dence. A philosopher is certain, in his sense of the term, only 
of what he intuitively perceives or can logically demonstrate ; 
a peasant is certain, in his sense of the term, of whatever he 
distinctly sees, or clearly remembers, or receives on authentic 
testimony. There is much reason, we think, to regret the 
existence of such a wide difference between the philosophical 
and the popular sense of an expression, which must occur so 
often both in speculative discussion and in the intercourse of 
common life. It may be doubted whether the metaphysician 
is entitled to borrow the language of society, and to engraft 
upon it an arbitrary definition of his own, different from and 
even inconsistent with that which it bears in common usage. 
Nor can he plead necessity as a sufficient excuse, or the 
accuracy of his definition as an effectual safeguard, since, how- 
ever needful it may be to discriminate between different species 
of Certitude, by marking their peculiar characteristics and 
respective sources, surely this might be done more safely and 
satisfactorily by designating one kind of it as Intuitive, another 
as Demonstrative, another as Moral, or Experimental, or His- 
torical, than it can be by any arbitrary restriction of the generic 
term to one or two of the many species which are compre- 
hended under it. No doubt there is a real distinction, and one 
of great practical importance, between certitude and probability ; 
but this distinction is not overlooked in the language of common 
life; ——it is only necessary to determine what truths belong 
respectively to each: whereas when all the truths of Experi- 
ence, and even, in some cases, those of scientific Induction, are 
ranked under the head of probability merely, is it not evident 


THEORY OF CERTITUDE. Sol 


that the language of Philosophy is in this respect at variance 
with the prevailing sense of mankind ? v 
An attempt has sometimes been made to draw a distinction 
between popular and philosophical Certitude, or, in other words, 
between the unreflecting belief of the many and the scientific 
belief of the few. Thus, M. Franck distinguishes Certitude, 
first of all, from the blind faith which commences with the 
earliest dawn of intelligence: then, from the doubt which 
supervenes on the initial process of inquiry; and then, from 
that half-knowledge, that middle term between doubt and _cer- 
tainty, which is called probability. And M. Javari speaks of 
Certitude “as the complete demonstration, acquired by reflec- 
tion, of the legitimacy of any judgment, or of the reality of any 
object: this is definitive and scientific certitude, which is con- 
trasted with that belief, however strong, which springs, not 
from the reflective, but the direct and spontaneous exercise of 
our faculties.”* It must be evident that, according to this 
definition of the term, Certitude, in the scientific sense of it, as 
the product of philosophical reflection, must be the privilege and 
prerogative of the few, who have been led by taste or education 
to cultivate the study of Psychology; while the vast majority 
of men, who are nevertheless as certain of the truths which 
they believe, and, to say the very least, as little liable to doubt 
or skepticism, as any class of philosophers whatever, must be 
held to have no Certitude, just because they have no Science. 
It seems to be assumed that Certitude is the creation of Science, 
the product of reflective thought; whereas it may be demon- 
strably shown that without Certitude, Science would be impos- 
sible, and that reflection can give forth nothing but what it finds 
previously existing in the storehouse of human consciousness. 
It surveys the streams of belief, and may trace up these streams 
to their highest springs; but it does not, it cannot, create a new 


1M. FRANCK, p. 237. M. JAVARI, p. 28. 
29 


338 MODERN ATHEISM. 


truth, or give birth to a higher certitude. We have no dis- 
position, assuredly, to underrate the value of philosophical 
reflection, or to disparage the science of Psychology ; the 
former may collect the materials and the latter may attempt 
the construction, of a goodly and solid fabric: but we cannot 
admit that the certainty of all our knowledge depends upon 
either of them, or that it is confined exclusively to the meta- 
physical inquirer. Reflection adds nothing to the contents of 
human consciousness: it examines our fundamental beliefs, but 
originates none of them; it discerns the elements and sources 
of certainty, but can neither produce nor alter them. Its sole 
province is to examine and report. If Certitude, in the philo- 
sophical sense of it, belongs to the reflex, Certainty, in the 
popular sense, belongs to the direct and spontaneous, operations 
of the human mind. We see and believe, we remember and 
believe, we compare and believe, we hear and believe, and that, 
too, with a feeling of confidence which needs no argument to 
confirm it, and to which all the philosophy in the world could 
impart no additional strength. Certitude is not the creation of 
Philosophy, but the object of its study ; “it exists independently 
of Science, and is only recognized by it; and it would still 
exist as a constituent and indestructible element of human con- 
sciousness were Metaphysics scattered to the wind. 

It appears, again, to have been assumed in some recent 
treatises, that Certitude belongs only to that portion of truth 
the denial of which would imply a contradiction, or amount to 
the annihilation of reason. Is it, then, to be restricted to 
necessary and absolute, as contrasted with contingent and rela- 
tive truths? Am J not as certazn that I see four objects before 
me, as that two and two make four? Yet the former is a con- 
tingent, the latter a necessary truth. Is not my personal con- 
sciousness infallibly certain? And yet can it be said to belong 
to the head of necessary truth? Surely Certitude is unduly 
restricted when we exclude from it many of our surest and 


i 


THEORY OF GERTITUDE. 339 


strongest convictions, which relate to truths attested by experi- 
ence, but the denial of which would involve no contradiction. 
The question has been still further complicated by extreme 
opinions of another kind. It seems to have been assumed that 
there can be no Certitude, unless we can explain the rationale 
of our knowledge, and even account for the objects of our 
knowledge by tracing them up to their First Cause, as the 
ground and reason of their existence.’ Now, if the question 
were, Can you account for your own existence, or for the exis- 
tence of the world around you, without having recourse to a 
supreme First Cause? we would answer, No: but if the ques- 
tion be, Can there be any Certitude prior to the idea of God, 
not deduced from it, and capable of existing without it? we 
would answer, Yes: the little child is certain of its mother’s 
existence before it is capable of knowing God, and the veriest 
Atheist is certain of his own existence and that of his fellow- 
men, even when he professes to doubt or to disbelieve the 
existence of God. It may be true that the essential nature 
and omniscient knowledge of God is the ultimate and eternal 
standard of truth and certainty, or, in the words of Fenelon, 
that “il n’y a qu’une seule verité, et qu’une seule maniere de 
bien juger, qui est, de juger comme Dieu méme;”? and yet it 
may not be true that all our knowledge is derived by deduction 
from our idea of God, or that its entire certainty is dependent 
on our religious belief. Surely we may be certainly assured 
of the facts of consciousness, of the phenomena of Nature, and 
of many truths, both necessary and contingent, before we have 
made any attempt to explain the rationale of our knowledge, 
or to connect it with the idea of the great First Cause; nay, 
it may be, and we believe it is, by means of these inferior and 


4 
1AMAND SarnTE, “Vie de Spinoza,” p. 201. Appi LAMENNAIS, 
“Essai sur l’Indifference,” 1v. 256. 
2 FENELON, “(Euvres Spirituelles,” 1. 138, 


340 MODERN ATHEISM. 


subordinate truths that we rise to the belief of a supreme, 
omniscient Mind. 

Some writers seem to confound Certitude with Infallibility, 
or at least to hold that there can be no Certitude without it. 
The tmpersonal reason of Cousin, the common sense or generic 
reason of Lamennais, and the authoritative tradition of the 
Church, have all been severally resorted to, for the purpose 
of obtaining a ground of Certitude in the matters both of 
Philosophy and Faith, such as iS supposed to be unattainable 
by the exercise of our own proper faculties, or by the most care- 
ful study of evidence. According to these theories, Certitude 
belongs to our knowledge, only because that knowledge is 
derived from a reason superior to our own,—a reason not 
personal, but universal; not individual, but generic. When 
they are applied, as they have been, to undermine the author- 
ity of private judgment, and to supersede the exercise of free 
inquiry; when they are urged as a reason why we should 
defer to the authority of the Race in matters of Philosophy 
and to the authority of the Church in matters of Faith; when 
we are told that the certainty of our own existence depends on 
our knowledge of God, and that our knowledge of God depends 
on the common consent or invariable traditions of mankind,— 
we do feel that the grounds of Certitude, so far from being 
strengthened, are sapped and weakened by such speculations, 
and that we have here a new and most unexpected application 
of the Scottish doctrine of Common Sense, such as may be 
highly serviceable to the Church of Rome. Protestant writers, 
indeed, have sometimes appealed to common consent as a col- 
lateral proof, auxiliary to that which is more direct and con- 
clusive ; but they have done so merely because they regarded 
it as a part of the evidence, well fitted to prove what Dr. Cud- 
worth calls “the naturality of the idea of God,” and not 
because they confounded it with the faculty by which alone 
that evidence can be discerned and appreciated. They never 


THEORY OF CERTITUDE. 341 


regarded it as the sole ground of certainty either in matters of 
Philosophy or Faith. Nor can it be so considered by any 
thoughtful mind. For how can I be more assured of an im- 
personal reason than of my own? How can I be more certain 
of the existence and the traditions of other men, than of the 
facts of my own consciousness, and the spontaneous convictions 
of my own understanding ? or how can I be assured that, in 
passing from the impersonal reason to the individual mind, 
from the generic-reason to the personal, the truth may not 
contract some taint of weakness or impurity from the vessel in 
which it is ultimately contained,— from the finite faculties by 
which alone it is apprehended and believed ? 

The fact is that any attempt to prove the truth of our facul- 
ties must necessarily fail. Did we set ourselves to the task of 
proving by argument or by authority that we are not wrong in 
believing in our own existence or that of an external world, or 
did we attempt to establish the trustworthiness of our faculties 
by resolving it into the veracity of God, our effort must needs 
be as abortive as it is superfluous, since it involves the neces- 
sity not only of proving the fact, but of proving the proof itself, 
and that, too, by the aid of the very faculties whose trustworthi- 
ness is in question! ‘There are certain ultimate facts beyond 
which it is impossible to push our speculative inquiries; 
certain first or fundamental principles of Reason, which are in 
themselves indemonstrable, but which constitute the ground or 
condition of all demonstration; certain intuitive perceptions, 
which are widely different from rational deductions, but which 
determine and govern every process of reasoning and every 
form of belief. To deny the certainty of our intuitive percep- 
tions, merely because we cannot prove by argument the truth 
of our mental faculties, would virtually amount to a rejection 
of all evidence except such as comes to us only through one 
channel, and that the circuitous one of a process of reasoning ; 


while, by the constitution of our nature, we are qualified and 
207 


/ 


842 MODERN ATHEISM. 


privileged to draw it fresh, in many cases, at its spring and 
fountain-head. It may be as impossible for man to prove the 
trustworthiness of his intellectual faculties as it is for the bee 
to prove the truth of its marvellous instinct; but, in either 
case, the reason may be that any such proof is unnecessary, 
that it is superseded by the laws of Instinct in the one, and 
by the laws of Thought in the other, and that by these laws a 
better and surer provision is made for our guidance than any 
that could have been found in a mere logical faculty, —a 
natural and irresistible authority, which the Skeptic may dis- 
pute, but cannot destroy, and which, however disowned in 
theory, must be practically obeyed. 

It must be evident that the various meanings which have 
been attached to the term Certitude must materially affect both 
the statement and solution of the general problem, and, more 
particularly, that they must have an important bearing on the 
question, whether the doctrine which affirms the Being, Per- 
fections, and Providence of God, should be ranked under the 
head of certain, or only of probable, truth. If, in making use 
of the term Certitude, I mean to denote by it something differ- 
ent from the certainty which belongs to the most assured con- 
victions of the human mind, something that arises, not from the 
spontaneous and direct exercise of its faculties, but from a 
process of reflective thought or philosophical speculation, some- 
thing, in short, that is peculiar to the metaphysical inquirer, 
and is not the common heritage of the race at large; then, 
unquestionably, the problem, as thus understood, must leave 
out of view many of the surest and most universal beliefs of 
mankind, — beliefs which may be illustrated and confirmed by 
Philosophy, but which are anterior to it in respect to their 
origin, and independent of it in respect of the evidence on 
which they severally rest. In the case of Certitude, just as in 
the case of every similar term expressive of a simple, elemen- 
tary idea, the ultimate appeal must be made to individual 


THEORY OF CERTITUDE. a4 


consciousness. No one can convey to another a conception of 
Certitude by means of words, apart from an experimental sense 
of it in the mind of the latter, any more than he could give the 
sdea of color to the blind or of music to the deaf. It is because 
we have had experience of it in our own breasts that we recog- 
nize and respond to the descriptions which others give of it. 
Every one knows what it is to be certain in regard to many 
things, just because, constituted as he is, he cannot doubt or 
disbelieve them. He is certain of his own existence, of the 
existence of other men, of the facts of his familiar conscious- 
ness, of many events long since past which are still clearly 
remembered, of certain abstract truths which are intuitively dis- 
cerned or logically demonstrated. These various objects of his 
thought may differ in other respects, and may occasion a cor- 
responding difference in the kind of Certitude which is con- 
ceived to belong to them; but they all possess the same generic 
character, and admit, therefore, of being classified under the 
same comprehensive category, as objects of our certain knowl- 
edge. 

In the current use both of philosophical and popular lan- 
guage, Certitude is spoken of in a twofold sense. We speak 
of.a belief or conviction of our own minds as possessing the 
character of Certitude, when it is so strong and so firmly rooted 
that it excludes all doubt or hesitation ;—we speak also of an 
object or event as possessing the same character, when it is so 
presented to our minds as to produce the full assurance of its 
reality. Hence the distinction between subjective and objective 
Certitude. The former is a fact of consciousness; it is simply 
the undoubting assent which we yield to certain judgments, 
whether these judgments be true or false; it exists in us, and 
not in the objects of thought; it denotes a condition of our 
minds, which may, or may not, be in accordance with the 
actual state of things. The latter is truth or certainty consid- 
ered objectively, as existing in the objects of our knowledge ; it 


344 MODERN ATHEISM. 


is independent of us and of our conceptions; it is as it is, 
whether it be known or unknown to us; our belief cannot add 
to its reality, nor can our unbelief diminish or destroy it. Cer- 
titude, considered as a mental state, denotes simply the strength 
of our conviction or belief, as distinguished from doubt or mere 
Opinion; but, considered as an objective reality, it denotes the 
ground or reason existing in the nature of things for the convic- 
tions which we cherish. Subjective certitude is not always the 
index or the proof of objective truth, for men often believe with 
the strongest assurance what they find reason afterwards to 
doubt or to disbelieve; and the prevalence of many false be- 
liefs, sincerely cherished and zealously maintained, raises the 
question, how we may best discriminate between truth and 
error? Hence the various theories of Certitude, and hence 
also the antagonist theories of Skepticism. 

The theories of Certitude may be reduced to three classes. 
The jirst places the ground of Certitude in Reason ; the second 
in Authority ; the third, in Lvidence, including under that term 
both the external manifestations of truth, and the internal prin- 
ciples or laws of thought by which we are determined in form- 
ing our judgments in regard to them. Each of these theories, 
however, has appeared in various phases in the history of phi- 
losophical speculation. The Individual Reason of Martineau, 
the Generic Reason of Lamennais, the Impersonal Reason of 
Cousin, the Authority of the Race, and the Infallibility of the 
Church, are specimens of these varieties. 

The theory which places the principle of Certitude in 
Reason has assumed at least two distinct shapes. In the one 
it discards all authority except that of private judgment or 
individual reason; in the other it appeals to a higher reason, 
which is said to be impersonal and infallible, and which is sup- 
posed to regulate and determine the convictions of the human 
mind. In the former shape, it appears in the speculations of 
Martineau ; in the latter, it is advocated by Cousin; and in one 


THEORY OF CERTITUDE. 345 


or other of these shapes it constitutes the ground-principle of 
RatTIonALism. The theory, again, which places the principle 
of Certitude in AuTHority has also assumed two: distinct 
shapes. In the one it speaks of a universal consent or Gen- 
eric Reason, the reason not of the individual but of the race to 
which he belongs, and exhibits a singular combination of the 
Philosophy of Common Sense as taught by Dr. Reid and the 
Scottish School, with the principle of Authoritative Tradition 
as taught in the Popish Church; in the other, it refers more 
specifically, not to the infallibility of the race at large, but to 
the infallibility of a select body, regularly organized and in- 
vested with peculiar powers, into whose hands has been com- 
mitted the sacred deposit and the sole guardianship of truth, 
whether in matters of philosophy or faith. In both forms it is 
presented in the writings of M. Gerbet and M. Lamennais, 
and in both it is necessary for the full maintenance of the 
Popish system of doctrine. The theory, again, which places 
the principle of Certitude in EvipEncr, admits of being 
exhibited in two very distinct aspects. In the one, it has been 
treated as if Evidence were purely subjective, as if it belonged 
exclusively to thought, and not to the object of thought, or as 
if it depended solely on the perceptions of our minds, and not 
at all on any objective reality which is independent of them, 
and which is equally true whether it be perceived by our minds 
or not. In this form it is a theory of Individualism, and has a 
strong tendency towards Skepticism. In the other aspect, 
Evidence is regarded as the sole and sufficient ground of Cer- 
titude, but it is viewed both objectively and sulyjectively ; — 
objectively, as having its ground and reason in a reality that is 
independent of our perceptions, and that may or may not be 
perceived without being the less true or the less certain in 
itself; — and yet subjectively also, as being equally dependent 
on certain principles of reason or laws of thought, without 
which no external manifestation would suffice to create the ideas 


846 MODERN ATHEISM. 


and beliefs of the human mind, since the evidence which is 
exhibited externally must not only exist, but must be perceived, 
discerned, and appreciated, before it can generate belief: but 
when perceived, it produces conviction, varying in different 
cases in degree, and amounting in some to absolute certainty, 
which leaves no room either for denial or doubt. 

Such are the three grand theories of Certitude, and the sev- 


eral distinct forms or phases in which they have severally 


appeared. We have no hesitation in declaring our decided 
preference for the second form of the third theory, — that 
which resolves the principle or ground of Certitude into Evi- 
DENCE ; but EVIDENCE considered both objectively and subjec- 
tively, — oljectively, as that which exists whether it is perceived 
or not, and is independent of the caprices of individual minds, 
and subjectively, as that which must be discerned before its 
proper impression can be produced, which must be judged of 
according to the laws of human thought, and which, when so 
discerned and judged of, imparts a feeling of assurance which 
no sophistry can shake and no philosophy strengthen. 
According to some recent theories, Certitude belongs to our 
knowledge, only because that knowledge is derived from a 
reason superior to our own, —a reason not personal, but uni- 
versal, not individual but generic, which, although not belong- 
ing to ourselves, is supposed to hold communication with our 
minds: and if this were meant merely to remind us of the lim- 
itation of our faculties, and of our consequent liability to error, 
or even to teach us the duty of acknowledging our dependence 
on a higher power, it might be alike unobjectionable and salu- 
tary; but when it is applied to undermine the authority of pri- 
vate judgment and to supersede the exercise of free inquiry, 
they have a tendency to excite suspicion and distrust in every 
thoughtful mind. The capital error which pervades all these 
speculations consists in not distinguishing aright between the 
evidence which constitutes the ground of our belief, and the 


THEORY OF SKEPTICISM. 347 


faculty by which that evidence is discerned and appreciated. 
The Generic Reason of Lamennais, as well as the uniform Tra- 
dition of the Church, may constitute, when duly improved, a 
branch of the objective evidence for the truth, and as such they 
have been applied even by Protestant writers when they have 
appealed to common consent as a collateral proof, auxiliary to 
that whichis more direct and conclusive; but they cannot be 
regarded as the exclusive grounds of the certainty of human 
knowledge, since this arises from the fundamental, universal, 
and invariable laws of human thought. 


The term Skepticism, again, may denote either a mere state 
of mind,—a state of suspense or doubt in regard to some par- 
ticular fact or opinion; or a system of speculative philosophy, 
relating to the principles of human knowledge or the grounds 
of human belief. In the former sense, it implies nothing more 
than the want of a sure and satisfactory conviction of the truth 
on the particular point in question. Were it expressed in 
words, it would simply amount to.a verdict of “non liquet.” In 
the latter sense, it imports much more than this; it is not 
merely a sense of doubt respecting any one truth, but a system 
of doubt in regard to the grounds of our belief in all truth, a 
subtle philosophy which seeks to explain the phenomena of 
Belief by resolving them into their ultimate principles, and 
which often terminates — in explaining them away. In both 
forms, it has existed, either continuously or in ever-recurring 
cycles, from the earliest dawn of speculative inquiry ; and 
while it has seemed to retard or arrest the progress of human 
knowledge, it has really been overruled as a means of quicken- 
ing the intellectual powers, and imparting at once greater 
precision and comprehensiveness to the matured results of 
Science. 

Theoretical Skepticism may be divided into three distinct 
branches: First, Universal or Philosophical Skepticism, which 


348 MODERN ATHEISM. 


professes to deny, or rather to doubt the certainty of all human 
knowledge; secondly, Partial or Religious Skepticism, which 
admits the possible certitude of human knowledge in other 
respects, but holds that religious truth is either altogether inac- 
cessible to our faculties, or that it is not supported by sufficient 
evidence ; thirdly, a mongrel system, which combines Philo- 
sophic Doubt with Ecclesiastical Dogmatism, and which may 
-be aptly characterized as the Skeptico-Dogmatic theory.! 

We agree with Dr. Reid in thinking that Universal Skepti- 
cism is unanswerable by argument, and can only be effectively 
met by an appeal to consciousness.” It might be shown, indeed, 
that in so far as it assumes, however slightly, the aspect of a 
positive or dogmatic system, it is self-contradictory and absurd ; 
it might also be shown that doubt- itself implies thought, and 
thought existence or reality: but the ultimate appeal must be 
to the facts of human consciousness, and the laws of thought 
which operate in every human breast. And when such an 
appeal is made, we can have no anxiety in regard to the result, 
nor any apprehension that philosophical skepticism can ever 
become the prevailing creed of the popular mind. There is a 
risk, however, of danger arising from a different source ; it 
may not be always remembered that the theory of Skepticism 
must be universal to be either consistent or consequent; and 
hence it may be partially applied to some truths, while it is 
practically abandoned in regard to other truths, which are 
neither more certain nor less liable to objection than the 


1 Sextus Empiricvs, “ Adversus Mathematicos,” that is, Dogmaticos 
teachers of wabyuata. GLANVILLE, “Scepsis Scientifica.” Humn, 
and MONTAIGNE, “Essays.” H. O’Connor, ‘Connected Essays and 
Tracts.” VILLEMANDY, “ Scepticismus Debellatus; seu, Humane Cog- 
nitionis Ratio ab imis radicibus explicata; ejusdem Certitudo adversus 
Scepticos quosque veteres ac novos invicte asserta.”” LAMENNAIS, ‘‘ Essai 
sur Indifference.” 

2 Dr. REID, Essays, — “Qn First Principles,” 11. 249-252, 293, 300. Sim 
Wma. Hamitton, “Reid,” pp. 91, 101, 109. 


THEORY OF SKEPTICISM. 3849 


former. Thus the skeptical difficulties which have been raised 
against the doctrines of Ontology are of such a kind that if 
they have any validity or force, they bear as strongly against 
the reality of an external world and the existence of our fellow- 
men, as against the doctrine which aflirms the being of God: 
yet many will be found urging them against the latter doctrine, 
who do not profess to have any doubt in regard to the two 
former ; and it is of paramount importance to show that this is 
a partial and therefore unfair application of their own prin- 
ciples, and that they cannot consistently admit the one without 
also admitting the other. 

Atheism, in its skeptical form, must either be a mere sense 
of doubt in regard to the sufficiency of the evidence in favor of 
the being and perfections of God; or a@ speculative system, 
which attempts to justify that doubt by some theory of philo- 
sophical skepticism, either partial or universal. In the latter 
case, it may be best dealt with by showing that it affects the 
certainty of our common knowledge, not less than that of our 
religious belief, and that we cannot consistently reject Theol- 
ogy, and yet retain our convictions on other cognate subjects 
of thought. In the former case, it should be treated as a case 
of ignorance, by illustrating the evidence, and urging it on the 
attention of those who have hitherto been blind to its force ; 
reminding them that their not seeing it is no proof that it does 
not exist, and that doubt itself on such a question, so nearly 
affecting their duty and welfare, involves a solemn obligation 
to patient, candid, and dispassionate inquiry. 

“ A skeptic in religion,” says Bishop Earle, “is one that 
hangs in the balance with all sorts of opinionsywhereof not one 
but stirs him, and none sways him. A man guiltier of credu- 
lity than he is taken to be; for it is out of his belief of every- 
thing that he fully believes nothing. Each religion scares him 
from its contrary, none persuades him to itself. .... He 
finds reason in all opinions, truth in none; indeed, the least 

te 30 


300 MODERN ATHEISM. 


reason perplexes him, and the best will not satisfy him... . . 
He finds doubts and scruples better than resolves them, and is 
always too hard for himself... . . In sum, his whole life is a 
question, and his salvation a greater, which death only con- 
cludes, and then he — is resolved.” 1 

This second phase or form of Skepticism, which we have 
designated as Partial or Religious Skepticism, admits the pos- 
sible certitude of human knowledge in other respects, and 
especially in regard to secular and scientific puruits, but holds 
that religious truth is either altogether inaccessible to man 
with his present faculties, or that its certainty cannot be evinced 
by any legitimate process of reasoning. 

These two positions are in some respects widely different, 
although they are often combined, and always conducive to the 
same result,— the practical negation of Religion. Many who 
never dream of doubting the certainty of human knowledge, in 
so far as it relates to their secular or scientific pursuits, are 
prone to cherish a skeptical spirit in regard to religious or 
spiritual truths ; and this, not because they have examined and 
weighed the evidence to which Theology appeals, and found it 
wanting, but rather because they have a lurking suspicion that 
men, with their present faculties, are incapable of rising to the 
knowledge of supernatural things, and that they could attain to 
no certainty, while they might expose themselves to much 
delusion, by entering on the inquiry at all. This is their 
apology for ¢gnoring Religion altogether, and contenting them- 
selves with other branches of knowledge, which are supposed 
to be more certain in themselves as well as more conducive to 
their present welfare. In this respect, it is deeply instructive 
to remark that Infidelity has been singularly at variance with 
itself. At one time, in the age of Herbert, human reason was 
extolled, to the disparagement of Divine Revelation ; it was 


1 BisHor EARxe, “ Microcosmography,”’ p. 120, 


THEORY OF SKEPTICISM. 351 


held to be so thoroughly competent to deal with all the truths 
of Theology, and to arrive, on mere natural grounds, at such 
an assured belief in them, that no supernatural message was 
needed either to illustrate, or confirm, or enforce the lessons 
of Nature: but now, when the lessons of Nature herself are 
called in question, human reason is disparaged as incompetent 
to the task of deciphering her dark hieroglyphics, and while 
she ¢an traverse with firm step every department of the mate- 
rial world, and soar aloft, as on eagle’s wings, to survey the 
suns and systems of astronomy, she is held to be incapable 
alike of religious inquiry and of divine instruction! There is, 
indeed, a striking contrast between the high pretensions of 
Reason in matters of philosophy, and the bastard humility 
which it sometimes assumes in matters of faith. 

But there is another, and a still more subtle, form of Partial 
or Religious Skepticism. It does not absolutely deny the pos- 
sibility of religious knowledge, nor does it dogmatically affirm 
that man, with his present faculties, can have no religious con- 
victions; it contents itself with saying, and attempting to prove, 
that the certitude of religious truth cannot be evinced by any 
legitimate process of reasoning. It examines the proof, and 
detects flaws in it. It discusses, with a severe and critical 
logic, the arguments that have been employed to establish the 
first and most fundamental article of Theology, the existence 
of God; and discarding them one by one, it reaches the con- 
clusion that, whether true or not, it cannot be proved. Strange 
as it may appear, these sentiments have been embraced and 
avowed by men who still continue to profess their belief in God 
and Religion. Some have held that proof by reasoning is im- 
possible, but only because it is superfluous. They distinguish 
between reason and reasoning ; and hold that while the latter 
is incompetent to the task of proving the existence of God, the 
former spontaneously suggests the idea of a Supreme Cause, 
and imparts to it all the certainty which belongs to a direct 


b02 MODERN ATHEISM. 


intellectual intuition. Others distinguish between the Specula- 
tive and the Practical Reason; and hold that while the former 
cannot prove by an-unexceptionable argument the existence of 
God, the latter affords a sufficient groundwork for religious 
belief and worship. Others, again, speak not so much of 
reason or reasoning, as of sentiment and instinct, as the source 
of our religious beliefs; and instead of addressing areuments 
to the understanding, they would make their appeal to the feel- 
ings and affections of the heart. There is still another class 
of writers who resolve all human knowledge, whether relating 
_ to things secular or spiritual, into what they call the principle 
of faith (for), and to this class belong two distinct parties who 
are widely different from each other in almost everything else. 
It is important, therefore, to mark the radical difference between 
their respective systems, since it is apt to be concealed or dis- 
guised by the ambiguous use of the same phraseology by both. 
The one party may be described as the disciples of a Faith- 
Philosophy of Reason, the other of a Laith-Philosophy of Rev- 
elation: the former resolving all our knowledge into the 
intuitive perceptions or first principles of the human intellect, 
considered as a kind of divine and infallible, though natural 
inspiration ; the latter contending that in regard at least to the 
knowledge of theological truth, human reason is utterly power- 
less, and can only arrive at certainty by faith in the divine 
testimony. The two are widely different, yet there are points 
of resemblance and agreement betwixt them, and on this 
account they have sometimes been classed together under a 
wide and sweeping generalization. 

The form of Partial Skepticism to which these remarks 
apply is perhaps more common than it is generally supposed to 
be. On what other principle, indeed, can we account, at least 
in the case of religious men, for the indifference and even aver- 
sion with which they turn away from any attempt to prove by 
natural evidence the existence and providence of God? The 


THEORY OF SKEPTICISM. 3008 


prevalence of such feelings even within the Christian commu- 
nity has been admitted and deplored by one of the most pro- 
found spiritual teachers of modern times ;* and it can only be 
explained, where Religion is cherished and professed, on the 
supposition that they regard proof by argument as superfluous, 
either because it is superseded by the natural instincts and 
intuitions of the human mind, or by the authoritative teaching 
of Divine Revelation. But it ought to be seriously considered, 
on the one hand, that the instincts and intuitions of human 
reason are not altogether independent of the natural evidence 
which is exhibited in the constitution and course of Nature ; 
and, on the other hand, that Revelation itself refers to that 
natural evidence, and recommends it to our careful and devout 
study. 

Besides the theories of Partial Skepticism to which we have 
already referred, there is a mongrel system which seems to 
combine the two opposite extremes of Doubt and Dogmatism, 
and which, for that reason, may be not inaptly designated as 
Skeptico-Dogmatic.? Ever since the era of the Reformation, 
when the principle of free inquiry, and the right or rather the 
duty of private judgment in matters of Religion, were so stren- 
uously affirmed and so successfully maintained, there has been 
a standing controversy between the Popish and Protestant 
Churches respecting the rival claims of Reason and Authority 
as the ultimate arbiter on points of faith. xtreme opinions 
on either side were advanced. One party, repudiating all 
authority, whether human or divine, rejected alike the testi- 
mony of Scripture and the decrees of the Church, and, receiv- 
ing only what was supposed to be in accordance with the 
dictates of Reason, sought to establish a scheme of Rationalism 


1 Dr. Joun Love, of Glasgow, “ Discourses.” 

2 Cousin, ‘‘ Cours,” 11. 420, 422. More .t, “ History of Philosophy,” 
I. 251; 11. 221, 505, 522. Spinoza, “‘ Tractatus Theolog.-Polit.,” p. 267. 
LAMENNAIS, “ Essai sur l’Indifference,” passim. 


30* 


354 MODERN ATHEISM. 


in connection with at least a nominal profession of Christianity. 
The opposite party, not slow to detect the error into which 
extreme Protestants had fallen, and intent seemingly on fasten- 
ing that error on all who had separated themselves from the 
Catholic Church, affirmed and endeavored to prove that Ra- 
tionalism, in its most obnoxious sense, is inherent in and insep- 
arable from the avowed principles of the Reformation, and that 
the recognition of the right of private judgment is necessarily 
subversive of all authority in matters of faith. They did not 
see, or if they did see, they were unwilling to acknowledge 
that Rationalism is a very different thing from the legitimate 
use of Reason; and that while the former repudiates all 
authority, whether human or divine, the latter may bow with 
profound reverence to the supreme authority of the Inspired 
Word, and even listen with docility to the ministerial authority 
of the Church, in so far as her teaching is in accordance with 
the lessons of Scripture. It may be safely affirmed that the 
Confessions and Articles of all the Protestant Churches in 
Kurope and America do recognize the authority both of God 
and the Church, and are as much opposed to Rationalism, con- 
sidered as a system which makes Reason the sole standard and 
judge, as they are to the opposite extreme of lordly domination 
over the faith and consciences of men. But such a controversy 
having arisen, it was to be expected that while eager partisans, 
on the one side, might unduly exalt and extol the powers and 
prerogatives of Reason, the adherents of Romanism, which 
claims the sanction of infallibility for her doctrines and decrees, 
would be tempted to follow an opposite course, and would seek 
to disparage the claims of Reason with the view of exalting the 
authority of the Church. Hence arose what has been called 
PopisH PyRRHONISM,—a system which attempts to combine 

Doubt with Dogmatism, and to establish the certitude of 
religious knowledge on the sole basis of authority, which is 
somehow supposed to be more secure and stable when it rests 


THEORY OF SKEPTICISM. 355 


on the ruins of human reason. Not a few significant symptoms 
of a tendency in this direction have appeared from age to age. 
It was apparent.in some of the writings, otherwise valuable, of 
Huet, Bishop of Avranches ; some traces of it are discernible 
in the profound “'Thoughts of Pascal;” but it was reserved for 
the present age to elaborate this tendency into a theory, and to 
give it the form of a regular system. This task was fearlessly 
undertaken by the eloquent but versatile Lamennais, while as 
yet he held office in the Church, and was publicly honored as 
one who was worthy to be called “the latest of the Fathers.” 
His “Essay on Indifference in Matters of Faith,” exhibits 
many proofs of a profound and vigorous intellect, and contains 
many passages of powerful and impressive eloquence. We 
heartily sympathize with it in so far as it is directed against 
that Liberalism which makes light of all definite articles of 
faith ; but we deplore the grievous error into which he has 
been seduced by his zeal for the authority of the Church, when 
he attempts to undermine the foundations of all belief in the 
trustworthiness of the human faculties. In opposition to the 
claims of private judgment, he contends for the necessity of a 
Reason more elevated and more general as the only ground of 
Certitude, the supreme rule and standard of belief. This nor- 
mal Reason he finds in the doctrine and decrees of an Infallible 
Church, wherever the Church is known; but where the Church 
is yet unknown, or while it was yet non-existent in its present 
organized form, he seeks this more general Reason in the com- 
mon sense or unanimous consent of the race at large, and 
affirms that this is the sole ground of Certitude, and the ulti- 
mate standard of appeal in every question respecting the truth 
or falsity of our individual opinions.‘ He holds that the 
authority both of the Church and of the Race is infallible; and 
that its infallibility neither requires nor admits of proof? With 


1 LAMENNAIS, “‘ Essai,” 11. 6, 7, 52, 60, 258. 
2 Thid., 11. 9,97, 110. 


356 MODERN ATHEISM: 


the view of establishing this one and exclusive criterion of Cer- 
titude, he assails the evidence of sense, the evidence of con- 
sciousness, the evidence of memory, the evidence even of 
axiomatic truths and first principles, and involves everything 
except ecclesiastical authority or general reason in the same 
abyss of Skepticism. He ventures even to affirm that “Geom- 
etry itself, the most exact.of all the Sciences, rests, like every 
other, on common consent!” No wonder, then, that he should 
also found exclusively on authority our belief in the existence 
and government of God. 

“An intelligent member of his own communion propounds a 
very different, and much more reasonable, opinion: “Tl n’y a 
pas d’autorité morale qui n’ait besoin de se prouver elle- 
méme, d’une maniere quelconque, et d’etablir sa legitimitd. 
En definitive, c’est a Vindividu qu’elle s’addresse, car on ne 
croit pas par masse, on croit chacun pour soi. individu 
reste donc toujours juge, et juge inevitable de l’autorité intel- 
lectuelle qu'il accepte, ou de celle qui s’offre a lui. Nous 
n’avons pas a examiner si cette disposition constitutive de 
esprit humain est bonne ou mauvaise; la seule question que 
Yon en fait est vaine et sterile. Nous sommes necessairement 
aménés par lobservation physchologique a constater qu il faut 
que homme croie a la fidelité du temoignage de ses sens indi- 
viduels, et & la valeur de sa raison personelle, avant de faire 
un pas au-dela.”? 

We think it unnecessary to enter into a detailed discussion 
of this strange and startling theory, especially as the altered 
position of the writer in his relation to the Church before his 
death may be held to indicate that to a large extent it had 
been abandoned by himself. Nor should we have thought it 
worthy even of this transient notice, had we not discerned 
symptoms of an incipient tendency in a similar direction among 


1 LaMEnnals, “ Essai,” 11. 59, 72, 75, 78, 80, 84, 94; rv. 255. 
2 BoucuitrkK, “ Histoire des Preuves,” p. 478, 


—— 


———— 


| 
| 


THEORY OF SKEPTICISM. S57 


some writers in the Protestant ranks. It should be remem- 
bered by divines of every communion that the rational facul- 
ties of man and their general trustworthiness are necessarily 
presupposed in any Revelation which may be addressed to 
them; and that in Scripture itself frequent appeals are made 
to the works of Creation and Providence, as affording at once a 
body of natural evidence, and a signal manifestation of His 
adorable perfections. It were a vain thing to hope that faith 
tn God may be strengthened by a spirit of Skepticism in regard 
to Reason, which constitutes part of His own image on the soul 
of man. 

It is but common justice to add that the speculations of 
Lamennais, so far from being sanctioned, were openly cen- 
sured, by some of the most distinguished of his fellow-ecclesias- 
tics. Such writers as Valroger, Gioberti, and the late Arch- 
bishop of Paris, gave forth their public protest against. them, 
and have thereby done much to vindicate their Church from 
the imputation of conniving at the progress of Skepticism. 

Valroger’s testimony is strong and decided: “M. de Lamen- 
nais pretendait que la raison individuelle est incapable de nous 
donner la Certitude. Cette pretention est, suivant, nous ab- 
surde et funeste. N’est ce pas par notre raison individuelle 
que la verité arrivé a nous et devient notre bien? Quel moyen 
plus immediat pourrons-nous avoir de saisir la verité ? Quel 
principe de connaisance ou de Certitude pourrait-on placer 
entre nous et notre raison? Et comment pourrions-nous ’em- 
ployer, si,ce ne’est avec notre raison? N’est ce pas une con- 
tradiction flagrante de vouloir persuader quelque chose 2 des 
hommes que l’on a declarés incapables de connaitre certaine- 
ment quoi que ce soit? A quoi bon une methode, une autorité 
infaillible, un_enseignement Divin, si nous n’avons que des 
facultés trompeuses pour user de ces secours? Nous croyons, 
nous, que la raison individuelle peut connaitre avec certitude 


\ 


toutes les verités necessaires 4 Vaccomplissement de notre des- 


308 MODERN ATHEISM. 


tinée. Si nous avons besoin de la Grace, de la Revelation, de 
la Tradition, et de l’Eglise pour atteindre le bit supreme de 
notre vie,—sur une foule de questions subalternes, nous pou- 
vons arriver a une certitude complete, sans recourir 4 aucune 
exterieure, 2 aucun secours surnaturel.”+ 

Gioberti is equally explicit: “M. de Lamennais dans sa 
theorie sur la Certitude, confond les deux methodes, Ontologique 
et Physiologique; il les rejette toutes les deux, et leur sub- 
stitue la seule methode d’Autorité. Mais la methode d’Au- 
torité est impossible sans un fondement Ontologique, et c’est 
une manifeste petition de principe que d’etabler ’Ontologie sur 
PAutorité.”? 

And the late Archbishop of Paris, —the same who fell before 
the barricades, a martyr to Charity if not to Truth, and who 
seems to have had a wakeful eye on the progress of philosophic 
speculation,—took occasion, in a preface to the Abbé Maret’s 
“'Theodicée,” to declare that Lamennais’ system was obnoxious 
to the Church, because of its opposition to the doctrine of 
Rational Certitude: “Tout le monde sait que le clergé de 
France avait repoussé le systeme de M. de Lamennais precisé- 
ment 2 cause de son opposition a la Certitude Rationnelle con- 
stanment professée dans nos ecoles; et tout le monde peu 
savoir que les Bossuet, les Fenelon, les Descartes ont raisonné, 
et que nous aussi nous raisonnons et discutons avec nos accusa- 
teurs,’. ...“preuve irrécusable que LE RATIONALISME ET 
LA RAISON SONT DEUX CHOSES FORT DIFFERENTES.”* 

PreRRONE has given a similar testimony, and we cannot 
doubt that the more thoughtful adherents of Romanism must 
be sensible of the danger which is involved in any attempt to 
combine Rational Skepticism with Dogmatic Authority. 

It were well, however, if they would reconsider their position 


1 VALROGER, “‘ Etudes Critiques,” p. 574. 
2 GIOBERTI, “ Introduction a l’Etude de la Philosophie,” 1. 592. 
3 MARET, “ Theodicéc,” Preface, p. VIII. 


THEORY OF SKEPTICISM. 359 


with reference to this whole question, in its more general bear- 
ings in conection with their doctrine as to the rule of faith; 
and weigh, with candid impartiality, the arguments which have 
been adduced by Protestant writers on the subject 


1 LA PLacETTE, “De Insanabili Romane Ecclesie Scepticismo.” 


py 1. Ry ie 


cay) 
; ay i _ we 


» 
we 
a 


‘aa. ioe oe te uaa ibaa se siitemersaeagie 
Seine Roicrion: wnnceon aR 68 SeeThru. aBlaanats A. Magiesee aie 
yaaa, QR Min icesnlM ye Geta ll wet Sarath york 


ait, 13.) AN mine 


, eat eunttacnt Aegan 0 ycmpetigca dit 


CHAPTER IX. 
THEORY OF SECULARISM.—G. J. HOLYOAKE. 


Sucu is the new name under which Atheism has recently 
appeared among not a few of the tradesmen and artisans of the 
metropolis and provincial towns of Great Britain. In litera- 
ture, it is represented by Mr. G. J. Holyoake, the author of an 
answer to Paley, the editor of “'The Reasoner,” and a popular 
lecturer and controversialist, whose public discussions are duly 
reported in that periodical, and occasionally reprinted in a sep- 
arate form. The extensive circulation which these and similar 
tracts have already obtained, the number of affiliated societies 
which have been formed in many of the chief centres of manu- 
factures and commerce, the zeal and boldness of popular 
itinerant lecturers, and the urgent demands which have been 
incessantly made for the extension of their machinery by 
means of a propaganda fund, are all indications of a tendency, 
in some quarters, towards a form of unbelief, less speculative _ 
and more practical, but only on that account more attractive to 


1 GroRGE JacoBp Hortyoaksn, “Paley Refuted in his own Words,” 
Third Edition, London, 1850. TowNnLEy anp Horyoaxe, “A Public 
Discussion on the Being of a God,” Third Thousand. London, 1852. 
GRANT AND HoLyoakg, “Christianity and Secularism; a Public Dis- 
cussion held on six successive Thursday evenings,” Seventh Thousand. 
London, 1853. 


31 


° 


3562 MODERN ATHEISM. 


the English mind, and neither less insidious nor less dangerous 
than any of the philosophical theories of Atheism. 

We have often thought, indeed, that should Atheism ever 
threaten to become prevalent in England, this is the form which 
‘it is most likely to assume. The English mind is eminently 
practical ; it has little sympathy with the profundity of German 
or the subtlety of French speculation on such subjects. A few 
speculative spirits may be influenced for a time by the reason- 
ings of Comte, or the representations of “'The Vestiges;” but 
the general mind of the community will desiderate something 
more solid and substantial; not content with any scientific 
theory, however ingenious, it will demand a practical system. 
And we are not sure that “Secularism” may not be made to 
appear, in the view of some, to be just such a system, since it 
dismisses or refuses to pronounce on many of the highest prob- 
lems of human thought, insists on the necessary limitation of 
the human faculties, and seeks to confine both our aspirations 
and our thoughts to the interests and the duties of the present 
life. In estimating the probable influence of such a system on 
the public mind, we must not forget the large amount of prac- 
tical irreligion which exists even in England, the strong temp- 
tation which is felt by many to escape from their occasional 
feelings of remorse and fear by embracing some plausible pre- 
text for the neglect of prayer and other religious observances, 
and the disposition, natural and ,almost irresistible in such cir- 
cumstances, to lend a willing ear to any doctrine which promises 
to relieve them of all responsibility with relation to God and a 
future state. The theory of Secularism is adapted to this state 
of mind; it chimes in with the instinctive tendencies of every 
ungodly mind; and it is the likeliest medium through which 
practical Atheism may pass into speculative Infidelity. 

Mr. Holyoake, it is true, abjures the name both of an Atheist 
and Infidel. We admire the prudence of his policy, but cannot 
subscribe to the correctness of his reasons for doing so. “ Mr. 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 363 


Southwell,” he says, “has taken an objection to the term Athe- 
ism. Weare glad he has. We have disused it a long time. 
.... We disuse it, because Atheist is a worn-out word. 
Both the ancients and the moderns have understood by it one 
without God, and also without morality. Thus the term con- 
notes more than any well-informed and earnest person accept- 
ing it ever included in it; that is, the word carries with it 
associations of immorality, which have been repudiated by 
the Atheist as seriously as by the Christian. Non-theism is a 
term less open to the same misunderstanding, as it implies the 
simple non-acceptance of the Theist’s explanation of the origin 
and government of the world.” ! 

But “ Non-theism” was afterwards exchanged for “ Secular- 
ism,” as a term less liable to misconstruction, and more cor- 
rectly descriptive of the real import of the theory. “Secular- 
asts was, perhaps, the proper designation of all who dissented 
extremely from the religious opinions of the day.” —“ Free- 
thinking is the Secudar sphere ; drawing its line of demarcation 
between time and eternity, it works for the welfare of man in 
this world.” —“The Secularist is the larger and more com- 
prehensive designation of the Atheist.”* With all this coyness 
and fastidiousness about names, there can be no doubt that the 
character of the system is essentially atheistic: “We refuse 
to employ the term God, not having any definite idea of it 
which we can explain to others, — not knowing any theory of 
such an existence as will enable us to defend that dogma to 
others. We therefore prefer the honest, though unusual desig- 
nation of Atheist; not using it in the sense in which it is 


1 “The Reasoner,” New Series, No. viz. 115. Of this serial it is said 
(x11. 6, 81), ‘The Reasoner, which was established in 1846, has come to 
be regarded as the accredited organ of Freethinking in Great Britain. 
Indeed, for a long time, it has been the principal professed exponent of 
these views, addressed to the working and thinking classes.” 

2Tbid., x1. 15, 222; x11. 4, 6, 49, 81. 


364 ' MODERN ATHEISM. 


commonly employed, as signifying one without morality, but in 
its stricter sense of describing those without any determinate 
knowledge of Deity.”’ “That the Atheist does consider matter 
to be eternal is perfectly correct; and for this reason, no 
Atheist could make use of such a term as that matter originally 
possessed, or originally was; whatever is eternal has-no origin, 
beginning, orend..... Organized plants and animals —man 
also with his noble intellect — are not now at least produced by 
supernatural causes; and the Atheist, without positively assert- 
ing that there must have been a beginning to life in this earth, 
argues that if a plant, an animal, or a man, can be produced at 
this time without supernatural interference, so also a first plant, 
a first animal, or a first man, may have been naturally pro- 
duced in this earth under the right circumstances, —circum- 
stances which probably cannot occur in the present condition 
of our globe. Our difficulties and our ignorance are not in the 
least dispelled, but on the contrary complicated and increased, 
by the adoption of the ancient belief in a Supernatural Con- 
triver and Maker, who, after existing from eternity in absolute 
void and solitude, suddenly proceeded to create the universe 
out of nothing or out of himself”? The editor thinks “the 
coursé to be taken is to use the term Secularists as indicating 
general views, and accept the term Atheist at the point at 
which Ethics declines alliance with Theology; always, how- 
ever, explaining the term Atheist to mean ‘not seeing God, 
visually or inferentially; never suffering it to be taken (as 
Chalmers, Foster, and many others represent it) for Anti- 
theism, that is, hating God, denying God, as hating implies 
personal knowledge as the ground of dislike, and denying 
implies infinite knowledge as the ground of disproof.”° 

These extracts are sufficient to illustrate the peculiar charac- 
ter of this popular form of Infidelity. It is not a philosophical 


1 “The Reasoner,” x11. 4,50. 2 Ibid.,x1.18,271. 3 Ibid., x1. 15, 232, 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 365 


~ 


system, although philosophical terms are often employed by its 
advocates ; it does not even profess to solve, as the theory of 
Development does, any of the great problems of Nature. We 
shall offer a brief statement of its distinctive peculiarities, as it 
is developed by Mr. Holyoake, and suggest some considerations 
which should be seriously pondered by those who may be 
tempted to exchange Christianity for Secularism. 

1. The theory of Secularism is a form, not of dogmatic, 
but of skeptical, Atheism; it is dogmatic only in denying the 
sufficiency of the evidence for the being and perfections of God. 
It does not deny, it only does not believe, His existence. 
There may be a God notwithstanding; there may even be suf- 
ficient evidence of His being, although some men ‘cannot, or 
will not, see it. “They do not deny the existence of God, but 
only assert that they have not sufficient proof of His existence.”! 
“The Non-theist takes this ground. He affirms that natural 
reason has not yet attained to (evidence of) Supernatural 
Being. He does not deny that it may do so, because the 
capacity of natural reason in the pursuit of evidence of Super- 
natural Being is not, so far as he is aware, fixed.” — “The 
power of reason is yet a growth. To deny its power absolutely 
would be hazardous; and in the case of a speculative question, 
not to admit that the opposite views may in some sense be 
tenable, is to assume your own infallibility, —a piece of arro- 
gance the public always punish by disbelieving you when you 
are in the right.”* Accordingly the thesis which Mr. Holy- 
oake undertook to maintain in public discussion was couched in 
these terms: —“ That we have not sufficient evidence to believe 
in the existence of a Supreme Being independent of Nature ;”2 
and so far from venturing to deny His existence, he makes the 
important admission, that “denying implies infinite knowledge 
as the ground of disproof.” 

1“ The Reasoner,” x11. 24, 376. 2 Ibid., New Series, pp. 9, 130. 


8 Ibid. x1. 24. 368 
31* 


366 MODERN ATHEISM. 


It is admitted, then, by the Secularist himself,— that there 
may be a God, — that there may be evidence of His existence, 
— that it may yet be discovered in the progress of natural 
reason, —and that to deny any one of these possibilities would 
be to assume “ infallibility,” or to arrogate “infinite knowledge 
as the ground of disproof” Now, we humbly conceive that 
there is enough in these admissions, if not to disarm the Secular 
polemic, yet to shut up every seriously reflecting man, not, 
perhaps, to the instant recognition of a Divine Being, but cer- 
tainly to the duty of earnest, patient, and persevering inquiry. 
It was with this view that both Chalmers and Foster penned 
those powerful passages which seem to have left some im- 
pression on the mind even of Mr. Holyoake, not for the pur- 
pose, as he seems to imagine, of confounding Atheism with 
Anti-theism, but for the very opposite purpose of discriminat- 
ing between the two, so as to show that, the one being impos- 
sible, the other can afford no security against the possible truth 
of Religion. And every word of warning which they convey 
should tell with powerful effect on Mr. Holyoake’s conscience, 
after the admissions which he has deliberately made, especially 
when he is engaged in the cheerless task of undermining the 
faith of multitudes in their “ Father which is in heaven.” 

Dr. Chalmers devotes a chapter of his “ Natural Theology” 
to illustrate “the duty which is laid upon men by the possibility 
or even the émagination of a God.” He does not overlook, on 
the contrary he founds upon, the distinction between Skeptical 
and Dogmatic Atheism. “ Going back,” he says, “to the very 
earliest of our mental conceptions on this subject, we advert 
first to the distinction, in point of real and logical import, 
between unbelief and disbelief. There being no ground for 
affirming that there is a God, is a different proposition from 
there being ground for affirming that there isno God. .... 
The Atheist does not labor to demonstrate that there is no 
God; but he labors to demonstrate that there is no adequate 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 367 


proof of there being one. He does not positively affirm the 
position, that God is not; but he affirms the lack of evidence 
for the position, that God is. Judging from the tendency and 
effect of his arguments, an Atheist does not appear positively to 
refuse that a God may be; but he insists that He has not dis- 
covered Himself, whether by the utterance of His voice in 
audible revelation, or by the impress of His hand upon visible 
nature. His verdict on the doctrine of a God is only that it is 
not proven; it is not, that it is disproven. He is but an 
Atheist: he is not an Anti-theist.” 

Mr. Holyoake can scarcely fail to recognize in these words a 
correct and graphic delineation of his own position and senti- 
ments. Now, says Dr. Chalmers, “there is a certain duteous — 
movement which the mind ought to take, on the bare suggestion 
that a God may be... . The certainty of an actual God 
binds over to certain distinct and most undoubted proprieties. 
But so also may the imagination of a possible God; in which 
ease, the very idea of a God, even in its most hypothetical 
form, might lay a responsibility even upon Atheists... .. 
The very idea of a God will bring along with it an instant 
sense and recognition of the moralities and duties that would 
be owing to Him. Should an actual God be revealed, we 
clearly feel that there is a something which we ought to be and 
to do in regard to Him. But more than this: should a possible 
God be imagined, there is a something not only which we feel 
that we ought, but there is a something which we actually 
ought to do or to be, in consequence of our being visited by 
such an imagination. .. . . To this condition there attaches a 
most clear and incumbent morality. It is to go in quest of that 
unseen Benefactor, who, for aught I know, has ushered me into 
existence, and spread so glorious a panorama around me. It is 
to probe the secret of my being and my birth; and, if possible, 
to make discovery whether it was indeed the hand of a Bene- 
factor that brought me forth from nonentity, and gave me place 


368 MODERN ATHEISM. 


and entertainment in that glowing territory which is lighted up 
with the hopes and happiness of living men. It is thus that 
the very conception of a God throws a solemn responsibility after 
at”? 

It isa dangerous mistake, then, to imagine either that we 
can ever know that there is no God, or that we can’ get rid of 
all responsibility by merely doubting His existence. Atheism, 
in so far as it is dogmatic, must, in his own language, “arrogate 
infinite knowledge as the ground of disproof;” and in so far as 
it is merely skeptical, it can afford no security against the fears 
and forebodings which doubt on such a subject must necessarily 
awaken in every thoughtful mind. And this consideration will 
become only the more solemn and impressive the longer we 
reflect upon it. Mr. Holyoake, however, is far from being 
consistent in his various statements on this subject. For not 
content with saying, “ Most decidedly I believe that the present 
order of Nature is insufficient to prove the existence of an in- 
telligent Creator,” he adds that “no émaginable order, that no 
contrivance, however mechanical, precise, or clear, would be 
sufficient to prove it.”? At one time he tells us that “an 
increasing party respectfully and deferentially avow their 
inability to subscribe to the arguments supposed to establish the 
existence of a Being distinct from Nature.” At another, “We 
have always held that the existence of Deity is ‘past finding 
out,’ and we have held that the time employed upon the inves- 
tigation might more profitably be devoted to the study of 
humanity.” Again, “That central point in all religious belief 
—the existence of God—has not yet been approached in a 
frank spirit. The very terms of the assertion are as yet an 
enigma in language, the fact is yet a problem in philosophy ; 
the world possesses as yet no adequate logic for that province 
of our speculation which lies beyond our immediate ex- 


1 Dr. CHALMERS’ “ Works,” 1. 64. 2“ Paley Refuted,” p. 12. 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 3869 


perience.”! “Man must die to solve the problem of Deity’s 
existence.”2 “The existence of God is a problem to which 
the mathematics of human intelligence seems to me to furnish 
no solution,’*® “a problem without a solution, a hieroglyphic 
without an interpretation, a gordian knot still untied, a question 
unanswered, a thread still unravelled, a labyrinth untrod.” * 
That there is here a strong expression of Skeptical Atheism 
is evident; but is there not something more? Does not Skep- 
tical Atheism insensibly transform itself into Dogmatic, when 
doubt respecting the sufficiency of the evidence is combined 
with a denial of the possibility of any satisfactory proof, or of 
the capacity of the human mind to reach it, here or hereafter? 
Yet the plea is the want of sufficient evidence now; and this 
plea is urged in connection with the admission that “ the power 
of reason is yet a growth,” and that although “it has not yet 
attained to evidence of Supernatural. Being,” the denial of it 
“would imply infinite knowledge as the ground of disproof.” 
Mr. Holyoake does not deny that there may be a God, distinct 
from Nature and superior to it ; but he denies, first of all, the 
sufficiency of the evidence to which we appeal, embracing here 
that form of Atheism which is merely skeptical; and he denies, 
secondly, the possibility of any sufficient proof, for “no imagin- 
able order would be sufficient,” and the whole “subject exceeds 
human comprehension,” embracing, in this instance, that form 
of Atheism which is strictly dogmatic, if not in affirming that 
there is no God, yet in affirming that it is impossible He can 
ever be known to exist. What then becomes of his cautious 
limitations, —“The fact is yet a problem in philosophy.” — 
“The world possesses as yet no adequate logic for that province 


1GRANT AND HOLYOAKE, “ Discussion,” pp. 5. 8, 221. 

2“ The Reasoner Reasoned with,” p.13. ‘“Holyoake’s Reply to Dr. 
Forbes of Glasgow.” 

3 “The Logic of ‘ Logic of Death,’”’ p. 10. 

4“ Paley Refuted,” p. 37. 


370 MODERN ATHEISM. 


of speculation” — “Men must die to solve the problem of 
Deity’s existence?” Is it still a problem, and one, too, which 
may after all be solved, and solved even in the affirmative ? 
If it be, why may it not be solved before death? or what other 
evidence will there be after death? And as to the plea of in- 
sufficient evidence, what is its precise meaning? Does it mean 
merely that it has hitherto failed to convince himself and his 
associates? If so, how can he tell that it may not yet flash 
upon him with irresistible power, and that he too, like his 
former associate, Mr. Knight, may be able to say, “By the | 
blessing of God, the exercise of those mental powers which He 
has bestowed upon me has led me to the conclusion that He 
exists. There is a God.”! If it means more than this, will he 
say that it is insufficient for others as well as for him? But 
why, if others believe on the ground of that evidence, and if, 
according to his favorite theory, belief is the ¢nevitable result of 
evidence? Is his belief, or theirs, the measure of truth? Does 
he not know that multitudes have passed through the same 
dreary shade of unbelief in which he is still involved, and have 
afterwards emerged into the clear light of faith, discovering 
what they now wonder they had overlooked before, and saying 
with heartfelt humility and gratitude, “One thing I know, that 
whereas I was blind, now I see”?? But what has their belief, 
or his unbelief, to do with the great, the momentous fact? The 
truth, whatever it be, is independent of both: and it is the 
truth, and not our apprehensions of it, it is the evidence, and not 
our belief or doubt, that is the subject of inquiry. Will it be 
affirmed, then, either that the supposed existence of God is 
intrinsically incredible, and as such incapable of proof, or that 
the evidence is insufficient, in the sense ‘of being illogical 
and inconclusive? This is the ultimate ground of atheistic 


1 TOWNLEY AND HOLYOAKE, “ Discussion,” p. 13. 
2 “The.Converted Atheist’s Testimony.” 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. oil 


unbelief, and here the Skeptical unites and blends with the 
Dogmatic form of Infidelity. 

But when driven to this last resort, and before taking up the 
position which it is concerned to defend, Secularism puts forth 
certain preliminary pleas, partly in the way of self-defence, 
and partly with the view of exciting prejudice against the 
cause of Theism.' “TI make no pretence,” says Mr. Holyoake, 
“to account for everything. I do not pretend to account for 
what I find in Nature. I do not feel called upon to account 
for it. Ido not know that I am required to account for it.” 

... “A man will come to me and say, Can you account for 
this? Can you account for that? Now he expects me to tell 
him all about everything, just as though I was present at the 
beginning of Nature, and knew all its manifestations. If I 
cannot do it, he will not admit my plea of ignorance ;— he will 
‘not admit the propriety of my saying, I do not know.” He is 
not bound to explain either the past or the future: “ What 
went before and what will follow me I regard as two black 
impenetrable curtains, which hang down at the two extremities 
of human life, and which no living man has yet drawn aside. 
hacia Salk deep silence reigns behind this curtain ; no one once 
within will answer those he has left without ; all you can hear 
is a hollow echo of your question, as if you shouted into a 


chasm.” ? 


And can a mind that is capable of writing thus be 
content to discard Religion from his thoughts on the sorry pre- 
text that he is not bound to account for the phenomena of 
Nature? One would expect at least a thoughtful, serious, and 
earnest spirit, even were it a spirit of doubt, in one surrounded 
with such solemn mysteries, gazing on these black impenetrable 
curtains, listening to the hollow echo from that awful chasm: 


nay, that seriousness might be expected to deepen into sadness, 


1 TOWNLEY AND HOLYOAKE, “ Discussion,” pp. 56, 57. 
2 HoLyoakeE, “ Logic of Death.” 


oie MODERN ATHEISM. 


too intensely real to be soothed by the plea of ignorance, or 
assuaged otherwise than by the light of truth. But to say, “I 
do not pretend to account for what I find in Nature,’ what is 
this but to discard the whole question, to give it up as one 
insoluble, at least by Aim, and to leave to others the problems 
which have ever exercised the noblest and most gifted minds? 
Mr. Holyoake is not bound, indeed, to explain everything, and 
he mistakes if he supposes that any one expects this at his 
hand. There are many subjects on which even a man of 
science must ingenuously confess his ignorance, and many 
more so little connected with the interests and duties of life as 
to have only a very slight claim on his interest and attention. 
But Religion is not one of these: it is so closely related to the 
welfare and the duty of men, and has such a direct bearing on 
the conscience, that it demands and deserves the serious atten- 
tion of all; and no one who undertakes to instruct his fellow- 
men, and especially when he attempts to overthrow their most 
sacred convictions, is entitled to turn round and say, “I do not 
pretend to account for what I find in Nature.” He is bound 
to give some intelligible answer to the question, What is the 
cause.of these marvellous phenomena which I behold? and 
what is the ground of that religious belief which has always 
prevailed in the world ? i 
But Mr. Holyoake is deterred from any attempt to answer 
such questions by its amazing presumption: “The assumption 
is,— we may look through Nature up to Nature’s God. That 
seems to me to imply a power, a capacity, an endowment, 
which repels me at the outset. If we are to deal with the 
common sense of probability, I say I am repelled by the amaz- 
ing probability which is against me if I am to deal with the 
assumption of distinctness,— that I can lock from Nature up 
to Nature’s God. Why, in the presence of this shadowy form 
of things, before which all men stand in awe and dread, in the 
presence of so many mysteries and marvels which art is unable 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 373 


to unravel, which philosophy is unable to explain, it seems to 
me an immense endowment when a man can say with con- 
fidence, I look through Nature, and beyond Nature, up to 
Nature’s God. I say the presumption of the thing does repel 
me.”—* Let the profound sense of our own littleness, which 
here creeps in upon us, check the dogmatic spirit and arrest 
the presumptuous world; we stand in the great presence of 
Nature, whose inspiration should be that of modesty, humility, 
and love.”—* When my friend talks so much about matter, 
. . . . his reasoning proceeds upon this very great hypothesis, 
namely, that he knows all that matter can do, and all that it 
cannot do. If he does not know that, I wonder by what right 
he says so plainly that the wonders he observes in Nature are 
not the work of Nature, but of some Being above Nature. 
That which repels me from that aspect of the argument is its 
amazing presumption, the amount of knowledge it implies.” } 
Foster’s argument against Dogmatic Atheism seems to have 
made some impression on Mr. Holyoake, since he makes the 
important admission that “the denial of a God implies infinite 
knowledge as the ground of disproof,” but it is here retorted 
against Dogmatic Theism; and Unbelief, at other times so 
arrogant in its pretensions, so confident in the powers of reason, 
and so proud of the prerogatives of man, borrows the cloak of 
modesty from the wardrobe of true science, and assumes an 
attitude of deep humility. At other times Mr. Holyoake does 
not scruple to sit in judgment on what God,— supposing such 
a Being to exist,—could or could not do; on what He could 
or could not permit to be done ;— He could not create a moral 
and responsible agent, and leave him to fall; He could not 
require or receive any satisfaction for sin; He could not hear or 
answer the prayers of his people; He could not inflict penal suf- 
fering, or allow it to be permanent. There is no presumption, 


1 TOWNLEY AND HoLyoak®, “ Discussion,” pp. 22, 37, 55. 


374 MODERN ATHEISM. 


it would seem, in determining what God could or could not 
do; but “when we stand in the great presence of Nature,” 
her inspiration should be “that of modesty and humility.” 
But presumption does not consist in looking at what we can 
see, or aiming to know what may be known; and it is a bastard 
humility, not the true modesty of science, which would turn 
away from the contemplation of any truth, however sublime, 
that is exhibited in the light of its appropriate evidence. We 
are not concerned to deny that it is “a great endowment” 
which enables men to discern in Nature a manifestation of 
God; it is a great endowment, but not too great for the mind 
of man, if he was made in “the image and likeness of God;” 
a small mirror may reflect the sun. Is it presumptuous in the - 
mind of man to scale the heavens, and trace the planets in 
their course, and calculate their distances, their orbits, and 
their motions in the illimitable fields of space? And if the 
sublime truths of Astronomy are not interdicted to our facul- 
ties, simply because there is a natural evidence in the light of 
which they may be clearly discerned, why should it be pre- 
sumptuous to look from Nature up to Nature’s God, if in 
Nature we behold a mirror in which His perfections are dis- 
played? If there be presumption on either side, does it not 
lie rather with those who virtually deny the power of God to 
make Himself known,— His power to create a world capable 
of exhibiting His perfections, and a mind adapted to that world 
capable of discerning the perfections which are therein dis- 
played? There might be modesty, there might be humility in 
the ingenuous confession of ignorance, saying, “I do not 
know;” but there can be neither in the confidence which 
affirms that “no imaginable order would be sufficient” to 
prove the existence of God, for what is this but to say” that 
“he knows all that matter can do, and all that it cannot do,” or 
be made to do? 

2. Secularism admits the existence of a self-existent and 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 379 


eternal Being, and thereby recognizes the fundamental law of 
Causality on which the Theistic proof depends, while it forces 
upon us the question whether these attributes should be 
ascribed to Nature or to God. 

“T am driven,” says Mr. Holyoake, “to the conclusion that 
the great aggregate of matter which we call ‘ nature’ is eternal, 
because we are unable to conceive a state of things when noth- 
ing was. There must always have been something, or there 
could be nothing now. This the dullest feel. Hence we arrive 
at the idea of the eternity of matter. And in the eternity of 
matter we are assured of the self-existence of matter, and self- 
existence is the most majestic of attributes, and includes all 
others.” “Tf Natural Theologians were content to stop where 
they prove a superior something to exist, Atheists might be 
content to stop there too, and allow Theologians to dream in 
quiet over their barren foundling.”? “If I supposed that the 
Christian meant no more than that something exists indepen- 
dently of Nature, that it may be boundless, that it may be 
limited, that it may be one, that it may be many beings, if I 
supposed nothing more than that was meant, then surely I 
would not occupy your time or my own in discussing a ques- 
tion so barren of practical consequences.”—“If we reason 
about it, unless we take refuge in the idea of a creation which 
we cannot understand, we must come to the conclusion that 
Nature ts self-existent, and that attribute is so majestic, — the 
power of being independent of any ruler,— the power of being 
independent of the law of other beings,— seems so majestic as 
fairly to be supposed to include all others ; for that which has 
power éo be has power to act, for the power to be is the most 
majestic of all forms of action.” ® 
It is here admitted that there must be a self-existent, inde- 


1 HoLyoakeE, “Logic of Death.” 
2 “Paley Refuted,” p. 31. 
3 TOWNLEY AND HoLyoakp, “ Discussion,” pp. 17, 24. 


376 MODERN ATHEISM. 


pendent, and eternal Being, that self-existence is an attribute 
so majestic that it may be fairly said to include all others, that 
the Being to whom it belongs is exempt from the conditions of 
other beings, and that the power ¢o act is involved in the power 
to be. It is assumed, indeed, that these attributes may belong 
to Nature, and that Nature is mere matter; but, reserving this 
point for the present, are we not warranted in saying that his 
doctrine, as stated by himself, involves the same profound 
mysteries, and is embarrassed by the same difficulties, which 
are often urged as objections to the theory of Religion, and 
that it is, at the very least, as tmcomprehensible as the doctrine 
which affirms the existence of God? Suppose there were 
simply an equality in this respect between the Theistic and 
Atheistic hypothesis, that both were alike incomprehensible 
and incapable of an adequate explanation, still the former 
might be more credible and more satisfactory to reason than the 
latter, since in the one we have an intelligent and designing 
Cause, such as accounts for the existence of other minds and 
the manifold marks of design in Nature, whereas in the other 
all the phenomena of thought, and feeling, and volition, as well 
as all the instances of skilful adjustment and adaptation, must 
be resolved into the power of self-existent, but unintelligent 
and unconscious matter. 

Further it is admitted, not only that we may, but that we 
must, proceed on the principle of Causality, the fundamental 
axiom of Theology; for “there must always have been some- 
thing, or there could be nothing now.” This principle or law 
of human thought leads him up to a region which far transcends 
his present sensible experience, and guides him to the stupen- 
dous height of self-existent and eternal Being. It is assumed 
and applied to prove the self-existence and eternity of matter. 
But if it be a valid principle of reason, its application may be 
equally legitimate when it is employed, in conjunction with the 
manifest evidence of moral as distinct from physical causation, 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. ove 


to prove the self-existence and eternity of a supreme intelligent 
Cause. A principle such as this cannot, from its very nature, 
be limited within the range of our present sensible experience. 
We are told, indeed, that “if we look over the nature of our 
own impressions, we find we always shall begin with things 
which lie below reason, with things plainer than reason, with 
things which need. no demonstration. Such is the nature of 
the human mind, that we all begin in this sphere of equal 
knowledge, we begin under the dominion of the senses, and 
whatever comes within that wants no demonstration, wants no 
proof, wants no logic; it is the constant, it is the most indubi- 
table, it is the most indisputable of all our knowledge. And if 
the question of the being of a God came within that sphere, if 
it was found amongst those indisputable truths, if it was found 
to be a matter of sense, then there would be no occasion for us 
to reason at all about it: it could not be a matter of contro- 
versy, because it never would be a matter of dispute.”* Cer- 
tain first principles of reason are admitted, but only, it would 
seem, with reference to matters of sense ; but why, if there be 
such a principle of reason as compels the Atheist himself to 
acknowledge a Self-existent and Eternal Being? Is this a 
matter of sense? Is it not a conclusion of reason,—founded, 
no doubt, on present sensible ‘experience, but far transcending 
it, and yet self-evident and irresistible as intuition itself? 
And if reason may thus rise from the contingent and variable 
to the conception and belief of the self-existent and eternal, 
why may it not be equally valid as a proof of a supreme, 
intelligent First Cause ? 

Speaking of Nature as self-existent and eternal, Mr. Holy- 
oake ascribes such attributes to it as might seem to imply a 
leaning towards Pantheism, rather than the colder form of 
mere material Atheism. “It seems to me,” he says, “that 


l TOWNLEY AND HoLyoake, “ Discussion,” p. 25. 


32* 


378 MODERN ATHEISM. 


Nature and God are one; in other words, that the God whom 
we seek is the Nature whom we know.” But he afterwards 
states, with clearness and precision, in what respects Secularism 
accords with, and differs from, Pantheism: “ The term, God, 
seems to me inapplicable to Nature. In the mouth of the 
Theist, God signifies an entity, spiritual and percipient, distinct 
from matter. With Pantheists, the term God signifies the 
aggregate of Nature,—but Nature as a being, intelligent and 
conscious. It is my inability to subscribe to either of these 
views which constitutes me an Atheist. I cannot rank myself 
with the Theists, because I can conceive of nothing beyond 
Nature, distinct from it, and above it.. . . . The Theist, there- 
fore, I leave; but while I go with the Pantheist so far as to 
accept the fact of Nature in the plenitude of its diverse, illimi- 
table, and transcendent manifestations, I cannot go further and 
predicate with the Pantheist the unity of its intelligence and 
consciousness !”1 He holds, therefore, that self-existence is an 
attribute of Nature, that this attribute is so majestic that it 
may be fairly held to include all others, and that, while intelli- 
gence and consciousness exist, he cannot affirm their wnty in 
Nature, or regard “Nature as a being, intelligent and con- 
scious.” Whence it follows that he can give no other account 
of the living, intelligent, active, and responsible beings which 
inhabit the world, than that they came into existence, he knows 
not how, and that they have the ultimate ground of their exis- 
tence in a necessary, underived, and eternal being, which is 
neither intelligent nor self-conscious ! 

3. Secularism seeks to invalidate the proof from marks of 
design in Nature by attempting to show, either that it is 
merely analogical, and can, therefore, afford no certainty, or that, 
if it were certain, it could prove nothing, because, by an exten- 
sion of the same principle, it must prove too much. 


1 HOLYOAKE, ‘‘ Logic of Death.” 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 3719 


Such is the pith and substance of Mr. Holyoake’s argument 
in his singular pamphlet entitled,“ Paley refuted in his own 
Words.” He first of all endeavors to invalidate the proof from 
design by assuming that it is a mere argument from analogy, 
and that at the best analogy can afford no ground of certainty, 
although it may possibly suggest a probable conjecture: “It 
may be said that analogy fails to find out God, and this must , 
be admitted, it being no more than was to be expected. ‘The 
God of Theology being infinite, it is no subject for analogy. 
. . . . No conceivable analogy can prove a creation. Creation 
is without an analogy... .. No analogy can prove creation, 
because no analogy can prove what it does not contain, namely, 
an example of creation.”’ “ Analogy, the specious precursor 
of reason, would suggest the personality of the powers which 
awed and cheered man. Reason sends us to facts as the only 
positive grounds of positive conclusions ; but in the childhood 
of intellect and experience, likelihood is mistaken for certainty, 
and probability for fact. In the disturbed reflection of man’s 
image on the wall, as it were, of the universe, arose the idea 
of God.” .... “I say, if that is all you mean by your argu- 
ment, that it is merely a matter of analogy, if it is only a matter 
of partial resemblance, I say you can get from it no complete 
proof; that if you merely found it upon partial resemblance, 
there is no demonstration there whatever, and your cause is no 
better, no sounder than I have before described it,—as being 
merely your conjecture about a Being independent of Nature ; 
it is merely a conjecture, merely a suggestion, just like my 
own conjecture, just like my own suggestion about Nature being 
that one great Being about which we are all concerned.”* 

But not content with assailing analogy as incapable of lead- 
ing to any certain conclusion, he changes his tactics, and 


1 HoLYoaKkE, “‘ Paley Refuted,”’ p. 37. 
2 TOWNLEY AND HoLyoakgE, “ Discussion,” pp. 23, 47. 


380 MODERN ATHEISM. 


seems at least to do homage to it, while he insists only on its 
extension. “The argument of design,” he says, “is unques- 
tionably the most popular ever developed, and the most seduc- 
tive ever displayed. It has the rare merit of making the 
existence of God, which is the most subtle of all problems, 
appear a mere truism,—and the proofs of such existence, which 
have puzzled the wisest of human heads, seem self-evident.” 
This tribute, however, must be read in the light of his chosen 
motto,—“ The existence of a watch proves the existence of 
a watch-maker; a picture indicates a painter; a-house an- 
nounces an architect. See here are arguments of terrible force 
for children.” “I took up,” he says, “ Dr. Paley’s book,.... 
and I agreed with myself to admit, as I read, whatever 
appeared plausible. I did so, and my objection to my author 
was this: Upon the grounds of analogy and experience I found 
Paley insisted that design implies a designer, that this designer 
must be a person, and that this person is God: but the analogy 
which had been the guide to his feet, and the experience which 
had been a lamp to his path, were suddenly abandoned, and at 
the very moment when their assistance seemed to promise 
curious revelations.” —“'Two modes of refutation are open; to 
attack the principle, or pursue the analogy. Geoffroy St. 
Hilaire has taken one course. I take the other. If, in the 
investigation of this question, it be legitimate to employ analogy 
in one part, it must be legitimate to employ it in like respects 
m ‘another. 2. 3. Analogy was Paley’s alpha, it must be 


made also his omega.”? 


In pursuing this course, he makes 
large concessions, such as might seem at first sight to involve 
the very principles on which the Theistic proof depends. 
“That design implies a designer, I am disposed to allow; and 


that this designer must be a person, I am quite inclined to admit. 


1Dr Grimm, Title page of “Paley Refuted.” 
2 HoLyroake, “ Paley Refuted,” pp. 8, 11. 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 381 


Thus far goes Paley, and thus far I go with him. ... His 
general position, that design proves a personal designer, is so 
natural, so easy, and so plausible, that it invites one to admit it, 
to see where it will lead, and what it will prove.”—“ Paley 
tells us that God is aperson. He insists upon it asa legitimate 
inference from his premises, nor would it be easy to disturb his 
conclusion. . ... From Paley’s premises, it is the clearest of 
all inferences. Design must have a designer, because whatever 
we know of designers has taught us that a designer is a person. 
All analogy is in favor of this inference. This is Paley’s rea- 
soning upon the subject, and it is too natural, too rigid, and too 


cogent to be escaped from.”* 


Here we have an apparent 
admission of the principle on which the argument of design is 
based, but it is apparent only, and is afterwards withdrawn. 
It was used to serve a temporary purpose, and as soon as that 
purpose was served, it was thrown aside, although it had been 
described as “so natural, so easy, and so plausible, that it in- 
vites one to admit it,’ as “too natural, too rigid, and too cogent 
to be escaped from.” “When I made the admission, I was 
going in the footsteps of Paley, and adopting his own phraseol- 
ogy: then I came to the conclusion to see whether it was 
right, and then I gave it up; when I found it led me to a con- 
trary result, then I gave it up ; what I supposed to be design in 
the opening of my argument is no longer design. My reverend 
friend is wrong in supposing that [ admit design, and yet refuse 
to admit the force of the design argument.”? And what is the 
reason which now induces him to deny the existence of design 
in Nature, and to withdraw all the admissions he had previ- 
ously made? Why, simply because he conceives that, by a 
legitimate extension of the same analogy, the design argument 
may be pushed to a reductio ad absurdum, so as to prove first 


1 HOLYOAKE, “ Paley Refuted,” pp. 19, 23. 
2 TOWNLEY AND HoLyoakgE, “ Discussion,” p, 27, 


882 MODERN ATHEISM. 


the existence of an organized person, “an animal God,” and, 
secondly, an infinite series of such organized persons, since one 
such must necessarily presuppose another, and that again 
another, and so on in infinitum. For there are two stages in 
his extension of the analogy. In the first, it is extended so far 
as to show that the person to whom design is ascribed must 
necessarily be an organized Being: in the second, it is still 
further extended, so as to show that, being organized, that per* 
son must also have had a designer or maker, since organization 
is held to imply design, and design to imply a designer. And 
thus the analogy, when extended, does not lead up to one 
Supreme Mind, the Infinite and Eternal Creator of all things, 
but to an organized being, himself exhibiting marks of design 
in his organization, and requiring therefore, like every organ- 
ism, a prior cause, and, by parity of reason, an eternal suc- 
cession or infinite series of such causes. 

The following extracts will place the progressive steps of his 
argument in a clear, if not convincing light: “By reasoning 
from analogy, Paley infers that there is a personal, intelligent 
being, the author of all design, whom he christens Deity. But 
what kind of a personis a Deity? If a person, is it organized 
like a person? Whence came it? How did it originate? 
Was it formed, as it is said to have formed us? .... I 
ask, has the person of Deity an organization? because, if it 
be unreasonable to suppose design without a designer, it is 
surely as unreasonable to suppose a person without an organ- 
ization, to the full contradiction of all analogy and all expe- 
rience.” .... “Every person is organized. No person was 
ever known without an organization. The term person implies 
it. All analogy, all experience are in favor of this truth. 
This is so plain as to be admitted almost before it is stated. 
. . . . No person ever knew of consciousness separate from an 
organization in which it was produced. No man ever knew 
of thought distinct from an organization in which it was gener- 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 383 


ated... . . Shelley says that ‘Intelligence is only known to 
us as a mode of animal being’. . . . We have great authority, 
—the authority of universal and uncontradicted experience,— 
for limiting the properties of mind to organization. ... - If 
intelligence is without an organization, design may be without 
a designer ; because there are the same experience and analogy 
to support the organization, as there are to support the design 
argument.” ? 

But “organization proves contrivance... . . Hf, then, every 
known organization is redolent with contrivance, and teems 
with marks of design, by what analogy can we conclude that 
Deity’s organization is devoid of these properties ?” —“ Shelley 
thus states the case, —‘ From the fitness of the universe to its 
end, you infer the necessity of an intelligent Creator. But if 
the fitness of the universe to produce certain effects be thus 
conspicuous and evident, how much more exquisite fitness to 
this end must exist in the author of this universe! ... . how 
much more clearly must we perceive the necessity of this very 
Creator’s creation, whose perfections comprehend an arrqnge- 
ment far more accurate and just! The belief of an infinity of 
creative and created gods, each more eminently requiring an 
intelligent author of his being than the foregoing, is a direct 
consequence of the premises.” —“ Hence from design, design- 
ers, and persons, we have stepped to organization and contri- 
vance, and arrive at a contriver again.”* 

Such is the outline of his argument. He seems to think that 
if there be any flaw in it, the only assailable point must be his 
extension of the analogy: “In the chain of analogies which Paley 
commenced, and which I have continued, I believe there is no 
defective link. The principle of assailment, if any, is the 
extension of the analogies beyond the Paley point... . . With 


1 Horyoakn, “Paley Refuted,” pp. 19, 24, 25. 
2 Tbid., pp. 26, 32,39. See also TOWNLEY AND HOLYOAKE, “ Discus- 
sion,” pp. 27, 29, 34, 43, 45. 


384 MODERN ATHEISM. 


the extension commences my responsibility. He who proves 
an irrelevancy in it answers my book.” ‘This is, no doubt, a 
vulnerable point, but we venture to think that it is not the only 
one. His whole reasoning seems to proceed on an unsound 
view of the nature and conditions of the argument, and is 
radically defective in at least three respects. 

It is not correct to say that the argument of design is a mere 
argument from analogy. Were it so, it might, like many 
another process of mere analogical reasoning, yield no more 
than a probable conclusion or a plausible conjecture. But in 
the case before us, the conclusion is strictly and properly an 
inductive inference. It may be suggested by the perception of 
analogy, but it is founded on the principle of causality. It is 
capable, therefore, of yielding, not a mere probability, but an 
absolute certainty. 'The fact that analogy is so far concerned 
in the process cannot weaken a conclusion which rests ulti- 
mately on a fundamental law of reason, the ground-principle 
of all induction. It is true, no doubt, that were we destitute 
of the conscious possession of intelligence, will, and design, we 
should be utterly incapable of forming these conceptions, or 
applying them to the interpretation of Nature; and in a loose 
sense, it may be said that we are guided by the analogy of our 
own experience to the belief in an intelligent First Cause; but 
mere analogy would not produce that belief without the great 
law of causality, which demands an adequate cause for every 
effect, nor is this law deprived of its necessary and absolute 
certainty merely because it comes into action along with, and 
is stimulated by, the perception of obvious analogies. Is it not 

- equally true, that it is only by our own mental consciousness 
that we are qualified to conceive of other minds, and that we 
are, to a certain extent, guided by analogy to the belief that 
our fellow-men are possessed, like ourselves, of intelligence and 
design? But who would say that this conclusion is no more 
than a probable conjecture, or that, depending as it does in part 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 380 


on the analogy of our own experience, it cannot yield absolute 
certainty? In so far as it is merely analogical, it might be 
only more or less probable; but being founded also on the law 
_of causality, it is an inductive inference, and, as such, one of 
the most certain convictions of the human mind. 

And so the argument derived from marks of design in 
Nature may be stated in one or other of two ways :— it may 
be stated analogically or inductively. The difference between 
analogy and induction, which is not always duly considered, 
should be carefully marked. Analogy proceeds on partial, 
induction on perfect resemblance. The former marks a resem- 
plance or agreement in some respects between things which 
differ in other respects: the latter requires a strict and entire 
similarity in those respects on which the inductive inference 
depends. The one by itself may only yield a probable con- 
jecture, but the other, when combined with it, may produce a 
certain conviction. Accordingly the design argument may be 
thrown either into the analogical or the inductive form. Stated 
analogically, it stands thus: “There is an ascertained partial 
resemblance between organs seen in art and organs seen in 
nature; as, for instance, between the telescope and the eye. 

“Tt is probable from analogy that there is in some further 
respect a partial resemblance between organs seen in art and 
organs seen in nature: in art the telescope has been produced 
by a contriver, analogy makes it probable that in nature the eye 
also will have been produced by a contriver.” 

But stated inductively, it stands thus: “If there be in nature 
the manifestation of supernatural contrivance, there must exist 
a supernatural contriver. 

“There is in nature the manifestation of supernatural con- 
trivance. 

“Therefore a supernatural contriver, — God,—must exist.”? 


1 TowNLEY AND Hotyoake, “ Discussion,” pp. 7, 414. 
33 


386 MODERN ATHEISM. 


Combine the perfection of analogy with the principle of 
causality, and you have not only the verisimilitude or likelihood 
which prepares the way for belief, but also a positive proof 
resting on a fundamental law of reason. The inference of 
intelligence from marks of design in nature is not one of 
analogy, but of strict and proper ¢xduction ; and accordingly we 
must either deny that there are marks of design in nature, 
thereby discarding the analogy, or do violence to our own reason 
by resisting the fundamental law of causality, thereby discarding 
the inductive inference. And of these two unavoidable alter- 
natives, Mr. Holyoake seems to prefer the former: he will 
venture to deny the existence of design in nature, rather than 
admit the existence of design and resist the inevitable infer- 
ence of a designing cause; for he is compelled in the long run 
to come round to this desperate confession, “ What I supposed 
to be desygn in the opening of my argument is no longer design. 
My reverend friend is wrong in supposing that I admit design, 
and yet refuse to admit the force of the design argument.” 

But if he mistakes the general nature and conditions of the 
argument when he speaks of it asif it were a mere argument 
from analogy, his extension of the analogy, and the reasonings 
founded on it, are equally unjustifiable and inconclusive. He 
forgets that analogy proceeds on a partial resemblance in some 
respects, between things which differ tn other respects, and 
that even induction itself requires a perfect resemblance 
only % those respects on which the inference depends. 
There may be such a resemblance between the marks of 
design in nature and in art as to warrant the inference of a 
contriver in both; and yet im other respects there may be a 
dissimilarity which cannot in the least affect the validity or the 
certainty of that inference. It is only when we extend the 
analogy beyond the inductive point, that the conclusion becomes, 
in some cases, merely probable, in others altogether doubtful. 
If we advance a step further than we are warranted to go by 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 3887 


obvious and certain analogies, our conclusions must be purely 
conjectural, and, cannot be accepted as inductive inferences. 
From what we know of this world, and of God’s design in it to 
make Himself known to His intelligent creatures, we may infer, 
with some measure of probability, that other worlds may also 
be inhabited by beings capable, like ourselves, of admiring His 
works, and adoring His infinite perfections; but if we go 
further, and infer either that all these worlds must now be 
inhabited, or that the inhabitants must be i all respects con- 
stituted as we are, we pass far beyond the point to which our 
knowledge extends, and enter on the region of mere conjecture. 
And so when Mr. Holyoake extends the analogy, so as to 
include not only the marks of design, on which the inductive 
inference rests, but also the forms of organization, with which 
in the case of man, intelligence is at presented associated, 
although not identified, he goes beyond the point at which 
analogy and induction combine to give a certain conclusion, and 
introduces a conjectural element, which may well render his 
own inferences extremely doubtful, but which can have no 
effect in weakening the grounds of our confidence in the fun- 
damental law, which demands an adequate cause for the marks 
of design in nature. 

Mr. Ferrier has shown that “the senses are only contingent 
conditions of knowledge; in other words, it is possible that 
intelligences different from the human (supposing that there are 
such) should apprehend things under other laws, or in other 
ways, than those of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and 
smelling ; or more shortly, owr senses are not laws of cognition 
or modes of apprehension which are binding on intelligence 
necessarily and universally.”—-“ A contingent law of knowl- 
edge” is defined as “one which, although complied with in cer- 
tain cases in the attainment of knowledge, 1s not enforced by 
reason as a condition which must be complied with wherever 
knowledge is to take place. Knowledge is thus possible under 


388 MODERN ATHEISM. 


other conditions than the contingent laws to which certain intel, 
ligences may be subject; in other words, there is no contradic- 
tion in affirming that an intelligent being may have knowledge 
of some kind or other without having such senses as we 
have.” 

The application of analogy as a principle of judgment is sub- 
ject to certain well-known limitations, which cannot be dis- 
regarded without serious risk of error. They are well stated 
by Dr. Hampden: “There are two requisites in order to every 
analogical argument:— 1. That the two, or several particulars 
concerned in the argument should be known to agree in some 
one point; for otherwise they could not be referable to any one 
class, and there would consequently be no basis to the subse- 
quent inference drawn in the conclusion. 2. That the con- 
clusion must be modified by a reference to the circumstances 
of the particular to which we argue. For herein consists the 
essential distinction between an analogical and an inductive 
argument. Since, in an inductive argument, we draw a gen- 
eral conclusion, we have no concern with the circumstantial 
peculiarity of individual instances, but simply with their 
abstract agreement. Whereas, on the contrary, in an analogi- 
cal argument, we draw a particular conclusion, we must enter 
into a consideration of the circumstantial peculiarity of the 
individual instance, in order to exhibit the conelusion in that 
particular form which we would infer. Whence it follows, 
that whilst by induction we obtain absolute conclusions, by 
analogy we can only arrive at relative conclusions, or such as 
depend for their absolute and entire validity on the coincidence 
of ail the circumstances of the particular inferred with those of 
the particular from which the inference is drawn.” Again: 
“The circumstances to which we reason may be considered of 


1 Pror. FERRIER, “Institutes of Metaphysic,” Epistemology, Prop. 
XX11. p. 377, also pp. 381, 385, 506. 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 389 


threefold character. They are either known or unknown. If 
they are known, they are either (1.) Such as we have no 
reason to think different in any respect from those under which 
our observations have been made; or (2.) Such as differ in 
certain known respects from these last. (3.) They are un- 
known, where we reason concerning truths of which, from the 
state of our present knowledge, from the nature of our faculties, 
or from the accident of our situation as sojourners upon earth, 
we are totally ignorant.” ? 

With these necessary limitations, suggested by the different 
circumstances in which analogy is applied, we shall have little 
difficulty in disposing of Mr. Holyoake’s extension of Dr. 
Paley’s argument. Not content with resemblance a some 
respects, he requires a sameness in all. He would exclude all 
dissimilarity, forgetting that analogy denotes a certain relation 
between two or more things which in other respects may be 
entirely different. We. may see a resemblance between the 
marks of design in nature and the ordinary effects of design in 
art; and that perception of design gives rise to an intuitive 
conviction or inductive inference of a designing cause: thus far 
we proceed under the guidance of analogy, but on the sure 
ground of induction. If we go beyond this, and insist that the 
designing cause must be in all respects like ourselves, that if we 
be organized, He must be organized, that if we act by material 
organs He must act by the same, we exceed the limits of legiti- 
mate reasoning, and enter on the region of pure conjecture. 
But such conjectures, groundless as they are, and revolting as 
every one must feel them to be, can have no effect in shak- 
ing our confidence in the valid induction by which we infer 
from marks of design in nature the existence of a designing 
Cause. 


1 Dr. Hamppen, “Essay on the Philosophical Evidence of Christianity,” 
pp. 60, 64. 
33* 


890 MODERN ATHEISM. 


It can scarcely be necessary to enlarge on the gratuitous 
assumptions on which this extension of the argument is made 
to rest; —such as that “every person is organized,” that “ all 
power is a mere attribute of matter,” that “no man ever knew 
of thought distinct from an organization in which it was gener- 
ated.” ‘The only fragment of truth that can be detected in 
these assumptions is the fact that we have, in our present state, 
no experience of intelligence apart from the organization with 
which it is here associated: but will this warrant the inference 
that intelligence cannot exist apart from organization, or that 
the one is the mere product of the other? It may be a good 
and valid inference from the marks of design in nature, that a 
designing cause must exist; for this inference, although sug- 
gested by analogy, is founded on induction, which requires a 
perfect resemblance only in those respects on which the infer- 
ence depends. But to go beyond this, and to insist that the 
designing cause must be organized, because we have no ex- 
perience of intelligence apart from organization, is to make our 
experience the measure of possible being, and to exclude, 
surely on very insufficient grounds, all notion of purely spiritual 
personality. In “extending the analogy beyond the Paley 
point,” Mr. Holyoake is arguing from the particular case of 
man to another case, which resembles it in some respects, but 
may differ from it in others; and similar as they are in the one 
point of living, designing intelligence, they may, for aught he 
knows, differ in many other respects. And this we hold to be 
a sufficient answer to his argument, especially when it is com- 
bined with the consideration that the assumptions on which 
that argument is based are purely gratuitous, namely, that 
“every person is organized,” and that there is no “ thought dis- 
tinct from an organization in which it is generated.” By these 
assumptions, his theory connects itself with the grossest 
Materialism; and that subject has been sufficiently discussed 
in a separate chapter. | 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 391 


But in truth we regard the whole discussion on organization 
as a huge and unnecessary excrescence on his argument, for 
he would have come to his point quite as effectually, and much 
more directly, had he said nothing at all about an organized 
being, and insisted merely on one, whether material or spiritual, 
possessing powers of intelligence, contrivance, and design ; for 
it is evidently on the existence of such a being, and not on the 
arrangements or adaptations of his organic parts, that his main 
argument depends, namely, that such a being implies also a 
contriver, and that again another, and so on in an endless 
series. Whatever force belongs to his argument lies here: it 
consists, not in the evidence of design arising from material 
organization, but in the necessity of a cause adequate to 
account for a being possessing intelligence, purpose, and will. 
The existence of an endless series of such beings is impossible, 
and the supposition of it is absurd; and Mr. Holyoake himself 
admits a self-existent, underived, and eternal Being,—a being 
exempt, therefore, from all the conditions of time and caus- 
ality to which others are subject, — while he ascribes the origin 
of intelligent, self-conscious beings to Nature, which is “neither 
intelligent nor self-conscious,” rather than to God, the father of 
spirits, Himself a Spirit, infinite, omniscient, and almighty. He 
ascribes the existence of intelligent, self-conscious, personal 
moral agents to a power called Nature, which he cannot ven- 
ture to call “a person,” nor even “an animal being,” and of 
which he “ cannot predicate with the Pantheist the unity of its 
intelligence and consciousness.” His theory, in so far as it is 
intelligible, seems to have a stronger affinity with Pantheism 
than he appears to suppose. Were he to define the meaning 
of the word Nature, — a word so often used in a vague, indefi- 
nite sense —he would find that his idea bears a close resem- 


1 Rosert Boye, “Theological Works,” on the term “ Nature.” 


392 MODERN ATHEISM. 


blance to that of the German school, who speak of the first 
being as the Indifference of the different,—a certain vague, 
undetermined, inexplicable entity, possessing no distinctive 
character or peculiar attributes, whose existence is necessary, 
but not as a living, self-conscious, and active being, while it is 
the cause of all life and intelligence and activity in the uni- 
verse; in short, a mere abstraction of the human mind. To 
some such cause, if it can be called a cause, Mr. Holyoake 
ascribes all the phenomena of the universe ; or he leaves them 
utterly unaccounted for, and takes refuge in an eternal series 
of derived and dependent beings, without attempting to assion 
any reason for their existence. He undertakes to account for 
nothing. He leaves the great problem unsolved, and discards 
it as insoluble. “ Mr. Harrison demanded of me, where the 
first man came from? I said, I did not know; I was not in 
the secrets of Nature.” “TI cannot accept, says one, the theory 
of progressive development, it is so intricate and unsatisfying.” 
“Tf something must be self-existent and eternal, says another, 
why may not matter and all its properties be that something ?” 
“The Atheist holds that the universe is an endless series of 
causes and effects ad infinitum, and therefore the idea of a Jirst 
cause is an absurdity and a contradiction.” In short, the 
eternity of the world is assumed, the origin of new races is 
left unexplained, and no account whatever is given of the order 
which everywhere exists in Nature. In the last resort, he 
takes refuge in the plea of ¢gnorance. His only answer is, “T 
do not know, I am not in the secrets of Nature.” 

But how does his extension of Paley’s argument justify the 
position which he now assumes? Or how can it invalidate the 
admissions which he had previously made? That extension of 
the argument, even were it supposed to be legitimate, amounts 


1 PROFESSOR NICOLAS, “ Quelques Considerations sur le Pantheisme,” 
pp. 30, 33, 35, 38. 
2 “The Reasoner,” x1. 8, 119, 23, 356, New Series, pp. 9, 141. 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 093 


simply to this, that a designer must be an organized being, 
and, as such, must have had a cause. But what analogy sug- 
gests, or what law of reason requires,.an infinite series of such 
causes? And what is there in this extension of the argument 
that should exclude the idea of a First Cause? It is thought, 
indeed, that by connecting intelligence with organization, we 
may succeed at least in excluding His infinity, His omnipres- 
ence, and other attributes which are ascribed to the Most 
High: but the main stress of the argument rests not on the 
fact of organization, but on the supposed necessity of an endless 
sertes of contrivers to account for the existence of any one 
intelligent being, whether organized or not is of little moment. 
Now, this is a mere assumption, an assumption entirely desti- 
tute of proof, an assumption which is not necessarily involved 
even in the proposed extension of the analogy: for all that the 
analogy, however extended, can possibly require is a cause 
adequate to the production of designing minds, and that cause 
may be a self-existent, underived, and eternal Being. Let the 
analogy be extended ever so far, it must reach a point at which 
we are compelled, by the fundamental law of causality, to rise 
to a self-existent Being, exempt from all conditions of time, 
space, and causality. Mr. Holyoake admits the very same 
truth in regard to Nature which we maintain in regard to God: 
“JT am driven to the conclusion that Nature is eternal, because 
we are unable to conceive a state of things when nothing was. 
.... And in the eternity of matter, we are assured of the self- 
existence of matter, and self-existence is the most majestic of all 
attributes, and includes all others;” it is “the power of being 
independent of the law of other beings.” Now, what is there in 
the proposed extension of the analogy that should exclude the 
idea of a self-existent First Cause, or shut us up to the admis- 
sion of an endles series of designing causes? And still further, 
what is there in the proposed extension of the analogy which 
should invalidate the argument from design, or induce Mr. 


394 MODERN ATHEISM. 


Holyoake to give it up, and to withdraw the concessions which 
he had previously made in regard to it? These concessions 
must be supposed to have been honestly made in deference to 
the claims of truth, and they are not in the least affected by the 
extension of the analogy. It is still true, if it ever was, that 
order prevails in Nature; and this is admitted: “If by Atheism 
is meant the belief that all that we see in Nature is the result ” 
of chance, of a fortuitous concourse of atoms, nothing would be 
so absurd as Atheism. Nothing can be more evident than that 
law and order prevail in Nature, that every species of matter, 
organic or inorganic, is impressed with certain laws, according 
to which all its properties and movements are regulated. .: 90% 
In denying, therefore, the existence of a personal, intelligent 
Deity, we do not admit that there is any chance, contingency, 
or disorder in Nature: we do not deny, but absolutely affirm, 
the constant and universal operation of law and order. "This 
we do, because it is a matter of fact of obvious and daily 
experience.”+ Again, it is still true, if it ever was, that design 
wmplies a designer; and this, says Mr. Holyoake, “I am dis- 
posed to allow; and that this designer must be a person, I am 
quite inclined to admit. Thus far goes Paley, and, therefore, 
thus far I go with him. His general position, that design 
proves a personal designer, is so natural, so easy, and so plaus- 
ible, that it invites one to admit it... . . Paley insists upon it 
as a legitimate inference from his premises, nor would it be 
easy to disturb his conclusion. . . . . This is Paley’s reasoning 
upon the subject, and it is too natural, too rigid, and too cogent 
ta be escaped from.” Now, what is there in the proposed ex- 
tension of the analogy that can invalidate either of these admis- 
sions, or that should induce us to set aside both? Extend the 
analogy ever so far, it is still true that law and order prevail in 
Nature, that design implies a designer, and that a designer 


1“ The Reasoner,” x1. 23, 357. 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 395 


must be a person. And how does Mr. Holyoake save his 
consistency? Simply by stretching the analogy till it snaps 
asunder; he begins by extending, and ends in destroying it; 
he admits it at first, merely “to see where it will lead and 
what it will prove,” and finding that it must imply an organized 
designer, and an endless series of such beings, “he gives it up,” 
and denies the existence of design altogether. There is a 
hiatus, it would seem,—an impassable gulf,— between the 
admission that law and order prevail in Nature, and the con- 
clusion that law and order are manifestations of design: “What 
I supposed to be design in the opening of my argument is no 
longer design. My reverend friend is wrong in supposing that 
LT admit DrEsiGn, and yet refuse to admit the force of the design 
argument.” On the supposition, then, that law and order are 
manifestations of design, the design argument might be valid 
and conclusive: but “xo conceivable order” could prove the 
existence of God; why? Because no conceivable order could 
be a manifestation of design. But how is this proved by the 
extension of the analogy? Does it not amount to a denial of 
the analogy itself? And is it not an instructive fact that his 
abortive attempt to disprove the design argument, results, not 
in the denial of the znductive inference, but in the exclusion of 
the very analogy which he proposed to extend, not in shaking 
the validity of the proof, but in disputing the fact on which it is 
based? ‘The extension of the analogy cannot prove either that 
law and order are not manifestations of design, or that there 
may be design without a personal designer; all that it could 
prove, even were it legitimate, would be the existence of an 
organized instead of a spiritual Being, which, on the supposi- 
tion of its self-existence, — a supposition which is not excluded 
by the argument, since that majestic attribute, which may be 
fairly held to “inelude all others,” is expressly admitted, — 
neither requires nor admits of an infinite series of contrivers. 
4. Secularism denies the truth of a special Providence, and 


3896 MODERN ATHEISM. 


also the efficacy of Prayer, while it justly holds both to be 
indispensable for the purposes of practical religion. 

The importance of these doctrines is strongly declared, and 
sometimes illustrated with much apparent feeling, by Mr. 
Holyoake himself: “There is more mixed up with the ques- 
tion than the mere fact as to whether some Being exists inde- 
pendently of Nature; for instance, if any man would debate 
whether there existed a Divine Being, whether a Providence, 
who was the Father of His creatures, whom we could pro- 
pitiate by prayer in our danger, from whom we could obtain 
light in darkness, and help in distress, —if any man debated a 
proposition like this, I should say there was much of great 
practical utility about it,.... If you tell me God exists, 
that he is a power, a principle, or spirit, or light, or life, or 
love, or intelligence, or what you will,—if He be not a Father 
to whom His children may appeal, if He be not a Providence 
whom we may propitiate, and from whom we can obtain 
special help in the hour of danger,—I say, practically, it does 
not matter to us whether He exists or not.”? “The great 
practical question is, whether there exists a Deity to whom we 
can appeal, who is the Father of his children, who is to be 
propitiated by prayer, and who will render us help in the hour 
of danger and distress.” 

With the spirit of these remarks every believer will cor- 
dially sympathize. He knows that there can be no practical 
religion without faith in Providence and confidence in prayer ; 
for “he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and that 
He is the rewarder of them that diligently seek Him.” Mr. 
Holyoake does not err in supposing that this is the general 
belief of Christians, or that it is explicitly sanctioned in Scrip- 
ture. He may, and we think he does err in his interpretation 
of the Bible doctrine, and the inferences which he deduces 


1 TOWNLEY AND HOLYOAKB, “Discussion,” pp. 16, 59. 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 3897 


from it; but assuredly Christianity would be robbed of its most 
attractive and endearing attributes, were it represented as silent 
on the paternal character of God and His providential care. 
He is right in saying that “the Providence man needs, the _ 
Providence the old theologies gave him, was a personal Provi- 
dence, an available help. . . . . I care only to add, that there 
is hardly any feature in the Christian system which is so seduc- 
tive as this doctrine of a special Providence... . . Do you 
not know that in all your appeals your success depends upon 
your telling all orders of people that there is One in heaven 
who cares for them, that every prayer will be answered, that 
every hair of their head is numbered, that not a sparrow falls 
to the ground without their heavenly Father’s knowledge, and 
are not they worth more than many sparrows?”* He sees 
the necessity, and seems to feel the attractiveness, of the doc- 
trine; yet he denies its truth: why? because it is contradicted, 
as he conceives, by experience. He adduces his own personal 
experience, and then appeals to the experience of his fellow- 
men: “I once prayed in all the fervency of this same religion. 
I believed once all these things. I put up prayers to Heaven 
which I cannot conceive how humanity could have refused to 
respond to,— prayers such as if put up to me I must have 
responded to. I saw those near and dear to me perishing 
around me; and I learned the secret I care no longer to con- 
ceal, that man’s dependence is upon his courage and his 
industry, and dependence upon Heaven there seems to be 
none.”2 Such was his private experience ; and facts of public 
notoriety are appealed to in confirmation: “It has long seemed 
to me the most serious libel on the character of the Deity to 
assume for one moment that he interferes in human exigencies. 
A mountain of desolating facts rises up to shame into silence 


1 GRANT AND HoLyoakg, “ Discussion,” pp. 80, 81. 
2 Thid., pp. 66, 80. 
84 


398 MODERN ATHEISM. 


the hazardous supposition? Was not the whole land a short 
time ago convulsed with horror at the fate of the Amazon? 
There was not a wretch in the whole country whose slumber- 
ing humanity would not have been aroused in the presence of 
that dismal calamity.” .... “How is it that liberty is in 
chains all over Europe, if God be still interposing in human 
affairs? If the older doctrine were true, if our brother’s blood 
still cried to God from the ground, the patriot would be re- 
leased from the dungeon, and the tyrant would descend from 
the throne he has polluted.” —“ Science has shown us that we 
are under the dominion of general laws, and that there is no 
special providence, and that prayers are useless, and that pro- 
pitiation is vain; that whether there be a Deity independent 
of Nature, or whether Nature be God, it is still the God of the 
tron foot, that passes on without heeding, without feeling, and 
without resting; that Nature acts with a fearful ata 
stern as fate, absolute as tyranny, merciless as death ; too vast 
to praise, too inexplicable to worship, too inexorable to pro- 
pitiate, it has no ear for prayer, no heart for sympathy, no arm 
to save.” } 

In these and similar appeals to the facts of individual or 
common experience, the scriptural doctrine of Providence and 
Prayer is supposed to be very different from what it really is, 
and stated without any of the qualifications which are expressly 
declared by the sacred writers. 


—It is nowhere declared in Scripture that every prayer 


must receive an immediate answer, whatever may be the 
object for which it is presented, or the spirit in which it is 
offered. On the contrary it is expressly written, “If I regard 
iniquity in my heart, the Lord will not hear me.” “ But let 
him ask in faith, nothing wavering; for he that wavercth is 
like a wave of the sea driven with the wind and tossed: For 


1 TOWNLEY AND Hotyoagge, “ Discussion,” p. 58. 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 3899 


let not that man think that he shall receive anything of the 
Lord.” “Ye ask, and receive not, because ye ask amiss, that 
ye may consume it on your lusts.”* 

—It is nowhere declared in Scripture that man is to obtain 
whatever he asks, irrespective of that Sovereign Will which is 
guided by unerring wisdom as well as infinite love. On the 
contrary, prayer is an expression of dependence and subjection, 
and must ever be qualified by submission to His sovereignty: 
“Nevertheless not my will, but Thine be done.” ? 

—It is nowhere declared in Scripture that Providence will 
suspend, or that Prayer will counteract, the operation of the 
general laws of Nature, excepting only in the case of those to 
whom a promise of miraculous power was vouchsafed. On 
the contrary, these laws are declared to be stable and perma- 
nent: “Thou hast established the earth, and it abideth: they 
continue this day according to thine ordinances: for all are 
thy servants;” and any wilful neglect or violation of these 
laws is a sinful tempting of Providence, even when it may 
seem to be sanctioned by a perverse application of Scripture 
itself; for the Saviour himself was solicited on this wise, “ If 
thou be the Son of God, cast thyself down ; for 2 7s written, 
He shall give his angels charge concerning thee, and in their - 
hands they shall bear thee up, lest at any time thou dash thy 
foot against a stone ;” but he answered, “Jt 7s written again, 
Theu shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.” * 

—JIt is nowhere declared in Scripture that Providence will 
secure, or Prayer obtain, exemption from the afflictions and 
calamities of life. On the contrary it is written, “ Many are 
the afflictions of the righteous, but the Lord delivereth him out 
of them all.” “In the world ye shall have tribulation: but be 
of good cheer, I have overcome the world.” “ If ye endure 


1 Psalm 66: 18; James 1: 6; 4: 3. 2 Matt. 26: 39. 
3 Psalm 119: 90; Matt. 4: 6. 


400 MODERN ATHEISM. 


chastening, God dealeth with you as with sons; for what son 
is he whom the father chasteneth not?” “Now no chastening 
for the present seemeth to be joyous, but grievous; neverthe- 
less afterward it yieldeth the peaceable fruit of righteousness 
unto them which are exercised thereby.” “We glory in tribu- 
lations also; knowing that tribulation worketh patience, and 
patience experience, and experience hope.” “ For our light 
affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more 
exceeding and eternal weight of glory.” “And we know that 
all things work together for good to them that love God!.... 
Who shall separate us from the love.of Christ? Shall tribula- 
tion, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or 


peril, or sword? Nay, in all these things we are more than 
991 . 


conquerors through him that loved us. 

—It is nowhere declared in Scripture that Providence will 
award, or that Prayer may hope to secure, a regular and equal 
distribution of good and evil in the present life. On the con- 
trary the present state is described as a scene of probation, 
trial, and discipline, which is preparatory to a state of retri- 
bution hereafter: “I saw under the sun the place of judgment, 
that wickedness was there; and the place of righteousness, that 
iniquity was there. I said in mine heart, God shall judge the 
righteous and the wicked; for there is a time for every purpose 
and for every work.” “ Because sentence against an evil 
work is not executed speedily, therefore the heart of the sons 
of men is fully set in them to do evil. Though a sinner do 
evil a hundred times, and his days be prolonged, yet surely I 
know that it shall be well with those that fear God, which fear 
before Him: but it shall not be well with the wicked, neither 
shall he prolong his days, which are as a shadow ; because he 
feareth not before God.”* “This is the faith and patience of 


1 Psalm 34: 19; John 16: 33; Heb. 12: 7,11; Rom. 5: 3; 2 Cor. 4: 17; 
Rom. 8: 28,.35, 37. 2 Eccles. 3: 16,17; 8: 11. 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 401 


the saints ;” a faith which is often staggered, a patience which 
may be ready to fail, in the view of the darker aspects of 
Providence ; for many a true believer may say, “As for me, 
my feet were almost gone, my steps had well-nigh slipped ; for 
I was envious at the foolish, when I saw the prosperity of the 
wicked ;” and even “the spirits of just men made perfect” 
sing the song, “O Lord! how long?” 

—It is nowhere declared in Scripture that Providence 
excludes the aid of Science, or that Prayer supersedes the 
diligent use of ordinary means. On the contrary it is written, 
“When wisdom entereth into thine heart, and knowledge is 
pleasant unto thy soul, discretion shall preserve thee, under- 
standing shall keep thee;” and believers are required to be 
“not slothful in business,” while they are “fervent in spirit, 
serving the Lord.”* 

On all these points, so clearly involved in the Christian doc- 
trine of Providence and Prayer, Mr. Holyoake’s argument rests 
on assumptions which are utterly groundless, and hence he im- 
agines that the doctrine is contradicted by experience, when a 
more scriptural view of it would be sufficient to obviate all his 
objections. He reasons as if there could be no truth in the doc- 
trine of a special Providence, and no efficacy in Prayer, unless 
every petition were immediately heard and answered; unless the 
ery of nature in distress were sufficient to ward off the stroke of 
disease and bereavement, and to avert all the calamities of life; 
unless the operation of the general laws of Nature were forth- 
with suspended ; unless the present state of trial and discipline — 
were converted into one of strict and impartial retribution ; 
and unless man’s wisdom and man’s agency were to be super- 
seded altogether by dependence on a higher power. But not 
one of these suppositions has any place in the doctrine of 
Scripture on the subject. It speaks of a special Providence, 


1 Proverbs 2: 10; Rom. 12: 11. 
34* 


402 MODERN ATHEISM. 


but not such as is incompatible with the constant operation of 
natural laws; it ascribes a certain efficacy to Prayer, but not 
such as implies a miraculous interference with the ordinary 
course of Nature, and still less an exemption from affliction, or 

an equal distribution of good and evil in the present life. If it 
be said that such being the doctrine of Scripture, it can afford 
little or no consolation, since it holds out no hope of sure and 
instant relief in circumstances of distress and danger, may we 
not ask, Is there no comfort in knowing that our affairs are 
under the superintendence of a Being everywhere present, 
infinitely wise and good, whose ear is ever open to our hy; 
who is able to do for us exceeding abundantly above all that 
we can ask, and who has promised to sustain us in all our 
trials, to sanctify us by means of them, and to make all things 
work together for our good? Is there no comfort in being able 
to say, “ God is our refuge and strength, a very present help in 
trouble, therefore will not we fear though the earth be removed, 
and though the mountains be carried into the midst of the 
sea.” “'The Lord is my Shepherd, I shall not want. Yea, 
though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will 
fear no evil, for Thou art with me.” “The Lord shall deliver 
me from every evil work, and will preserve me unto His 
heavenly kingdom ”?+ Is there not enough for all the purposes 
of practical religion in the assurance, “Ask, and it shall be 
given’ you; seek, and ye shall find; ... . for if ye, being 
evil, know how to give good.gifts unto your children, how 
much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good 
things to them that ask Him?” “Your heavenly Father 
knoweth that ye have need of all these things. Seek ye first 
the kingdom of God, and His righteousness; -and all these 
things shall be added unto you”?? And when the believer is 
enabled in any measure to comply with the injunctions of 


1 Psalm 46: 1, 2; 23: 1,4; 2 Tim. 4: 18. 2 Matt. 7: 7,11; 6: 32, 33. 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 403 


_Seripture,—“ Cast thy burden on the Lord, and He will sus- 
iain it, “Commit thy way unto Him, and He will bring it to 
pass,” “Be careful for nothing, but in everything by prayer 
and supplication with thanksgiving, let your requests be made 
known unto God, and the peace of God, which passeth all 
understanding, shall keep your hearts and minds through 
Christ Jesus,’—does he not know experimentafly that it is 
faith in a living, personal God,—the God of providence, and 
the Hearer of prayer, and not the desolate doctrine of Nature, 
—“the God of the iron foot, stern as fate, absolute as tyranny, 
and merciless as death,’—that can sustain him under every 
trial, and nerve him with fresh vigor for the “ battle of life ” ? 
Mr. Holyoake refers to his own experience, and appeals to 
the experience of his fellow-men, in confirmation of his negative 
conclusion in regard to a special Providence and the efficacy 
of Prayer. But what weight is due to his testimony in such a 
case? Is it sufficient to countervail the experience of all in 
every age —“the great cloud of witnesses ”— who have unani- 
mously declared that “the Lord hath not forsaken them that 
seek Him,” and that “He hath not said to the seed of Jacob, 
Seek ye my face in vain”? Which is entitled to the greater 
weight, the testimony of Mr. Holyoake, or that of the Psalmist, 
“T waited patiently for the Lord, and He inclined unto me, 
and heard my cry ;” or that of the prophet, “I cried by reason 
of mine affliction unto the Lord, and He heard me: out of the 
belly of hell cried I, and thou heardest my voice: When my 
soul fainted within me I remembered the Lord, and my prayer 


5] 


came in unto Thee into thine holy temple;” or that of the 
apostle, “For this thing I besought the Lord thrice, that it 
might depart from me; and He said unto me, My grace is suf- 
ficient for thee, for my strength is made perfect in weak- 


ness”?! A cry for help may not be“ the prayer of faith,” but 


1 Psalm 40: 1; Jonah 2: 2,7; 2 Cor. 12: 8. 


404 MODERN ATHEISM. 


the utterance of an unsubdued and rebellious will, and can 
afford no test, therefore, of the truth of the doctrine of 
Scripture. 

But “Science,” says Mr. Holyoake, “is the providence of 
life, and spiritual dependence may be attended with material 
destruction.” He would substitute, therefore, the Science of 
man for the Providence of God, and secular diligence for spir- 
itual dependence. But is there no room for both? Are they 
necessarily incompatible or mutually exclusive? Why should 
the Science of man be opposed to the Providence of God, or 
secular industry to religious faith? All Christians combine 
the two; why should Mr. Holyoake seek to divorce them? 
What is Science? It is “the well-devised method of using 
Nature; it is in this that Science is the providence of man. It 
is not pretended that Science is a perfect dependence ; on the 
contrary, it is admitted to be narrow and but partially devel- 
oped; but it is the only special dependence that man has.”! 
And is the wise use of Nature inconsistent with Religion? is it 
the exclusive monopoly of Atheism? Or is spiritual depen: 
dence necessarily incompatible with industrial pursuits? Who 
have been the most scientific and the most industrious members 
of the community, the small band of Atheists, or,the great 
body of Christians? ‘To the latter belong all the advantages 
which Science, or the wise use of Nature, can secure, while 
they have besides a Providence, distinct from Nature and 
superior to it, whose wakeful eye never slumbers, and whose 
ear is ever open to their cry. 

5. Secularism seeks to supersede Religion, and to substitute 
morality in its stead,—but a morality which leaves men irre- 
sponsible for their belief, their passions, and even their actions, 
to any superior Power. 

“The histories of all ages,” says Mr. Holyoake, “and the 


1GRANT AND HOLYOAKE, V. 8, 40, 50, 57. 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 405 


bitter experience of mankind, prove the pernicious influence of 
piety. It seems a more useful work cannot be performed than 
to sweep away the assumed foundations of all religions.” “I 
deem it inimical to human welfare, and should no more pro- 
ceed to supply a new religion than the people who had just 
interred the cholera would think of raising a plague..... 
Religion is a distraction of social progress; once removed, no 
wise man will desire its restoration.” 

“But one question remains to be answered, If Religion is 
not our proper business, what is? I answer, Morality! .... 
By Religion I understand a system of human duties, commenc- 
ing from a God: by Morality a system of human duties, com- 
mencing from man. Religion asks but one question, Is an act 
pleasing to Deity? Morality makes the wiser inquiry, Is an 
act useful to man? The standard of religion varies with fickle 
creeds ; the standard of morality is wédlity.”1 “There exist 
(independently of Scriptural Religion) guarantees of morality 
in human nature, in intelligence, and utility.” “ Morality, that 
system of human duties commencing from man, we will keep 
distinct from Religion, that system of human duties assumed to 
commence from God.”? Nature refers us to science for help, 
and to humanity for sympathy; love to the lovely is our only 
homage, study our only praise, quiet submission to the iney- 
itable our duty, and work is our only worship.”® “ We, by | 
establishing morals independently of scriptural authority, and 
basing them on secular considerations, —more immediate, more 
demonstrative and universal,—attain a signal benefit ; for when 
Inspiration is shaken, or Miracles fail you, or Prophecy eludes 
the believer, he breaks away, and probably falls into vice; 
while we hold the thinker by the thousand relations of Natural 
Affection, Utility, and Intelligence, which the Christian dis- 


1 “ Paley Refuted,” p. 38, 43. 
2 GRANT AND HOLYOAKE, “ Discussion,” pp. v. 7. 
8 TOWNLEY AND HOLYOAKE, “ Discussion,” p. 58. 


406 MODERN ATHEISM. 


trusts... ..A man may do good because it is honest, because 
it is useful, because it is commanded by human law, because it 
is humane, because it is polite, because it is a noble pleasure.”! 
Of course, when Morality is thus divorced from Religion there 
can be no responsibility to a higher Power, and man is not 
accountable to any one for his belief, his passions, his will, his 
character or conduct, except in so far as his actions may trench 
on the rights of others, and render him amenable to civil or 
criminal law. And Mr. Holyoake, at one time an associate 
and fellow-laborer of Robert Owen, still cleaves to the doctrine 
that his belief is entirely dependent on evidence, and that his 
character is, to a large extent, determined by the circumstances 
of his condition. 

An attempt is thus made to establish the Ethics of Atheism 
on the ruins of Religion. But to one who calmly reflects on 
the subject, it must be evident that a scheme of morals founded 
on the negation of all religious belief can have none of that 
authority which belongs to the expression of a superior will, 
and must be utterly destitute of all sanctions excepting such as 
may be found in the natural consequences of our conduct. Its 
only standard is wtihty; and utility must be interpreted by 
every man for himself, according to his own taste and inclina- 
tion. The word duty is used, but there is nothing in the 
system to account for the ¢dea which that word is intended to 
convey, nothing to explain or justify the meaning of the phrase, 
I ought. For why ought I to do this, or refrain from that? 
Because it is useful? because it is conducive to happiness? 
Because it will be followed by certain natural consequences? 
But if I love the pleasures of sin, if I prefer them to every 
other kind of enjoyment, if I am willing to accept the conse- 
quences and to say, “ Evil, be thou my good,” what is there in 
the system of secular ethics that should oblige me to forego my 


1 GRANT AND Hotyoake, “ Discussion,” p. 223. 


o\ oes 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 407 


favorite indulgences, or that can impress me with the convic- 
tion that I ought to do so? True I may suffer, and suffer 
much, as the drunkard and the libertine do, in the way of 
natural consequence, and it may be prudent to be temperate in 
the indulgence of my sensual appetites; there may even be a 
sense of inward degradation, and a politic regard to the 
opinions of my fellow-men, which will operate to some extent 
as a restraining influence; but if I be destitute of a sense of 
duty, and willing to brave all hazards and accept:all conse- 
quences, Secularism has nothing to say to me, and is utterly 
powerless to govern or control me otherwise than by physical 
coercion or the power of brute force. But admit the idea of 
God as a Moral Governor, and of Conscience as His vicegerent 
in my soul, view the law of my moral nature as the authorita- 
tive expression of His supreme will, and instantly I recognize 
a Master whom I ought to obey, and a course of conduct which 
it is my duty to pursue, irrespective alike of my personal 
propensities and of all possible consequences. The “ categoric 
imperative” within is felt to be a far more solid ground, as 
well as a much stronger sanction, of duty, than any that can be 
found in the mere consequences of my actions ; while it accounts 
for the innate sense of right and wrong, and the sentiments of 
remorse, and shame, and fear which conscious guilt inspires. 
But Mr. Holyoake shifts the question from this broad gen- 
eral ground, which is common to all earnest inquirers after 
truth, and seeks to entangle us in a collateral, but subordinate, 
discussion respecting the relation between Morality and Scrip- 
ture. He proposes to show that “there exist, exdependently of 
Scriptural Religion, guarantees of morality in human nature,” 
and that “morals may be established independently of serip- 
tural authority.” But this is not the question: the question is a 
wider and more comprehensive one, namely, whether a system 
of morals can be established apart from the recognition of God, 
and independently of any expression, natural or supernatural, 


408 ' MODERN ATHEISM. 


of His supreme and authoritative will? Mr. Holyoake is 
bound to return and defend an affirmative to this question, and 
is not at liberty to take refuge in the mere denial of the abso- 
lute dependence of morals on “scriptural authority.” The idea 
of duty may be involved in the principles of Natural Religion, 
and these may be presupposed and assumed in Revelation; but 
to make out his case, he must attempt to show that neither 
Natural nor Revealed Religion is necessary to establish and 
sanction a code of ethics, and that the natural consequences of 
our actions are sufficient of themselves, and without reference to 
the law of a Supreme Will, to awaken and sustain a sense of 
moral obligation. In point of fact, Christianity does not repre- 
sent the duties of morality as dependent on its own sole 
authority. It sanctions these duties, it illustrates their nature, 
it enforces their observance by new and powerful motives; but 
it presupposes the existence of Conscience, as God’s vicegerent 
in the heart, and appeals to “a law” by which every man is 
“a law to himself’’ The law revealed in Scripture is binding 
by reason of the authority of the Lawgiver; but not more 
binding than the law written on the heart, without which we 
should be incapable alike of moral instruction and of moral 
government. The question, then, is not whether morality be 
entirely dependent on the authority of Scripture, but whether 
it be so independent of Religion as to be equally authoritative 
and binding with or without the recognition of God? 

And if this be the real question at issue, few will be bold 
enough to aflirm either that the nature of moral duty is in no 
wise affected, or that its foundation is in no degree weakened, 
by the non-recognition of God and His supreme will. The 
will of God may not be the ultimate ground of duty, but it is 
the expression of the essential holiness of His nature, which is 
the unchangeable standard of rectitude. The supposition of 
His non-existence, therefore, or even the skeptical Atheism - 
which doubts, without venturing to deny, the reality of His 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 409 


being, deprives morality of its only absolute support, and leaves 
it to depend on the fluctuating opinions or the capricious tastes 
of individual minds. It affects both the nature and the extent 
of moral duty, by resolving it into a mere regard to utility, and 
excluding a large class of duties which Religion sanctions, 
while it deprives every other class of their sacred character 
as acts of obedience to God. It shuts out some of the most 
powerful and impressive motives to virtuous conduct, by reliey- 
ing men from a sense of responsibility toa higher Power, by 
excluding the idea of a future retribution, and still more by 
keeping out of sight the attributes, alike august and amiable, 
of a living personal God, everywhere present, beholding the 
evil and the good, an omniscient Witness and an impartial 
Judge. Christianity leaves all the secular motives to morality 
intact and entire, and only superadds to these certain spiritual 
motives of far higher power. It neither supersedes the lessons 
of experience nor abjures all regard to utility; but by reveal- 
ing our relation to God, it extends, and elevates, and purifies 
our sense of duty. In vain does Mr. Holyoake pretend that by 
basing morals on secular considerations, he ‘attains a signal 
benefit, and that he “holds the thinker by the thousand rela- 
tions of Natural Affection, Utility, and Intelligence, which the 
Christian distrusts;” for not one of these “relations” is ex- 
cluded by the scheme of Revealed Religion, not one of them is 
denied by the Christian; and if he may be said to distrust 
them, it is only because he holds them to be insufficient, with- 
out a belief in God, to maintain a pure morality in the world. 
But he can say, with at least as much earnestness as any 
Secularism can feel, “ Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever 
things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things 
are pure, whatsoever things are dovely, whatsoever things are 
of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any 
praise, think of these things;” and he feels that far from 
* 85 ° 


410 MODERN ATHEISM. 


weakening, he greatly enhances, the force of that appeal, when 
he adds, “and perfect holiness in the fear of the Lord.” 

6. Secularism professes to be “ the positive side of Atheism,” 
and to be better than Religion at least for this world, because 
it pays a preéminent, if not an exclusive, regard to the duties 
of the present life. 

This is, perhaps, the most dangerous aspect of the doctrine. 
It prescribes a course of systematic ungodliness, a practical dis- 
regard of the future, and an engrossing attention to things seen 
and temporal, as if these were virtues in which mankind are 
greatly deficient, and as if their general prevalence would be a 
prelude to a secular millennium, or the commencement of an 
atheistic paradise. But the purely negative part of the system, 
however accordant with the natural tendencies of men, is felt 
to be in itself somewhat unattractive; it must be associated, 
therefore, with some positive element, some practical aims, 
such as may give it a hold on the interest and a claim on the 
zealous support of its adherents. “ Under this conviction,” 
says Mr. Holyoake, “the Secularist applied himself to the re- 
inspection of the general field of controversy, and the adoption 
of the following rules, among others, has been the consequence : 
1. To disuse the term Atheist, since the public understand by 
that word one who is without God and also without morality, 
and who wishes to be without both. 2. To disuse the term 
Infidel, since Christians understand by that term one who is 
unfaithful or treacherous to the truth. .... 3. To recognize, 
not as a matter of policy merely, but as a matter of fact, the 
sincerity of the clergy and the good intentions of Christians 
generally, ,.., 4. To seek the maxims of duty in the 
relations of man to society and nature, and, as the Christian 
Spectator did us the* honor to admit, ‘to preach nature and 
science, morality and art: nature, the only subject of knowl- 
edge; science, the providence of life; morality, the harmony 
of action; art, the culture of the individual and of society.’ ” 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 411 


“We therefore resolved to choose a new name (Secularism), 
which should express the practical and moral element always 
concealed in the word Atheism. .... Secularism seeks the 
personal Law of duty, the Sphere of duty, and the Power by 
which duty may work independently. The Law is found in 
natural, utilitarian, and artistic morals. The Sphere is this, to 
work with our first energies in this life, for this life, — for its 
growth, culture, development, and progress. The Power is 
discovered in Science, the providence of life, and intelligence.”? 
“By ‘Secularism’ is meant giving the precedence to the 
duties of this life over those which pertain to another life ;— 
attention to temporal things should take precedence of consider- 
ations relating to a future existence.” “The positive side of 
our views is amore recent development of our own.” “ We 
seek the codperation of all who can agree to promote present 
human improvement by present human means.”? .... “If 
there are other worlds to be inhabited after this life, those per- 
sons will best be fitted for the enjoyment of them who have 
made the welfare of humanity their business in this. But if 
there are not other worlds, men are essentially losers, by 
neglecting the enjoyment of this. Hence Aristippus was 
truly wise, who agreed with Socrates in dismissing, as wholly 
unprofitable, all those speculations which have no connection 
with the business of life.” “This life being the first in 
certainty, we give it the first place in importance; and by 
giving human duties in relation to men the precedence, we 
secure that all interpretations of spiritual duty shall be in har- 
mony with human progress.” “Secularism is the philosophy 
of the things of time. A Secularist is one who gives primary 
attention to those subjects, the issues of which can be tested by 
the experience of this life. The Secularist principle requires 


1Grant AND Hotyoake, “ Discussion,” pp. 4, 221. 
2 Tbid., v., v1. 7 


aim? . MODERN ATHEISM. 


that precedence should be given to the duties of this life over 
those which pertain to another world.” ! 

Secularism, then, professes to be the positive or practical 
side of Atheism, and it claims to be better than Religion at 
least for this world, because it pays a preéminent, if not 
exclusive, regard to the duties of the present life. We cannot 
consider this “new development” of an old system, in con- 
nection with its recent change of name, and the reasons that are 
assigned for it, without seeing that the force of public opinion, 
whether well or ill founded, has compelled its advocates to alter 
their tactics at least in two respects: they are anxious to with- 
draw from offensive prominence the negative articles of their 
creed, and to put forward the positive elements of truth which 
may still survive after the ruin of Religion; and they evince a 
disposition, somewhat new, to conciliate the Christian com- 
munity, by admitting the sincerity of the clergy and the good’ 
intentions of believers generally, and inviting their codperation 
in plans of secular improvement. But Atheism still lurks 
under the disguise of Secularism; and men of earnest religion 
are not likely to be tempted to any close alliance or active co- 
operation with those who misrepresent the character of that 
God in whom they believe, and of that Saviour in whom they 
trust. There may be some nominal Christians, however, 
already as unconcerned about the future and devoted to the 
present life, as Mr. Holyoake himself could wish them to be, 
who will eagerly grasp at this “new development,” as a plausible 
pretext for continuing in their present course; for “with the 
exception of those who compose the real Church of Christ, 
whose faith is not a mere name and an unthinking assent to 
Christianity, but a real, living, constant power over their life, 
the whole world ts practically secularist, and is living solely by 


1HOLyoake, “Paley Refuted,” p. 43. Grant anp Horyroaxke, 
** Discussion,” pp. 7, 8. 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 413 


the light of the present, and under the impulse of the motives 
which it supplies.”* For “Secularism is only the Latin term 
for the old Saxon worldliness: Secularism has more elements 
of union than perhaps any other phase of infidelity ; it has 
the worldliness of mere nominal Christians, as well as of real 
infidels.”? They are really Secularists, but as yet they may 
not be at ease in their Secularism. There may be a secret 
monitor within, which reminds them occasionally of death, and 
judgment, and eternity ; and the rapid flight of time, or the in- 
cipient sense of disease, or the ever-recurring instances of mor- 
tality, may awaken them to transient thoughts of another life 
for which it were well to be better prepared. What they want 
is a theory, — of plausible aspect and easy application, — which 
might serve to quell these rising thoughts, and allay their fore- 
boding fears; and just such a theory they may seem to find in 
the proverbial maxim of Secularism, “ Work dn this life, Sor 
this life.” We are not sure, however, that even with such 
men the zeal of the new propaganda will be altogether success- 
ful. It may seem to some to be out of place, and may even 
excite a sense of the ludicrous. “Just fancy for a moment,” 
says the author already quoted, “some missionary of this prin- 
ciple going into the Royal Exchange at London, or the Stock 
Exchange at Leeds or Bradford, or the Cloth-halls of any of 
our manufacturing towns, summoning around him the mer- 
chants and the brokers, and then beginning with much earnest- 
ness and point to urge them mot to live for eternity, but to be 
very careful about the present life: insisting that it was very, 
very doubtful if earth were not all,—the present existence 
the whole of human existence; and that therefore until there 
was. more certainty they had better make the most of this; be 
industrious and prudent, and make themselves as comfortable 


1 “Modern Atheism, or the Pretensions of Secularism Examined,” p. 59. 
2 Logic of ‘‘ Logic of Death,” p. 4. 
35* 


414 MODERN ATHEISM. 


as possible; get as much money as they-could honestly, and by 
no means let any dread of retribution hereafter fetter them in 
any of their actions here. Why, these merchants would turn 
away laughing and saying, ‘ Hither the man is mocking us, or 
he is mad: that is just what we are doing with all our might.’ 
They would see at least that Mr. Holyoake’s teaching is very 
different from that of Him who said, ‘Take no thought for 
your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for 
your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, 
and the body than raiment? But seek ye first the kingdom of 
God and His righteousness ; and all these things shall be added 
unto you.’ ‘For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the 
whole world, and lose his soul? or what shall a man give in 
exchange for his soul?’ And marking that vast difference, 
they will feel, at least, that no man is entitled to address them 
as rational beings in the style of Secularism, unless he can give 
them an absolute assurance that there is and can be no future 
state of existence, — that the present is man’s only life, and that 
death is an eternal sleep.” 

But does Mr. Holyoake give, or pretend to give, any such 
assurance? “We do not say,” he tells us, “that every man 
ought to give an exclusive attention to this world, because that 
would be to commit the old sin of dogmatism, and exclude the 
possibility of another world, and of walking by a different light 
from that by which alone we are able to walk. But as our 
knowledge is confined to this life, and testimony, and conjec- 
ture, and probability are all that can be set forth with respect 
to another life, we think we are justified in giving precedence 
to the duties of this state, and of attaching primary importance 
to the morality of man to man.” It is not certain, then, that 
there is no future life; it is even possible that there may be 
one; the supposition is not in itself incredible, it may even 
have “ testimony, conjecture, and probability” in its favor :— 
some attention to it, therefore, cannot be forbidden without 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 415 


“committing the old sin of dogmatism, and excluding the pos- 
sibility of another world ;” but its comparative uncertainty is 
urged as a reason for “ giving precedence to the duties of this 
state, and attaching primary importance to the morality of man 
to man.” ‘The question would seem to be, not whether any 
attention should be bestowed on a future life, but whether it 
should be less or more than the attention which we bestow on 
the present world. It is a question of degree; and the settle- 
ment of that question iss made to hinge entirely on the com- 
parative uncertainty of our prospect after death. Suppose it 
were more uncertain, might not the magnitude of the interests 
that must be involved in a new and untried existence here- 
after, and which must be measured on the scale of eternity, be 
more than sufficient to counterbalance the difference? “ Let 
us be only fully convinced that our present life is (or may be) 
the beginning of an eternal duration, and how irresistibly are 
we urged to a mode of conduct answerable to that accession of 
importance which our present condition in the world derives 
from the peculiar point of view in which we then contemplate 
it!” But, in point of fact, can it be reasonably said that the 
future of our present life is in any respect more certain than 
our prospects after death: “ What is our life? is it not like a 
vapor, which appearetn for a little time, and then vanisheth 
away?” And yet, in spite of its proverbial uncertainty, is it 
not a fundamental principle of Secularism that “true life 
begins in renunciation,” and that “the future must rule the 
present?” Extend these maxims, which are of unquestionable 
authority with reference to the present life, to our prospects 
beyond the grave, whether they be regarded as certain, or 
probable, or possible only, and they will abundantly vindicate 
the position that our conduct now and here should be regulated 
to some extent by a regard to what may be before us. In 


1 Dr. HaMppEN, “Philosophical Evidence of Christianity,” p. 28. 


416 MODERN ATHEISM. 


both cases alike, present gratification must give place to future 
safety, and self-denial, according to the shrewd remark of 
Franklin, is neither more nor less in the case of a prudent 
man than se/f-owning, the recognition of his own dignity, and 
the preference of a greater and more permanent to a smaller 
and transitory good. It might still, therefore, be alike our 
interest and our duty to have some regard to a possible future 
in the scheme of our present life. And: aware of this Mr. 
Holyoake solaces himself, and attemfts to sustain the spirits 
of his friends with the assurance, “ Whatever is likely to secure 
your best interests here will procure for you the same here- 
after,” a strange inversion of the scriptural maxim, for it 
practically amounts to this, “Seek first the things of this 
world, and the kingdom of heaven shall be added unto you.” 
And he states the ground or reason of his confidence “in this 
respect: “If there be other worlds to be inhabited after this 
life, those persons will best be fitted for the enjoyment of them 
who have made the welfare of humanity their business in this” 
To make “ the welfare of humanity their business in this life,” 
is a duty which may be discharged by the Christian not less 
than the Secularist, and perhaps with all the greater zeal in 
proportion to his estimate of men as responsible and immortal 
beings, all passing on, like himself, to an interminable future. 
But if there be another state of being after death, will he be 
best prepared for it who lives “without God” in this world, 
without serious forethought in regard to his eternal prospects, 
without any deliberate preparation for his certain and solemn 
change? Or will it be a consolation to him then to reflect that 
he disbelieved or doubted now, and that he exerted his talents 
and spent his life on earth in undermining the faith of his 
fellow-men, and weakening their impressions of things unseen 
and eternal ? 

Mr. Holyoake seems to imagine that whether there be or be 
not a future state after death, Secularism is the “safest side,” 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 417 


and he puts the alternative thus: “If there are other worlds to 
be inhabited after this life, those persons will best be fitted for 
the enjoyment of them who have made the welfare of humanity 
their business in this. But if there are not other worlds, men 
are essentially losers by neglecting the enjoyment of this.” On 
either supposition, it would seem, the Secularist has the advan- 
tage of the Christian: on the one, because he and not the Chris- 
tian, “makes the welfare of humanity his business ;” on the 
other, because he, and not the Christian, has the true “ enjoy- 
ment ” of the present life. It might be difficult to prove either 
of these convenient assumptions, or to show that there is any- 
thing in Christianity to prevent, anything in Atheism to promote, 
the care of humanity on the one hand, or the enjoyment of life 
on the other. On the contrary, all experience testifies that 
Religion is the only sure spring of philanthropy, and that, on 
the whole, none have a sweeter enjoyment of the present life | 
than those who can look abroad on the works of Nature and 
say, “My Father made them all,” and who can look forward 
to death itself with “a hope full of immortality.” It is true, 
that the serious expectation of a future state must impose a 
certain restraint on the indulgence of our appetites and pas- 
sions; but is it such a restraint as is injurious even to our tem- 
poral welfare? is it not the dictate of enlightened prudence, 
were we to look no further than to the present life? Mr. 
Holyoake himself repudiates the language which the apostle 
puts into the mouth of the unbeliever, “ Let us eat and drink, 
for to-morrow we die,’”—language which is expressive of what 
would be the natural tendency of men, were they assured of 
non-existence hereafter, but which Mr. Holyoake rejects, with 
something like virtuous indignation, saying, “ That is the senti- 
ment of the sensualist: it is not the sentiment of a man who is 
at all conscious that right and wrong are inherent in human 
nature, that there are wide distinctions between virtue and 
vice. ‘This is not the sentiment of the man who comprehends 


418 MODERN ATHEISM, 


that if we do well, it will be well with us, that if we do harm, 
the evil influence will follow us; who sees distinctly that “ our 
acts, if good, our angels are,” and “if ill, our fatal shadows that 
walk by us still.”’ It is not the apostle’s sentiment nor the 
sentiment of any believer; it is, as Mr. Holyoake says, “the 
sentiment of the sensualist;” but it is represented as the 
natural offspring of unbelief in regard to a future state, just 
as sensualism is naturally generated and fostered by unbelief in 
regard to those moral principles which have respect to the 
present life; and if these principles may and should exert a 
controlling influence over our conduct, even to the extent of 
imposing restraint and self-denial with a view to our welfare in 
time, may they not be expected to be all the more powerful 
when we include also our welfare in eternity? and may it not 
thus become manifest that “godliness hath the promise of the 
life that now is, as well as of that which is to come?” It 
would be difficult to say in what respect believers “neglect the 
enjoyment of this life,” or are “essentially losers” by their 
religion. They will gratefully ascribe to it their highest and 
purest happiness; and rather than part with it they will cheer- 
fully submit to “the loss of all other things,” and even to 
persecution and martyrdom itself. But it is asked, “If Chris- 
tianity be false, is it nothing that you are troubled with a thou- 
sand anxieties and cares about what shall become of you after 
death? If Christianity be false, is it nothing that day after 
day you have the fear of death before your eyes? If Chris- 
tianity be false, it makes you slaves while you live, and cowards 
in death.” We might answer, If Christianity be ¢rwe, what 
then? but we prefer a different course: we say that the reality 
of a future state is in nowise dependent on the truth of Chris- 
tianity, however much we may be indebted to Christianity for 


1 HOLYOAKE AND Grant, “ Discussion,” p. 125. 
2 “Modern Atheism,” p. 14. 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 419 


our certain knowledge of it; that even on the principles of 
Atheism there is no security against the everlasting continuance 
of self-consciousness, any more than there is against the inev- 
itable stroke of death; that Christianity in either case assumes 
the fact, and addresses men as dying yet immortal creatures, 
while it reveals a way in which those “who through fear of 
death were all their lifetime subject to bondage” may be deliy- 
ered from that fear, and raised to “a hope full of immortality.” 
As death is not created or called into being by Christianity, so 
neither is the awful future which lies beyond it: the Secularist 
not less than the Christian has to do with it. Mr. Holyoake 
seems, at least occasionally, to be sensible of this solemn truth. 
“Tam as much concerned,” he says, “as this reverend gentle- 
man can be, as to what shall be the issue of my own condition 
in the future; I am as much concerned in the solution of this 
question as he is himself; and I believe that the view I enter- 
tain, or that any of us may entertain, conscientiously, will be 
our justification in that issue, if we should come to want justi- 
fication. When we pass through the inexorable gates of the 
future; when we pass through that vestibule where death 
stands opening his everlasting gates as widely to the pauper as 
to the king; when we pass out here into the dim mysteries of the 
future, to confront, it may be, the interrogations of the Eternal, 
—T apprehend every man’s responsibility will go with him, and 
no second-hand opinions will answer for us.”! Is there not 
something here that should arrest the attention and awaken the 
anxiety even of the Secularist himself? He sees before him 
the inevitable event of death, and beyond it “the dim mysteries 
of the future ;” he may be called to “confront the interrogations 
of the Eternal,” and then “every man’s responsibility will go 
with him.” Surely there is enough in the bare possibility of 
such a prospect to justify more than all the interest which has 


1 TOWNLEY AND HOLroakge, “ Discussion,” p. 18. 


420 MODERN ATHEISM. 


ever been expended upon it even by the most “anxious 
inquirer.” But, haunted by these solemn thoughts, Mr. Holy- 
oake takes refuge in the other alternative of his dilemma: “If 
there are other worlds, those will best be fitted for the enjoy- 
ment of them who have made the welfare of humanity their 
business in this.” Secular philanthropy is the best, and only 
needful, preparation. ‘With this any beliéf in regard to the 
future is unnecessary, without it no belief will be of any avail: 
for “the view which any of us may entertain, conscientiously, 
will be our justification in that issue, if we should come to want 
justification ;” “No second-hand opinions will answer for us. 
Nothing can justify us, nothing can give us confidence, but the 
conscientious nature of our own conclusions ; nothing can give 
us courage but ¢nnocence; nothing can serve our turn but 
having believed according to the best of our judgment, and 
having followed those principles which seem to us to be the 
truth.” He takes refuge,.then, first in his good works, and 
secondly in the sincerity of his convictions, as the sole 
grounds of his confidence in the prospect of “confronting the 
interrogations of the Eternal!” 

Is it wonderful,—such being his only hope in death,—that 
when cholera appeared in London, and multitudes were sud- 
denly removed by that appalling visitation, he should have felt 
it necessary to deliver a series of Lectures,— now reprinted 
as “The Logic of Death,” — “with a view to the assurance of 
his friends?” Might there not be some among them who 
would shrink from a future judgment on the ground of their 
“innocence ” or “ good works,” and many more who would feel 
that they were making an awful venture in leaving their eter- 
nity to depend on the mere sincerity of their convictions, in 
whatever way these convictions may have been formed, and 
whether they were true or false? And could they be reassured 
or comforted by any other article of the Secular Creed? They 
might be told, as Mr. Holyoake tells them, “I am not an 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. . 421 


unbeliever, if that implies the rejection of Christian truth, since 
all I reject is Christian error :” I reject “the fall of man, the 
atonement, the sin of unbelief, the doctrine of future punish- 
ment; a disbeliever in all these doctrines, why should I fear to 
die?” But the more thoughtful among them, all who were 
really in earnest, might desiderate something more; they 
might see that disbelief, however dogmatic, does not amount to 
disproof, and that the real ground of fear is not in the least 
removed by it. Does his question imply, that if these doc- 
trines were true, he would have just reason to fear death? or 
does it mean merely, that whether they be true or false, he can 
have no reason to fear death, simply because he disbelieves 
them? On the former supposition, how vast the difference 
between the Secularist and the Christian? The one would 
have reason to fear because these doctrines are or may be 
true ; the other believes them to be true, and finds in that very 
belief a deliverance from the fear of death, and a firm ground 
of confidence and hope! On the latter supposition, — which 
we believe to be the correct one, — what an amazing confidence 
- must that man possess in the stncerity of his convictions, the 
conscientiousness of his judgment, and the rigid impartiality of 
his inquiries after truth, who can peril his eternal prospects on 
the mere fact that he disbelieves these doctrines, whether they 
be true or false! Suppose that disbelief may diminish the 
intensity of his fears, can it alter the real state of the case, or 
remove the only just ground of apprehension and anxiety in 
regard to the future? The truth of these doctrines is not 
dependent either on our belief or disbelief; and in the way of 
natural consequence, even were there no additional penal inflic- 
tion, they may vindicate themselves hereafter in the case of 
those who neglect or disbelieve them here, by leaving them 
destitute of all the advantages which flow only from the cordial 
reception of the truth. Thus much at least would be in entire 
accordance with the analogy of our experience with reference 
36 


422 MODERN ATHEISM. 


to the interests of the present life; for we do suffer, even now 
and here, in consequence of our ignorance, or neglect, or prac- 
tical disbelief of truth,—and it may be so hereafter, in the way 
simply of inevitable natural consequence, but much more in 
the way of righteous penal retribution, if there be any truth in 
that philosophy of unbelief, so true to nature and so solemnly 
proclaimed, “This is the condemnation, that light is come into 
the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because 
their deeds were evil; for every one that doeth evil hateth the 
light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be 
reproved.”} 


We have endeavored to estimate the claims of Secularism, 
and to examine the foundations on which it rests. In doing so, 
we have not denied either the right or the duty of any man to 
inquire and to decide for himself on his own solemn responsi- 
bility. We admit as fully as Mr. Holyoake himself, that per- 
sonal responsibility implies the right, or rather the duty, of 
inquiry. He has our entire sympathy when he says, “It is my 
business to take care, if I walk from time to eternity, that I walk 
by that light which satisfies my own dnderstanding. If it were 
true that any of you would take my place, if we should eventu- 
ally find ourselves at the bar of God, and I should find myself 
to be made answerable for the opinions which I entertain, or 
for beliefs which I had in time, if any of you, or all of you, 
would take my place, and answer for me, then I might be con- 
tent to take your opinions, then I might stand on the side of the 
world: but what does it matter to me what Newton believed, 
what Locke believed, or what the world believes, unless the world 
will answer for me if I believe as the world believes?” But 
while the right of inquiry is frankly admitted, it can scarcely 
be denied that the mind may be biased by prejudice and 


1 John 3: 20, 21. 


THEORY OF SECULARISM. 425 


involved in error; and the ultimate question is, not, what are 
your opinions ? but, what are the grounds on which they rest? 
—not, what is your belief? but, what is the truth? Mr. 
Holyoake is the Coryphzeus of his party. As a popular writer 
and speaker, his talents and zeal, devoted to a better cause, 
might have fitted him for extensive usefulness, and rendered 
him a benefactor to his country. As it is, no man in England 
rests under a heavier load of responsibility. He has placed 
himself at the head of the propaganda of popular infidelity. 
Is it yet too late for him to reconsider his opinions, and retrace 
his steps? For his own sake, for the sake of those who are 
near and dear to him, for the sake of the multitudes who must 
be influenced, for good or evil, by his speeches and writings, let 
him lay to heart the solemn words of Sir Humphrey Davy ;— 
“TI envy no quality of mind or intellect in others, — not genius, 
power, wit, or fancy: but if I could choose what would be 
most delightful, and I believe most useful to me, I should pre- 
fer a firm religious belief to every other blessing; for it makes 
life a discipline of goodness, creates new hopes when all earthly 
hopes vanish, and throws over the decay, the destruction of 
existence, the most gorgeous of all lights, calling up the most 
delightful visions, where the sensualist and skeptic view only 
gloom, decay, and annihilation.” - 


* Attempt how vain, — 
With things of earthly sort, with aught but God, 
With aught but moral excellence, truth, and love 
To satisfy and fill the immortal soul! 
To satisfy the ocean with a drop; — 
To marry immortality to death; 
And with the unsubstantial Shade of Time 
To fill the embrace of all Eternity.” 


: THE END. 


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, THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS. 


New Edition. With a SUPPLEMENTARY DIALOGUE, in which the author’s review- 
ers are reviewed. 12mo, cloth, $1.00. 


This masterly production, which has excited so much interest in this country and in Europe, will 
now have increased attraction in the SUPPLEMENT, in which the authoyr’s reviewers are triumphantly 
reviewed. 


COMPARATIVE ANATOMY OF THE ANIMAL KINGDOM. 


By Prof. C. Tu. Von Sieso_p and H. Stannivus. Translated, with Notes, Ad- 
ditions, &c., By WaLbo J. Burnett, M. D. One vol., octavo, cloth, $3.00. 


This is unquestionably the best and most complete work of its class ever yet published. 


WORKS BY HUGH MILLER. 


TIE FOOTPRINTS or THE CREATOR;|THE OLD RED SANDSTONE; or, New 
or, The Asterolepis of Stromness. With} Walks in an Old Field. Illustrated with 
Illustrations. Memoir ofthe Author by| Plates and Geological Sections. 12mo, 
Louis AGassiz. 12mo, cloth, $1.00. cloth, $1.00. 


MY SCHOOLS and SCHOOLMASTERS;|FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF ENGLAND 
Gn The irr of my Prhention.:” With “oe She ERCELE. Nites se8 
an elegant Likeness. 12mo, cloth, $1.25.| 8Taving of the Author. 12mo, cl., $1.00. 

A thrillingly interesting, and very instructive 
This is a personal narrative of a deeply interest-|book of travels ; presenting the most perfectly life- 
ing and instructive character, concerning one of |like views of England and its people, to be found 
the most remarkable men of the age. in the language. 
Dr. BucKeLanp said, ‘He would give his left hand to possess such powers of description as this 
man.” 


THE NATURAL HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SPECIES. 


Its Typical Forms and Primeval Distribution. By CHARLES HAMILTON SMITH, 
With an Introduction, containing an Abstract of the Views of Blumenbach, 
Prichard, Bachman, Agassiz, and other writers of repute. By SAMUEL KNEE- 
LAND, Jr.,.M.D. With elegant Illustrations. 12mo, cloth, $1.25. 


It is a book of learning, and full of interest, and may be regarded as among the comparatively few 
real contributions to science. — {Christian Witness. w 


VALUABLE WORKS PUBLISHED BY GOULD & LINCOLN, BOSTON. 


CYCLOPEDIA OF ANECDOTES OF LITERATURE AND THE FINE ARIS, 


A choice selection of Anecdotes of the various forms of Literature, of the Arts, of 
Architecture, Engravings, Music, Poetry Painting and Sculpture, and of the most 
celebrated Literary Characters and Artists of different Countries and Ages, &c¢. 
By Kazuirr ARvinE, A.M. With numerous Illustrations. 725 pages, octavo, 
cloth, $3.00. 


This is unquestionably the choicest collection of ANECDOTES ever published. It contains rHRExE 
THOUSAND AND FORTY ANECDOTES, and more than ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY ILLUSTRATIONS. 
It is admirably adapted to literary and scientific men, to artists, mechanics, and others, as a Dic- 
TIONARY FOR REFERENCE, in relation to facts on the numberless subjects and characters intro- 
duced. 


~ 


KINTO'S POPULAR CYCLOPEDIA OF BIBLICAL LITERATURE. 


Condensed from the larger work, by the author, Joun Kirro, D. D. Assisted by 
JAMES TAYLOR, D. D. With over 500 Illustrations. Octavo, 812 pp., cloth, $3.00. 


This work answers the purpose of a commentary, while at the same time it furnishes a complete 
DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE, embodying the products of the best and most recent researches 
in biblical literature, in which the scholars of Europe and America have been engaged. Itis not 
only intended for ministers and theological students, but is also particularly adapted to parents, 
Sabbath-scheol teachers, and the great body of the religious public. 


HISTORY OF PALESTINE. 


With the Geography and Natural History of the Country, the Customs and Institu- 
tions of the Hebrews, etc. By Joun Kirro, D. D. ith upwards of 200 Illus- 
trations. 12mo, cloth, $1.25. 


Beyond all dispute this is the best historical compendium of the Holy Land, from the days of 
Abraham to those of the late Pasha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali. — (Edinburgh Review. 


0g@™ In the numerous notices and reviews, the work has been strongly recommended, as not only 
admirably adapted to the raMILY, but also as a text-book for SABBATH and WEEK DAY SCHOOLS. 


CHAMBERS’S CYCLOPADIA OF ENGLISH LITERATURE, 


Two large imperial octavo volumes of 1400 pages; with upwards of 300 elegant Illus- 
trations. By Roperrt CHAMBERS. Embossed cloth, $5.00. 


This work embraces about ONE THOUSAND AUTHORS, chronologically arranged and classed 
as Poets, Historians, Dramatists, Philosophers, Metaphysicians, Divines, etc., with choice selections 
from their writings, connected by a Biographical, Historical, and Critical Narrative; thus presenting 
acomplete view of English literature from the earliest to the present time. Let the reader open 
where he will, he cannot fail to find matter for profit and delight. The selections are gems — 
infinite riches in a little room ; in the language of another, “A wHoLe ENGLISH LIBRARY FUSED 
DOWN INTO ONE CHEAP BOOK!” 


CHAMBERS’S MISCELLANY OF USEFUL AND ENTERTAINING KNOWLEDGE. 


By WILLIAM CHAMBERS. With Illustrations. Ten vols,, 16mo, cloth, $7.00. 


CHAMBERS’S HOME BOOK AND POCKET MISCELLANY. 


A choice Selection of Interesting and Instructive Reading for the Old and the Young. 
Six vols. 16mo, cloth, $3.00. 


This work is fully equal, if not superior, to either of the Chambers’s other works in interest, 
eontaining a vast fund of valuable information, furnishing ample variety for every class of readers. 


CHAMBERS’S REPOSITORY OF INSTRUCTIVE AND AMUSING PAPERS. 


With Illustrations. 16mo, cloth, bound. 4 vols. in two, $1.75; and 4 vols. in one, $1.50. 
(3) 


¢ 


VALUABLE WORKS 


PUBLISHED BY 
wOULD AND LINCOLN, 


59 WASHINGTON STREET, BOSTON. 


THE CHRISTIAN’S DAILY TREASURY. 


A Religious Exercise for Every Day in the Year. By E. TemMPLE. A new and im- 
proved edition. 12mo, cloth, $1.00. . 


A work for every Christian. Itis indeed a “ Treasury ” of good things. 


THE SCHOOL OF CHRIST; 


Or, Christianity Viewed in its Leading Aspects. By the Rev. A. L. R. Foors, 
author of ‘‘ Incidents in the Life of our Saviour,” etc. 16mo, cloth, 50 cents. 


THE CHRISTIAN LIFE, 
Social and Individual. By Prerer Bayne, M.A. 12mo, cloth, $1.25. 


The demand for this extraordinary work, commencing before its publication, is still eager and con- 
stant. There is but one voice respecting it; men of all denominations agree in pronouncing it one of 
the most admirable works of the age. : 


GOD REVEALED IN THE PROCESS OF CREATION, 


And by the Manifestation of Jesus Christ. Including an Examination of the Develop- 
ment Theory contained in the ‘‘ Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation.” By 
JAMES B. WALKER, author of “Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation.” 12mo, 
cloth, $1.00. 


PHILOSOPHY OF THE PLAN OF SALVATION. 


By an AMERICAN CiT1zEN. An Introductory Essay, by CALvin E. Stowe, D. D.* 
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This book is generally admitted to be one of the best in the English language. The work has been 
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A WREATH AROUND THE CROSS; 


Or, Scripture Truths Illustrated. By A. Morton Brown, D.D. Recommen- 
datory Preface, by JoHN ANGELL JAMES. Beautiful Frontispiece. 16mo, cloth, 60 
cents. 


THE BETTER LAND; 


Or, The Believer’s Journey and Future Home. By Rev. A.C. THompson. 12mo, 
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A most charming and instructive book for all now journeying to the “ Better Land,” and 
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THE MISSION OF THE COMFORTER. 


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for the American edition. 12mo, cloth, $1.25. 


DR. WAYLAND’S UNIVERSITY SERMON 
Delivered in the Chapel of Brown University. 12mo, cloth, $1.00. 


THE RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD, 


And their Relations to Christianity. By FrepERicK DENISON MAURICE, A. M, 
Professor of Divinity, King’s College, London. 16mo, cloth, 60 cts. 
(5) 


VALUABLE WORKS PUBLISHED BY GOULD & LINCOLN, BOSTON. 


SACRED RHETORIC ; 


Or, Composition and Delivery of Sermons. By Henry J. RIPLEY, Professor in 
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poraneous Preaching. 12mo, 75 cts. 


THE PREACHER AND THE KING; 


Or, Bourdaloue in the Court of Louis XIV. An Account of that distinguished Era, 
Translated from the French of L. F. BunGENER. With an Introduction by the 
Rey. GEorGE Porrs, D.D. New edition, with a fine Likeness, and a Sketch of 
the Author’s Life. 12mo, cloth, $1.25. 


It combines substantial history with the highest charm of romance. Its attractions are SO various 
that it can hardly fail to find readers of almost every description. — [Puritan Recorder, 


THE PRIEST AND THE HUGUENOT; 


Or, Persecution in the Age of Louis XV. Translated from the French of L. F. Bun- 
GENER. 2 vols., 12mo, cloth, $2.25. 


“eg This is truly a masterly production, full of interest, and may be set down as one of the greatest 
Protestant works of the age. 


FOOTSTEPS OF OUR FOREFATHERS. 
What they Suffered and what they Sought. Describing Localities and portraying 


Personages and Events conspicuous in the Struggles for Religious Liberty. By 
JamEs G. M1aLL. Thirty-six fine Illustrations. I2mo, $1.00. 


An exceedingly entertaining work. The reader soon becomes so deeply entertained that he finds 
it difficult to lay aside the book till finished. —[Ch. Parlor Mag. 


A work absorbingly interesting, and very instructive. — [Western Lit. Magazine. 


MEMORIALS OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY. 


Presenting, in a graphic, compact, and popular form, Memorable Events of Early 
Ecclesiastical History, etc. By JAMES G. MIALL. With numerous elegant Ilus- 
trations. 12mo, cloth, $1.00. 


ugQ~ This, like the ‘“ Footsteps of our Forefathers,” will be found a work of uncommon interest. 


WORKS BY JOHN HARRIS, D.D. 


THE PRE-ADAMITE EARTH. Con-/THE GREAT TEACHER; or, Charac- 
' tributions to Theological Science. 12mo,|_ teristics of our Lord’s Ministry. With 
cloth, $1.00. an Introductory Essay. H. Hum- 


By 
Again PHREY, D. D. 12mo, cloth, 85 cts. 
MAN PRIMEVAL; or, the Constitution 
and Primitive Condition of the Human THE GREAT COMMISSION ; or, the 
Being. With a fine Portrait of the Au-| Christian Church constituted and charg: 
thor. 12mo, cloth, $1.25. ed to convey the Gospel to the World. 


Introductory Essay by W. R. Wi1- 
PATRIARCHY; or, THE FAMILY. Its) trams, D.D. l2mo, cloth, $1.00. 


Constitution and Probation; being the 
third volume of ‘‘ Contributions to The-/ ZEBULON; Or, the Moral Claims of Sea- 
logical Science.” $1.25. men. 18mo, cloth, 26 cts. 


PHILIP DODDRIDGE. 


His Life and Labors. By Jonn Stovenron, D.D., with beautiful Wluminated 
Title-page and Frontispiece. 16mo, cloth, 60 cents. 


THE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY, 


As exhibited in the writings of its apologists, down to Augustine. By W.J. Botton, 
of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. 12mo, cloth, 80 cents. 
(6) 


‘ 


IMPORTANT WORKS. 


ANALYTICAL CONCORDANCE OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES ; 


or, The Bible presented under Distinct and Classified Heads or Tepics. By Jonn 
Eaviz, D.D., LL. D., Author of ‘ Biblical Cyclopedia,” ‘‘ Dictionary of the 
Bible,” &c., &c. One volume, royal octavo, 885 pp. Cloth, $3.00; sheep, $3.50. 
Just published. 


The publishers would call the special attention of clergymen and others to some of the peculiar 
features of this great work. : 

1. It isa concordance of sulyects, not of words. In this it differs from the common concordance, 
which, of course, it does not supersede. Both are necessary to the Biblical student. 

2. It embraces all the topics, both secular and religious, which are naturally suggested by the entire 
contents of the Bible. In this it differs from Scripture Manuals and Topical Text-books, which are 
confined to religious or doctrinal topics. 

8. It contains the whole of the Bible without abridgment, differing in no respect from the Bible in 
common use, except in the classification of its contents. 

4. It contains a synopsis, separate from the concordance, presenting within the compass of a few 
pages a bird’s-eye view of the whole contents. 

5. It cortains a table of contents, embracing nearly two thousand heads, arranged in alphabetical 
order. 

6. It is much superior to the only other work in the language prepared on the same general plan, 
and is offered to the publle at much less cost. 

The purchaser gets not only a Concordance, but also a Bitle,in this volume. The superior con- 
venience arising out of this fact, — saving, as it does, the necessity of having two books at hand and 
of making two references, instead of one, — will be readily apparent. 

The general subjects (under each of which there are a vast number of sub-divisions) are arranged 
as follows, viz.: 


Agriculture, Genealogy, Ministers of Religion, Sacrifice, 

Animals, God, Miracles, Scriptures, 
Architecture, Ifeaven, Occupations, Speech, 

Army, Arms, Idolatry, Idols, Ordinances, Spirits, 

Body, Jesus Christ, Parables and Emblems, Tabernacle and Temple, 
Canaan, Jews, Persecution, Vineyard and Orchard, 
Covenant, Laws, Praise and Prayer, Visions and Dreams, 
Diet and Dress, Magistrates, Prophecy, War, 

Disease and Death, Man, Providence, Water. 

Earth, Marriage, ~ Redemption, 

Family, Metals and Minerals, Sabbaths and Iloly Days, 


That such a work as this is of exceeding great convenience is matter of obvious remark. But it 
is much more than that ; it is also an instructive work. It is adapted not only to assist the student 
in prosecuting the investigation of preconceived ideas, but also.to impart ideas which the most care- 
ful reading of the Bible in its ordinary arrangement might not suggest. Let him take up any one of 
the subjects — “‘ Agriculture,” for example —and see if such be not thecase. This feature places 
the work in a higher grade than that of the common Concordance. It shows it to be, so to speak, a 
work of more mind. 

No Biblical student would willingly dispense with this Concordance when once possessed. It is 
adapted to the necessities of all classes, -- clergymen and theological students; Sabbath-school 
superintendents and teachers; authors engaged in the composition of religious and even secular 
works; and, in fine, common readers of the Bible, intent only on their own improvement. 


A COMMENTARY ON THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF THE ACTS 
OF THE APOSTLES. By Horatio B. Hackett. D. D., Professor of Biblical Liter- 
ature and Interpretation, in the Newton Theological Institution. [77 A new, 
revised, and enlarged edition. In Press. 
wag This most important and very popular work, has been throughly revised (some parts being 

entirely rewritten), and considerably enlarged by the introduction of important new matter, the 

result of the Author's continued, laborious investigations since the publication of the first edition, 
aided by the more recent published criticisms on this portion of the Divine Word, by other distin- 
guished Biblical Scholars, in this country andin Europe. cy) 


IMPORTANT NEW WORKS. 


THE TESTIMONY OF THE ROCKS: or, Geology in its Bearings on 


the two Theologies, Natural and Revealed. By HucuH MiLLEeR. “ Thou shalt be 
in league with the stones of the field.” — Job. With numerous elegant illustrations, 
12mo, cloth, $1.25. 


The completion of this important work employed the last hours of the lamented author, and may 
be considered his greatest and in fact his life work. 


MACAULAY ON SCOTLAND. A Critique By Hucu Miter, 
Author of “ Footprints of the Creator,” &c. 16mo, flexible cloth, 25c. 


Every one who has read Macaulay’s last volumes will remember in what an unfavorable light he 
has presented the Scottish character. In this critique Hugh Miller enters the lists in defence of 


his native country. He shows that the distinguished historian has sacrificed truth for the sake of 


making « brilliant picture, and also gratifying his prejudices. The charm of Tlugh Miller’s style, 
rivalling that of Macaulay himself, and his manifest superiority in knowledge of historic facts, will 
secure for this essay a wide perusal, | It certainly presents Macaulay in a new light as a historian. 


When we read Macaulay’s last volumes, we said that they wanted nothing but the fiction to make 
an epic poem ; and now it seems to be proved that they are not wanting even in that. Wis abuse of 
the Scotch Presbyterians is shown up according to his deserts, in the little work before us. The 
truth is, that, through his religious prejudices, Macaulay is incapable of understanding either the 
Presbyterians or the Puritans, or any other who have a spiritual religion. — PURITAN RECORDER. 


This is a searching Critique upon the most distinguished living historian of Great Britain. The 
name of Hugh Miller will create a demand for it among those who are acquainted with his writings. 
— PHILA. CHRISTIAN OBSERVER. 


The historian is handled with amasterly hand in its pages. — DoLLAR NEWSPAPER. 


It is very sad to know that such an intellect as beams through these brilliant pages has been 
quenched — for this world — in the waters of death. This critique is sparkling and severe, but just. 
— CONGREGATIONALIST. 


He meets the historian at the fountain head, tracks him through the old pamphlets and newspapers 
on which he relied, and demonstrates that his own authorities are against him. In the course of the 
discussion, some new facts in Macaulay’s personal history are disclosed, tending to set his assault on 
the Highlanders in avery unamiable light. The weight of his character and the well known attrac- 
tions of his style will secure for this tract a wide and attentive perusal.— Boston TRANSCRIPT. 


ESSAYS IN BIOGRAPHY AND CRITICISM. By Prrer Baynz, 
M.A., Author of “The Christian Life, Social and Individual.” Arranged in 
TWO SERIES, OR PARTS. 12mo, cloth, each, $1.00. 


This work is prepared by the author exclusively for his American publishers. It includes eigh- 
teen articles, viz.: § 

First SERIES :-- Thomas De Quincy. — Tennyson and his Teachers. — Mrs. Barrett Browning. 
— Recent Aspects of British Art. —- John Ruskin. — Hugh Miller. — The Modern Novel ; Dickens, &c. 
~— Ellis, Acton, and Currer Bell. — Charles Kingsley. 

Seconp Series: —S. T. Coleridge. — T. B. Macaulay. — Alison. — Wellington. — Napoleon. ~ 
Plato. — Characteristics of Christian Civilization. — Education in the Nineteenth Century. — The 
Pulpit and the Press. 


LIFE AND CHARACTER OF JAMES MONTGOMERY. Abridged 


from the recent London, seven volume edition. By Mrs. H. C. Knreut, Author 
of ** Lady Huntington and her Friends,” &c. With a fine likeness and an elegant 
illustrated title page on steel. 12mo, cloth, $1.25. 


This is an original biography prepared from the abundant, but ill-digested materials con- 
tained in the seven octavo volumes of the London edition. The great bulk of that work, together 
with the heavy style of its literary execution, must necessarily prevent its republication in this 
country. At the same time, the Christian public in America will expect some memoir of a poet 
whose hymns and sacred melodies have been the delight of every household. This work, it is confi- 
dently hoped, will fully satisfy the public desire. It is prepared by one who has already won distin- 
guished laurels in this department of literature. (x) 


IMPORTANT NEW WORKS. 


YAHVEH CHRIST, or the Memorial Name. By AnexanpErR Mao- 
Wuorter, Yale University. With an Introductory Letter, by Nathaniel W. 
Taylor, D. D., Dwight Professor of Didactic Theology, Yale Theological Seminary. 
16mo, cloth, 62c. ~ 


The object of this work is to show that a most important error has hitherto been entertained 
respecting the Hebrew word given as Jehovah," in the Old Testament. The author shows, by a 
historic-philological argument, that it was not ‘‘ Jehovah,” but Yauveun,— that it does not mean 
“JY Am” (self-existence), bnt “\He wio WiLL Br, or Come” (The Deliverer); in short, that 
the “ Jehovah” of the Old Testament, and the '* Christ’ of the New, denote one and the same being. 


ExrractT From Dr. TayYvor’s InTRopuctToRY LETTER.— The argument is altogether new™ 
and original; and if valid, proves what many of the ablest theologians have believed, without resting 
their belief upon-grounds so thoroughly exegetical, It raises a question to be met wherever the Bible 
is read, — 2 question in respect to a fact which it would seem, if not admitted, must at least be con- 
troverted. Ifthe view here taken is erroneous, it is too plausible to be passed over with indifference 
by the friends of truth; if true, it is of unmeasured importance to the Church and to the world. 


The book is an intensely interesting one ; rich in suggestions with regard to the scheme of Provi- 
dence and Grace as developed under both Dispensations, and presenting in its main topie a subject 
that is deserving of thorough investigation. We think it cannot fail to be widely circulated, and to 
attract in no small degree the attention of scholars, —-CHICAGO CHRISTIAN TIMES. 


This little volume is destined at least to awaken thought and attention, if not to accomplish all that 
the author expects of it. The argument to a cursory glance shows great. probability, and is worth 
a serious attention. I his position could be demonstrated it would be one of vast importance to 
theology, and would give in some sense a new face to the Old Testament. Though the work relates 
to a Hebrew word, it is written in a form to be understood by all readers, and it deserves, what we 
have no doubt it will receive, a careful examination. —PuRITAN RECORDER. 


It is refreshing in these days of many books, to fall in with an original work, laying open a new vein 
of thought, and leading the student to a novel train of investigations. Mr. MacWhorteris entitled 
to this rare distinction, for his conclusions will be entirely new to the large body of American 
scholars. We can commend the volume cordially to all readers who enjoy an investigation, marked 
by great thoroughness, ripe scholarship, and eminent candor, and written, too, in an animated and 
flowing style. We anticipate that the work must create a profound sensation in the theological world, 
for its conclusions are tenable ; it puts at rest forever all doubts of the Divinity of Christ. — WaTCcH- 
MAN AND REFLECTOR. 


HEAVEN. By James Wittism Kiwzatyt. With elegant illustrated title- 
page. 12mo, cloth, $1.00. 


From Pror. HUNTINGTON, EDITOR OF THE RELIGIOUS MAGAZINE.—He has avoided the 
perilous and tempting extremes of rash or fanciful painting on the one side, or of a too exact and 
literal description on the other. . . . One is surprised at the mental discipline, the variety of 
information, and the measure of literary skill evinced in the body of the work. 

The book is full of beautiful ideas, consoling hopes, and brilliant representations of human destiny, 
all presented in a chaste, pleasing, and very readable style. —N. Y. CHRONICLE. 

There is an air of freshness and originality about it, that will render it interesting even to some 
whose spirits have not caught the upward tendency. — PURITAN RECORDER, 

This is a delightful volume, written by an active business man of this city, upon a subject which 
must always possess peculiar interest to the Christian. — N. E. FARMER. 

It is suggestive of elevated thoughts respecting that lofty state and place which is called heaven, 
and to the attainment of which our best energies should be directed. — PRESBYTERIAN. 

We welcome this contribution to our religious literature, from the open pen of a Christian mer- 
chant. Free from pedantry and the conventionalities of logic and of style, it comes to us with a 
freshness of thought and a fervor ot feeling that are often wanting in the scholar’s page. The author 
draws illustrations, som times, from scenes with which the professional teacher is little conversant. 
— N. Y. INDEPENDENT, 

The author is certainly an independent thinker, as well as a vigorous writer, and has written a 
book that will please the thoughtful, and will astonish pious people, who seldom, and always timidly, 
think. Freed from the technicalities of theological science, his style is all the more pleasing. In 
short, everything about the work is fresh and racy. The author’s views of the society, joy, and 
occupations ot Heaven are somewhat peculiar, but none the less philosophical and acceptable. We 
admire him intensely, and bid him God speed. -WxEsTERN Lit. MESSENGER. (Cw) 


MODERN ATHEISM. 


MODERN ATHEISM, under its Forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secu. 


larism, Development, and Natural Laws. By Jamus Bucuanan, D.D , LL.D, 
12mo, cloth, $1.25. 


The Author of this work is the successor of Dr. Chalmers in the Chair of Divinity in the New 
College, Edinburgh, and the intellectual leader of the Scottish Free Church. 

From Huan MILier, AuTuoR or “ OL_p Rep SANDSTONE,” &c., &c. — The work before us is 
one of at once the most readable and solid which we have ever perused. 

From Tue “ News oF rue CuurcueEs.” — It is a work of which nothing less can be said, than 
that, both in spirit and substance, style and argument, it fixes irreversibly the name of the author 
as a leading classic in the Christian literature of Britain. 

From Wowarpv Maccom, D.D., Presipent or Lewispura@ University.—No work has 
come into my hands, for a long time, so helpful to me as a teacher of metaphysics and morals, 
I know of nothing which will answer fora substitute. The public specially needs such a book at 
this time, when the covert atheism of Fichte, Wolfe, Hegel, Kant, Schelling, D’Holbach, Comte, 
Crousse, Atkinson, Martineau, Leroux, Mackay, Holyoake, and others, is being spread abroad with 
all earnestness, supported, at least in some places, both by church influence and university honors. 
Icannot but hope that a work so timely, scholarly, and complete, will do much good. 

It is one of the most solid and remarkable books in its department of literature; one of the most 
scholarly and profound productions of modern Christian literature. — WORCESTER TRANSCRIPT. 

Dr. Buchanan has earned a high and well-deserved reputation asa classical writer and close logi- 
cal reasoner. He deals heavy, deadly blows on atheism in all its various forms 3; and wherever the 
work is read it cannot fail to do good. — CuRISTIAN SECRETARY. 

It is a work which places its author at once in the highest rank of modern religious authors. His 
analyses of the doctrines held by the various schools of modern atheism are admirable, and his 
criticism original and profound ; while his arguments in defence of the Christian faith are powerful 
and convincing. Itis an attractive as well asa solid book ; and he who peruses a few of its pages is, 
ag it were, irresistibly drawn on to a thorough reading of the book.— Boston PORTFOLIO. 

The style is very felicitous, and the reasoning clear and cogent. The opposing theories are fairly 
stated and combated with remarkable ease and skill. Even when the argument fells within the 
range of science, it is so happily stated that no intelligent reader can fail to understand it. Such a 
profound, dispassionate work is particularly called for at the present time.— Bos1on JouRNAL. 

It is justly described as ‘‘a great argument,” “ magnificent in its strength, order, and beauty,” in 
defence of truth, and against the variant theories of atheism. It reviews the doctrines of the dif- 
ferent schools of modern Atheism, gives a fair statement of their theories, answers and refutes them, 
never evading, but meeting and crushing their arguments. — PuILa. CHRISTIAN OBSERVER. 

Dr. Buchanan is candid and impartial, too, as so strong a man can afford to be, evades no argument, 
undertakes no opposing view, but meets his antagonists with the quict and unswerving confidence 
of a locomotive on iron tracks, pretty sure to crush them. — CuriIsTIAN REGISTER. 

We hail this production of a master mind asa lucid, vigorous, discriminating, and satisfactory 
refutation of the various false philosophies which have appeared in modern times to allure ingenu- 
ous youth to their destruction. Dr. Buchanan has studied them thoroughly, weighed them dispas- 
sionately, and exposed their falsity and emptiness. Wis refutation is a clear stream of light from 
beginning toend. — PHILA. PRESBYTERIAN. 

We recommend ‘Modern Atheism” as a book for the times, and as having special claims on 

‘theological students. — UNIVERSALIST QUARTERLY. 

It is remarkable for the clearness with which it apprehends and the fairness with which it states, 
not less than for the ability with which it replies to, the schemes of unbelief in its various modern 
forms. It will be found easy to read—though not light reading — and very quickening to thought, 
while it clears away, one by one, the mists which the Devil has conjured around the great doctrines 
of our Faith, by the help of some of his ingenious modern coadjutors, and leaves the truth of God 
standing in its serene and pristine majesty, as if the breath of hatred never had been breathed forth 
against it. — CONGREGATIONALIST. 

Dr. Buchanan has here gone into the enemy's camp, and defeated him’ on his own ground, 
The work is a masteriy defence of faith against dogmatic unbelief on the one hand, and that uni- 
versal skepticism on the other, which neither affirms nor denies, on the ground of an assumed 
deficiency of evidence as to the reality of God and religion. —N. Y. CuRISTIAN CHRONICLE. 


It is a clearly and vigorously written book. Itis particularly valuable for its clear statement and 
masterly refutation of the Pantheism of Spinoza and his School. — CurisTIAN HERALD. cw) 


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